Sixth Circuit Reaffirms § 922(g)(1) Under Bruen: As-Applied Relief Turns on a Defendant’s Failure to Prove “Not Actually Dangerous”

1. Introduction

In United States v. James Watson (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit reviewed a constitutional attack on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (the federal felon-in-possession ban) brought by defendant-appellant James F. Watson against the United States.

The case arose after officers responded to reports of a man acting erratically and placing a gun in a trash can outside a gas station. Watson—already barred from firearm possession due to a prior burglary conviction and then serving state probation for cocaine possession—was indicted for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon. He moved to dismiss, arguing § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The district court denied the motion; Watson later pleaded guilty while reserving a limited appellate right, and then appealed.

The appeal presented two core issues: (1) whether § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional after Bruen; and (2) whether it is unconstitutional as applied to Watson, who claimed he is not dangerous.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • Watson’s facial challenge is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent—specifically United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), which held § 922(g)(1) “is constitutional on its face.”
  • Watson’s as-applied challenge fails because, under Williams, a defendant must show he is “not actually dangerous,” and Watson’s criminal history (including domestic violence and aggravated menacing conduct) supported a finding of dangerousness.
  • Although Watson’s conditional plea did not clearly preserve an as-applied argument (because the district court did not rule on one), the government did not invoke the relevant claims-processing limitation; thus, under Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019), the government forfeited that procedural objection and the court reached the merits anyway.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is primarily an application of the Sixth Circuit’s post-Bruen framework and its internal rules of precedent, alongside procedural doctrines governing conditional pleas and issue preservation.

1) Second Amendment merits framework and § 922(g)(1)

  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): The doctrinal catalyst for modern Second Amendment litigation. Watson invoked Bruen to claim § 922(g)(1) lacks historical support. The panel did not re-litigate Bruen’s methodology; instead, it treated Bruen as filtered through binding Sixth Circuit precedent, especially United States v. Williams.
  • United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): The controlling precedent. It supplied two decisive rules: (i) § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional; and (ii) any viable as-applied challenge requires an individualized showing the defendant is “not actually dangerous,” with courts permitted to consider the defendant’s “entire criminal record.” The Watson panel treated Williams as both the governing merits standard and the template for evaluating “dangerousness.”
  • United Sates v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Cited for the proposition that when an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence, “the threatening individual may be disarmed.” The panel used Rahimi to reinforce that violent threats (like those in Watson’s aggravated menacing incident) fit within a historically supported disarmament principle.
  • United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2024): Used to underscore that domestic-violence convictions typically involve physical force and to connect modern disarmament measures to historical analogues consistent with Rahimi and Williams. Although Gailes addressed § 922(g)(9), it served as persuasive support for treating domestic violence as strong evidence of “dangerousness” in the § 922(g)(1) as-applied inquiry.
  • Post-Williams applications (reinforcing how hard it is to win as-applied relief with violent/menacing histories):
    • United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492 (6th Cir. 2024)
    • United States v. Wellington, No. 24-3151, 2024 WL 4977138 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024)
    • United States v. Moss, No. 24-3105, 2024 WL 4903832 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2024)
    • United States v. Hewlett, No. 23-2040, 2024 WL 4564645 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2024)
    These cases were cited to show that the Sixth Circuit has “consistently declined” as-applied challenges where the record contains domestic violence, violent threats, burglary, drug trafficking, or similar markers of danger.

2) Appellate procedure, preservation, and standards of review

  • United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited for the standard of review—constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) are reviewed de novo (at least when properly preserved).
  • United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2008): The internal-rule-of-precedent citation. It provided the basis for rejecting Watson’s request that the panel disregard Williams—no three-judge panel may overrule a published Sixth Circuit decision.
  • United States v. Alexander, 540 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2008) and Fed. R Crim. P. 11(a)(2): These authorities framed conditional guilty pleas as a mechanism that preserves only specified issues. The panel used them to explain that Watson’s reservation (“any ruling based on the Court’s denial of [his] motion to dismiss the indictment”) did not clearly preserve an as-applied claim the district court never ruled on.
  • United States v. Hack, 999 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2021) and Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019): Together, these supported the proposition that the issue-preservation limitation here is a claims-processing rule that must be enforced if invoked, but may be forfeited if not invoked. The panel treated the government’s silence as forfeiture and proceeded to the merits.
  • United States v. Alvarado, 95 F.4th 1047 (6th Cir. 2024): Provided the default standard for an as-applied challenge raised for the first time on appeal: plain-error review. The panel did not definitively decide between plain error and de novo because Watson lost under either.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Facial challenge: the binding effect of Williams

The panel’s facial-challenge reasoning is straightforward and institutional: United States v. Williams holds § 922(g)(1) facially constitutional; United States v. Hardin prevents a three-judge panel from overruling that published holding. Watson’s concession—that precedent was against him—rendered this portion of the appeal largely preservational (aimed at future higher-court change), not a live dispute the panel could entertain.

2) As-applied challenge: (i) preservation mechanics, (ii) dangerousness burden, (iii) record-based assessment

The as-applied portion has three distinct steps:

  1. Scope of appeal after a conditional plea. The panel observed Watson’s plea reserved an appeal from “any ruling” denying his motion to dismiss. Because his motion below did not actually develop an as-applied dangerousness theory, the district court did not rule on that question; in that sense, there was arguably no as-applied “ruling” to appeal. Under United States v. Alexander and Fed. R Crim. P. 11(a)(2), that would normally bar review. But that bar is a claims-processing rule; under United States v. Hack and Fort Bend County v. Davis, the government forfeited the objection by not invoking it, so the panel reached the merits.
  2. Standard of review is uncertain, but immaterial. Under United States v. Alvarado, new as-applied theories on appeal are typically reviewed for plain error. The parties urged de novo review due to perceived ambiguity in the motion below, but the panel declined to choose because Watson loses even under the more favorable standard.
  3. Merits: Watson failed to show he is “not actually dangerous.” Under United States v. Williams, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional “as applied to dangerous people,” and a defendant bears the burden to demonstrate he is “not actually dangerous.” The panel then applied Williams’ guidance that certain offense types—especially crimes against persons, burglary, and serious drug-related conduct—make non-dangerousness showings “very difficult.”

    Critically, Williams allows a court to examine the defendant’s “entire criminal record,” not solely the predicate felony. The panel relied on Watson’s extensive history (46 adult convictions), emphasizing:
    • First-degree domestic violence, which under Ohio law involves causing/attempting physical harm or recklessly causing serious physical harm (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.25). Citing United States v. Gailes, the panel treated this as strong evidence of violence risk.
    • Aggravated menacing conduct (threatening to kill a woman, smashing her car window, coercing a ride), which the panel tied to United Sates v. Rahimi’s principle that credible threats of physical violence can justify disarmament.
    Given these facts, the panel held that Watson could not satisfy Williams’ “not actually dangerous” burden, and therefore § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied.

C. Impact

Although the decision is “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION” (and thus limited in precedential force), its reasoning is significant as an application and reinforcement of the Sixth Circuit’s post-Bruen architecture built around United States v. Williams.

The likely practical impacts include:

  • As-applied challenges will remain narrow and fact-intensive. Watson underscores that defendants with domestic violence, credible threats, or similar conduct will have substantial difficulty proving they are “not actually dangerous.”
  • Criminal-history breadth matters. By reiterating that courts may consider the “entire criminal record,” the opinion incentivizes litigants to develop robust evidentiary records (both aggravating and mitigating) on dangerousness, rather than focusing solely on the predicate felony.
  • Procedural framing in conditional pleas is outcome-determinative. The opinion illustrates how conditional pleas must be carefully drafted and how a district-court record must actually present the theory to be appealed. At the same time, it shows that the government can lose a powerful procedural defense by failing to invoke a claims-processing rule.
  • “Threat” evidence aligns with post-Rahimi disarmament rationales. The panel’s reliance on Rahimi signals that violent threats—especially when documented in pre-sentence reports—will be central in the historical-analogue analysis and the “dangerousness” inquiry within the Sixth Circuit.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is invalid in all (or nearly all) applications; an as-applied challenge argues the law is unconstitutional specifically as applied to this defendant’s circumstances. Watson lost both: facially due to binding precedent, and as-applied due to his record of violence/threats.
  • Conditional guilty plea (Rule 11(a)(2)): A defendant can plead guilty but reserve the right to appeal specific issues. If the issue was not clearly reserved—or the district court did not actually rule on it—an appellate court often will not reach it.
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture (procedural): Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right; forfeiture is a failure to timely assert it. Here, the government forfeited a procedural objection (that Watson’s plea did not preserve the as-applied issue) by not invoking it.
  • Claims-processing rule: A mandatory rule that courts enforce when properly raised, but which is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited. The panel treated the issue-preservation limitation this way.
  • Plain-error vs. de novo review: De novo review is fresh review with no deference; plain error is a difficult standard applied when an argument was not properly preserved. The panel found it unnecessary to choose because Watson’s claim failed under either.
  • “Not actually dangerous” standard (from Williams): In the Sixth Circuit, an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) generally requires the defendant to prove he is not actually dangerous, evaluated through an individualized, fact-specific inquiry that may consider the entire criminal record.

5. Conclusion

United States v. James Watson is best read as a disciplined application of United States v. Williams and the Sixth Circuit’s emerging post-Bruen approach to felon-in-possession prosecutions. The panel reaffirmed that § 922(g)(1) remains facially valid in the circuit and made clear that as-applied challenges hinge on an individualized showing that the defendant is “not actually dangerous”—a showing Watson could not make given a record including first-degree domestic violence and credible violent threats. Procedurally, the opinion also serves as a cautionary guide: conditional pleas must precisely preserve issues, but even strong preservation defenses can be lost if the government fails to invoke claims-processing rules.