South Carolina Adopts the Cheek Three-Step Remmer Framework, Bars Juror “Effect” Testimony Under Rule 606(b), and Overrules Ethier on Mental-Process Evidence

I. Introduction

In State v. Richard Alexander Murdaugh (S.C. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2026), the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the denial of Richard “Alex” Murdaugh’s motion for a new trial and remanded for retrial after finding that the Colleton County Clerk of Court, Rebecca Hill, improperly communicated with jurors about the case—comments aimed at Murdaugh’s credibility and the defense’s evidence.

The case arose from Murdaugh’s March 2, 2023 convictions for the murders of his wife, Maggie, and son, Paul, and related weapons charges. While his direct appeal was pending, he pursued a new-trial motion alleging external jury influence: Hill allegedly advised jurors “not to be fooled,” to “watch him closely,” to observe “actions” and “movements,” and to anticipate quick deliberations (“this shouldn’t take us long”), among other conduct tied to Hill’s media access and book project. Former Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal presided over the post-trial hearing and denied relief, finding improper comments occurred but concluding they did not prejudice the verdict.

The central legal issues were (1) the governing standard for evaluating “outside influence” on jurors, including whether and how the Remmer presumption applies; (2) what evidence may be considered in assessing prejudice, particularly under Rule 606(b), SCRE; and (3) in guidance for retrial, the proper limits on admitting extensive “other bad acts” evidence of Murdaugh’s financial crimes as proof of motive under Rules 401–404(b), SCRE.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • New trial ordered. Hill’s juror-directed comments were “more than innocuous interventions,” triggered a rebuttable presumption of prejudice under Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (Remmer I), and the State failed to prove “no reasonable possibility” the verdict was influenced.
  • Doctrinal clarification. South Carolina courts must apply the Fourth Circuit’s three-step external-contact analysis from United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1996) when faced with improper third-party juror contacts.
  • Evidence-rule enforcement. The Court held the post-trial court erred by eliciting and relying on juror testimony about whether Hill’s comments “influenced” verdicts—testimony barred by Rule 606(b), SCRE.
  • Ethier curtailed. The Court expressly overruled Ethier v. Fairfield Mem'l Hosp., 429 S.C. 649, 842 S.E.2d 355 (2020) “to the extent this case condoned the use of testimony about the jury’s mental processes in reaching their verdict.”
  • Guidance on retrial evidence. Some financial-crimes evidence may be admissible to show motive, but the first trial’s 12.5 hours and granular, inflammatory details went “far too long and far too deep” and must be curtailed under Rules 403 and 404(b), SCRE.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The Remmer line and South Carolina’s alignment with the Fourth Circuit

The Court anchored its prejudice framework in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (Remmer I), which holds that “any private communication, contact, or tampering” with a juror “about the matter pending before the jury” is “presumptively prejudicial,” with a heavy burden on the Government to show harmlessness. The Court emphasized the presumption is rebuttable, not conclusive, echoing Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (Remmer II) and its instruction to examine the “entire picture.”

To operationalize Remmer, the Court adopted the Fourth Circuit’s structured approach from United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1996): (i) the movant must present competent evidence that the external contact was “more than innocuous interventions”; (ii) if so, the Remmer presumption is automatically triggered; and (iii) the prevailing party must show “no reasonable possibility” the verdict was influenced. The Court also relied on Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532 (4th Cir. 1986) for the “innocuous interventions” concept.

The Court used Fourth Circuit authority to confirm the presumption’s continued vitality: United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[a]live and well”), and Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2014) for both the centrality of an impartial jury and the entitlement to a hearing upon a credible allegation of external contact. It further cited Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988) for the standard that external contact concerns the matter pending when it reasonably draws into question the verdict’s integrity.

2. Defining “external” influence and why Hill’s statements crossed the constitutional line

The Court reinforced the “external vs. internal” distinction (critical under both Remmer doctrine and Rule 606(b)) using Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2009) (external influences “necessitate a thorough judicial inquiry”), State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 610 S.E.2d 859 (Ct. App. 2005) (defining external and internal influences), and it situated Hill’s conduct as quintessentially external: an officer of the court communicating substantive credibility cues to jurors.

On the degree of prejudice when an officer of the court speaks to jurors about guilt/credibility, the Court relied heavily on Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966). In Parker, a bailiff told jurors the defendant was guilty; the Supreme Court noted the bailiff’s “official character” carries great weight. The Court here treated Hill’s role as similarly powerful—indeed, as the jury’s “primary caretaker” during a high-profile trial—and found her remarks “more comparable” to Parker than to less prejudicial procedural remarks. The Court also invoked Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (as quoted in Parker) to underscore that some official intrusions are inherently incompatible with due process.

3. Distinguishing Green and narrowing when Remmer is not triggered

The Court distinguished its own prior decision in State v. Green, 427 S.C. 223, 830 S.E.2d 711 (Ct. App. 2019) (Green I), aff'd as modified, 432 S.C. 97, 851 S.E.2d 440 (2020) (Green II). In Green, a bailiff answered a juror’s procedural question about what might happen in the event of a deadlock (including an Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) charge). Green II held those comments did not touch the merits and therefore did not trigger the Remmer presumption. Here, by contrast, Hill’s comments were merits-directed: they attacked the defense and directed jurors to evaluate the defendant as deceitful, thus “about the matter before the jury.”

4. The Phillips/Olano debate and why Remmer survives

The opinion confronted the post-Remmer jurisprudential debate by discussing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). The Court read these cases (consistent with Lawson and Barnes) as limiting indiscriminate presumptions but not overruling Remmer in the external-contact setting. It noted Olano expressly recognized some intrusions should be presumed prejudicial, while declining to presume prejudice from alternate jurors’ presence during deliberations (especially under a plain-error posture, citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157 (1936)).

The Court also cited Jenkins v. State, 825 A.2d 1008 (Md. 2003) for the proposition that Phillips and Olano do not eliminate presumptive prejudice where misconduct is “excessive or egregious.”

5. South Carolina cases re-situated under the clarified framework

The Court acknowledged that South Carolina decisions sometimes analyzed prejudice without explicit Remmer framing, including State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (mistrial posture; juror shared a pro-death-penalty pamphlet) and State v. Bryant, 354 S.C. 390, 581 S.E.2d 157 (2003) (detectives contacted jurors’ families; timing and nature undermined impartiality). Rather than treating these as contrary law, the Court “clarif[ied] today” that the Cheek/Remmer three-step analysis is the operative method going forward for improper third-party juror contact.

The opinion also rejected the post-trial court’s reliance on State v. Aldret, 333 S.C. 307, 509 S.E.2d 811 (1999), noting Aldret dealt with premature deliberations—an internal influence—where different rules apply.

6. Rule 606(b) and the Court’s reliance on federal analogs

The Court grounded its Rule 606(b) holding in textual interpretation principles (citing Ex parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 625 S.E.2d 205 (2005)) and the propriety of consulting federal authority when rules align (citing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Palmetto Cont. Servs., Inc., 434 S.C. 104, 862 S.E.2d 714 (Ct. App. 2021) and Renaissance Enters., Inc. v. Ocean Resorts, Inc., 334 S.C. 324, 513 S.E.2d 617 (1999)).

On the policy of insulating deliberations, the Court relied on Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), and on the specific bar against “effect on the juror’s mind or emotions,” it leaned on United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1996) (error to ask whether jurors considered all evidence; improper reliance on mental processes), plus supporting decisions such as Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1994) and United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 1995). It further invoked State ex rel. Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) for the “sanctity” rationale. Finally, it rejected an “invited error” argument relying on State v. Stanko, 402 S.C. 252, 741 S.E.2d 708 (2013) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490, 832 S.E.2d 575 (2019)), holding Rule 606(b)’s protections are systemic and not the defendant’s to waive.

7. Evidentiary guidance cases (motive, propensity, unfair prejudice)

On motive relevance, the Court cited State v. White, 437 S.C. 490, 879 S.E.2d 21 (Ct. App. 2022) (relevance threshold is low) and State v. Sweat, 362 S.C. 117, 606 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 2004). On Rule 404(b) structure and limits, it referenced State v. Galloway, 443 S.C. 229, 904 S.E.2d 866 (2024), State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 842 S.E.2d 654 (2020), State v. Benton, 338 S.C. 151, 526 S.E.2d 228 (2000), and the foundational logical-connection requirement from State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). For the Rule 403 backstop even when an exception applies, it cited State v. Clasby, 385 S.C. 148, 682 S.E.2d 892 (2009) and State v. Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 667 S.E.2d 728 (2008). Deference to trial-court discretion was framed with State v. Heyward, 441 S.C. 484, 895 S.E.2d 658 (2023) and Morris v. BB&T Corp., 438 S.C. 582, 885 S.E.2d 394 (2023).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Fact-finding on Hill’s comments and why credibility mattered

The Court first resolved the factual predicate: which statements were made. Although the post-trial court referenced only some remarks (e.g., “epic day,” “important day,” “watch body language”), it found Hill not credible and never distinctly rejected the remainder of the reported comments. The Supreme Court treated the record as supporting the fuller set of remarks—“not to be fooled,” “not to be confused,” “don’t let them convince you,” and closely monitor Murdaugh’s actions/movements—corroborated by multiple sources (Juror Z, the alternate juror, Juror 785’s affidavit, and testimony about Hill’s similar statements to staff/media).

2. Triggering Remmer: “more than innocuous interventions”

Applying Cheek, the Court held Murdaugh met the minimal showing that the contact was more than innocuous and was “about the matter before the jury.” The key was content: Hill’s remarks were not logistical or procedural. They framed the defendant’s testimony as suspect, urged jurors not to be misled by the defense, and pushed jurors to assess credibility in a particular direction—an issue “exclusively for the jury” (citing State v. Reyes, 432 S.C. 394, 853 S.E.2d 334 (2020)). The Court analogized this to Parker—an officer of the court telling jurors the defendant is guilty—rather than to Green.

The Court further reasoned that Hill’s institutional role amplified prejudice: as Clerk of Court, she was not a random bystander but an elected constitutional officer (citing McCormick Cnty. Council v. Butler, 361 S.C. 92, 603 S.E.2d 586 (2004)) who managed aspects of the trial and jury handling.

3. Rebutting Remmer: State’s burden and why it failed

Once the presumption attached, the State had to prove “no reasonable possibility” the verdict was influenced. The Court found multiple errors undermining the post-trial court’s “no prejudice” conclusion:

  • Burden misallocation. The post-trial court required Murdaugh to prove prejudice, contrary to the Remmer/Cheek allocation.
  • Improper reliance on juror mental-process testimony. The post-trial court asked jurors whether Hill’s comments “influenced” their verdicts and relied on those answers. The Supreme Court held this violated Rule 606(b), SCRE, which permits juror testimony about the existence of an outside influence but prohibits testimony about the effect on jurors’ minds, emotions, or mental processes.
  • Mischaracterization of the remarks as limited/not overt. The Supreme Court held the remarks were overt as to credibility and effectively urged a guilty verdict.
  • “Only a few jurors heard it” is not a cure. Relying on Parker, the Court stressed the constitutional entitlement is to 12 impartial jurors, not 9 or 10.
  • Strength of the evidence is not dispositive under this framework. The Court noted the case was largely circumstantial and credibility was central; Hill’s credibility attacks therefore “went to the heart of the case.” It cited harmless-error reasoning from Barnes v. Thomas, 938 F.3d 526 (2019) and Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996) (Motz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) emphasizing impact on the verdict, not sufficiency absent error.
  • Jury instructions could not cure what the judge never knew. While instructions often cure exposure to incompetent evidence (citing State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 517 S.E.2d 216 (1999)), the Court held standard instructions did not address an officer-of-the-court urging jurors to distrust the defense; moreover, the misconduct surfaced months later, so the trial judge never had an opportunity to give a tailored curative instruction.

Because the State could not rebut the presumption on an admissible record and in light of the seriousness of the external influence, the Court ordered a new trial.

4. Rule 606(b): a sharp boundary, plus an express partial overruling of Ethier

The Court’s Rule 606(b) analysis is itself precedent-setting in South Carolina practice. It holds that courts may take juror testimony to establish the existence and nature of an external influence, but may not ask or consider whether the influence affected a juror’s verdict. This rule is enforced even where a party submits an affidavit containing impermissible “effect” statements; such statements are inadmissible, and the party cannot “waive” the protection because the policy protects the jury system itself. The Court then overruled Ethier v. Fairfield Mem'l Hosp. to the extent it allowed mental-process testimony to show whether misconduct affected juror votes.

Notably, the Court pointed to how the State may still rebut presumptive prejudice without violating Rule 606(b), citing as an example United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593 (4th Cir. 2022) (rebuttal where exposed juror was removed and deliberations restarted).

5. Guidance on financial-crimes evidence: admissible in principle, but must be proportionate

Although the new trial was ordered for jury tampering, the Court issued retrial guidance on the State’s extensive financial-crimes evidence:

  • Relevance and motive. The Court agreed the financial-crimes evidence tended to make the State’s motive theory more probable under Rules 401 and 402, SCRE.
  • Rule 404(b) and logical connection. The Court held the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting some other-acts evidence to show motive, consistent with State v. Lyle and later Rule 404(b) cases (e.g., State v. Perry).
  • Rule 403 proportionality and efficiency. The Court unanimously held the State’s presentation exceeded what motive required. It singled out inflammatory, minimally probative details (e.g., testimony highlighting that a victim was a “vulnerable adult”) as having “zero probative value” to the motive theory while carrying obvious unfair prejudice. The Court also criticized the sheer scale (12.5 hours across ten days) and directed that, if admitted on retrial, the evidence must be introduced “efficiently” and without lengthy inflammatory detail.
  • No mandate to admit on retrial. The Court stressed retrial facts and circumstances may differ; the trial court must re-apply Rules 403/404(b) in context.

C. Impact

  1. Uniform external-contact doctrine in South Carolina. By expressly adopting the Cheek three-step test, the Court supplies a single, predictable framework for trial and post-trial courts to evaluate improper third-party juror contacts, including contacts by court officials.
  2. Stricter Remmer implementation and a heavier practical burden on the State. Once a defendant shows “more than innocuous interventions,” trial courts must presume prejudice and require the State to prove “no reasonable possibility” of influence. This is a demanding standard that will likely increase grants of new trials where the misconduct touches credibility, guilt, or the defense theory.
  3. Rule 606(b) hearings will look different. Post-trial courts must avoid asking jurors whether misconduct “influenced” them. Instead, hearings should focus on admissible facts: what was said/done, who heard it, timing, whether it was repeated, and surrounding circumstances—without probing deliberations or mental effect. This change should reduce “verdict reliability” inquiries but strengthen deliberation privacy.
  4. Ethier narrowed. Litigants can no longer rely on Ethier for the proposition that juror mental-process testimony is admissible when fairness is at stake. The Court’s express overruling signals that even serious allegations must be litigated through external facts, not juror cognition.
  5. Trial-management signal on “other bad acts.” The financial-crimes guidance reinforces that “motive” evidence is not a license for an expansive mini-trial on uncharged wrongdoing; trial courts should actively police cumulative and inflammatory detail under Rule 403, even when Rule 404(b) permits motive use.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Remmer presumption
If a third party privately communicates with a juror about the case (especially on guilt or credibility), the law presumes the contact was prejudicial. The State then must prove it did not affect the verdict (in South Carolina now framed as “no reasonable possibility” of influence).
Cheek three-step test
(1) Defendant shows the contact was more than trivial; (2) prejudice is presumed; (3) State must rebut by proving no reasonable possibility the contact influenced the verdict.
External vs. internal influence
External: information/pressure from outside the jury (e.g., a clerk/bailiff’s comments). Internal: dynamics originating within jurors themselves (e.g., premature discussions among jurors). External influences are treated more strictly.
Rule 606(b), SCRE
Jurors may testify that an outside influence occurred, but they may not testify how it affected their thinking, emotions, vote, or deliberations. Courts likewise may not rely on such “effect” testimony.
Rule 404(b) and Rule 403
Rule 404(b) generally bars “other crimes” to prove propensity (“he did bad things before, so he did this”), but allows it for specific purposes like motive. Rule 403 still allows exclusion if the evidence’s unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value—especially where details are inflammatory or cumulative.
Allen charge
A supplemental instruction (from Allen v. United States) encouraging jurors to continue deliberating when they report deadlock.

V. Conclusion

State v. Richard Alexander Murdaugh establishes a clear, statewide rule: South Carolina courts must apply the United States v. Cheek three-step approach to third-party juror contacts, impose the Remmer presumption when the contact is more than innocuous, and require the State to rebut it under a stringent “no reasonable possibility” standard. The decision also draws a bright evidentiary line under Rule 606(b), SCRE, barring juror “effect” testimony and overruling Ethier v. Fairfield Mem'l Hosp. to the extent it permitted mental-process proof.

Practically, the opinion strengthens the institutional commitment to jury impartiality—especially against credibility-steering by court officials—and signals more disciplined trial management of other-acts motive evidence under Rules 403 and 404(b), SCRE. The immediate consequence is a retrial; the broader consequence is a more structured and defendant-protective regime for litigating external jury influence claims in South Carolina.