State May Oppose NRS 1.235 Disqualification Motions When Served; Disqualification Requires “Deep-Seated” Bias (Canarelli/Liteky) or Objective Doubt Under NCJC 2.11(A)

Precedents Cited

• Clay v. EKighth Jud. Dist. Ct. — Cited for the proposition that writ relief is extraordinary and the Supreme Court has discretion whether to consider a petition. This frames the threshold posture: even if review is available, it is not automatic.
• State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong) and NRS 34.160 — Provide the classic mandamus standard: mandamus may compel a legally required act or control “a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” The court repeatedly returned to this standard when evaluating whether Chief Judge Wiese’s decision crossed the “manifest abuse” line.
• Pan v. Highth Jud. Dist. Ct. — Used to emphasize that the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating extraordinary relief is warranted, placing the evidentiary and legal burden squarely on D.C.
• Towbin Dodge, LLC vu. Highth Jud. Dist. Ct. — Recognizes mandamus as the “appropriate vehicle” to seek judicial disqualification. This supported the court’s decision to reach the merits (and its note that the standing question was “important and novel”).
• Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc. — Standing is reviewed de novo. This allowed the court to independently interpret NRS 1.235’s silence and reconcile it with other procedural rules.
• NAMIC v. State, Div. of Ins. and Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno — Define statutory standing principles and the method of statutory interpretation (start with the text; if silent/ambiguous, use construction tools and harmonize with related rules). These cases underpinned the court’s move from NRS 1.235’s text to the broader procedural framework.
• Allstate Ins. Co. v. Facketi — Justifies looking beyond plain text when a statute is “ambiguous or silent on the issue in question,” which NRS 1.235 was regarding nonmoving-party oppositions.
• State v. Javier C. and Arizona State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Dep't of Health, Ed. & Welfare — Address expressio unius est exclusio alterius and caution that the canon applies only when the resulting inference is “logical and sensible.” The court used this to reject D.C.’s argument that because NRS 1.235 mentions a judge’s answer, it necessarily excludes any opposition by other parties.
• Lyft, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., Watson Rounds P.C. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., and Nev. Power Co. v. Haggerty — Establish the judiciary’s authority over procedure and the interpretive preference to harmonize statutes and rules. These authorities supported reading NRS 1.235 alongside local motion practice rules rather than as an exclusive procedural code.
• Margold v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. — Confirms that court rules have the effect of statutes when not inconsistent with constitutional or certain state laws, reinforcing EDCR 2.20(e)’s force in regulating motion practice.
• Miller v. Burk — The court declined to reach unnecessary issues (D.C.’s constitutional standing/real-party-in-interest arguments) after resolving standing on statutory/procedural grounds.
• Ham v. Highth Jud. Dist. Ct. — States judges have a duty to sit absent a compelling reason to the contrary, setting a baseline against disqualification.
• Rippo v. State and Sonner v. State — Reaffirm the presumption of judicial impartiality and that substantial weight is afforded to a judge’s self-assessment of impartiality; together, they raise the practical evidentiary hurdle for disqualification.
• Canarelli v. Highth Judicial District Court and Liteky v. United States — Central to the merits: when alleged bias arises from the judge’s performance of judicial duties (rulings, comments in court), disqualification requires “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” making fair judgment impossible.
• Leonard v. State and Cameron v. State — Address judicial irritation and remarks in proceedings. Irritation aimed at efficiency or courtroom control is not disqualifying unless it shows the judge has “closed his or her mind” to evidence.
• Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. — Missing record materials on writ review are presumed to support the district court’s decision (here, videos D.C. referenced but did not supply in the writ record).
• City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht — Recognizes disqualification based on bias toward an attorney requires extreme circumstances; this narrowed the relevance of D.C.’s claims about facial expressions and treatment of counsel.
• Valdez- Jimenez v. Kighth Judicial District Court — Invoked by D.C. for burden/allocation principles in detention, but distinguished because Valdez addressed bail and unaffordable bail-driven detention in the criminal context; juvenile delinquency proceedings differ, including by rule (N.R.Cr.P. 1).
• Matter of D.C. — Provided context for the seminar: the earlier decision held error in applying juvenile competency standards in concluding D.C. was competent to stand trial as an adult. The court used this to characterize the seminar as a general educational discussion of ramifications, not a discussion of D.C.’s ongoing case.
• Williams v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. — Sets a high bar for reassignment under the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority: only “exceedingly rare cases” to preserve public confidence.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standing to Oppose Disqualification Under NRS 1.235

The court treated the problem as one of procedural architecture: NRS 1.235 authorizes the challenged judge to file an answer (NRS 1.235(7)), but is silent on whether a nonmoving party may file an opposition. Rather than treating silence as prohibition (as D.C. urged via expressio unius), the court harmonized NRS 1.235 with the district court’s power to manage motion practice.

The fulcrum was EDCR 2.20(e), which not only permits but requires an “opposing party” to file opposition or nonopposition upon service of a motion, on pain of the motion potentially being deemed meritorious. The court emphasized two practical points:

• D.C. served the State. Even though NRS 1.235(5) only requires service on the judge sought to be disqualified, D.C. in fact served both the judge and the State.
• No express bar in NRS 1.235. The statute does not prohibit responsive pleadings from other parties or forbid the court from considering them.

With that, the court held Chief Judge Wiese did not manifestly abuse discretion in allowing opposition consistent with local rule and the judiciary’s procedural authority (including reference to NRCP 83(b)).

2) Merits of Disqualification: Two Tracks (Judicial-Acts Bias vs Extrajudicial Bias)

The opinion is structured around a bifurcated disqualification inquiry:

• Judicial-acts bias: When the alleged bias arises from rulings, custody decisions, or in-court remarks, the court applies the heightened standard adopted in Canarelli v. Highth Judicial District Court from Liteky v. United States: the movant must show “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” preventing fair judgment.
• Extrajudicial bias: When the alleged bias stems from “something other than rulings, opinions formed, or statements made” in the case, the court applies NCJC Rule 2.11(A), asking whether impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”

3) Application to the Record

On judicial-acts bias, the court characterized D.C.’s showing as mainly disagreement with custody-related rulings and management of proceedings—insufficient under Liteky/Canarelli. It also treated Judge Marquis’s consideration of D.C.’s intellectual disability as permissible where relevant to dangerousness (citing NCJC Rule 2.3(D)). Assertions about facial expressions and nonverbal conduct were deemed subjective and, in any event, not “extreme” bias under City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht.

The court also rejected D.C.’s attempt to import criminal pretrial-detention/bail principles from Valdez- Jimenez v. Kighth Judicial District Court, emphasizing the juvenile context, including NRS 62D.145(2) (placement considerations before competency determination) and NRS 62C.010 (broad juvenile court discretion).

On extrajudicial bias, the seminar was framed as a general discussion of the ramifications of Matter of D.C. for juvenile competency proceedings, with no clear evidence it addressed D.C.’s ongoing case. The court found the invitation to the head of the public defender’s juvenile division mitigated ex parte concerns. Judge Marquis’s chat comment was construed as a general view about differences between information presented to a jury and to a judge, not a pledge to keep D.C. in custody; therefore it did not create an objective appearance problem under NCJC Rule 2.11(A) and did not violate NCJC Rule 2.10.

4) Review of Chief Judge Wiese’s Order

Applying the mandamus lens (manifest abuse/arbitrary-capricious), the Supreme Court credited Chief Judge Wiese’s statement that he reviewed pleadings, exhibits, and testimony and found no bias. The court also declined to invoke supervisory reassignment, finding the circumstances did not meet Williams v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct..

Impact

• Clarifies opposition practice under NRS 1.235: The opinion establishes that silence in NRS 1.235 about party oppositions does not preclude them, especially where the movant serves the other party and local rules (here, EDCR 2.20(e)) contemplate or require an opposition. Future litigants should expect adversarial briefing on disqualification motions unless a statute or rule expressly forbids it.
• Reinforces the Canarelli/Liteky “high bar”: The court signals continued reluctance to treat adverse rulings, custody determinations, courtroom impatience, or generalized demeanor complaints as disqualifying absent unusually strong evidence of “deep-seated” antagonism.
• Constrains “seminar speech” as a disqualification hook: Judges’ generalized educational comments about legal issues—especially when not tied to the merits of a pending case—are unlikely to trigger NCJC Rule 2.11(A) disqualification, provided they do not reasonably appear to affect the case’s outcome or impair fairness under NCJC Rule 2.10(A).
• Juvenile-specific detention framing: By distinguishing Valdez- Jimenez v. Kighth Judicial District Court and emphasizing statutes such as NRS 62D.145(2) and NRS 62C.010, the opinion may be cited to resist importing adult criminal bail/detention doctrine into juvenile competency/custody disputes.
• Record discipline in writ practice: The reliance on Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. underscores that petitioners must supply key exhibits (e.g., videos) in the writ record or risk the presumption that omitted materials support the district court.