Sixth Circuit: No ADA Accommodation Duty Without Timely Medical Verification; “Honest Belief” Defeats Pretext; Rule 60(b)(3) Trial-Fraud Claims Waived Without Mistrial

Introduction

In Yarlen Henry v. City of Detroit, Michigan (appeal by plaintiff-appellant Dawn Wortham), the Sixth Circuit reviewed a consolidated set of ADA claims arising from the termination of a Detroit Police Department officer who had spent years on restricted duty after serious injuries. Wortham alleged that Detroit (1) retaliated against her for ADA-protected activity when it fired her, (2) intentionally discriminated against her based on disability, and (3) failed to accommodate her disability. After the district court granted summary judgment to the City on retaliation, a jury returned a defense verdict on the remaining claims, and the district court denied post-trial motions.

The appeal centered on: (i) whether the City’s stated reason for termination—failure to report for duty and to provide requested, current medical documentation—was pretextual; (ii) whether Wortham properly requested an accommodation; (iii) whether alleged instructional errors warranted reversal under plain-error review; and (iv) whether claimed “fraud at trial” could support post-judgment relief.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that summary judgment on retaliation was proper because, even assuming a prima facie case, the City articulated a legitimate reason for termination and Wortham did not produce evidence of pretext. It further held that the jury could reasonably reject the failure-to-accommodate claim because Wortham did not timely provide the medical verification the City requested, and could likewise reject intentional discrimination because the City’s explanation was supported by the record and shielded by the “honest belief” rule. Challenges to jury instructions failed under plain-error review due to inadequate identification of error and, in any event, correct instruction on “undue hardship.” Finally, alleged trial fraud did not justify relief: Rule 60(a) was inapplicable; Rule 60(b)(3) was unpreserved and, independently, waived by failure to seek a mistrial when the purported prejudice was apparent.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Bowles v. SSRG II, LLC and Meridian Leasing, Inc. v. Assoc. Aviation Underwriters, Inc.: The court reaffirmed de novo review of summary judgment and the constraint that appellate review is limited to the record “at the time of its ruling,” foreclosing reliance on trial-developed evidence to attack a prior summary-judgment disposition.
  • A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ.: This decision supplied both the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for ADA retaliation and a central Sixth Circuit articulation of the “honest belief” rule—protecting an employer where it made a “reasonably informed and considered” decision. The panel repeatedly used A.C. as the measuring stick for whether Detroit’s process and information set defeated pretext.
  • Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC: Cited for the proposition that absenteeism/noncompliance can supply a “legitimate, non-discriminatory basis” for termination, supporting Detroit’s burden at step two of McDonnell Douglas.
  • Mittman v. City of Toledo (and supporting out-of-circuit/nonprecedential authorities Coleman v. Bowerman, Brandon v. Kinter, Smith v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., Shah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., Stites v. Alan Ritchey, Inc.): The court highlighted a practical causation inference: an employer’s long-term retention of an employee during years of protected activity can undercut an inference of retaliatory animus when termination occurs later for a seemingly independent reason.
  • Sharp v. Profitt and Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.: Used for the pretext pathway that the stated reason “did not actually motivate” the decision; the panel held Wortham did not meet this evidentiary showing.
  • Braithwaite v. Timken Co. and Smith v. Chrysler Corp.: These cases anchored the “particularized facts before the employer” principle, reinforcing that pretext is judged based on information reasonably available to decisionmakers at the time.
  • Chen v. Dow Chem. Co.: Reinforced that courts do not “Monday-morning quarterback” an employment decision when the employer “reasonably and honestly” relied on the facts it had.
  • Beny v. Univ. of Mich. (citing Escher v. BWXTY-12, LLC) and Smith v. Towne Props. Asset Mgmt. Co.: These authorities supported the decisionmaker-knowledge premise: alleged errors in a medical clearance did not establish pretext where relevant decisionmakers were not informed.
  • Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc.: The court relied on Miles to reject policy-violation arguments as stand-alone evidence of pretext absent proof of differential application to similarly situated employees.
  • Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden: Used to dismiss remote-in-time evidence as weak on causation (here, a seven-year-old retirement recommendation).
  • Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ.: The court applied forfeiture principles where Wortham advanced new adverse-action theories on appeal and where Rule 60(b)(3) fraud arguments were not raised below.
  • Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc. v. EquipmentFacts, LLC and Klopfenstein v. Fifth Third Bank: These cases set the standards for Rule 50(b) review (no reweighing or credibility assessments) and Rule 59(a) review (new trial only if verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence).
  • Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.: Supplied the five-element prima facie framework for a failure-to-accommodate claim.
  • Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs. (quoting Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med.) and Kennedy v. Superior Printings Co.: These cases were pivotal to the accommodation analysis: an employer has no duty to accommodate until the employee provides a proper diagnosis and requests a specific accommodation; and an employer may require verification rather than “take [the employee’s] word for it.” Failure to submit requested medical forms can defeat the claim.
  • Edwards v. Shelby County and Anderson v. City of Blue Ash: These framed the intentional-discrimination prima facie case and confirmed that, once a legitimate reason is given, the plaintiff must show pretext.
  • Barnett v. Smithwick, EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, and Puckett v. United States: These governed plain-error review of unobjected-to jury instructions; the panel found no obvious, prejudicial legal deviation.
  • Brenay v. Schartow: Cited for the court’s refusal to scour the record to develop an appellant’s undeveloped jury-instruction argument.
  • Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. and Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park: These decisions drove the Rule 60(b)(3) analysis: alleged fraud apparent at trial must be met with contemporaneous corrective action (typically a mistrial motion), or the party “bets on the jury” and waives Rule 60 relief; Rule 60 is not meant to undo strategic choices.
  • New York v. Hill (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.) and Erhart v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.: The panel invoked agency principles—clients are bound by counsel’s acts/omissions—rejecting the argument that new counsel and transcript timing excused failures to preserve issues.
  • Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc.: Used to caution that Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a vehicle to relitigate the merits under the label of “fraud.”

Legal Reasoning

1) Retaliation (Summary Judgment): Pretext and the “Honest Belief” Rule

The court assumed a prima facie case but affirmed because Detroit’s explanation—Wortham’s repeated failure to report and to supply requested, current medical documentation— was legitimate and unrebutted by evidence of pretext. The Sixth Circuit treated the key question as whether Detroit honestly and reasonably relied on the information it had when it terminated Wortham. Under the “honest belief” rule (drawn from A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ. and Smith v. Chrysler Corp.), even an arguably mistaken decision is not “pretext” if made after a reasonably informed process based on particularized facts available to decisionmakers at the time.

Wortham’s later-produced medical forms did not undermine the City’s stated reason because they were not in the City’s possession when the termination decision was made (Meridian Leasing, Inc. v. Assoc. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. and Braithwaite v. Timken Co.). Nor did an alleged medical-section mistake in returning her to full duty establish pretext absent evidence the mistake was communicated to relevant decisionmakers (Beny v. Univ. of Mich.).

2) Failure to Accommodate (Jury Verdict): No Duty Without Timely Verification

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury’s rejection of the accommodation claim on a narrow, dispositive ground: Wortham did not “properly request an accommodation” because she did not timely provide the medical verification the City requested. Citing Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., and Kennedy v. Superior Printings Co., the court emphasized that employers may require documentation and are not obligated to design accommodations based on unverified complaints. On this record, Wortham repeatedly appeared without current forms and produced supportive documentation only after termination, permitting the jury to find no ADA violation.

3) Intentional Discrimination (Jury Verdict): Same Pretext Failure

For the discriminatory-discharge theory, the City again relied on the failure-to-provide-documentation rationale. The court held the trial record allowed a reasonable jury to accept that explanation and reject pretext, particularly given repeated warnings and the timing of the doctor’s forms. The court’s approach effectively aligned the pretext analysis across retaliation and discrimination where the asserted reason for the adverse action was the same.

4) Jury Instructions: Plain-Error Barrier and Statutory “Undue Hardship”

Because Wortham did not object below, the court applied plain-error review (Barnett v. Smithwick; Puckett v. United States). The panel rejected the challenge for inadequate briefing (failure to identify the specific instruction) and observed that the only potentially relevant concept—“undue hardship”— was a correct statutory defense under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10)(B), 12112(b)(5)(A).

5) Alleged Trial Fraud: Rule 60 Limits, Preservation, and Waiver

The court drew sharp procedural lines. Rule 60(a) addresses clerical/oversight mistakes, not intentional trial misconduct. Rule 60(b)(3) relief for “fraud…misrepresentation, or misconduct” was unavailable because Wortham did not raise it in the district court, and—crucially—because she did not seek a mistrial when the alleged fraud was apparent (Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.). The opinion underscores a strategic-waiver principle: a litigant cannot proceed through verdict, then invoke Rule 60 as a fallback if the jury rules against her.

Impact

  • Documentation is litigation-critical in ADA accommodation disputes. The decision reinforces that, in the Sixth Circuit, an employer may insist on timely, current medical verification as a precondition to engaging in accommodation. Plaintiffs who delay documentation risk losing not only accommodation claims but also pretext battles tied to discipline for noncompliance.
  • “Honest belief” remains a powerful defense across ADA theories. The court’s reasoning shows how an employer’s contemporaneous record—requests for forms, warnings, and a documented decision chain—can defeat pretext even when the employee later produces evidence suggesting a different medical reality.
  • Procedural rigor: preserve issues early or likely lose them. The opinion highlights multiple procedural gates—record-limitation on summary judgment appeals, plain-error review for unpreserved instruction claims, forfeiture of new theories on appeal, and waiver of Rule 60(b)(3) arguments absent timely mistrial motions.
  • Rule 60 is not a “second trial.” By characterizing Wortham’s fraud arguments as merit relitigation (Jinks v. AlliedSignal, Inc.), the court signals skepticism toward post-verdict attacks that hinge on disputed evidence rather than truly concealed misconduct that prevented fair presentation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • McDonnell Douglas framework: A burden-shifting method used when there’s no direct proof of retaliation/discrimination. The employee must first show basic elements suggesting unlawful motive; the employer then offers a lawful reason; the employee must then prove that reason is a cover (“pretext”).
  • Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason wasn’t the real reason. It is not enough to show the employer was wrong; the plaintiff must show the reason was not honestly relied on or was used as a disguise for unlawful motive.
  • “Honest belief” rule: If an employer reasonably investigates and relies on the facts it has at the time, courts generally won’t label the decision “pretext” merely because later evidence suggests the decision may have been mistaken.
  • Failure to accommodate vs. discrimination: “Failure to accommodate” focuses on whether the employer provided a reasonable adjustment to allow work. “Discrimination” focuses on whether the employee was treated adversely because of disability. The two can overlap but have different required proofs.
  • Plain error (jury instructions): If a party didn’t object at trial, an appellate court will correct an instruction only for an obvious, outcome-affecting legal error necessary to prevent injustice.
  • Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is a failure to timely raise an argument; waiver is an intentional (or strategic) relinquishment—like choosing not to seek a mistrial and proceeding to verdict. Both can block appellate or post-judgment relief.
  • Rule 60(a) vs. Rule 60(b)(3): Rule 60(a) fixes clerical errors; Rule 60(b)(3) addresses fraud/misconduct that undermined the fairness of the proceeding, but requires preservation and timely action.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms a stringent, process-focused approach to ADA employment litigation: (1) an employer may require timely medical verification before accommodation duties attach; (2) discipline grounded in documented noncompliance can be insulated from pretext attacks by the “honest belief” rule; and (3) post-verdict challenges—especially claims of trial fraud—are tightly constrained by preservation rules and waiver principles, including the expectation that parties seek immediate corrective relief (like a mistrial) when alleged misconduct surfaces at trial.