Solop v. Solop: Deployed Parents Have No Unilateral Right to Delegate Court-Ordered Custodial Time Under Mississippi Code § 93-5-34

1. Introduction

Case: Solop v. Solop (Supreme Court of Mississippi, May 21, 2026).
Parties: Christopher Harper Solop (father/appellant) and Sarah Elizabeth Solop (mother/appellee).
Background: The parties share joint legal and joint physical custody of three minor children, exercising equal time on a week-on/week-off rotation. Christopher, an active-duty captain in the Mississippi Army National Guard, received orders for a seven-month overseas deployment beginning January 2026.

Key Issue: Whether Mississippi Code Section 93-5-34 permits a deploying parent with joint physical custody to “delegate” all of his court-ordered custodial time to his parents (the children’s grandparents) during deployment—effectively preserving the week-on/week-off rotation through a substitute caregiver.

Proceedings Below: The chancellor denied Christopher’s request to delegate his custody time to the grandparents but awarded them extensive temporary visitation during deployment and imposed statutory communication/leave-access requirements on the non-deployed parent under Section 93-5-34(3)(c). Christopher appealed, seeking clarification and a ruling that would allow his parents to exercise his full custodial weeks.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed. It held that Section 93-5-34 does not authorize a deployed parent to unilaterally delegate court-ordered custodial time to a third party. Decisions about temporary custody arrangements and any delegation-like relief remain vested in the chancery court, which must apply the child’s best interest as the “polestar consideration.” The Court further held that the chancellor did not abuse discretion by denying full delegation and instead granting the grandparents substantial temporary visitation during deployment.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

(a) Standards of review and deference in custody matters

  • Harwell v. In re Lauderdale Cnty. (citing Keener Props., LLC v. Wilson): Used to frame that statutory interpretation and application of law are reviewed de novo. This allowed the Supreme Court to independently assess Section 93-5-34 without deference to the chancellor’s legal conclusions.
  • Hensarling v. Hensarling and Mabus v. Mabus: Reinforced the “narrow” appellate review of child custody determinations and the “best interest of the child” as the polestar. The Court relied on these cases to avoid substituting its judgment for the chancellor’s factual and discretionary determinations.
  • Tucker v. Prisock (quoting Johnson v. Ferguson): Provided the definition of “substantial evidence” supporting a chancellor’s findings—more than a mere scintilla—bolstering the affirmance of the visitation-heavy remedy.
  • M.R.C.P. 53(g)(2): Although not a case, the Rule set the review framework for a chancellor’s acceptance of a special master’s findings (“accept unless manifestly wrong”), supporting institutional deference to trial-level factfinding.

(b) Statutory interpretation methodology

  • Marx v. Broom (citing City of Hazlehurst v. Mayes, Hamner v. Yazoo Delta Lumber Co., and State v. Traylor): Anchored the principle that courts cannot “restrict or enlarge” an unambiguous statute. This was central to rejecting Christopher’s attempt to read into Section 93-5-34(3) a mandatory “status quo” preservation mechanism or implied unilateral delegation power.
  • State ex rel. Fitch v. Yazaki N. Am., Inc. (citing Dalton v. Cellular S., Inc.): Supplied the definition of ambiguity (susceptibility to two reasonable interpretations). The Court’s approach implied the relevant provisions were sufficiently clear to apply as written.
  • Miss. Ethics Comm'n v. Grisham (quoting Marx v. Broom): Confirmed that when no ambiguity exists, the Court need not resort to interpretive rules beyond the text.

(c) Chancery court’s parens patriae role and best-interest primacy

  • Bryant v. Bryant (quoting Mathews v. Williams (In re Conservatorship of Mathews)): Reaffirmed that chancery courts are the “superior guardian” of minor children and are not bound by parental preferences. This supported the Court’s core holding that “delegation” of court-ordered custodial rights is a judicial decision, not a parental entitlement.

(d) Temporary orders and the Albright framework

  • Albright v. Albright and Sanders v. Sanders: Used to explain that because the order was a temporary custody order tied to deployment, the chancellor was not required to conduct a full Albright analysis. This insulated the trial court from an argument that it failed to engage in comprehensive factor-by-factor findings.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Textual distinction in Section 93-5-34: custody vs. visitation

The Court focused on the statutory structure:

  • Section 93-5-34(3) applies when a parent “has custody, or has joint custody with primary physical custody” and receives orders materially affecting the ability to exercise custody responsibilities. It authorizes the court to enter a “temporary custody order” and mandates certain communication and access provisions (leave availability; electronic contact; leave-schedule notice).
  • Section 93-5-34(4) explicitly states the court “may delegate” a deploying parent’s visitation rights (or a portion) to a qualifying family member if in the child’s best interest.

Christopher argued that Section 93-5-34(1) requires preserving the “status quo” and that the trial court should have allowed his parents to step into his 50/50 custodial weeks. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that Section 93-5-34 creates any unilateral delegation authority for custody. It emphasized that, while the statute does not forbid the court from considering delegation-like arrangements as part of a temporary custody order, it does not confer upon the parent the power to unilaterally transfer custodial rights.

(b) The “power of delegation” belongs to the court

The Court’s central clarification is institutional: custody (and any temporary reallocation of custodial time during deployment) is a judicial function. Even in deployment contexts, “the power to determine or delegate custodial rights is properly vested in the chancery court.” The Court anchored this in:

  • constitutional and traditional chancery jurisdiction over minors; and
  • Section 93-5-34(7), which preserves the court’s duty to apply the child’s best interest in “custody or visitation matters.”

This reasoning effectively distinguishes between (i) a statute allowing courts to manage disruption caused by deployment and (ii) a statute creating an entitlement for the deploying parent to keep “his” time in the family by substitution.

(c) Discretionary best-interest assessment supported by record evidence

On the facts, the Court deferred to the chancellor’s discretionary determination that full substitution of the grandparents for seven months was not required and might exacerbate conflict. The opinion highlights evidence supporting the chancellor’s solution:

  • documented hostility and lack of cordial co-parenting between Sarah and the grandparents, including a prior refusal to allow Sarah to pick up the children;
  • Sarah’s testimony about communication problems (calls/texts not answered) and fears of non-cooperation with school paperwork;
  • competing testimony about the children’s care and supervision at the grandparents’ home; and
  • the trial court’s effort to protect the deployed parent-child relationship through mandated availability on leave and electronic communication.

The “extensive temporary visitation” award to the grandparents functioned as a middle-ground remedy: it increased continuity of contact with the paternal family while keeping the custodial “default” with the non-deployed parent in times not allocated by the order.

3.3. Impact

  • No unilateral delegation rule (clarified): The decision squarely rejects the proposition that a deployed parent with court-ordered custody can, by request, compel a court to allow a third party (even grandparents) to assume the parent’s custodial weeks. Any delegation is discretionary with the court.
  • Custody vs. visitation matters: By emphasizing the statute’s explicit “delegate” language in subsection (4) (visitation) and its different mechanism in subsection (3) (temporary custody orders), the opinion will likely be cited to cabin attempts to treat custody as freely “assignable” during deployment.
  • Best-interest lens remains paramount in deployment cases: The Court underscored that Section 93-5-34(7) preserves best-interest analysis, limiting arguments that deployment creates a presumptive entitlement to preserve an equal-time schedule through a stand-in.
  • Grandparent involvement likely via visitation, not substitutionary custody: Trial courts may be more inclined—consistent with this case—to award substantial visitation to extended family during deployment rather than a complete transfer of a parent’s custodial allocation.
  • Litigation framing: Future litigants may tailor requests as court-crafted temporary custody arrangements rather than “delegations,” but Solop signals that labels will not override the court’s non-delegable responsibility to decide custody in the child’s best interest.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Joint legal vs. joint physical custody: “Legal custody” concerns decision-making (education, medical, welfare). “Physical custody” concerns where the children live and the time-sharing schedule.
  • Delegation (in this context): Allowing someone else to exercise a parent’s court-ordered parenting time. Section 93-5-34 expressly discusses delegation of visitation in subsection (4). Solop clarifies that custody-time substitution is not something the deploying parent controls; it is for the court to decide.
  • Temporary custody order: A short-term order designed to manage circumstances (here, deployment). It is not necessarily a permanent modification of custody.
  • Albright analysis: A factor-based test from Albright v. Albright commonly used in Mississippi for permanent custody determinations. The Court noted it was not required for this temporary, deployment-specific order.
  • “Manifestly wrong / clearly erroneous / abuse of discretion”: High-deference standards. Appellate courts do not re-try custody cases; they reverse only when the trial court’s decision lacks evidentiary support or misapplies law.
  • Substantial evidence: Enough relevant evidence that reasonable decision-makers could accept it as adequate to support the trial court’s conclusion.

5. Conclusion

Solop v. Solop establishes a practical and precedential clarification for Mississippi deployment-related custody disputes: Mississippi Code Section 93-5-34 does not grant a deployed parent the unilateral power to delegate court-ordered custodial time to a third party. Any temporary custody arrangement during deployment—and any delegation-like effect—remains within chancery court discretion and must be driven by the child’s best interest. The decision also signals that trial courts may appropriately protect continuity and family relationships through robust visitation and statutory communication safeguards without endorsing a full substitution of custodial rights.