State Custody Does Not Start the Speedy Trial Act Clock Absent a Solely Federal Hold; An Unseen Show of Authority Is Not a Seizure

Case: United States v. Brandon Brown (4th Cir. July 20, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam)
Charge: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition)
Disposition: Conviction affirmed; denial of Speedy Trial Act dismissal and suppression affirmed

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Brandon Stephon Brown’s federal prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Brown was initially arrested and held in Virginia state custody after being suspected of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Months later, a federal indictment issued, state charges were dismissed, and Brown entered federal custody.

Brown’s appeal presented two principal issues:

  • Speedy Trial Act: Whether time spent in state custody should be treated as triggering the federal 30-day indictment clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), on the theory that the state case functioned as a “placeholder” for a federal prosecution.
  • Fourth Amendment suppression: Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Brown, including (i) when the “seizure” occurred and (ii) whether the observed conduct (movement into a breezeway and a firearm “clanking” to the ground) supported a Terry stop.

Brown also renewed Second Amendment challenges under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, but he conceded those arguments were foreclosed in the Fourth Circuit.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed on all issues. It held:

  • Speedy Trial Act: The district court did not clearly err in finding that Brown’s initial arrest and detention were for a state prosecution, not a federal arrest and not a state hold “solely to answer to federal charges.” Therefore, the federal 30-day clock in § 3161(b) was not triggered by his earlier state custody.
  • Suppression: Brown was not “seized” merely because an officer briefly drew a weapon where Brown could not see it. After Brown moved away and a firearm hit the ground, officers had reasonable suspicion—based on the totality of circumstances—to conduct a Terry stop.
  • Second Amendment: Brown’s Bruen-based claims were foreclosed by United States v. Canada and United States v. Hunt.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Speedy Trial Act framework and review

  • United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 2012): Provided the appellate standard: Speedy Trial Act interpretation is reviewed de novo, factual findings for clear error. This division mattered because Brown’s theory depended heavily on factual characterization (state vs. federal purpose).
  • United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2005): Supplied the controlling trigger rules for § 3161(b):
    • The 30-day indictment period begins upon a federal arrest on a federal charge, or
    • When a defendant is held by state authorities solely to answer to federal charges and the Government knows of the detention.
    Brown’s “placeholder” argument attempted to fit within the second Woolfolk pathway.
  • United States v. Lawson, 128 F.4th 243 (4th Cir. 2025): Defined “clear error” with emphasis on deference to the district court’s factfinding. This case mattered because the panel’s affirmance turned on accepting the district court’s factual conclusion that the state case was a bona fide state prosecution.

B. Terry stop standards, “seizure,” and reasonable suspicion

  • United States v. Henderson, 136 F.4th 527 (4th Cir. 2025): Set the standard for reviewing suppression rulings: legal conclusions de novo, factual findings for clear error, with evidence viewed in the government’s favor.
  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Anchored the doctrinal test. The opinion relied on Terry for two propositions:
    • A brief investigatory stop requires reasonable suspicion.
    • A “seizure” occurs only when an officer uses physical force or a show of authority that restrains liberty (including Terry n.16).
  • United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2018): Supplied the “particularized, objective basis” requirement and the “totality of circumstances” approach. The court used Kehoe to frame why Brown’s movement plus the firearm sound, combined with context, surpassed a mere hunch.
  • United States v. Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2013): Confirmed that “evasive conduct” short of headlong flight remains a meaningful factor. The panel treated Brown’s “sudden movement” into the breezeway as evasive conduct supporting suspicion.
  • United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc): Limited the “high-crime area” factor: it cannot alone generate reasonable suspicion. The court acknowledged Curry to reject any suggestion that location alone justified the stop.
  • United States v. Foster, 824 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 2016): Explained how a high-crime area and late hour can contribute to reasonable suspicion when coupled with additional factors. The panel used Foster to uphold consideration of location as one component of a multi-factor analysis.
  • United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2013): Emphasized that “being a felon in possession” is not a default status and that lawful open carry (where permitted) cannot alone justify detention. The panel distinguished Black because officers did not stop Brown simply for possessing/carrying; they reacted to movement suggestive of evasion and the dropping of a gun.

C. Second Amendment backdrop (addressed but not dispositive)

  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Provided the “historical tradition” test; noted only to explain Brown’s foreclosed constitutional arguments.
  • United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024): Foreclosed a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) in the Fourth Circuit.
  • United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025): Reaffirmed circuit precedent foreclosing as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Speedy Trial Act: task-force involvement does not itself “federalize” a state arrest

The Speedy Trial Act requires dismissal if the Government fails to indict within 30 days of a triggering arrest or summons. Brown’s argument depended on treating his state custody as the functional equivalent of a federal hold because a detective involved in the arrest also served as an FBI task force officer and allegedly made comments implying federal influence.

The panel, applying Woolfolk, focused on two trigger routes:

  • Federal arrest on a federal charge: The district court found Brown was arrested on a state charge and prosecuted in state court.
  • State hold solely for federal charges (with federal knowledge): The district court found Brown was not held “solely” to answer federal charges.

Because these are largely factual characterizations, Lawson’s deferential “clear error” standard did most of the work on appeal: the panel would not reweigh inferences from the task force officer’s statements so long as the district court’s account was plausible on the whole record. The result is a practical lesson: cross-designated officers and “federal-sounding” remarks do not, without more, convert a state detention into a Speedy Trial Act trigger.

B. Suppression: (1) no seizure from an unseen show of authority; (2) reasonable suspicion from evasion-like movement plus dropping a gun

Brown first argued he was seized before the gun fell because an officer drew a firearm. The court rejected that theory on a key factual point: body-worn camera video showed Brown could not see the drawn weapon because his back was turned, and the officer reholstered within seconds. Using Terry’s seizure framework (force or show of authority restraining liberty), the panel reasoned that an unperceived show of authority cannot restrain liberty. In effect, without perception, there is no submission and no restraint attributable to the show of authority.

Brown next argued that even after the gun dropped, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. The panel upheld the stop based on the “totality of the circumstances” under Kehoe:

  • Sudden movement away from approaching officers into a breezeway—characterized as potentially evasive behavior (Bumpers).
  • The sound and observation of a firearm hitting the ground immediately after that movement, which (in context) could suggest an attempt to discard contraband.
  • Contextual factors (high-crime area; late hour), treated as supporting but not independently sufficient (Curry, Foster).

The court also addressed Black to cabin the rationale: the stop was not justified by a presumption that “gun equals felon” or by mere firearm possession. Instead, it was justified by behavior indicating possible illegality (discarding) coupled with context.

3.3. Impact

A. Speedy Trial Act litigation in joint federal-state investigations

Even though the decision is unpublished and “not binding precedent,” it signals how the Fourth Circuit is likely to treat common “placeholder” arguments:

  • Substance over labels—but facts control. Defendants will need concrete proof that state custody was maintained solely for federal prosecution, not merely that federal agents (or task-force officers) were involved or made suggestive comments.
  • District court factfinding is pivotal. Because appellate review is highly deferential on the key factual questions, the evidentiary record at the motion stage (communications between agencies, detainers, charging decisions, reasons for continued custody) will often determine the outcome.

B. Fourth Amendment practice: perception matters for “show of authority”

The opinion reinforces a practical seizure principle: a show of authority that the suspect does not perceive will generally not establish a seizure at that moment. This can affect the suppression timeline—especially where officers draw weapons, activate lights, or issue commands outside the suspect’s awareness.

C. Gun-related Terry stops: “gun + movement + discard” differs from “gun alone”

The panel’s careful distinction from United States v. Black underscores a continuing line in Fourth Circuit law: mere firearm possession (especially in lawful-carry contexts) is not enough, but firearm possession combined with evasive/disposing conduct can generate reasonable suspicion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Speedy Trial Act 30-day indictment clock (18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)): The federal government usually must indict within 30 days after a qualifying federal arrest/summons. A state arrest generally does not start the federal clock.
  • “Held by state authorities solely to answer to federal charges” (Woolfolk): If the state is holding someone only because the federal government wants the person held for a federal case—and the federal government knows the person is being held— the Speedy Trial Act can be triggered despite nominally “state” custody.
  • Clear error review: An appellate court will not overturn a factual finding unless it is firmly convinced a mistake was made. If the trial judge’s view of the facts is plausible, it usually stands.
  • Terry stop: A brief detention for investigation is allowed when officers have specific, objective reasons to suspect criminal activity.
  • Reasonable suspicion: Less than probable cause, more than a hunch; courts look at the whole situation, not each fact in isolation.
  • Seizure by “show of authority”: A person is seized when an officer’s authority restrains the person’s liberty—typically requiring that the person perceive the authority and submit (or be physically forced).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Brandon Brown affirms two recurring principles in federal criminal procedure:

  • Speedy Trial Act: State custody will not start the federal 30-day indictment clock absent a factual showing that the defendant was federally arrested on a federal charge or held in state custody solely to answer federal charges, as framed by United States v. Woolfolk.
  • Fourth Amendment: A brief, unseen weapon draw is not necessarily a seizure, and reasonable suspicion may arise from the totality of circumstances where a suspect makes an evasive movement and appears to discard a firearm, with contextual factors (like a high-crime area) playing a supporting role rather than a standalone justification.

While unpublished and nonprecedential, the decision is a useful roadmap for litigants in joint task-force cases and for courts evaluating the timing of seizure and the sufficiency of suspicion in firearm-adjacent encounters.