Standing Orders Cannot Replace Case-Specific Personal Jurisdiction and Joinder Analysis in “Schedule A” Online Marketplace IP Suits

Case: Thomas Wood v. Eiazuiks, No. 25-2340 (3d Cir. May 19, 2026) (not precedential)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Origin: W.D. Pa., D.C. No. 2:25-cv-00800 (Ranjan, J.)

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from a growing category of intellectual-property enforcement suits commonly called “Schedule A” cases—actions in which a rights-holder sues numerous allegedly related online sellers, often seeking ex parte temporary restraining orders to halt sales and freeze marketplace accounts. Thomas Wood, an artist who copyrights and sells images of pets and Americana, sued fifty-four foreign individuals and entities for copyright infringement, alleging they sold “knockoff” versions of his work through online marketplaces (including Amazon) to purchasers in Pennsylvania.

The Western District of Pennsylvania had adopted a standing order for “Schedule A” cases that set “procedural guidelines” for pleading personal jurisdiction and for joinder. After denying Wood’s ex parte TRO request, the District Court directed Wood to justify joinder or file an amended complaint “bolstering” jurisdictional allegations and curing joinder issues. Wood addressed joinder but not personal jurisdiction. The court then dismissed the complaint without prejudice, stating it could be refiled “consistent with the Standing Order.”

The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the District Court erred by failing to conduct (and explain) the required, case-specific analysis of (1) personal jurisdiction over internet-based sellers and (2) joinder/severance under the Federal Rules.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit identified two independent deficiencies in the dismissal:

  • Personal jurisdiction: The District Court appeared to rely on an incomplete understanding of specific jurisdiction for online sellers. The complaint alleged defendants offered infringing products for purchase by and delivery to Pennsylvania residents; under Third Circuit precedent, such allegations can establish purposeful availment. The panel remanded for the District Court to examine purposeful availment and whether the claims “arise out of or relate to” the Pennsylvania contacts.
  • Joinder: The District Court did not explain whether it dismissed for misjoinder and, if so, why severance (rather than dismissal) would not suffice. Because Rule 21 authorizes severance and misjoinder is not a basis to dismiss an action, the lack of a reasoned analysis warranted vacatur.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is anchored in well-established jurisdiction and joinder doctrine and uses those authorities to police the boundary between permissible “case management” via standing orders and the court’s obligation to apply the Federal Rules and Due Process to the facts alleged.

1. Personal jurisdiction framework

  • O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007): Cited for two core propositions: (i) a federal district court ordinarily follows the forum state’s jurisdictional law, and (ii) Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute reaches to the constitutional limit—so the analysis collapses into federal due process.
  • Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945): The canonical “minimum contacts” baseline—jurisdiction must comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
  • Hepp v. Facebook, 14 F.4th 204 (3d Cir. 2021): Supplies the Third Circuit’s modern articulation of specific jurisdiction’s two elements: (i) purposeful availment via deliberate forum-directed conduct, and (ii) a claims-contacts connection (“give rise to—or relate to—”).
  • Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021): Reinforces that “arise out of or relate to” is broader than strict causation and requires a “strong relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”

2. Internet commerce and purposeful availment

  • Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003): A touchstone for internet jurisdiction. It is cited to illustrate when internet activity is not purposeful availment: websites not “designed or intended” to reach the forum and no evidence of knowingly doing business with forum residents.
  • Hasson v. FullStory, Inc., 114 F.4th 181 (3d Cir. 2024): The opinion’s key contemporary comparator. It supports that an internet-based defendant purposefully avails itself of Pennsylvania where it conducts business with residents and sells products to Pennsylvanians through its website.
  • American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1130 (2025): Cited as persuasive, consistent authority that accepting orders with forum shipping addresses and committing to ship into the forum constitutes purposeful availment.
  • NBA Props. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614 (7th Cir. 2022): Similarly cited to show that willingness and capacity to ship into the forum, coupled with filling an order and shipping an infringing product there, satisfies purposeful availment.

3. Joinder, severance, and the need for reasoned discretion

  • Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009): Governs the standard for joinder/severance decisions—district courts have broad discretion but must provide a “reasoned analysis” applying Rule 20 to the specific fact pattern.
  • Avenatti v. Fox News Network LLC, 41 F.4th 125 (3d Cir. 2022): Reinforces that Rule 21 discretion “is discretionary but not unlimited,” underscoring that unexplained or rule-inconsistent party-management orders are vulnerable on appeal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Standing-order “guidelines” cannot substitute for the due process inquiry

The Third Circuit’s central corrective is methodological: personal jurisdiction requires applying the specific jurisdiction test to the allegations (and, as appropriate, record evidence), not defaulting to categorical statements about e-commerce. The panel flagged that the Standing Order’s “Personal Jurisdiction Guideline” correctly rejects the notion that “simply being an online seller on Amazon” suffices, but it fails to account for the other half of the internet-jurisdiction picture—where a seller deliberately targets or serves the forum market.

The opinion identifies allegations that could satisfy purposeful availment: defendants offered infringing products for purchase by and delivery to Pennsylvania residents. That aligns with Hasson v. FullStory, Inc. and is distinguishable from Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., where there was no indication the websites were designed to reach the forum or that the defendants knowingly transacted with forum residents.

Importantly, the panel did not hold jurisdiction exists; it held the District Court erred by dismissing without conducting the full analysis. On remand, it directed the court to evaluate:

  • whether Wood plausibly alleged that defendants offered infringing products for sale in Pennsylvania;
  • whether he plausibly alleged someone purchased infringing products for shipment to Pennsylvania; and
  • whether the copyright claims “arise out of or relate to” those Pennsylvania contacts (the Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. nexus requirement).

2. Joinder: dismissal without explanation conflicts with Rules 20 and 21

The Standing Order’s “Joinder Guideline” effectively prescribes that each complaint consist of “a single defendant or group of defendants acting under the same operator,” and requires separate filing fees for separate complaints. The Third Circuit did not deem that approach invalid per se; instead, it found the dismissal defective because the District Court did not explain why the complaint was “inconsistent with the Standing Order,” leaving unclear whether the dismissal rested on joinder.

That lack of explanation mattered because the Federal Rules provide calibrated tools:

  • Rule 20 permits multi-defendant joinder when claims arise out of the same transaction/occurrence (or series) and share common questions of law or fact.
  • Rule 21 provides that misjoinder is not a ground to dismiss an action; instead, the court may drop parties or sever claims “on just terms.”

Under Hagan v. Rogers, a court exercising joinder discretion must provide a reasoned Rule 20 analysis grounded in the particular allegations—especially salient in “Schedule A” cases where plaintiffs often plead coordination, common storefront tactics, shared providers, or other links to argue a “series of transactions.” The Third Circuit could not review the exercise of discretion because the District Court did not identify (i) what aspect of Rule 20 was not met, or (ii) why severance could not cure any defect.

C. Impact

1. Constraint on categorical jurisdiction screening in online IP cases

The decision signals that district courts—particularly those adopting “Schedule A” standing orders—must ensure their streamlined procedures do not harden into categorical denials that omit recognized routes to jurisdiction. Allegations (and proof) of offering to sell and ship into the forum, and actual shipments, remain central jurisdictional facts in internet-commerce infringement cases across circuits (as reflected by American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka and NBA Props. v. HANWJH).

2. Pleading and evidentiary development in ex parte TRO practice

Although Wood did not appeal the TRO denial, the opinion implicitly affects the TRO playbook in “Schedule A” cases: plaintiffs seeking early marketplace freezes will likely bolster complaints with concrete forum-directed facts (e.g., screenshots showing shipping availability to Pennsylvania, test purchases by non-party customers, fulfillment records, or marketplace data). The remand instructions highlight which allegations the district court should scrutinize and, by extension, what plaintiffs should document at filing.

3. Joinder orders must be reviewable: explanation and tailored remedies

On joinder, the opinion strengthens the appellate expectation that district courts explain their Rule 20/Rule 21 reasoning and prefer severance over outright dismissal when misjoinder is the problem. For “Schedule A” dockets, this pushes courts to articulate, defendant-by-defendant (or group-by-group), why a “series of transactions” is or is not plausibly alleged—and to use severance and case management rather than dismissal where appropriate.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Personal jurisdiction: A court’s power to require a defendant to litigate in that state. For foreign online sellers, the key question is often whether they deliberately served the state’s market (not merely that a website exists).
  • Purposeful availment: The defendant must have intentionally engaged with the forum—e.g., by offering to sell and ship products there and actually fulfilling such sales.
  • “Arise out of or relate to”: The lawsuit must be tied to the forum contacts. In product sales cases, sales/shipments of the allegedly infringing goods into the forum often provide that tie.
  • Rule 20 joinder: Multiple defendants may be sued together only if the claims are connected (same transaction/occurrence or series) and share common issues.
  • Rule 21 severance: If defendants are improperly joined, the court can split the case into separate actions; misjoinder alone is not a reason to throw the case out.
  • Standing order: A court-wide procedural directive. It can guide practice, but it cannot replace the Federal Rules or the constitutionally required, fact-specific jurisdiction analysis.

V. Conclusion

Thomas Wood v. Eiazuiks reinforces two institutional principles in the context of modern online marketplace IP litigation. First, personal jurisdiction over internet sellers must be evaluated under the complete specific jurisdiction framework—especially purposeful availment through forum-directed sales and shipments—and not truncated by categorical assumptions embedded in standing orders. Second, when joinder is questioned in “Schedule A” complaints, district courts must explain their Rule 20 reasoning and employ Rule 21 tools like severance rather than unexplained dismissal. Even as a not precedential decision, the opinion is a pointed reminder that docket-management innovations must remain tethered to due process and the Federal Rules’ remedial structure.