2. Background and Procedural Setting
A. The challenged affiliate-placement practices
The dispute concerns rates approved since 2019. According to the complaint, United Services insures military members whose highest career pay grade was E-7 or above, while GIC insures those whose highest grade was E-1 through E-6. Each affiliate calculated its rates using aggregate information about its own insured population. Because those populations’ data differed, their rates differed; GIC charged the higher rates.
The policyholders alleged that using military pay grade to determine affiliate placement amounted to using “income” or “occupation,” contrary to 211 C.M.R. § 79.04(12). That regulation prohibits using those characteristics to determine placement within an insurance company group. They also alleged that the insurers’ certifications of compliance with Massachusetts law were consequently false.
These assertions remained allegations. The First Circuit did not decide whether military pay grade constitutes income or occupation under the regulation, or whether the certifications were inaccurate.
B. The statutory and regulatory framework
Chapter 175E governs the relevant automobile insurance rate-approval process and incorporates consistent provisions of Chapter 175A. The framework includes several safeguards:
- Advance approval: Insurers must file proposed rates and supporting information before the rates take effect.
- Substantive review: The Commissioner must not approve rates that are excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory, contrary to public policy, or otherwise inconsistent with Chapter 175E.
- Disclosure: Regulations require supporting data, descriptions of rate-making methods, and identification of risk attributes relevant to affiliate placement.
- Administrative participation: An aggrieved party may petition for a pre-approval hearing under Chapter 175A, § 7(b).
- Judicial review: An aggrieved party has twenty days to seek review of a Commissioner’s decision under Chapter 175E, § 13.
- Continuing oversight: Post-approval investigation may lead to suspension and disapproval of existing rates under Chapter 175E, § 8.
Separately, Chapter 12, § 11F authorizes the Massachusetts Attorney General to intervene on behalf of consumers in administrative or judicial proceedings involving insurance rates.
No pre-approval hearing or statutory judicial review was sought concerning the rates at issue. The Attorney General did not intervene in the rate proceedings or this litigation. The complaint did not allege false actuarial or other underlying data, noncompliance with the identified procedural disclosure requirements, or a post-approval investigation by the Commissioner. Those omissions mattered to the court’s comparison with earlier Massachusetts decisions, but the court did not hold that any one of them independently defeated the action.
C. Claims, remedies, and interlocutory review
The policyholders filed suit in 2023, invoking diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). They sought:
- A declaration that the affiliate-placement practices and compliance certifications violated Massachusetts law;
- Injunctions preventing the challenged practices and requiring compliant rate filings; and
- Restitution of allegedly excessive amounts paid by GIC policyholders.
The policyholders conceded that an additional breach-of-contract claim should be dismissed.
The district court denied the insurers’ motion to dismiss on May 15, 2024. It reasoned, in part, that at least some requested remedies did not directly challenge approved rates and therefore might survive even if a filed rate doctrine applied. It certified the filed-rate question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the First Circuit accepted review after obtaining clarification.
The clarified issues concerned the source of governing law, the possible extension of the federal doctrine to state-approved rates, and whether any applicable doctrine broadly barred rate-related litigation or only direct challenges to rates.
4. Analysis: Precedents and Their Influence
A. The federal doctrine’s statutory origins
Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005), supplied the historical starting point: the federal filed rate doctrine originated as a judicially created restriction on antitrust damages claims involving rates regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission. It also illustrated the doctrine’s limits. There, the court declined to apply it to a federal claim involving state-filed rates because there was no direct relationship between the claim and the rates.
Town of Norwood v. FERC, 217 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2000), characterized the doctrine as an evolving and complex body of rules. It also declined to apply the doctrine where the challenged conduct did not contradict an existing filing. Together, these decisions showed why the label “filed rate doctrine” cannot replace analysis of the relevant regulatory system and challenged conduct.
The opinion relied particularly on Judge Park’s concurrence in Skolarus v. Bloomberg, L.P., 2026 WL 3012007 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 2026), and Judge Jordan’s dissent in Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2018). Those separate opinions traced the federal doctrine to interpretation of federal rate-setting statutes, rather than to a free-standing federal power to protect every regulator’s approved rates. Their status as a concurrence and dissent matters: the First Circuit adopted their reasoning as persuasive analysis, not as binding holdings of those courts.
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. EnCana Corp., 503 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2007), reinforced that statutory account. In litigation involving rates filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Ninth Circuit explained that the statutory reasoning underlying Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), could apply to the Natural Gas Act. The relevance was not that all approved rates enjoy the same protection, but that federal protection can follow from the structure and interpretation of a particular federal statute.
B. Erie and the limits of federal common law
The foundational authority was Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which repudiated the general federal common-law approach associated with Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Together with the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins required the federal court to respect state substantive law unless a valid federal source supplied a different rule.
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), and Rodriguez v. FDIC, 589 U.S. 132 (2020), supplied the limiting principle for exceptional federal common law: federal judicial lawmaking must be justified by the protection of uniquely federal interests within areas committed to federal control. An insurance dispute does not acquire such an interest merely because it is litigated in federal court.
The court also cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), recognizing the states’ traditional and federally acknowledged interest in detailed insurance regulation. That observation supported leaving Massachusetts to determine the consequences of its own approval process.
C. Earlier First Circuit applications did not establish a federal rule for state rates
The insurers could not derive a contrary rule from the circuit’s prior applications of the federal doctrine:
- Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000), upheld dismissal of certain state and federal claims concerning FERC-filed rates.
- PNE Energy Supply LLC v. Eversource Energy, 974 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2020), applied the doctrine to state and federal claims involving FERC-filed rates.
- Breiding v. Eversource Energy, 939 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2019), likewise involved federal regulatory filings.
The distinction is important: a federal doctrine may affect a state-law claim when the claim implicates a federal rate-setting scheme. That does not establish that the same doctrine governs a state-law claim involving only a state regulatory scheme.
D. Other circuits support looking to the relevant state’s law
The opinion surveyed decisions applying or predicting state law in disputes over state-regulated rates. Their different outcomes demonstrated that selecting state law does not predetermine whether a claim survives.
| Precedent |
Role in the court’s analysis |
| Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000) |
Applied California law and concluded that the state doctrine did not bar the state-law claim. |
| Coll v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 2011) |
Applied New Mexico’s doctrine to bar state-law claims involving a state-filed insurance rate. |
| In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451 (3d Cir. 2012) |
Applied New Jersey’s doctrine to state-law insurance-rate claims. |
| Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2018) |
The majority made an Erie prediction about whether Florida and Pennsylvania would recognize a doctrine under their regulatory systems, independently of the dissent’s broader theoretical discussion. |
| Granite State Ins. Co. v. Star Mine Servs., Inc., 29 F.4th 317 (6th Cir. 2022) |
Applied Kentucky’s doctrine in affirming summary judgment against a state-law claim. |
| Alpert v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 983 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2020) |
Applied Washington’s doctrine and certified questions to the state supreme court, illustrating the use of certification in this setting. |
| Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2020) |
Rejected an unexplained federal filed-rate defense in a state-law case and clarified that the doctrine does not affect federal subject-matter jurisdiction. |
The court also noted Coleman v. USAA, No. 25-793 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2026), involving certification of questions about similar USAA practices in California. It expressly declined to treat those questions as informative here because the California provisions differed from Chapter 175E. Similar business practices do not eliminate material differences between state regulatory statutes.
E. The Massachusetts utility decisions: relevant but not controlling
i. City of Bos. v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. of Bos.
In City of Bos. v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. of Bos., 136 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1922), the SJC held that Chapter 164 displaced a common-law action seeking recovery of excessive electricity charges approved by the Department of Public Utilities, or DPU. Consumers were confined to the statute’s comprehensive remedial process.
This decision supported the insurers’ position that a detailed administrative system can channel disputes away from ordinary private litigation. But its statutory setting differed substantially. At the time, the relevant remedies included petitions by specified groups of customers or municipal representatives, followed by DPU action. The utility framework subsequently changed in 1927 to require advance filing and approval and to permit investigations on the DPU’s own initiative. The decision therefore could not simply be transplanted into Chapter 175E.
ii. Sullivan v. Bos. Consol. Gas Co.
Sullivan v. Bos. Consol. Gas Co., 97 N.E.2d 535 (Mass. 1951), affirmed dismissal of consumers’ claims for refunds of approved gas charges, even though the DPU had mistakenly required a rate increase despite federally fixed supply costs.
The case strengthened the proposition that an asserted error in regulatory approval does not necessarily create a private refund action. Nevertheless, it involved a different statute and did not settle the availability of Chapter 93A relief under the automobile insurance framework.
iii. Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General
The policyholders relied heavily on Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 385 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1979). There, the Attorney General alleged that gas companies had charged customers certain short-term debt interest expenses, failed to answer required accounting questions, and deliberately concealed their conduct from the DPU.
The SJC reaffirmed that direct challenges to DPU-determined rates generally had to proceed through statutory judicial review. It nevertheless permitted the Attorney General’s Chapter 93A and fraud claims because their essential character was deceptive conduct intended to undermine the regulatory structure. The Attorney General also possessed broader statutory enforcement authority than private parties, and the governing statute contemplated notification to that official of legal violations.
The First Circuit identified two decisive uncertainties in extending that reasoning here:
- The plaintiffs are private policyholders, not the Attorney General.
- The alleged false compliance certifications are materially different from allegations of false underlying data, withheld required answers, and deliberate concealment from the regulator.
The distinction did not establish that the policyholders’ allegations were legally insufficient. It established that Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General did not clearly answer whether those allegations could support this private action.
iv. Spence v. Bos. Edison Co.
The insurers emphasized Spence v. Bos. Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d 80 (Mass. 1983). The SJC refused to independently interpret “apartment” in a DPU-approved rate filing where there was no allegation of fraud or deception on the agency. Interpretation of the rate belonged to the regulator.
That decision supported regulatory primacy over questions embedded in approved rate filings. But it did not definitively resolve whether the present allegations concern impermissible rate reinterpretation, actionable unlawful practices, or some combination of the two.
Collectively, these four Massachusetts decisions offered competing analogies rather than controlling answers. None addressed Chapter 175E, and none used the term “filed rate doctrine.” The First Circuit accordingly focused on the statutes and enforcement arrangements rather than assuming Massachusetts had adopted a single, uniform doctrine covering all regulated industries.
F. Certification precedents and judicial restraint
Massachusetts S.J.C. Rule 1:03 permits certification of potentially determinative state-law questions lacking controlling SJC precedent. Nicholls v. Veolia Water Cont. Operations USA, Inc., 144 F.4th 354 (1st Cir. 2025), and In re Engage, Inc., 544 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008), explained that certification is inappropriate when the state court’s likely course is reasonably clear. Here, the differing statutes, parties, and allegations prevented that level of confidence.
In re Engage, Inc. also warned against separating broad language from the facts and precise questions of earlier cases. That warning was particularly important to the policyholders’ reliance on the fraud-related language in Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General.
Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC, 63 F.4th 71 (1st Cir. 2023), supported certification of important questions about how private agreements or claims interact with a detailed state regulatory scheme. Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc., v. Nat'l Real Est. Info. Servs., 608 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2010), similarly emphasized policy consequences extending beyond the immediate parties. Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 736 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2013), supplied both a certification example and recognition of the First Circuit’s established practice of consulting the SJC.
No party initially requested certification. Nevertheless, Nicholls v. Veolia Water Cont. Operations USA, Inc. and Williams v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 858 F.3d 700 (1st Cir. 2017), recognized the court’s authority to certify on its own initiative. The Massachusetts and federal decisions in Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1101 (Mass. 1994), and 15 F.3d 1222 (1st Cir. 1994), showed that party objections need not prevent certification. The court gave the parties an opportunity to propose questions but adopted neither side’s formulation.
The opinion’s historical examples of successful certification also included the SJC decisions in Nicholls v. Veolia Water Cont. Operations USA, Inc., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Med. Props. Tr. Inc., Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC, Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Info. Servs., Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm. These citations demonstrated institutional experience with certification; the court did not use their underlying substantive rules to resolve the insurance dispute.
Finally, Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357 (2025), supplied an analogy concerning the sensitive policy choices involved in private statutory enforcement. It did not decide the scope of Massachusetts Chapter 93A. Armacost v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 1993), and Santiago-Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 859 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1988), supported the related concerns of avoiding inefficient federal predictions and respecting state courts’ authority over unsettled state policy.
5. Analysis: The Court’s Legal Reasoning
A. Identify the source of law before defining the defense
The court’s central methodological move was to ask where the proposed defense came from before debating how broadly it operated. The federal filed rate doctrine is not a universal rule triggered whenever an agency approves a price. Its application requires an appropriate federal legal foundation.
Here, every substantive component was state-created: the claims, the rate standards, the approval process, the regulator’s powers, and the available avenues of review. Federal diversity jurisdiction supplied a forum, not a federal substantive immunity.
B. Rejecting the federal defense does not establish liability
The decision separates two questions that can easily be confused:
- Can federal law independently bar these state-law claims?
- Does Massachusetts law bar or limit them?
The court answered the first question negatively in the circumstances presented. It left the second unresolved. Massachusetts might recognize an applicable state-law restriction, conclude that its administrative procedures are exclusive, permit some Chapter 93A claims, or distinguish among remedies. The opinion selects the governing legal system without selecting among those possible state-law outcomes.
C. The statutory enforcement structure matters
The availability of hearings, short-period judicial review, continuing regulatory supervision, and Attorney General participation raises a substantial question about whether Chapter 93A supplies an additional private route. A later lawsuit could potentially supplement those safeguards, but it could also bypass the structure chosen by the legislature.
The First Circuit did not convert those concerns into an exhaustion ruling or hold that failure to seek timely review automatically barred the complaint. Instead, it asked the SJC to determine how the relevant Massachusetts statutes fit together.
D. The character of the alleged misconduct matters
The policyholders described unlawful affiliate placement and false certifications rather than expressly asking a court to calculate a different approved rate. Yet the requested relief could affect the rate structure, and restitution would require identifying payments treated as excessive.
Conversely, labeling a claim a rate challenge cannot itself establish immunity for independently actionable deception. The unresolved issue is how Massachusetts distinguishes an impermissible collateral challenge to regulatory approval from a permissible consumer-protection action. The comparison between Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General and Spence v. Bos. Edison Co. exposes that boundary without resolving it.
E. Remedies may require separate treatment
The second certified question preserves a remedy-specific inquiry:
- Restitution could require a court to identify what policyholders should have paid instead of the approved amounts.
- Prospective injunctions could alter future placement practices or require new filings, while still affecting matters within the Commissioner’s authority.
- Declaratory relief could clarify legality but might also undermine assumptions underlying approved filings.
These are competing considerations, not conclusions reached by the court. The First Circuit neither endorsed the district court’s view that some remedies necessarily survive nor accepted the insurers’ position that all requested relief is barred.