Date: May 12, 2026

Sixth Circuit Limits § 1225(b)(2)(A) Mandatory Detention to Noncitizens Actively “Seeking Admission,” Routing Interior EWI Detainees to § 1226 Bond Process

Introduction

This consolidated Sixth Circuit decision arises from habeas grants issued by the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, and Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft. The Petitioners—longtime U.S. residents without lawful status, many with U.S.-citizen children—were arrested in the interior of the United States and placed in removal proceedings. Relying on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 2025 decision Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), immigration judges largely concluded they lacked bond jurisdiction because the government had classified Petitioners as subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The key statutory question was whether noncitizens arrested in the interior after years of residence—who never affirmatively attempted a lawful entry—may be mandatorily detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), or instead fall under § 1226 (which generally permits release on bond or conditional parole). A second question was constitutional: whether detention without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (at least for those detained under § 1226(a)).

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Clay, J., joined by Cole, J.) affirmed the habeas grants. It held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not govern detention of interior noncitizens like Petitioners because that provision applies only when an “applicant for admission” is “seeking admission”—a phrase the court read to require an affirmative, present attempt to obtain “admission” (lawful entry after inspection and authorization). Petitioners, who entered without inspection and were not pursuing lawful entry at inspection, were not “seeking admission.” Consequently, their detention could proceed only under § 1226.

On due process, the court held that Petitioners—having “passed through our gates” and lived in the interior—possess a liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint. The court rejected the government’s reliance on Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020) and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) to defeat bond-hearing rights for § 1226(a) detainees, and agreed with district courts that prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violated due process (with one district court having declined to reach the constitutional issue after granting statutory relief).

Judge Murphy dissented, aligning with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ broader view that § 1225(a)(1) requires courts to treat noncitizens present without admission as “applicants for admission” “for purposes of” the INA, which—by ordinary meaning—makes them “seeking admission,” thus triggering § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory detention. The dissent also argued due process permits categorical detention during removal proceedings without bond hearings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The majority’s analysis is anchored by Supreme Court, circuit, and immigration precedents that it uses for (1) statutory method, (2) immigration detention architecture, and (3) constitutional baseline.

1) Detention framework and the § 1225/§ 1226 divide: Jennings v. Rodriguez

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) supplies the opinion’s statutory “map.” The Sixth Circuit quotes Jennings’ description that §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) authorize detention of certain “aliens seeking admission,” while §§ 1226(a) and (c) address detention of “aliens already in the country.” The majority uses Jennings to reinforce that § 1226 functions as the “default rule” for interior detention unless § 1225(b) legitimately applies.

2) Textualism and interpretive method: Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. and related canons

The court frames its interpretive approach through United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp., 993 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)) and United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989): start with text, context, and statutory coherence; proceed no further if unambiguous. It also relies on interpretive principles including:

Different-words presumption: Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 168 F.4th 367 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting Tomaszcuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 2018)).
Anti-surplusage: Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013).
Avoiding absurd results: Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
Verb tense/grammar sensitivity: United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992); present participle discussion via United States v. Stewart, 73 F.4th 423 (6th Cir. 2023).

3) Longstanding executive practice after the end of Chevron: Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo

The majority treats the government’s 29-year historical practice as probative context, citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014)) for the proposition that courts exercise independent judgment but may consider longstanding practice in determining “what the law is.” This is deployed against the government’s post-2025 shift, highlighted by the 1997 interim rule (62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323 (Mar. 6, 1997)) treating interior EWI detainees as bond-eligible.

4) Circuit split context (and the Sixth Circuit’s alignment)

The majority situates its holding within an active split, noting decisions including: Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami; Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden; Avila v. Bondi; Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi; and Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (including Judge Lee’s individual opinion). The Sixth Circuit expressly joins the Second and Eleventh Circuits and Judge Lee’s view that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like Petitioners.

5) Due process baseline for interior noncitizens: Mezei, Yamataya, Zadvydas, and related detention cases

The majority draws a sharp constitutional distinction between those “on the threshold” and those who have entered. It cites Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) and Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) for the proposition that noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally” are entitled to proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness. It relies on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)) for the core liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint, and Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) and Demore v. Kim for the general permissibility of detention during removal proceedings (while limiting Demore’s reach to § 1226(c)).

In discussing when bond hearings are constitutionally required as detention becomes needlessly prolonged, the majority cites: Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 2020); and German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020).

Legal Reasoning

1) The central move: “seeking admission” requires affirmative pursuit of lawful entry

The majority’s holding turns on parsing § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s phrase “an alien seeking admission.” Congress defined “admission” as “lawful entry … after inspection and authorization” (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)) and defined “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1) as a noncitizen present without admission or who arrives. But Congress did not define “seeking.”

The court therefore gives “seeking” its ordinary meaning and consults contemporaneous dictionaries (and Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142 (2023)), concluding that “seeking” denotes a present, active effort to obtain admission. By combining (i) “seeking” as an active endeavor and (ii) “admission” as lawful entry after inspection, the court holds that a person “seeking admission” must be attempting lawful entry via inspection and authorization.

That understanding excludes interior EWI noncitizens like Petitioners: they did not attempt lawful entry and, by definition, avoided inspection. Thus, while Petitioners are “applicants for admission” (a legal status consequence of their presence without admission), they are not necessarily “seeking admission” (a present-action concept).

2) Structural and canonical reinforcement: distinct phrases, surplusage, and absurdity avoidance

The court places heavy weight on statutory drafting choices:

Different-words presumption: Congress used both “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission,” suggesting two different concepts. Reading “seeking admission” as coextensive with “applicant for admission” would collapse Congress’s deliberate word choice.
Surplusage canon: If “seeking admission” adds nothing beyond “applicant for admission,” it is superfluous, contrary to Nielsen v. Preap and Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp.
Absurd-results check against the dissent’s withdrawal theory: The dissent argued that § 1225(a)(4) (withdrawal of application) explains why some “applicants” might not be “seeking” at the relevant moment. The majority responds that making bond eligibility turn on a detainee’s desire to leave immediately, or on whether discretionary withdrawal is granted, yields irrational outcomes and should be avoided under Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League.

3) Capacity “escape hatch” argument: Congress planned for § 1226(c) space constraints but not for § 1225(b)(2)(A)

The majority adds a practical-structure argument: Congress included a transitional delay mechanism for mandatory detention under § 1226(c) due to detention capacity constraints, but did not include an analogous mechanism for § 1225(b)(2)(A). Given Congress’s awareness of a large interior population of unadmitted noncitizens, the court finds it implausible that Congress silently mandated detention of “millions” without capacity safeguards in the same enactment. This supports a narrower reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A).

4) Rejecting the government’s textual “otherwise” argument from § 1225(a)(3)

The government argued that § 1225(a)(3) (“applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission…”) shows that all applicants are “seeking admission.” The majority rejects this, distinguishing cases where “otherwise” functions as a catchall following an enumerated list (e.g., Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015); Kleber v. CareFusion Corporation, 914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Attorney General of the United States v. Wynn, 104 F.4th 348 (D.C. Cir. 2024)). It also invokes Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) to caution against overextending list-based canons.

The majority instead reads “otherwise” as introducing distinct categories (including scenarios where someone who is not an “applicant for admission” may still “seek admission”), such as certain lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) or stowaways under §§ 1182(a)(6)(D), 1225(a)(2).

5) Term-of-art discipline: “applicant for admission” cannot be decomposed into “apply/applicant” ordinary meanings

The dissent (and the government) attempted to reason from the ordinary meaning of “apply/applicant” to conclude all “applicants for admission” are “seeking admission.” The majority refuses to break the statutory term of art apart, emphasizing that Congress “defined” (or at least fixed the INA meaning of) “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1), and that courts should not substitute ordinary meanings where Congress indicated a specialized import (citing, among others, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) and the BIA’s observation in Matter of Miguel Lemus-Losa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA 2012)).

6) Due process: limiting Thuraissigiam to border/threshold cases and Demore to § 1226(c)

The court treats Petitioners as interior residents entitled to due process protections per Mezei, Yamataya, and Zadvydas. It rejects the government’s claim that Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam limits due process to whatever Congress provides, because that holding addressed a noncitizen stopped within “25 yards of the border” and concerned “initial entry.” It similarly refuses to extend Demore v. Kim—upholding no-bond mandatory detention for certain criminal detainees under § 1226(c)—to Petitioners detained under § 1226(a), where Congress did not make the same criminal-flight-risk findings and where the statutory scheme is expressly discretionary.

Finally, the court answers the dissent’s framing that noncitizens lack a liberty interest in remaining in the United States by clarifying that the relevant liberty interest is freedom from detention itself (citing Zadvydas and Hamdi).

Impact

Detention classification rule in the Sixth Circuit: Interior noncitizens who entered without inspection and are not affirmatively pursuing lawful entry are not covered by § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention; the government must proceed under § 1226’s detention scheme.
Bond-hearing consequences: By routing such detainees into § 1226(a), the decision restores immigration judge bond jurisdiction for this class (absent other mandatory-detention triggers), and constitutionalizes the need for individualized process in prolonged § 1226(a) detention for longtime interior residents.
Administrative reverberations: The court’s rejection of the logic underpinning Matter of Yajure Hurtado weakens reliance on that BIA interpretation within the circuit and invites renewed habeas litigation where DHS attempts to classify interior detainees as § 1225(b)(2)(A) detainees.
National significance and Supreme Court risk: The opinion deepens an acknowledged inter-circuit conflict (with the dissent aligning with Avila v. Bondi and Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, while the majority aligns with Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden and Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami), increasing the likelihood of Supreme Court review or congressional clarification.
Post-Loper Bright statutory interpretation posture: The court’s use of “longstanding practice” as persuasive evidence (without deference) offers a roadmap for litigants contesting abrupt agency reversals in immigration detention policy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Admission” vs. “applicant for admission”: “Admission” is a defined term meaning lawful entry after inspection and authorization (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). “Applicant for admission” is a statutory status: certain noncitizens (including those present without admission) are treated as applicants under § 1225(a)(1), even if they never filed an “application” in the everyday sense.
“Seeking admission”: The majority reads this as requiring a present, affirmative attempt to obtain lawful entry through inspection—something interior EWI residents typically have not done. The dissent reads it as a constructive legal consequence of being treated as an “applicant for admission.”
§ 1225 vs. § 1226 detention: § 1225(b)(2)(A) is a mandatory detention pathway for certain “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission.” § 1226(a) is the general detention provision during removal proceedings, allowing release on bond or conditional parole (subject to mandatory-detention exceptions such as § 1226(c)).
Bond hearing: A hearing before an immigration judge to decide whether detention is necessary based on flight risk or danger to the community. Under this decision, such hearings become available to the covered class because they fall under § 1226(a), and due process may require individualized review when detention becomes unjustified by regulatory goals.
Habeas corpus: A federal court mechanism allowing a detainee to challenge unlawful custody. Here, Petitioners used habeas to contest both statutory authority for detention and the absence of bond process.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit establishes (for its jurisdiction) a clear statutory boundary: § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory detention does not automatically attach to interior noncitizens present without admission; it applies only when such a person is also “seeking admission,” understood as an affirmative pursuit of lawful entry. The practical effect is to route long-resident interior EWI detainees into § 1226’s bond-capable framework and to reaffirm that due process protections for noncitizens “within the interior” include meaningful individualized procedures when continued civil detention loses its regulatory justification. The dissent underscores an entrenched circuit split—making this decision a consequential waypoint in national immigration detention law.