Stash-House Enhancement Applies Without Leasehold When De Facto Control or Co-Conspirator Foreseeability Is Shown

1. Introduction

Khari Qunarll Smith pleaded guilty to federal methamphetamine and fentanyl trafficking offenses arising out of a Lexington, Kentucky investigation centered on his brother, Khmari Smith. Agents tied the brothers to two Lexington residences—one on Roosevelt Boulevard and one in an apartment building on North Locust Hill Drive—where searches uncovered narcotics, firearms, and drug-processing materials.

At sentencing, the district court applied U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12)’s two-level enhancement for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance” (the “stash-house enhancement”), calculated a guideline range of 188–235 months, and imposed 200 months.

On appeal, Smith raised two principal challenges:

• Guidelines issue: Whether the district court clearly erred by finding Smith “maintained” the North Locust Hill Drive apartment for drug purposes even though he did not lease or own it and claimed he lived mostly in Detroit.
• Reasonableness issue: Whether a 200-month sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of mitigating factors (youth, no criminal history, family responsibilities, health issues).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not clearly err in applying the stash-house enhancement because the record supported a finding that Smith exercised sufficient de facto control over the North Locust Hill Drive apartment and used it jointly with his brother for storing, packaging, and distributing drugs. The panel further concluded that, even apart from Smith’s own “maintenance,” the enhancement was independently supported under relevant-conduct principles: a co-conspirator’s maintenance of a drug premises can be attributed to the defendant if within the jointly undertaken criminal activity, in furtherance of it, and reasonably foreseeable.

The panel also rejected Smith’s substantive-reasonableness challenge, emphasizing the presumption of reasonableness for a within-guidelines sentence and the district court’s explicit consideration of the mitigating factors when selecting a low-to-mid-range sentence.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is largely an application of established Sixth Circuit standards, with several cases doing distinct work:

• United States v. Johnson, 737 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2013):
  Provided the circuit’s basic three-part articulation of the enhancement—“(1) knowingly (2) opens or maintains any place (3) for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance”—and framed “maintaining” as the only disputed element here.
• United States v. Florence, 150 F.4th 773 (6th Cir. 2025):
  Supplied the standard of review: applying the “maintenance” prong to facts is reviewed for clear error, a deferential lens that matters because Smith’s claim was fact-intensive (control, access, use of the premises).
• United States v. Byrd, 689 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2012):
  Confirmed that the government must prove sentencing enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt—lowering the evidentiary hurdle for the enhancement.
• United States v. Hernandez, 721 F. App'x 479 (6th Cir. 2018):
  Served as the centerpiece for “de facto control” doctrine. The district court relied on it for two key propositions: (a) maintenance may be shown through a variety of control-like facts (continuity, renting/furnishing, supervising/protecting, etc.), and (b) the enhancement may apply even without a legal interest if the government shows de facto control—“no Statute of Frauds defense.”
• United States v. Flores- Olague, 717 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2013):
  Quoted (via Hernandez) for the limiting concept that “maintains” contemplates someone “more than a casual visitor,” helping the court distinguish meaningful involvement from incidental presence.
• United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386 (6th Cir. 2023):
  Reinforced that de facto control need not be “exclusive or continuous,” and supported applying the enhancement where a defendant used a residence “that was not his” to distribute drugs.
• United States v. Terry, 83 F.4th 1039 (6th Cir. 2023):
  Characterized the evidentiary bar as “relatively low” and stated that “drug storage on the property and transactions on the property will usually suffice,” a practical gloss that strongly favored affirmance on this record.
• United States v. Bennett, No. 22-5142, 2024 WL 966367 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2024):
  Used as a close factual analogue: the enhancement was upheld where drugs were stored at another person’s house and agents found drug-mixing equipment—mirroring North Locust Hill Drive’s processing materials.
• United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2010):
  Although involving 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), the panel treated its “maintenance” analysis as analogous: pervasive drug paraphernalia, defendant’s presence, and knowledge supported the inference that the home was maintained for drug purposes.
• United States v. Rich, 14 F.4th 489 (6th Cir. 2021):
  Critical for the alternative route to the enhancement: a co-conspirator’s premises maintenance can be attributed under U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(B) if it is within the jointly undertaken activity, in furtherance, and reasonably foreseeable.
• United States v. Drew, No. 23-3931, 2025 WL 1144831 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025) (per curiam), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 341 (2025):
  Clarified the foreseeability focus: the question is whether maintenance is foreseeable “in connection with” the criminal activity (e.g., selling drugs out of houses), not whether it is foreseeable that “lack of control” might still trigger the enhancement.
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Jones, 81 F.4th 591 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2008):
  These framed the substantive-reasonableness review: abuse of discretion, presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences, and appellate reluctance to reweigh § 3553(a) factors merely because a defendant prefers a different balance.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two reinforcing layers: direct “maintenance” by Smith, and attribution via co-conspirator relevant conduct.

A. “Maintenance” through de facto control without a legal interest

The court accepted (as undisputed) that Smith lacked a formal possessory interest in North Locust Hill Drive, but treated that as non-dispositive under United States v. Hernandez and United States v. Taylor. The question became whether facts showed de facto control and more-than-casual use for drug purposes.

Key evidentiary anchors the panel highlighted:

• Agents observed Smith and Khmari traveling from Detroit to Lexington and moving luggage (two suitcases and two backpacks) into the apartment building at North Locust Hill Drive after a brief stop at Roosevelt Boulevard—suggesting coordinated operational use of the locations.
• Searches found narcotics, firearms, and drug-processing equipment (cutting agents, PPE, a press, and written mixing instructions), including in a common area/adjacent closet that Smith could access.
• Evidence suggested Smith stayed there and had a bedroom (men’s clothing in both bedrooms; agent testimony that one bedroom belonged to Smith).
• Smith admitted involvement in his brother’s trafficking activities, supporting knowledge and purposeful use rather than incidental presence.

With United States v. Terry providing the doctrinal “relatively low” evidentiary threshold, these facts were sufficient for a clear-error affirmance: they supported the inference that Smith was not a transient visitor but a participant using the premises to facilitate packaging/storage/distribution.

B. Alternative basis: co-conspirator maintenance as relevant conduct

Even if Smith’s own control were debatable, the panel explained that United States v. Rich allows the enhancement when a co-conspirator’s maintenance of the premises satisfies U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(B)’s three conditions:

• Scope: within the jointly undertaken criminal activity
• Furtherance: in furtherance of that activity
• Foreseeability: reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity

The court treated the North Locust Hill Drive apartment as functionally integrated into the conspiracy’s drug operations (processing/packaging/storage and then distribution). Under United States v. Drew, it was foreseeable that a drug-trafficking conspiracy operating out of residences would involve maintaining those residences as drug premises. The panel also corrected Smith’s framing: foreseeability is not about predicting that “lack of control” could still yield the enhancement; it is about predicting the role a premises plays in the jointly undertaken trafficking.

C. Substantive reasonableness: within-guidelines presumption and the ban on reweighing

On sentencing, the district court imposed 200 months—within the 188–235 month range—and explicitly credited mitigation (age, lack of criminal history, family responsibilities) by moving below the guideline midpoint. Under United States v. Jones, that sentence was presumptively reasonable, and under United States v. Sexton the appellate court would not second-guess the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors absent an abuse of discretion. The panel therefore rejected Smith’s claim that the mitigating factors demanded an even lower term.

3.3. Impact

While unpublished, the decision underscores several practical points likely to influence plea and sentencing litigation in drug cases:

• Property formalities matter less than functional use. A defendant’s lack of lease/ownership will not defeat §2D1.1(b)(12) if facts indicate shared operational control (overnight stays, a designated room, access to processing materials, coordinated travel and logistics).
• The “relevant conduct” pathway is a powerful backstop. Even where personal “maintenance” is contestable, United States v. Rich allows attribution based on foreseeability and joint activity. This increases the importance of narrowly defining the “scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity” at sentencing.
• Clear-error review is outcome-shaping. With United States v. Florence’s deferential standard, defendants face a steep uphill climb when the district court has credited testimony and drawn plausible inferences from mixed facts.
• Within-guidelines sentences remain difficult to overturn. The combination of United States v. Jones (presumption) and United States v. Sexton (no reweighing) means mitigation arguments are most consequential in the district court, not on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Maintaining” a premises (U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12)): Not limited to owning or leasing. Courts look for practical control and use—whether the defendant helped run the place as part of drug manufacturing/distribution (storage, packaging, processing, dealing).
• De facto control: Real-world authority or management over the premises (staying there, using it as an operational base, accessing and using drug equipment), even if another person is the tenant.
• Relevant conduct (U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(B)): At sentencing, a defendant can be held responsible for certain acts of co-conspirators if those acts were part of the jointly undertaken activity, advanced it, and were reasonably foreseeable.
• Preponderance of the evidence: “More likely than not.” This is the usual burden for proving guideline enhancements.
• Clear error (appellate review): The appellate court will not overturn a factual finding unless it is left with a firm conviction a mistake was made. If the district court’s view is plausible, it usually stands.
• Substantive reasonableness: A challenge that the sentence is too long considering § 3553(a). A within-guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Khari Qunarll Smith reaffirms that the Sixth Circuit will uphold the U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12) stash-house enhancement where the record supports practical, shared use and control of a drug premises—even absent a leasehold—and, independently, where a co-conspirator’s maintenance of the premises is attributable as relevant conduct under United States v. Rich. The decision also illustrates the formidable appellate barriers to overturning (1) fact-bound guideline applications reviewed for clear error and (2) within-guidelines sentences reviewed under a presumption of reasonableness.