Date: Jan 18, 2026

Specific Unanimity Instruction Alone Cures Duplicitous “Multiple-Instances” Counts—Special Interrogatories Not Constitutionally Required

1. Introduction

In State v. Carlos G. (Conn. Jan. 20, 2026), the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed a recurring trial problem in child sexual abuse prosecutions: the state charged single statutory offenses in single counts, but each count was supported by evidence of multiple, separate incidents over a span of years. That charging format is commonly described as duplicitous because a single count encompasses multiple distinct acts, each of which could constitute a separate violation.

The defendant, Carlos G., was convicted of five counts of sexual assault in the first degree under General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2) (and other offenses not challenged on appeal). The key appellate issue was narrow but significant: even when a trial court gives a correct specific unanimity instruction, does the federal constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict also require the court to submit—sua sponte—special interrogatories asking jurors to identify which incident(s) they unanimously found for each count?

The court’s answer was unequivocal: no. A proper specific unanimity instruction is sufficient; the federal Constitution does not require special interrogatories in this setting.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the judgments. It held that where the state charges, in a single count, a single statutory offense supported by evidence of multiple separate incidents, the defendant’s federal constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is adequately protected by a specific unanimity instruction requiring jurors to agree unanimously on at least one specific incident that satisfies the count.

The defendant’s unpreserved claim—seeking a rule that special interrogatories are additionally required—failed on the merits. The court found no constitutional authority compelling interrogatories where correct unanimity instructions were given and presumed the jury followed those instructions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421, 285 A.3d 1067 (2022)

Douglas C. is the opinion’s doctrinal anchor. The court relied on it for three linked propositions:

A unanimity problem “as to instances of conduct” arises when “a single count” charges violation of “a single statute in multiple, separate instances,” each capable of being a separate crime—i.e., a duplicitous count.
The constitutional danger is not that jurors disagree about guilt in the abstract, but that they may “agree” the defendant committed something while not agreeing on which incident constitutes the charged offense.
The cure for that risk is a specific unanimity instruction directing jurors that they must unanimously agree on a particular incident (or at least one specific incident) to convict on the count.

State v. Carlos G. treats Douglas C. as establishing the baseline constitutional safeguard: if the jury is properly instructed on specific unanimity, the unanimity right is protected—absent some reason to think the jury did not follow the instruction.

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)

Because the defendant did not request special interrogatories at trial, the claim was unpreserved. The court applied the familiar four-part framework of Golding, as modified by In re Yasiel R., which refines the third prong’s articulation. In this case, the state conceded:

the record was adequate, and
the claim was of constitutional magnitude.

The court resolved the appeal on the merits (the “third prong” question whether a constitutional violation exists) by holding there was no violation in light of the proper unanimity instructions.

In re Vada V., 343 Conn. 730, 275 A.3d 1172 (2022)

In re Vada V. is cited for the methodological point that the first two Golding prongs concern reviewability, while the latter prongs address merits. Its role is clarifying the analytic structure rather than supplying a substantive unanimity rule.

State v. Sharpe, 353 Conn. 564, 343 A.3d 408 (2025)

Sharpe supplied a critical presumption used to reject the need for interrogatories: courts presume juries follow instructions unless the challenger shows otherwise. Because Carlos G. did not argue the jury failed to follow the unanimity instruction, the court treated the instruction as effective in ensuring actual unanimity as to at least one incident per count.

State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 10 A.3d 942 (2011)

The state argued waiver under Kitchens (typically addressing waiver/induced error where counsel has a meaningful opportunity to review and accept instructions). The court explicitly declined to reach the waiver question because it found no constitutional violation in the first place. Nonetheless, the citation signals that in future cases a defendant’s failure to request interrogatories (or to object after reviewing proposed instructions) may raise waiver issues—though that question remains open in this decision.

State v. Anderson, 158 Conn. App. 315, 118 A.3d 728, cert. granted, 319 Conn. 907, 123 A.3d 438 (2015), and cert. granted, 319 Conn. 908, 123 A.3d 437 (2015) (appeals withdrawn)

The court cited Anderson in a footnote to illustrate that special interrogatories sometimes appear in criminal trials, including when a jury must find a fact necessary for a sentence enhancement. This comparison underscores the court’s main point: interrogatories may be permissible or even required in specific contexts, but that does not translate into a general constitutional mandate to use interrogatories to “police” unanimity where the jury has been properly instructed.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a linear chain:

Identify the nature of the charging problem. Each sexual assault count alleged a particular sexual act but encompassed “multiple, separate instances.” This is the classic “multiple-instances single-count” duplicity concern.
Apply the established constitutional cure. Under State v. Douglas C., a specific unanimity instruction cures the unanimity risk posed by a duplicitous count. Here, the defendant conceded the trial court gave proper specific unanimity instructions for each sexual assault count.
Reject the requested constitutional add-on (interrogatories). The defendant sought a new rule that a court must also require special interrogatories—even without a request—so the defendant can know which incident formed the basis of conviction. The court framed the dispositive question as one of federal constitutional necessity, and held the defendant failed to show such a requirement exists.
Rely on the presumption that juries follow instructions. Citing State v. Sharpe, the court presumed jurors followed the specific unanimity instruction and therefore actually reached unanimity on at least one incident per count. Absent evidence or argument undermining that presumption, the court found “no doubt” that constitutional unanimity was satisfied.

Importantly, the court did not say interrogatories are improper; it said the Constitution “requires nothing more” than the properly given specific unanimity instruction in this setting, and the defendant cited no authority for a contrary federal mandate.

3.3. Impact

The decision has immediate practical consequences for Connecticut criminal trials involving repeated conduct over time (especially child sexual abuse cases, where victims may recall categories of abuse and locations but not always precise dates or a cleanly countable number of occurrences):

Stability of the Douglas C. framework. The court reinforces that specific unanimity instructions are the constitutionally sufficient tool for “multiple-instances single-count” prosecutions. Trial courts are not constitutionally obligated to go further by creating an interrogatory mechanism.
Limits on post-verdict “which incident?” challenges. Defendants may argue that uncertainty about which incident underlies a conviction is unfair, but Carlos G. treats the unanimity instruction—not post-verdict incident identification—as the constitutional measure. The opinion thus narrows the path for unpreserved unanimity challenges framed as demands for special verdict specificity.
Strategic implications for trial practice. If a party wants interrogatories for clarity, appellate-proofing, or future litigation (e.g., issue identification), it should request them. The court leaves open whether interrogatories would be “appropriate” if requested, but makes clear they are not constitutionally compelled sua sponte.
Presumption of juror compliance is pivotal. Future challenges may shift from “instructions weren’t enough” to “why the presumption should not apply here” (for example, if instructions were confusing, internally inconsistent, or undermined by argument or verdict form structure). Carlos G. signals that without such a showing, the presumption will carry the day.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Duplicitous count (duplicity): A single count that effectively alleges more than one distinct criminal act. The risk is that jurors might split: some believe act A happened, others believe act B happened, and they convict without agreeing on the same act—threatening unanimity.
Specific unanimity instruction: A jury instruction that requires jurors to agree unanimously on the same particular incident (or at least one specific incident) supporting the count, not merely that the defendant did something wrong at some point.
Special interrogatories: Written questions the jury answers in addition to (or as part of) the verdict, typically used to record findings on specific factual issues. Here, the defendant wanted interrogatories asking jurors to specify which incident they unanimously found proved for each sexual assault count.
Golding review: A Connecticut doctrine allowing appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims if certain conditions are met. Even if reviewable, the defendant must still show an actual constitutional violation on the merits.
Presumption the jury follows instructions: Courts generally assume jurors follow the judge’s legal instructions unless the challenging party shows reason to believe they did not. This presumption was decisive in concluding the unanimity instruction effectively ensured unanimity.

5. Conclusion

State v. Carlos G. solidifies a clear rule for “multiple-instances” prosecutions: when a single count covers multiple separate incidents, a properly delivered specific unanimity instruction satisfies the defendant’s federal constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. The Connecticut Supreme Court declined to constitutionalize an additional requirement that trial courts submit special interrogatories on unanimity sua sponte.

The opinion’s broader significance lies in its restraint: it preserves flexibility for trial courts to use interrogatories when requested or otherwise required (e.g., sentence-enhancement findings), but it keeps the constitutional floor where Douglas C. placed it—on clear instructions and the presumption that juries follow them.