Small Claims Courts in Hawaiʻi Lack Jurisdiction to Decide Pet Ownership (Replevin/Title) Disputes

1. Introduction

In Miller v. Collins (Haw. July 27, 2026), petitioner Alexandra Miller sought extraordinary relief after the Small Claims Division of the District Court of the Second Circuit (Wailuku Division), presided over by Judge Lance D. Collins, adjudicated a dispute over the ownership of a dog named Bigsby. Respondent Wylan Faulk opposed Miller’s request for Bigsby’s return and asked the court to confirm his ownership.

The central legal issue was subject matter jurisdiction: whether Hawaiʻi’s small claims division—whose jurisdiction is confined by HRS § 633-27—may decide title/ownership to personal property (here, a dog) in a dispute between private parties, especially where the plaintiff alternatively requests money damages.

Because small claims judgments generally cannot be appealed (HRS § 633-28(a); RSCD Rule 12(b)), the case reached the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court via a petition for writ of mandamus.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court granted mandamus, holding that the small claims division lacked jurisdiction to decide Bigsby’s ownership. The court:

  • Vacated the small claims ruling dated March 4, 2026.
  • Remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.

The opinion stresses that HRS § 633-27 limits small claims jurisdiction to three categories: (1) money-only claims up to the statutory cap; (2) certain residential security-deposit disputes; and (3) return of leased or rented personal property (under the statutory thresholds). A dispute over who owns a dog fits none of these categories. The trial court’s act of awarding “legal and physical ownership” to Faulk and ordering a compensatory payment to Miller necessarily amounted to an adjudication of title, which the small claims division had no authority to make.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie, 125 Hawaiʻi 128, 141, 254 P.3d 439, 452 (2011)
    Role in the opinion: Anchors the court’s jurisdictional framework: subject matter jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be created by consent, waiver, or estoppel. This directly defeats the district court’s rationale that Miller “chose this forum” and thus could be bound by it.
  • Kahawaiolaa v. Hawaiian Sun Invs., Inc., 146 Hawaiʻi 424, 434, 463 P.3d 1081, 1091 (2020)
    Role in the opinion: Supplies the definition and nature of replevin as an action seeking the return of specific personal property. This supports the Supreme Court’s characterization of Miller’s claim (despite her pleadings) as “in substance, an action in replevin.”
  • Chong v. Young, 39 Haw. 527, 529-30 (Haw. Terr. 1952)
    Role in the opinion: Provides the classic elements of replevin—resting on the plaintiff’s title and right to immediate possession—showing why any award of the dog (or valuation of an “ownership interest”) necessarily requires a title determination.
  • Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557, 564 n.5, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 n.5 (1981)
    Role in the opinion: Establishes that a dog is personal property under Hawaiʻi law. This classification matters because it places the dispute within property remedies (replevin/conversion) rather than family-law “custody” concepts, and it clarifies that “ownership” is a title question.
  • Freddy Nobriga Enters., Inc. v. State, Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 129 Hawaiʻi 123, 129, 295 P.3d 993, 999 (App. 2013)
    Role in the opinion: Cited to show an alternative remedy—conversion—for wrongful detention of personal property, reinforcing that there are appropriate procedural vehicles outside small claims for litigating such disputes.
  • Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP v. Kim, 153 Hawaiʻi 307, 319, 537 P.3d 1154, 1166 (2023)
    Role in the opinion: Supplies the modern standard for mandamus: a “clear and indisputable” right plus no other adequate remedy. The court applies this standard to the jurisdictional defect and the lack of an appeal route from small claims.
  • Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawaiʻi 152, 159, 977 P.2d 160, 167 (1999)
    Role in the opinion: Confirms the consequence of jurisdictional absence: a judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. This underpins the court’s remedy (vacatur and dismissal).
  • State v. Moniz, 69 Haw. 370, 373, 742 P.2d 373, 376 (1987)
    Role in the opinion: Used to emphasize that the absence of appellate review is a compelling factor in exercising supervisory/extraordinary writ power. It bolsters the conclusion that mandamus is appropriate given small claims’ non-appealable nature.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Statutory confinement of small claims jurisdiction.

    The court begins with HRS § 633-27(a), which enumerates three and only three categories within small claims jurisdiction: money-only claims within the cap; residential security-deposit disputes; and return of leased/rented personal property under the statutory limits. The opinion treats this as a hard boundary, not a flexible guideline.

  2. Equitable powers are also narrow.

    The court notes that even equitable relief in small claims is limited by HRS § 633-27(c) to landlord-tenant security-deposit disputes and specified forms of relief (“to repair, replace, refund, reform, and rescind”). That statutory design forecloses “equitable” ownership allocations in non-landlord-tenant disputes (even if the outcome feels fair).

  3. Substance over labels: the claim was replevin.

    Although Miller framed her primary request as “return of dog” and pleaded Bigsby as “unique personal property,” the court does not treat the claim as a generic small claims matter. Relying on Kahawaiolaa v. Hawaiian Sun Invs., Inc. and Chong v. Young, the court characterizes the action as replevin—a title-and-possession claim governed by HRS § 654-1(a). Because replevin requires deciding who has the right to immediate possession (and typically title), it is incompatible with the small claims division’s limited jurisdiction.

  4. Dogs are personal property, but ownership disputes are still title disputes.

    By citing Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, the court confirms the dog’s status as personal property. The key move, however, is that being personal property does not mean small claims can decide title. The relevant jurisdictional question is whether the case fits within HRS § 633-27—and a pet-ownership replevin claim does not.

  5. The district court’s two rationales were legally wrong.
    • “Miller chose this forum.”

      The Supreme Court rejects this as a misunderstanding of subject matter jurisdiction. Under Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie, parties cannot create jurisdiction by pleading choices, consent, or silence. Courts have an independent duty to recognize and announce jurisdictional defects.

    • “The court determined it wasn’t her property.”

      The Supreme Court explains that denying Miller’s ownership claim necessarily requires deciding ownership—“a ruling on title to personal property.” The small claims court could not declare Bigsby “wasn’t hers” without, in effect, determining whose dog he was. The trial court went further by affirmatively awarding Faulk “full legal and physical ownership,” cementing the jurisdictional overreach.

  6. The alternative money request did not cure jurisdiction.

    Miller’s fallback request for $3,000 did not convert the matter into a “money-only” small claim, because the damages were expressly tethered to her asserted ownership interest in Bigsby. Awarding or denying that amount required the same impermissible title determination. The opinion thus draws a practical rule: a plaintiff cannot plead an alternative valuation of disputed property to smuggle a title dispute into small claims.

  7. Mandamus was appropriate due to void judgment and no appeal.

    Applying Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP v. Kim, the court finds (1) a clear and indisputable right to relief because the small claims division exceeded statutory authority and the resulting judgment is void under Amantiad v. Odum, and (2) no adequate remedy because small claims judgments are non-appealable (HRS § 633-28(a); RSCD Rule 12(b)), a factor reinforced by State v. Moniz. The court also cites its supervisory and writ powers under HRS § 602-5(a)(3) and HRS § 602-4.

3.3 Impact

The decision establishes a clear procedural boundary in Hawaiʻi: pet ownership disputes (and, more broadly, non-lease title disputes over specific personal property) cannot be adjudicated in small claims. Several practical consequences follow:

  • Forum correction for “pet custody” conflicts. Parties commonly seek quick small claims resolutions for shared-pet breakdowns. Miller signals that such disputes must be brought in a court and procedural posture that can adjudicate replevin/conversion and title—rather than being shoehorned into small claims.
  • Limits on “equitable” ownership allocations. The small claims court’s “equitable” decision to award the dog to one party and pay the other resembles a buyout remedy. Miller forecloses such remedies in small claims unless the case falls within the narrow landlord-tenant equity authorization of HRS § 633-27(c).
  • Pleading strategy will not expand jurisdiction. The opinion discourages jurisdictional gamesmanship: adding a monetary alternative does not transform a title dispute into a money-only claim when valuation depends on deciding ownership.
  • Mandamus as an important safety valve. Because small claims judgments are generally unappealable, Miller reinforces the Supreme Court’s willingness to use supervisory writs to correct jurisdictional overreach, especially where the judgment is void.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subject matter jurisdiction: The legal power a court has (or lacks) to decide a type of case. If it’s missing, the parties cannot “agree” their way around it, and any resulting judgment is legally invalid.
  • Small claims division (statutorily limited jurisdiction): A court division that can only hear the kinds of disputes the legislature specifically lists in the statute. If a dispute is outside that list, the court must dismiss.
  • Replevin: A lawsuit seeking the return of a specific item of personal property (not just money). It generally requires the court to decide who has the right to possess the item now.
  • Conversion: A civil claim for wrongful control over someone else’s personal property, typically resulting in money damages rather than return of the specific item.
  • Mandamus: An extraordinary order from a higher court directing a lower court (or official) to correct a clear legal error when there is no adequate normal remedy (like an appeal).
  • “Dismissed without prejudice”: The case is dismissed, but the plaintiff may file again in a proper court/format.

5. Conclusion

Miller v. Collins draws a bright statutory line: Hawaiʻi’s small claims division cannot decide who owns a dog (or otherwise adjudicate title through replevin-like disputes) unless the matter fits within the precise categories in HRS § 633-27. The decision reinforces the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction, invalidates small claims judgments that exceed statutory authority, and confirms mandamus as the principal corrective mechanism when no appeal is available. In practical terms, litigants seeking return of a pet or adjudication of ownership must proceed in a forum empowered to decide title and possession—not in small claims.