Staffing-Agency Limits Under ADA § 12112(b)(2): No Liability for Client’s Internal-Hire Disability Inquiry Absent Participation or Corrective Control; § 12112(d) Damages Require Tangible Injury

I. Introduction

Suchak v. TEKSystems, Inc. (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) arises from a common modern arrangement: a staffing agency employs a worker and assigns him to a client site, while the client (or a successor vendor) controls day-to-day work and, sometimes, offers a direct-hire “conversion” role.

Steven Scott Suchak (plaintiff/appellant) worked as a temporary Data Center Technician employed by TEKSystems, Inc. (“TEK”) and placed at Integris, where Tech Mahindra, Inc. (“Mahindra”) later assumed IT management. Mahindra asked Suchak—first in 2020 and again in 2021—to complete the Department of Labor’s OFCCP Form CC-305 (a voluntary disability self-identification form). Suchak refused and filed a complaint with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”). When his assignment later ended and TEK’s at-will employment relationship ended co-extensively with the assignment, Suchak sued TEK under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), alleging:

  • impermissible disability-related inquiries (2020 and 2021), and
  • retaliation for filing an OFCCP complaint.

The district court granted summary judgment to TEK on all claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in full (in a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” citable for persuasive value).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court assumed (without deciding) that requesting completion of Form CC-305 could qualify as an impermissible disability-related inquiry under the ADA. Even so, it held:

  1. 2020 inquiry claim fails because Suchak did not show a tangible injury flowing from the inquiry; without injury, he could not recover compensatory or punitive damages.
  2. 2021 inquiry claim fails because TEK was not liable for Mahindra’s request tied to Mahindra’s separate internal hiring process; TEK did not participate in the inquiry and had no corrective measures “within its control,” and the inquiry “only affect[ed]” Mahindra’s employees/applicants under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6(c).
  3. Retaliation claim fails because, under McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, TEK articulated a legitimate reason for termination (assignment expired per the employment agreement), and Suchak produced insufficient evidence of pretext. Attempts to attribute Mahindra’s actions to TEK were rejected (or deemed waived).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary judgment framework and appellate review

  • GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Behunin and Dullmaier v. Xanterra Parks & Resorts frame de novo review and Rule 56’s “no genuine dispute of material fact” standard.
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. supplies the definitions of “material” and “genuine,” anchoring the court’s insistence on record evidence that could move a jury.
  • Young v. Dillon Companies, Inc. reinforces the obligation to view evidence in the nonmovant’s favor—important here because the court still found the record wanting even under that lens.
  • Celotex Corp. v. Catrett and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. govern the burden shift: once TEK pointed to an absence of evidence on key elements (injury, participation/control, pretext), Suchak had to identify specific supporting facts.

2. ADA impermissible inquiry claims: elements and remedies

  • Williams v. FedEx Corp. Servs. supplies the basic impermissible-inquiry elements and the principle that a plaintiff need not prove he is disabled to sue under § 12112(d). The panel used this to bracket the dispute over whether CC-305 is an inquiry—then assumed unlawfulness and resolved the case on other grounds.
  • Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc. (1998), Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., and Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc. (2001) are the remedial backbone: a plaintiff must prove “injury flowing from” the inquiry; “merely being ask[ed] the impermissible question” is not enough.
  • Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light is cited (through Griffin (2001)) to reinforce the “tangible injury” requirement as a condition of compensatory relief for a technical § 12112(d) violation.
  • Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc. (2001) also defeats the plaintiff’s punitive-damages theory: absent injury, punitive damages are unavailable for a mere inquiry violation.

3. Contractual-relationship liability and staffing agency limits

  • Fromm v. MVM, Inc. and Keneipp v. MVM, Inc. are used to discuss the principle that an employer may not “do through a contractual or other relationship what it is prohibited from doing directly.” The panel accepted the principle but emphasized its limits in the staffing context—liability turns on participation or control.
  • The panel relied heavily on the EEOC’s “Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed By Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms” Enforcement Guidance (Dec. 3, 1997) for the staffing-agency rule: a staffing firm is liable for a client’s discrimination only if it participated, or if it knew/should have known and failed to take corrective measures within its control.

4. Issue preservation and the record on appeal

  • Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. supports restricting de novo review to materials adequately presented to the district court; the panel used it to reject new evidentiary theories raised for the first time on appeal.
  • Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., United States v. McBride: unpreserved theories (e.g., joint-employer liability for Mahindra’s non-extension) require a plain-error argument on appeal; failure to make one results in waiver.

5. ADA retaliation burden-shifting and pretext

  • McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green provides the framework; Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc. explains the production burden and what constitutes pretext (“unworthy of credence” or discriminatory motive more likely).
  • Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co. supplies the retaliation prima facie elements and also supports affirmance on any record-supported ground.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. 2020 inquiry: assuming illegality is not enough—injury is required

The court sidestepped administrative-exhaustion disputes and affirmed on an alternative ground: no injury. Under the Griffin/Garrison line, an impermissible inquiry claim is not self-executing for damages; it requires a cognizable harm caused by the inquiry. The record showed that after Suchak objected, TEK asked Mahindra to waive the requirement; Suchak then continued working for eleven more months and even received a later conversion offer. On those facts, no reasonable jury could find a “tangible injury” from the 2020 request.

The opinion also tightens remedies: invoking Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc. (2001), it rejects punitive damages absent injury, preventing plaintiffs from converting a technical inquiry violation into a punitive-damages case without concrete harm.

2. 2021 inquiry: staffing-agency nonliability where the client’s internal hiring process is separate and beyond agency control

The 2021 request arose in a different posture: Mahindra’s internal offer was “separate and distinct” from Suchak’s TEK assignment. The panel assumed the form might be an impermissible inquiry but focused on who could be liable.

Applying the staffing-firm lens reflected in the EEOC guidance (participation, or knowledge plus corrective action within control), the court found no triable evidence that TEK:

  • asked Suchak to complete CC-305,
  • represented it as a TEK condition of continued TEK employment,
  • controlled Mahindra’s internal onboarding paperwork, or
  • had authority to obtain a waiver in 2021 (as opposed to 2020, when the request related to continuing the TEK assignment).

The opinion further relies on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6(c): even if an employer cannot contract around ADA duties, it is “not liable for the actions of the other party or parties to the contract which only affect that other party’s employees or applicants.” Because the 2021 inquiry was tied to Mahindra’s internal hiring and did not alter TEK’s employment relationship with Suchak, it “only affect[ed]” Mahindra’s side of the relationship. The panel declined an “expansive reading” that would effectively impose strict liability on staffing agencies for client conduct outside the staffing firm’s involvement or control.

3. Retaliation: TEK’s “assignment expired” rationale is legitimate; no pretext shown

The court accepted (as did the district court) that Suchak could establish a prima facie retaliation claim based on temporal proximity between the OFCCP complaint and the end of TEK employment. But it limited the adverse action analysis to TEK’s termination, refusing to attribute Mahindra’s conversion withdrawal to TEK absent control or participation, and treating the joint-employer/non-extension theory as waived.

At step two, TEK met its burden by producing the employment agreement and undisputed timing: TEK employment ended when the assignment ended on August 31, 2021. At step three, the court found no record evidence undermining that explanation. It distinguished Keneipp v. MVM, Inc., where the contractor’s termination letter tied the firing to medical issues and the contractor knowingly implemented the client’s discriminatory directive. Here, there was no comparable evidence that TEK knew Mahindra’s motivations, adopted them, or acted inconsistently with its stated assignment-expiration rationale.

C. Impact

Although nonprecedential, the decision is a detailed, practical roadmap for ADA claims involving staffing agencies and third-party client conduct:

  • Inquiry claims will turn on injury. Plaintiffs alleging ADA § 12112(d) inquiry violations should expect dispositive scrutiny of tangible harm and causation; the mere asking of a prohibited question is not enough for damages (including punitive damages).
  • Staffing agency liability is cabined by control. The opinion reinforces that § 12112(b)(2) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 do not create strict liability for a client’s actions; liability aligns with participation or feasible corrective measures within the staffing firm’s control.
  • “Conversion” scenarios are treated as separable. Where a client’s internal hiring and onboarding is meaningfully separate from the staffing relationship, the staffing firm has a strong argument that the conduct “only affect[s]” the client’s applicants/employees under § 1630.6(c).
  • Preservation and record-building are decisive. The opinion highlights how failure to properly present facts in the district court (and to argue plain error on appeal) can foreclose otherwise colorable theories such as joint-employer responsibility.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Impermissible disability-related inquiry” (ADA § 12112(d)): Questions (or forms) that ask whether someone has a disability or the nature/severity of a disability. Certain limited inquiries are allowed if job-related and necessary.
  • “Tangible injury” for inquiry damages: A concrete harm caused by the unlawful inquiry (e.g., denial of an opportunity, emotional distress with evidentiary support, or other compensable consequences). The question alone does not automatically yield money damages.
  • “Contractual relationship” liability (ADA § 12112(b)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6): Employers cannot evade ADA obligations by outsourcing to another entity; but the regulation also limits liability for acts that only affect the other entity’s applicants/employees.
  • Staffing firm “corrective measures within its control”: Steps the staffing agency can actually take—such as objecting, seeking waiver when the issue concerns the staffing assignment, reassigning the worker, or ending the placement—depending on contractual and practical authority.
  • McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting: An evidentiary method for retaliation/discrimination cases without direct proof: (1) employee shows prima facie case; (2) employer gives a legitimate reason; (3) employee must show the reason is a pretext.
  • Waiver/forfeiture on appeal: If an argument was not made below, the appellant generally must argue “plain error” on appeal; otherwise the appellate court may refuse to consider it.

V. Conclusion

Suchak v. TEKSystems, Inc. affirms summary judgment for a staffing agency facing ADA inquiry and retaliation claims rooted in a client’s conduct. The opinion’s central lessons are twofold: (1) ADA impermissible-inquiry claims seeking damages require proof of a tangible injury caused by the inquiry, and (2) staffing agencies are not automatically liable for a client’s allegedly unlawful inquiry or employment decision tied to the client’s separate internal hiring process unless the agency participated or failed to take corrective action within its control. In the retaliation context, a contractually defined assignment end can be a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason, and plaintiffs must marshal concrete record evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.