Sixth Circuit Validates “Enterprise Existed or Would Exist” RICO-Conspiracy Instruction and Upholds Delayed Cross-Examination Amid COVID Disruptions

1. Introduction

In United States v. William Boylston (a consolidated appeal involving seven defendants), the Sixth Circuit affirmed sweeping RICO, VICAR, kidnapping, murder, drug-trafficking, and related convictions arising from the Clarksville, Tennessee chapter of the Mongols Motorcycle Club. The government alleged that defendants—members or associates—built a racketeering enterprise fueled by methamphetamine trafficking and enforced by extreme violence, including the May 2015 kidnapping and murder of Stephanie Bradley and the 2017 kidnapping and murder of former member Stephen Cole.

The appeal presented (among many issues) (i) whether evidence sufficiently proved a RICO conspiracy and related VICAR/kidnapping/drug counts; (ii) whether trial management choices (semi-anonymous jury, gang expert testimony, evidentiary rulings, severance, and lengthy COVID-related pauses) violated constitutional or procedural safeguards; and (iii) whether multiple sentencing determinations and pronouncements were erroneous.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions and sentences. Key holdings include:

  • RICO conspiracy: Sufficient evidence supported that the Clarksville Mongols existed as an association-in-fact enterprise by spring 2015; and, in any event, a RICO conspiracy can be complete based on agreement to participate in a yet-to-be-formed enterprise.
  • Boylston & Meyerholz (Cole murder counts): Testimony and corroborating circumstances were sufficient; credibility disputes were for the jury.
  • Drug and money-laundering conspiracies: Evidence supported convictions of Hern and Stanley; “buyer-seller” and “mere association” characterizations failed on this record.
  • Attempted drug possession (Opana) and firearm use: Attempt liability was established despite the seller’s plan to rob; aiding-and-abetting and § 924(c) convictions stood.
  • Federal kidnapping “benefit” element: Abducting Chavez’s companion provided “benefit” by enabling the chapter to control the narrative to the Mother Chapter.
  • Inconsistent verdicts: Not reviewable here; suggested “exceptions” did not apply, and codefendant leniency does not create a constitutional claim.
  • Semi-anonymous jury: Properly empaneled (even sua sponte) with adequate safeguards and a neutral explanation to jurors.
  • COVID delay and cross-examination: A three-week gap between direct examination and some cross-examination did not violate the Confrontation Clause where defendants ultimately had a full and fair opportunity to cross.
  • Jury-instruction challenges (including “enterprise existed or would exist” language): No constructive amendment or material variance.
  • Sentencing: No reversible procedural or substantive error; several claimed errors were harmless because the Guideline range or practical sentence outcome was unchanged.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) RICO enterprise and RICO conspiracy structure

  • Boyle v. United States supplied the governing definition of an association-in-fact enterprise—purpose, relationships, and longevity—while emphasizing informality is permitted. The court applied Boyle to reject arguments that enterprise status depended on formal “patching” by the national club.
  • United States v. Iossifov provided the Sixth Circuit’s element statement for RICO conspiracy, including the requirement that a conspirator agreed that someone would commit at least two racketeering acts.
  • United States v. Rich was pivotal: it recognized that “an agreement to associate with and participate in a yet-to-be-formed racketeering enterprise” can complete a § 1962(d) conspiracy. This precedent anchored both the sufficiency ruling and the later jury-instruction/indictment analysis approving “existed or would exist” language.
  • United States v. Mahar, United States v. Collins, and United States v. Cimini supported standard conspiracy principles: not every member must commit every act, and late-joining conspirators take a conspiracy “as they find it.”
  • Walker v. United States was used to treat Boylston’s attempted disavowal of club membership as waived because his own counsel conceded membership at trial.

2) VICAR “purpose” requirement

  • United States v. Woods supplied the controlling “animating purpose” formulation: VICAR’s purpose element is met if maintaining/increasing position was an animating purpose, not necessarily the sole purpose. This framework sustained Boylston’s VICAR murder conviction and Hern’s accessory-after-the-fact VICAR-related conviction.

3) Kidnapping “for ransom or reward or otherwise” and interstate-commerce hook

  • United States v. Windham and United States v. Small controlled the “benefit” requirement: “otherwise” encompasses any objective a defendant finds sufficiently beneficial to induce kidnapping, and “any reason” benefiting the kidnapper suffices. The court used these to hold that controlling information and appeasing/answering to the Mother Chapter was a qualifying benefit.

4) Attempt, aiding-and-abetting, and firearm predicates

  • United States v. Ferguson supplied attempt’s “intent + substantial step” test; the court held substantial steps occurred before the deal devolved into a robbery.
  • United States v. Sadler governed aiding-and-abetting attempt: participation intending to make the venture succeed. Santiago’s providing a loaded firearm and car supported liability.
  • United States v. Randolph, United States v. Lawrence, and especially United States v. Powell grounded the rejection of inconsistent-verdict challenges. The opinion read Powell as strongly limiting review of inconsistency because sufficiency review is the proper protection. The court also relied on United States v. Ruiz and United States v. Stewart to narrow a suggested exception to inconsistencies between two guilty verdicts (not guilty vs. guilty outcomes). Harris v. Rivera foreclosed the “my codefendant got leniency” fairness claim.

5) Semi-anonymous jury standards

  • United States v. Warman, United States v. Talley, United States v. Lawson, and United States v. Deitz supplied the Sixth Circuit’s anonymous-jury framework: strong reason for protection + reasonable steps to minimize prejudice + adequate voir dire + neutral explanation. The court used these to uphold a semi-anonymous jury (counsel knew juror identities; defendants/public did not).
  • Luce v. United States supported the trial court’s inherent authority to manage trials, reinforcing that a government motion is not a prerequisite. The court also cited sister-circuit approvals of sua sponte action: United States v. Shyrock, United States v. Hall, United States v. Bowman, United States v. Branch, and United States v. Edmond.
  • Morgan v. Illinois was referenced to frame the adequacy-of-voir-dire constitutional interest the court found satisfied.

6) Gang/organized-crime expert testimony under Rule 702

  • United States v. LaVictor set the abuse-of-discretion appellate standard for expert admissibility.
  • United States v. Gray and United States v. Reynolds
  • United States v. Rios and United States v. Ledbetter

    7) Confrontation Clause and delayed cross-examination

    • Foundational confrontation authorities—Coy v. Iowa, United States v. Owens, Davis v. Alaska, and Crawford v. Washington—were used to identify the core confrontation guarantees: face-to-face testimony and an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
    • Delaware v. Fensterer provided the key limiting principle: the Constitution guarantees an opportunity for effective cross, not cross in whatever manner or timing the defense prefers. United States v. Fox similarly rejected the notion of absolute defense control over cross-examination.
    • Samia v. United States
    • On timing, the court found little direct authority: it cited Loomis v. Warden, Noble Corr. Inst. (rejecting a similar claim) and noted that Perry v. LeekeSchaffer v. State Bd. of Veterinary Med., Modesitt v. State) address general cross-examination effectiveness rather than a federal Confrontation Clause rule requiring immediacy.

    8) Mistrial and delay management

    • The “drastic remedy” framing came from United States v. Perez and United States v. Gantley. Trial-scheduling discretion and “actual prejudice” requirements were supported by United States v. Van Dyke, United States v. Braxton, and United States v. Martin. The court also cited pandemic/illness interruption decisions approving denial of mistrial: United States v. Smith, United States v. McDonald, United States v. Thomas, People v. Breceda, and State v. Henderson. United States v. Dennison and Illinois v. Somerville

    9) Severance in multi-defendant conspiracy trials

    • Zafiro v. United States
    • Sixth Circuit severance principles were reinforced through United States v. Smith (joint trials favored in conspiracy cases), Thomas v. United States (speculation insufficient), and cases rejecting prejudice based solely on inflammatory evidence against others: United States v. Gallo and United States v. Seale. The court also cited United States v. Critton (antagonistic defenses) and United States v. Moore (efficiency concerns).

    10) Indictment/instruction mismatch: constructive amendment, variance, duplicity

    • The taxonomy and constitutional stakes were drawn from United States v. Combs and United States v. Kuehne (actual amendment, constructive amendment, variance), with United States v. Davis
    • Martin v. KassulkeUnited States v. Budd
    • On duplicity and waiver/forfeiture: United States v. KakosUnited States v. DavisUnited States v. Soto, and United States v. HallUnited States v. Savoires (non-existent offense instruction).

    11) Plea bargaining and “package deals”

    • The rejection of Boylston’s “improper package deal” argument relied on United States v. Peterson, United States v. Usher, and United States v. Carpenter, recognizing the government may condition an offer on a codefendant’s plea.

    12) Sentencing pronouncement, supervised-release conditions, and harmless error

    • Oral-vs-written sentence disputes were governed by United States v. Booker, with ambiguity resolution supported by United States v. Shaw and United States v. Villano.
    • The defendant’s right to be present at sentencing was framed by United States v. Blake and United States v. Harrell, but the claim failed under plain-error review.
    • Standard supervised-release conditions required oral notice per United States v. Hayden, but any error was harmless given Frazier’s mandatory life terms.
    • The court repeatedly used harmlessness where Guideline range/outcome was unchanged, relying on United States v. Faulkner and United States v. Messer.

    B. Legal Reasoning

    1) The “enterprise existed or would exist” framework as both sufficiency rule and instruction rule

    The opinion treats United States v. Rich as doing two types of work. First, it answers a merits question: defendants can conspire to operate a racketeering enterprise even if they are in the “founding” stage and not formally recognized. Second, it answers an indictment/instruction question: because the offense is the agreement, the jury may be instructed that the enterprise “existed or would exist” without changing the charged offense.

    Importantly, the court framed the indictment as plainly charging a conspiracy (“did conspire”) and described “prospective and/or founding members,” undermining claims of surprise. Applying United States v. Combs and United States v. Kuehne, it found no constructive amendment (no risk of conviction for a different offense) and no prejudicial variance.

    2) Confrontation Clause: delay is not denial where cross-examination ultimately occurs

    The court’s confrontation analysis is functional: the Clause protects opportunity, not optimal sequencing. Anchored in Delaware v. Fensterer and related precedent, the court held that the three-week COVID-driven pause did not invalidate cross-examination where defendants conducted probing cross on bias, lack of firsthand knowledge, inconsistencies, incentives, and alternative-perpetrator theory. The court also emphasized the competing constitutional interest in sick defendants’ presence at trial and the absence of gamesmanship.

    3) Inconsistent verdicts: narrowing the practical reach of suggested “exceptions”

    The court reaffirmed United States v. Powell’s general rule that inconsistent verdicts are not reviewable and treated sufficiency review as the proper safeguard. It characterized one suggested exception (“two guilty verdicts that necessarily exclude each other”) as inapplicable to guilty/acquittal mixes (citing United States v. Ruiz and United States v. Stewart), and expressed skepticism that an “arbitrariness or irrationality” exception can be squared with Powell’s lenity/compromise rationale—while noting the Sixth Circuit has not granted relief on that basis.

    4) Anonymous-jury practice: procedural safeguards over formal prerequisites

    The court treated semi-anonymity as a calibrated measure: counsel knew jurors’ identities; jurors received a neutral rationale tied to media privacy; and voir dire was extensive, including questionnaires. Drawing on United States v. Deitz, it focused on preserving impartiality and avoiding signaling dangerousness, rather than insisting on a government motion.

    5) Attempt liability unaffected by the counterparty’s criminal intent

    By holding attempt complete once substantial steps occurred (money obtained, gun supplied, travel to meeting, intent to buy), the court rejected a “no attempt because it was a planned robbery” defense as legally irrelevant under United States v. Ferguson. This reasoning also stabilized the firearm predicate under § 924(c): the drug-trafficking attempt was already underway when the robbery erupted.

    C. Impact

    • RICO conspiracy prosecutions in the Sixth Circuit gain reinforced authority to charge and try “founding-stage” enterprises and to use “existed or would exist” instructions without triggering indictment-amendment reversals—so long as the indictment clearly alleges conspiracy and the enterprise theory remains the same offense.
    • Trial management during disruptions (pandemics, illness) is given significant deference: substantial mid-trial pauses will not, without concrete prejudice, require mistrials or establish Confrontation Clause violations when cross-examination ultimately occurs and jurors are instructed appropriately.
    • Inconsistent verdict challenges are further hemmed in; the opinion signals strong reluctance to expand any “arbitrariness” exception beyond Powell.
    • Anonymous/semi-anonymous juries are affirmed as permissible tools (including court-initiated consideration) in organized-crime cases, so long as courts follow the Sixth Circuit’s safeguard checklist.
    • Attempt and § 924(c) litigation is clarified: the seller’s intent to rob does not negate the buyer’s attempt where substantial steps were taken toward a drug purchase.

    4. Complex Concepts Simplified

    • RICO “enterprise” (association-in-fact): A real-world group can be an enterprise even if it is informal. Under Boyle v. United States, it needs a shared purpose, relationships among members, and enough longevity to pursue the purpose.
    • RICO conspiracy (§ 1962(d)): The crime is the agreement to conduct the enterprise through racketeering—not the completion of racketeering acts. Under United States v. Rich, agreeing to participate in a not-yet-fully-formed enterprise can still be a completed conspiracy offense.
    • VICAR (§ 1959): A violent crime becomes a VICAR offense when committed to maintain or increase one’s position in a racketeering enterprise; it can be one motivating purpose, not the only one.
    • Constructive amendment vs. variance: A constructive amendment risks conviction for a different offense than the grand jury charged (automatic reversal). A variance proves different facts but the same offense (reversal only if prejudicial).
    • Confrontation Clause: Guarantees the chance to cross-examine witnesses, not the best possible timing. A delay is not unconstitutional if the defense still gets a meaningful cross-examination in court.
    • Federal kidnapping “benefit”: “Otherwise” is broad; it covers virtually any advantage the kidnappers sought (money, leverage, intimidation, information control).
    • Attempt: If someone intends a crime and takes substantial steps toward it, attempt can be complete even if the plan fails because of an unexpected twist (like being set up for a robbery).

    5. Conclusion

    This published Sixth Circuit decision strengthens a pragmatic, prosecution-friendly framework for complex, multi-defendant racketeering trials: (1) RICO conspiracies can reach agreements to build an enterprise that “would exist,” and jury instructions may say so without rewriting the indictment; (2) pandemic-driven trial interruptions—without concrete prejudice—do not amount to mistrials or Confrontation Clause violations where cross-examination is ultimately full and fair; and (3) established doctrines on anonymous juries, inconsistent verdicts, and attempt liability are applied in ways that emphasize safeguard-based trial management and sufficiency review over speculative prejudice.