Sixth Circuit Reaffirms U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2’s “75:1” Video-to-Image Rule After Loper Bright and Upholds Comparative Sentencing Remarks Under § 3553(a)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Chance York (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 120-month below-Guidelines sentence imposed for possessing child pornography and for receiving and distributing visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

The appeal presented two central issues:

  1. Guidelines calculation / procedural reasonableness: whether the district court correctly applied the five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) by using the Commentary’s “75:1 Rule” (counting each video as 75 images).
  2. Sentencing remarks and substantive reasonableness: whether the district judge’s comments comparing York’s conduct to producers of child pornography reflected impermissible considerations, and whether the 120-month sentence was too long.

The parties were the United States (appellee) and Chance York (appellant), who had pleaded guilty.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed on both procedural and substantive grounds.

  • Procedural reasonableness: The district court correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, adequately explained the sentence, and properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court did not err in applying the 75:1 Rule because Sixth Circuit precedent—United States v. Phillips—controls and approves reliance on the Commentary for that conversion. The panel also rejected the claim that the judge’s remarks about wishing to sentence a producer at the maximum reflected impermissible considerations; reviewed for plain error, the remarks were permissible contextual comparisons tied to § 3553(a).
  • Substantive reasonableness: The 120-month sentence was below the 151–188 month Guidelines range and therefore carried a presumption of reasonableness. York did not rebut that presumption, particularly given the district court’s discussion of seriousness, deterrence, victim harm, and comparative sentencing data.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is notably precedent-driven. It does less to “create” a new doctrinal test than to clarify the Sixth Circuit’s post-Loper Bright posture on deference to the Sentencing Guidelines Commentary and to reinforce limits on panel reconsideration.

1. Sentencing procedure and standards of review

  • United States v. Johnson, 934 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2019): Cited for the basic requirements of procedural reasonableness—proper Guidelines calculation, advisory treatment, adequate explanation, and consideration of § 3553(a). York applies this checklist and concludes the district court “showed its work.”
  • United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018): Supplies (i) the standard of review structure (fresh review for Guidelines interpretation; abuse of discretion for the ultimate sentence) and (ii) the framing that substantive reasonableness can be summarized as whether a sentence is “too long.”
  • United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2012): Reinforces abuse-of-discretion review of sentencing outcomes.

2. The “75:1 Rule” and deference to Guidelines Commentary

  • United States v. Phillips, 54 F.4th 374 (6th Cir. 2022): The controlling decision. York treats Phillips as binding on the key question: whether “image” in § 2G2.2(b)(7) is ambiguous as applied to videos and whether the Commentary’s “75 images per video” conversion is a reasonable interpretive rule entitled to controlling weight under the applicable deference framework. The panel relies on Phillips to reject York’s proposed alternative counting methods (e.g., 1–3 images per video).
  • Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019) and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997): Cited through Phillips for the proposition that when a regulation is genuinely ambiguous, an agency’s reasonable interpretation in its authoritative guidance may receive controlling weight (the Auer/Kisor framework).
  • United States v. Roberts, 787 F. Supp. 3d 219 (E.D. Va. 2025): A nonbinding district court decision “in another circuit” that “went the other way.” The panel dismisses it as irrelevant in light of binding Sixth Circuit precedent.
  • United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Haggerty, 107 F.4th 175 (3d Cir. 2024): Both are cited to show that other circuits have found Judge Larsen’s textual critique in Phillips persuasive. Importantly, York uses these cases not to follow them, but to show that—even if the debate is live elsewhere—the Sixth Circuit remains bound by Phillips unless the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit en banc changes course.
  • Beaird v. United States, No. 25-5343, 2026 WL 1052007 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2026): The panel notes a “pending” Supreme Court case but expresses skepticism that it will aid York—both because York’s argument does not align with the alternatives discussed in Phillips and because Phillips already rejected a simplistic “1:1 ratio” approach.

3. Stare decisis within the circuit after Loper Bright

  • Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 774 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1985): The internal law-of-the-circuit rule: a panel cannot overrule a prior panel; only the Supreme Court or en banc review can.
  • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): York invoked it to suggest diminished deference regimes. The panel acknowledges Loper Bright ended Chevron deference for agency interpretations of statutes, but it distinguishes that development from the interpretive framework used in Phillips.
  • United States v. Prather, 138 F.4th 963 (6th Cir. 2025): This is the bridge case that matters for York. It holds the Auer/Kisor framework “remains good law in the Sixth Circuit,” thereby undermining the argument that Loper Bright silently destabilized Phillips.

4. Preservation, plain error, and sentencing remarks

  • United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004): The “Bostic question” practice—after pronouncing sentence, the judge asks for objections. York’s failure to object when asked triggers a more demanding review posture.
  • United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc): Sets the consequence of not objecting—plain-error review.
  • United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012): Supports the notion that district courts may contextualize conduct across a spectrum of seriousness and that distinguishing levels of child pornography conduct (possession/distribution/production) can promote fair sentencing rather than undermine it.

5. Substantive reasonableness, deference, and presumptions

  • United States v. Hawkins, 165 F.4th 442 (6th Cir. 2026): Cited for how substantive reasonableness review focuses on sentence length and factor-weighing.
  • United States v. Williams, 169 F.4th 727 (6th Cir. 2026): Emphasizes that disagreement over weighing § 3553(a) factors is not itself an abuse of discretion.
  • United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2013): Establish that a below-Guidelines sentence carries a presumption of reasonableness that the defendant must rebut—a “significant burden” that York could not meet.
  • United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012): Used to reinforce the district court’s holistic approach to the facts and factors—“the good, the bad, and the ugly.”
  • United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2008): Underlines appellate deference to the district court’s “on-the-scene” balancing and rejects the idea that sentencing is a “mathematical proof.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the panel treated the 75:1 Rule issue as largely foreclosed

The heart of York’s procedural challenge was the argument that the district court should have counted each video as only “one, two, or three images,” which would have reduced the enhancement from five levels to three under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7). The panel’s answer is bluntly institutional: United States v. Phillips already approved the district court’s approach, and Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs. prevents a later panel from revisiting it.

The panel then closes the two most obvious escape hatches:

  1. Intercircuit and district-court disagreement is not enough: even if United States v. Roberts (E.D. Va.) disagreed, it cannot trump Sixth Circuit precedent.
  2. Loper Bright does not undo Auer/Kisor in this circuit: because United States v. Prather maintained the Auer/Kisor framework, Phillips remains intact notwithstanding the demise of Chevron.

2. The panel’s treatment of Judge Larsen’s concurrence and York’s “middle ground” proposal

York attempted to leverage the intellectual force of Judge Larsen’s concurrence in United States v. Phillips and the later decisions in United States v. Kluge and United States v. Haggerty. The panel acknowledged those authorities but highlighted a practical and doctrinal mismatch: Judge Larsen’s proposed alternative in Phillips was frame-by-frame counting, not York’s proposed “few images per video” method. Given York’s video collection (including a 33-minute video), the panel underscored that York did not show the alternative would even reduce his offense level.

Put differently, even if a defendant can mount a serious critique of the 75:1 Rule in the abstract, York signals that the Sixth Circuit will still demand a defendant-specific showing that the alternative methodology is legally available and materially favorable under the Guidelines’ enhancement thresholds.

3. Sentencing remarks: permissible contextual comparison rather than impermissible consideration

York argued the judge improperly sentenced him based on views about producers. Because York did not object below—especially after the United States v. Bostic invitation—review was for plain error under United States v. Vonner.

The panel treated the judge’s remark (“waiting for the day” to sentence an actual producer at the maximum) as:

  • tethered to legitimate § 3553(a) factors: the “nature and circumstances” and the “seriousness” of the offense; and
  • consistent with United States v. Bistline, which permits courts to measure conduct along a spectrum and to distinguish possession/distribution from production to promote fair sentencing.

The panel also reasoned that the comment did not prejudice York; the judge imposed a below-Guidelines sentence, suggesting the comparison was used to calibrate downward (i.e., “York is not the worst case”).

4. Substantive reasonableness: below-Guidelines presumption plus deference to balancing

On substantive review, the panel relied on United States v. Pirosko and United States v. Greco to apply a presumption of reasonableness to York’s below-Guidelines sentence. York attempted to focus on § 3553(a)(6) (avoiding unwarranted disparities) by pointing to average and median sentences (109 and 97 months). The panel responded that the district court did consider those metrics and still reasonably chose 120 months given the seriousness of the content (including depictions of abuse of an infant and a toddler), victim harm, deterrence, protection of children, and treatment needs.

Citing United States v. Grossman, the panel rejected a quasi-mathematical demand that the district court “optimize” around averages. And citing United States v. Williams and United States v. Hawkins, it emphasized that appellate courts do not reweigh factors merely because another judge might have chosen 97 or 109 months.

C. Impact

1) Stability of the 75:1 Rule in the Sixth Circuit: The most concrete doctrinal impact is institutional: York reinforces that United States v. Phillips remains controlling in the Sixth Circuit, and that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2’s Commentary “75:1 Rule” remains a valid basis for calculating image totals and applying the maximum enhancement tier under § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D).

2) Post-Loper Bright clarification: The opinion signals that litigants should not assume that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo disrupts deference regimes beyond Chevron. In particular, it highlights that the Sixth Circuit—via United States v. Prather—continues to apply the Auer/Kisor framework in appropriate contexts, which in turn keeps Phillips on firm footing absent higher-court intervention.

3) Sentencing-record practice: The decision underscores the practical importance of objecting after the United States v. Bostic question. Failure to do so channels challenges into plain-error review, which is rarely successful where remarks can be characterized as contextual and linked to § 3553(a).

4) Permissible “spectrum” comparisons in child-pornography sentencing: By leaning on United States v. Bistline, York may be cited to defend judges’ use of comparative seriousness statements (possession vs. distribution vs. production) so long as the comments are used to contextualize § 3553(a) factors rather than to punish uncharged conduct.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7) image-count enhancement
This Guideline increases the offense level based on how many “images” are involved. More images generally mean a higher advisory sentencing range. The top tier (five levels) applies at 600 images or more.
The “75:1 Rule” (Guidelines Commentary)
The Guidelines text does not specify how to count videos. The Commentary supplies a conversion: treat each video as 75 images. That conversion can dramatically change whether a defendant crosses the 600-image threshold.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness
Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court followed the correct process (correct Guidelines calculation, proper consideration of § 3553(a), adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given those factors.
Plain error review
If a defendant does not object in the district court, the appellate court generally reviews only for “plain error,” a demanding standard that requires clear and obvious error that affects substantial rights and undermines the fairness of proceedings.
Law of the circuit (panel cannot overrule panel)
Under Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., later three-judge panels must follow earlier published panel decisions unless the Supreme Court or the court sitting en banc changes the rule.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Chance York is a consolidating Sixth Circuit precedent with two principal takeaways:

  1. The Sixth Circuit continues to treat the Sentencing Guidelines Commentary’s “75:1” video-to-image conversion as controlling for § 2G2.2(b)(7) enhancements under United States v. Phillips, and it rejects the argument that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermines that approach in light of United States v. Prather.
  2. Judges may make comparative seriousness remarks (including contrasting producers with possessors/distributors) when tethered to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and failure to object after the United States v. Bostic question will generally relegate such challenges to unsuccessful plain-error review.

In the broader legal context, York exemplifies how appellate courts can resolve contentious sentencing issues less by re-litigating first principles and more by enforcing institutional rules of precedent, preservation, and deference in the sentencing function.