State-Interview Lies as Federal Witness Tampering: Routine Federal–State Collaboration and a Materialized FBI Investigation Satisfy Fowler’s “Reasonable Likelihood”

Introduction

In United States v. Aaron Strong (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the witness-tampering conviction of Aaron Strong, a former New Castle, Indiana police officer. The prosecution arose from a 2019 arrest in which the government alleged Strong beat a suspect who had already surrendered. After the incident was referred to the Indiana State Police, Strong gave a voluntary interview to Detective Andrew Wandersee and minimized the force used. Wandersee later shared information with the FBI, and a federal investigation followed.

The central appellate issue was narrow: whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the federal “nexus” element of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)—i.e., whether Strong’s misleading statements to a state investigator were made with the intent to hinder communication to federal law enforcement, as measured by the Supreme Court’s “reasonable likelihood” standard.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed. It held that the government presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find it was reasonably likely that Strong’s statements to the state investigator would be communicated to federal officers. The panel emphasized that (1) excessive-force matters are commonly investigated federally as civil-rights cases, (2) state and federal authorities routinely share information on such matters, and (3) federal involvement in Strong’s case in fact occurred.

The court also rejected Strong’s attempt to frame the question as whether he subjectively knew the FBI would become involved; the governing test concerns intent to hinder federal communication as shown by the objective likelihood of federal involvement, not proof of the defendant’s subjective awareness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 678 (2011)

    Fowler supplies the controlling standard: to prove the federal-intent component of § 1512(b)(3), the government must show a “reasonable likelihood” of federal involvement—more than “remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical.” The Strong panel treated Fowler as the measuring stick for whether evidence of federal interest and information-sharing sufficed.

  • United States v. Carpenter, 162 F.4th 876, 881 (7th Cir. 2025)

    Carpenter is cited for the ordinary standard of review on sufficiency claims: de novo. It frames the baseline against which the government argued for plain-error review.

  • United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2012)

    Hosseini is invoked for the proposition that plain-error review may apply when an appellant’s argument on appeal differs from what was presented below. The government used Hosseini to argue Strong had shifted theories.

  • United States v. Otradovec, 72 F.4th 794, 796 (7th Cir. 2023)

    Otradovec supports the panel’s conclusion that Strong preserved his sufficiency argument even if he emphasized the wrong aspect (subjective awareness) in the district court. Because he identified the relevant evidence and authority bearing on “reasonable likelihood,” he could refine the theory on appeal and still receive de novo review.

  • United States v. Snyder, 865 F.3d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 2017)

    Snyder is Strong’s principal comparator for limiting federal nexus. The Strong court reiterated Snyder’s important caution: the mere fact that the underlying conduct could be a federal offense (e.g., civil-rights violations under § 242) does not automatically establish § 1512(b)(3)’s federal connection. But the panel distinguished Snyder on its facts: Snyder involved an underlying convenience-store robbery (rarely prosecuted federally) and the victim never actually communicated with federal agents (because she was murdered). Those features made federal communication unlikely there, whereas federal communication occurred here and excessive-force cases have a more established federal enforcement pattern.

  • United States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2015)

    Veliz is used for a practical evidentiary point: where the jury sees evidence that federal communication did occur, it becomes harder to argue no reasonable jury could find such communication was reasonably likely. The Strong panel used Veliz to underscore that subsequent FBI involvement is powerful proof of likelihood (while still applying Fowler’s standard).

  • United States v. Sheffler, 125 F.4th 814 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2785 (2025)

    Sheffler is the opinion’s anchor. The court described Strong as “materially identical” to Sheffler, where the Seventh Circuit affirmed a § 1512(b)(3) conviction based on lies to a state investigator about a guard’s beating of a prisoner. Sheffler held that evidence of (i) frequent federal interest in serious assaults by officials, (ii) regular federal–state collaboration, and (iii) a federal investigation that actually materialized satisfied Fowler’s “reasonable likelihood” standard. Strong applies Sheffler’s logic to police excessive-force investigations and treats the evidentiary package as substantively the same.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Elements and the “federal nexus” focus

    The court restated § 1512(b)(3): misleading conduct toward another person, done with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent communication to a federal law enforcement officer about a possible federal offense. The disputed element was intent to impede federal communication, which Fowler operationalizes through the objective “reasonable likelihood” of federal involvement.

  2. Preservation and standard of review

    Although Strong’s district-court argument emphasized his lack of subjective awareness that the FBI might receive the information, the panel held he preserved the proper “reasonable likelihood” issue. By citing the relevant authority and pointing to the evidence bearing on federal involvement, he could sharpen the legal framing on appeal. The court thus reviewed de novo.

  3. Why Snyder didn’t control

    The court accepted Snyder’s general proposition that the underlying federal nature of the possible offense does not alone establish likelihood of federal investigation. But it concluded Snyder’s fact pattern (convenience-store robbery rarely prosecuted federally; no federal communication ever occurred) was a poor fit for a civil-rights/excessive-force investigation, especially where the evidence showed state–federal information sharing and actual FBI follow-up.

  4. Sheffler as the dispositive analogue

    The panel treated Sheffler as effectively resolving the case: both involved official violence, lies to a state investigator, testimony that such cases commonly draw federal civil-rights scrutiny, testimony of routine collaboration between state and federal authorities, and a federal investigation that “in fact materialized.” That combination allowed a reasonable jury to conclude federal involvement was more than “remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical.”

  5. Rejection of attempted distinctions

    The court found immaterial (a) that Sheffler included a false written report and an interview the next day whereas Strong lied only in an interview five days later, and (b) that Wandersee personally had collaborated with the FBI in only two of forty excessive-force investigations. It reiterated Sheffler’s characterization of Fowler as a “relatively low bar” and added that other testimony (including Agent Kempf’s) supported the broader proposition of regular federal–state communication in excessive-force investigations.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, the disposition illustrates how the Seventh Circuit is applying Fowler through the lens of United States v. Sheffler in civil-rights use-of-force contexts:

  • Evidence package that satisfies Fowler in official-force cases: testimony that such incidents commonly attract federal civil-rights scrutiny, proof of routine federal–state coordination, and evidence that federal involvement actually occurred can be enough to sustain § 1512(b)(3) where the lie is told to a state investigator.
  • Limits of Snyder in civil-rights enforcement: Snyder remains a warning against treating “possible federal offense” as self-proving federal nexus, but its “rarely federal” crime setting makes it less persuasive when the underlying allegation is a classic federal civil-rights target (e.g., excessive force by an officer).
  • Lower threshold does not require frequent personal collaboration: the court signaled that even modest historical collaboration by the particular state investigator (two out of forty) may still support “reasonable likelihood” when supplemented by broader evidence of interagency practice and the actual emergence of a federal investigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Witness tampering” under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3): Not limited to threats. It also covers misleading someone (including investigators) if done to keep information from reaching federal law enforcement about a possible federal crime.
  • “Reasonable likelihood” (Fowler): The government need not prove that federal agents were definitely going to get involved, only that federal involvement was realistically in play—more than a far-fetched possibility.
  • Objective likelihood vs. subjective knowledge: The inquiry is not “Did the defendant know the FBI would hear about it?” but whether, given the nature of the case and interagency practices, it was reasonably likely the information would be communicated to federal officers—and the defendant acted to hinder that.
  • De novo vs. plain-error review: De novo means the appellate court fully re-examines the sufficiency question. Plain error is more deferential and applies when issues were not properly preserved. Here, the court applied de novo because Strong adequately teed up the “reasonable likelihood” theory below, even if imperfectly framed.

Conclusion

United States v. Aaron Strong reinforces (through direct reliance on United States v. Sheffler) that a defendant can commit § 1512(b)(3) witness tampering by lying to a state investigator in an excessive-force investigation when the evidence shows a realistic prospect of federal civil-rights involvement—especially where state–federal information sharing is routine and an FBI investigation actually emerges. The decision also underscores that the government’s burden is not to prove the defendant’s subjective prediction of FBI involvement, but to prove, under Fowler, that federal involvement was reasonably likely and the defendant intended to hinder that federal communication.