Standing Bar to Equal-Protection Claims Based on Nonprosecution, and Renewed Emphasis on State-Remedy Prerequisites for Procedural Due Process

I. Introduction

Chase Peden v. Glenn Stephens (11th Cir. Aug. 19, 2026) arises from the termination of Chase Peden, a Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Office deputy, after an internal investigation into allegations that he engaged in extramarital sexual activity while on duty and used county property (including his patrol vehicle) to do so. The allegations were triggered by an anonymous letter signed “Michael,” later revealed to have been written by Carole Stephens—Peden’s former affair partner and the wife of Gwinnett County Administrator Glenn Stephens.

Chase and his wife Marjorie sued county officials—Glenn Stephens, Sheriff Butch Conway, and Chief Deputy Lou Solis—asserting: (1) a § 1983 procedural due process claim (property and “stigma-plus”/reputation theory); (2) a Georgia defamation claim; and (3) a § 1983 equal protection theory premised on alleged influence over the district attorney’s decision not to prosecute Carole Stephens for stalking/harassment.

The district court granted summary judgment to the county officials on all three claims. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on procedural due process and defamation, but vacated and remanded the equal protection claim with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Procedural due process (property and liberty/reputation): Affirmed. Even assuming factual disputes about the “real reason” for termination, Peden’s federal procedural due process claims fail because he did not utilize available and adequate state remedial procedures (merit-board process, state-court review, and potential mandamus).
  • Defamation (Georgia law): Affirmed. The record contained no evidence that any defendant “tipped” a reporter or otherwise caused publication; Peden’s causation theory rested on impermissible speculation.
  • Equal protection based on nonprosecution decision: Vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice for lack of standing. Private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of others.
  • Cross-appeal: Dismissed as moot because the officials prevailed on the merits of the appeal.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Procedural due process: pretermination minima vs. state-remedy prerequisite

The court framed the basic “what process is due” standard by citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), which requires “oral or written notice of the charges,” an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to respond before termination. But the decisive authority was not Loudermill; it was the Eleventh Circuit’s remedial-process doctrine from McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

Under McKinney v. Pate, a plaintiff cannot succeed on a federal procedural due process claim if the state provided adequate means to remedy the alleged procedural deprivation and the plaintiff failed to use them. The panel treated McKinney as controlling and emphasized its core formulation: a plaintiff “has not suffered a violation of his procedural due process rights unless and until the State . . . refuses to make available a means to remedy the deprivation.”

The opinion noted that McKinney had been “abrogat[ed] on unrelated grounds recognized by Littlejohn v. Sch. Bd. of Leon Cnty., 132 F.4th 1232 (11th Cir. 2025),” reinforcing that McKinney remains binding on the state-remedy prerequisite.

The court then used two applications of McKinney to show how failure to pursue state review defeats both property-interest and liberty-interest procedural due process claims:

  • Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1994): A plaintiff who voluntarily dismissed his Georgia state-court appeal could not later claim deprivation of procedural due process in federal court because Georgia courts could review and remedy the personnel action, including constitutional defects.
  • Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2000): A “stigma-plus” theory (reputational harm tied to termination) failed because Georgia law provided an adequate remedy—particularly mandamus—to compel a name-clearing hearing, and the plaintiff did not pursue it.

Together, McKinney v. Pate, Narey v. Dean, and Cotton v. Jackson supplied the doctrinal engine for the due process holding: whatever the alleged defect in notice (including allegedly concealing the “true reason”), the federal constitutional claim does not ripen where the plaintiff bypasses adequate state corrective processes.

2. Defamation: speculation cannot create a triable issue

On defamation, the court relied on Georgia and federal summary-judgment principles to reject inference-by-guesswork:

  • HI Tech. Corp. v. Quality Inv. Props. Suwanee, LLC, 894 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023): An inference that a defendant made a defamatory statement must be reasonable and “more than mere speculation, conjecture, or possibility.”
  • Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005): “Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact.”
  • John D. Robinson Corp. v. S. Marine & Indus. Supply Co., 395 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990): Mere speculation about publication or communication of defamation is not probative evidence.

These cases supported the court’s conclusion that Peden lacked evidence tying any named defendant to the reporter’s Open Records Act request; without evidence of publication/causation attributable to defendants, the claim collapses.

3. Equal protection/“access to judicial system” theory: no standing to demand prosecution

The court treated the equal protection theory as an effort to obtain judicial review of a nonprosecution decision and held the plaintiffs lacked standing under Supreme Court precedent:

  • Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973): “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”
  • Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981): reaffirming prosecutorial discretion and lack of standing to challenge decisions opposing warrants against alleged wrongdoers.

Procedurally, the court relied on: Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2008), to reiterate that a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is without prejudice, and it cited TocMail, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 67 F.4th 1255 (11th Cir. 2023), alongside Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), in directing the proper disposition.

4. Cross-appeal mootness

After affirming for the defendants, the court dismissed their cross-appeal as moot under: United States v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 1998), and Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank v. Fickling, 58 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1995).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural due process: the claim fails at the “state remedy” gate

Peden’s theory was that the process was a “lie” because officials did not specify that the “real reason” for termination was the affair with Carole Stephens, even though he was notified that he was being terminated for on-duty sex and misuse of county property and the polygraph indicated deception.

The panel largely bypassed the debate over specificity because it identified a threshold defect: Peden settled his merit-board appeal (trading an evidentiary hearing and further review for a “resignation” designation) and did not pursue available Georgia remedies that could have corrected any procedural deficiency.

The court underscored concrete state-law avenues Peden knowingly abandoned:

  • Continuation of the Gwinnett County Merit Board process (including a full evidentiary hearing), followed by state-court review (citing Ga. Code Ann. §§ 5-3-3, 5-3-7).
  • For the reputational (“name-clearing”) component, a potential writ of mandamus under Ga. Code Ann. § 9-6-20, consistent with Cotton v. Jackson.

Importantly, the court rejected the attempt to excuse nonuse of state remedies on the ground of late discovery of the “true reason.” In footnote 7, it reasoned that discovery within months did not plausibly foreclose state remedies and pointed to Georgia’s long limitations period for statutory rights (Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-22) and the absence of a specific mandamus limitations period (Ga. Code Ann. § 9-6-20 to § 9-6-28), while noting that “gross laches” under Cowen v. Clayton Cnty., 832 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. 2019), was not implicated by less than a year’s delay.

The holding thus reinforces a structural point: even if an employer’s process is allegedly defective or pretextual, the federal procedural due process claim is not the first resort when state procedures exist to cure the defect.

2. Defamation: no evidence of attribution or causation

The allegedly defamatory material became public after a reporter requested Peden’s personnel file under the Georgia Open Records Act (Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-71) and aired a story. Peden alleged the defendants conspired to “tip” the reporter, but he could not identify who did it (if anyone) and presented no record evidence beyond inference from supposed motive.

Applying HI Tech. Corp. v. Quality Inv. Props. Suwanee, LLC and Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., the court held the causal link was speculative and therefore insufficient at summary judgment. The analysis effectively treats “publication by a defendant” (or defendant-caused republication) as a necessary element that cannot be supplied by conjecture.

3. Equal protection: reframing merits as jurisdiction

The district court resolved the equal protection claim on the merits, but the panel held the case should not have reached merits because the plaintiffs lacked standing. The asserted injury was the government’s failure to prosecute Carole Stephens, allegedly due to Glenn Stephens’ influence.

Under Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and Leeke v. Timmerman, that asserted injury is not judicially cognizable because prosecution decisions are discretionary and private citizens generally have no legally protected interest in compelling prosecution of third parties.

The court’s remedial instruction matters: it vacated summary judgment and ordered dismissal without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, aligning disposition with the jurisdictional nature of standing.

C. Impact

1. Employment due process litigation in the Eleventh Circuit

The opinion reaffirms a practical litigation rule: plaintiffs challenging public-employment discipline on procedural due process grounds must pursue adequate state remedial pathways (administrative review, state-court review, and where appropriate, mandamus) before federal courts will recognize a procedural due process violation. Settlements that short-circuit those pathways may foreclose subsequent federal procedural due process claims, even when the plaintiff later alleges concealed motives or incomplete notice.

2. “Stigma-plus” claims and name-clearing hearings

By treating Cotton v. Jackson as fully applicable, the decision reinforces that reputational-harm procedural due process claims are likewise subject to the state-remedy prerequisite. Plaintiffs must consider mandamus (or equivalent state relief) as the primary route to secure a name-clearing hearing.

3. Defamation claims tied to open records disclosures

The decision signals that where public records are released in response to statutory requests, plaintiffs must produce concrete evidence linking particular officials to the alleged defamatory “publication” beyond the lawful release itself. Allegations of motive and conclusory conspiracy framing will not substitute for proof of who communicated what to whom.

4. Equal protection and prosecutorial discretion: pleading cannot cure standing defects

The standing ruling clarifies that repackaging a nonprosecution grievance as “equal protection” or “access to the judicial system” does not create a cognizable injury. Future plaintiffs in similar disputes should expect jurisdictional dismissal rather than merits adjudication.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural due process (property interest): If you have a protected interest in your job (e.g., can only be fired for cause), you are entitled to fair procedures before the government takes it away.
  • Procedural due process (liberty interest / “name-clearing”): If the government publicly stigmatizes you in connection with firing you (for example, accusations affecting reputation and employability), due process can require a chance to clear your name.
  • The Eleventh Circuit’s “state remedy” requirement: In this circuit, even if the process was flawed, there is no federal procedural due process violation unless the state fails to provide an adequate way to fix the flaw. If you do not use the available state fix, the federal claim generally fails.
  • Mandamus: A state-court order compelling a public official to perform a legal duty (here, potentially ordering a name-clearing hearing).
  • Standing: A constitutional requirement that the plaintiff have a legally cognizable injury the court can remedy. Wanting someone else prosecuted is typically not such an injury.
  • Vacate vs. affirm; dismissal without prejudice: “Vacate” wipes out the lower court’s merits judgment. A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is “without prejudice,” meaning it is not a merits determination.

V. Conclusion

Chase Peden v. Glenn Stephens strengthens two recurring doctrinal guardrails in Eleventh Circuit practice. First, it reiterates that federal procedural due process claims—whether framed as loss of employment or reputational stigma—are generally unavailable when the plaintiff bypasses adequate state corrective processes, including administrative review, state-court review, and mandamus. Second, it confirms that claims premised on dissatisfaction with nonprosecution decisions fail at the courthouse door for lack of standing under Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and Leeke v. Timmerman, requiring jurisdictional dismissal rather than merits adjudication. The decision also underscores an evidentiary lesson for defamation plaintiffs: inferences must be grounded in proof, not “if”-based speculation.