Date: Jan 8, 2026

Standard Sentencing Remarks Do Not Create Procedural Error When Followed by Case-Specific § 3553(a) Analysis

Introduction

In United States v. DeRosse (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed a 180-month within-Guidelines sentence imposed after Gerald DeRosse pleaded guilty to bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The district court (Kuntz, J.) calculated an advisory range of 151–188 months after deeming DeRosse a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and it imposed restitution and forfeiture of $205.

On appeal, DeRosse argued (1) procedural unreasonableness—claiming the court relied on boilerplate sentencing language, inadequately engaged with his allocution and traumatic history, and insufficiently addressed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (unwarranted disparities); (2) erroneous career-offender classification; (3) substantive unreasonableness given age, mental health, and treatment; and (4) that reassignment would be required if remanded due to comments that could be perceived as discouraging appeal.

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the decision is a detailed application of Second Circuit sentencing-review principles—especially regarding how much explanation is required when a judge uses standardized introductory remarks but then addresses individualized facts and arguments.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that there was no plain procedural error because the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory, and provided a sufficiently individualized explanation tied to § 3553(a) factors. The panel also rejected DeRosse’s arguments about sentencing disparities, distinguishing his reliance on United States v. Stewart and emphasizing that within-Guidelines sentences generally require less explanation where the Commission’s reasoning supports the range. DeRosse’s challenge to career-offender status was deemed foreclosed by United States v. Evans. The sentence was also not substantively unreasonable under the “shockingly high/low” framework of United States v. Rigas. Finally, the court noted that certain district-court remarks could raise concerns under United States v. Quattrone, but reassignment was moot because no remand was warranted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Gall v. United States and United States v. Cavera: The panel anchored review in the deferential abuse-of-discretion framework and identified the core categories of procedural error (miscalculation, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failure to consider § 3553(a), clearly erroneous facts, inadequate explanation).
United States v. Villafuerte: Used for two related propositions: (1) what counts as procedural error in sentencing, and (2) the district court need not respond to every mitigating argument or circumstance in detail so long as the record shows meaningful consideration and a reasoned basis.
Rita v. United States: Central to the court’s discussion of explanation. The panel relied on Rita’s requirement of “enough” explanation to show the court considered the arguments and had a reasoned basis, while also invoking Rita’s recognition that a within-Guidelines sentence often needs less elaboration when the judge is effectively adopting the Sentencing Commission’s reasoning.
United States v. Rosa: Cited to reinforce that the circuit expects the sentencing court to identify the consideration(s) driving the sentence—without demanding exhaustive point-by-point rebuttal of each defense argument.
United States v. Fernandez and United States v. Bonilla: Applied to allocution: a judge need not recite the substance of the defendant’s statement; the absence of a verbatim response is not itself error.
United States v. Verkhoglyad: Provided the presumption that sentencing judges faithfully discharge their duty to consider statutory factors, absent record evidence to the contrary—supporting rejection of the allocution-based procedural claim.
United States v. Stewart and United States v. Dorvee: DeRosse relied on Stewart to argue inadequate disparity analysis; the panel distinguished it by noting Stewart involved a child pornography Guideline that Dorvee described as “fundamentally different” and not based on an empirical approach. In contrast, this case involved bank robbery and a within-Guidelines sentence where less elaborate disparity discussion may suffice.
United States v. Lawrence: Quoted to underline that where circumstances show the judge is resting on the Commission’s reasoning that a Guidelines sentence is proper, “no lengthy explanation is needed.”
United States v. Broxmeyer and United States v. Fernandez: Used to reject the notion that § 3553(a)(6) requires a sentencing-data or comparator analysis absent a disparity argument made to the district court.
United States v. Dussard, United States v. Groysman, and United States v. Olano: Structured the plain error standard applicable because DeRosse did not preserve his procedural objections below (error; plainness; effect on substantial rights).
United States v. Evans: Foreclosed the Guidelines “crime of violence” challenge by holding that bank robbery under § 2113(a) qualifies for purposes of the career-offender guideline.
United States v. Rigas: Defined the narrow universe of sentences that are substantively unreasonable—those “shockingly high” or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.
United States v. Thavaraja: Cited for the unresolved question whether unpreserved substantive-reasonableness claims are reviewed for plain error; the panel assumed abuse-of-discretion review.
United States v. Pope: Supported the principle that disagreement from the defense or Probation regarding the appropriate sentence does not itself establish an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Quattrone: In the reassignment discussion, Quattrone supplied the “interest and appearance of justice” rationale and the concern triggered when judicial statements could be perceived as intimidating or penalizing appellate pursuit.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural reasonableness: “boilerplate” vs. individualized assessment

The core procedural attack was that the district court’s use of prepared introductory sentencing language suggested a non-individualized approach. The Second Circuit treated the issue as one of adequate explanation and meaningful consideration under Rita and Villafuerte, not stylistic originality. The panel’s key move was to separate form from function:

Form: Standardized remarks may be used; courts are not required to “draft novel language for every point.”
Function: What matters is whether the court then engages in case-specific discussion enabling meaningful appellate review.

Here, the record showed individualized analysis: the court discussed DeRosse’s age, lengthy and repetitive robbery history, near-immediate recidivism following release, parole status during the offense, and the “violent nature” of threatening an elderly victim, along with substance abuse and mental health issues. The panel held that these findings sufficiently demonstrated a § 3553(a) assessment and thus no procedural error—especially under plain-error review.

2) Allocution and trauma: acknowledgment is enough

DeRosse argued the court failed to meaningfully engage with his allocution and traumatic history. Relying on Fernandez, Bonilla, and Verkhoglyad, the panel emphasized that appellate courts presume the judge considered the allocution and § 3553(a) factors unless the record suggests otherwise. The record here included explicit acknowledgment of DeRosse’s trauma and treatment efforts, and the district court’s remarks “mirrored the themes” of the allocution. The panel therefore found no procedural defect.

3) § 3553(a)(6) disparities: obligation recognized; no comparator exercise required

The panel distinguished Stewart by treating it as context-specific—tied to the child pornography guideline’s unusual provenance as described in Dorvee. For a within-Guidelines bank-robbery sentence, and where DeRosse did not press a disparity-comparator argument below, the district court’s express recognition of § 3553(a)(6) and statement that the sentence rested on the “nature and characteristics of this defendant and the instant crime of conviction” was adequate. Under Broxmeyer and Fernandez, § 3553(a)(6) does not invariably compel statistical comparisons or detailed discussion of other cases.

4) Career offender: foreclosed by binding circuit precedent

On the “crime of violence” question, the panel treated the issue as controlled by Evans: bank robbery under § 2113(a) qualifies under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), making DeRosse a career offender. The argument was presented solely for preservation.

5) Substantive reasonableness: within-range, recidivism, and public protection

Applying Rigas, the panel held the 180-month sentence—within the 151–188 month range—was not “shockingly high” given the serious threat of lethal violence, vulnerability of the victim, parole status, and the decades-long pattern of similar conduct. Mitigation (trauma, substance use disorder, mental illness, treatment efforts) was considered but did not compel a lower sentence. Pope reinforced that a lower recommendation from defense or Probation does not render the chosen sentence an abuse of discretion.

6) Reassignment concerns: cautionary note, but moot

The panel addressed, but did not decide in operative fashion, whether the district court’s comments about appellate rights and potential sentencing on remand created the appearance of punishing an appeal. It noted that if a remand were required, the “interest and appearance of justice” under Quattrone would counsel care to avoid intimidation. Because there was no remand, reassignment was moot. The passage nonetheless functions as a warning that judges should avoid statements that could be construed as chilling appellate review.

Impact

Formally, the decision is a nonprecedential summary order. Practically, it reinforces several durable themes in Second Circuit sentencing review:

“Boilerplate” is not itself reversible error when the sentencing transcript shows individualized discussion tied to § 3553(a).
Allocution challenges face a presumption of consideration; absent record indicators that a judge ignored the defendant, appellate courts will not require explicit, point-by-point engagement.
§ 3553(a)(6) does not automatically require comparator-based analysis, particularly when the defendant did not raise a disparity argument below and the court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence.
Career-offender challenges remain constrained by circuit precedent such as Evans, even if raised for preservation.
Reassignment signals: the panel’s discussion highlights continuing sensitivity to comments that could be perceived as penalizing a successful appeal, even where the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural reasonableness: Whether the sentencing process was properly conducted—e.g., correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a) factors, reliance on accurate facts, and adequate explanation.
Substantive reasonableness: Whether the length/type of sentence is within the range of permissible outcomes given the facts and § 3553(a). Under Rigas, reversal is reserved for extreme outliers (“shockingly high/low”).
Plain error review: A tougher standard applied when objections were not made in the district court. Under Olano/Dussard/Groysman, the appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights (and typically that correction is needed to protect the fairness and integrity of proceedings).
Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A Guidelines status that substantially increases the advisory sentencing range if the defendant has qualifying prior convictions and the current offense is a “crime of violence” or controlled-substance offense.
“Crime of violence” (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)): A defined category of offenses that, under the Guidelines and circuit precedent, includes bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) in the Second Circuit (Evans).
§ 3553(a)(6) unwarranted disparity: A directive to avoid unjustified differences among similarly situated defendants. DeRosse underscores that courts may satisfy this factor without detailed cross-case comparisons, particularly absent a developed disparity claim.

Conclusion

United States v. DeRosse affirms a within-Guidelines career-offender sentence and clarifies that standardized sentencing remarks do not create procedural error where the transcript shows an individualized, § 3553(a)-grounded assessment. The decision also signals that detailed § 3553(a)(6) disparity analysis is not invariably required—especially absent a disparity argument at sentencing—and reiterates the Second Circuit’s narrow approach to substantive unreasonableness under Rigas. Finally, while moot here, the panel’s reassignment discussion cautions sentencing courts to avoid statements that could be perceived as discouraging appellate review.