Sixth Circuit: No Williams Remand When the Record Makes Felon Dangerousness “Self-Evident” Under § 922(g)(1)

I. Introduction

Case: United States v. Tony Wilkinson (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) (unpublished).
Parties: United States (Plaintiff–Appellee) v. Tony F. Wilkinson (Defendant–Appellant).
Charge: Possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The appeal sits at the intersection of modern Second Amendment doctrine and the Sixth Circuit’s post-Bruen framework for evaluating § 922(g)(1). After Kentucky troopers stopped Wilkinson’s truck for an equipment violation and investigated reports of an armed drug trafficker, Wilkinson admitted a loaded handgun was tucked between his back and the driver’s seat. He moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The district court denied the motion; Wilkinson then entered a conditional guilty plea preserving the Second Amendment issue.

A procedural wrinkle defined the appeal: Wilkinson was sentenced before the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Williams, which announced how defendants may mount an as-applied challenge by showing they are not “dangerous.” Wilkinson sought a remand to develop evidence under Williams.

Key issue: Whether, in a pre-Williams record, the Sixth Circuit must remand to allow an “individualized showing” of non-dangerousness—or may affirm when the existing record makes dangerousness indisputable.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Wilkinson’s § 922(g)(1) conviction. Applying Williams and subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions addressing pre-Williams cases, the court held that remand was unnecessary because the record evidence would have “indisputably” led the district court to find Wilkinson dangerous enough to be constitutionally disarmed.

The panel emphasized that dangerousness is a holistic, fact-specific inquiry considering the defendant’s entire criminal record. Wilkinson’s history—felony burglary; two felony drug-trafficking convictions; repeated DUIs; driving and alcohol/drug offenses; and two fleeing-and-evading convictions—demonstrated a persistent pattern of conduct posing serious public danger.

Concurring opinion (Bush, J., joined by Nalbandian, J.): The concurrence added that Wilkinson’s offense conduct (possessing and manipulating a loaded firearm while under the influence of methamphetamine during a traffic stop) independently supports disarmament, citing historical acceptance of disarming intoxicated persons and drawing support from § 922(g)(3) precedent.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)

1. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

Bruen supplied the governing Second Amendment test: firearm regulations are permissible if consistent with “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The Wilkinson panel treated Bruen as the starting point for evaluating § 922(g)(1), but the operative Sixth Circuit implementation of Bruen came through Williams.

2. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)

Rahimi clarified that modern firearm restrictions need not have a “historical twin.” Wilkinson relies on this clarification indirectly: it supports the Sixth Circuit’s approach of analogical reasoning rather than demanding an exact historical match. The panel quoted Rahimi through Williams to reinforce that dangerousness-based disarmament can fit within historical tradition without one-to-one historical replicas.

3. United States v. Williams. 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)

Williams was the decisive precedent. The Wilkinson panel applied several Williams holdings:

  • Constitutionality rule: § 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to “dangerous people.”
  • Process requirement: Congress may disarm a group believed dangerous so long as each member has an opportunity to make an individualized showing that he is not actually dangerous.
  • Burden: The defendant bears the burden to prove § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied by showing he is not dangerous “given his specific circumstances.”
  • Scope of evidence: Dangerousness is fact-specific and turns on the defendant’s entire criminal record, not merely the predicate felony.
  • Non-categorical approach: Courts should not import an ACCA-style “categorical approach” to Second Amendment dangerousness; instead, they must evaluate the record holistically.

Wilkinson’s attempted path to relief—remand for a “Williams opportunity”—was answered not by disputing Williams, but by applying the Sixth Circuit’s post-Williams handling of pre-Williams cases.

4. United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2024)

Gailes provided the standard of review: as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) are reviewed de novo. This empowered the panel to assess dangerousness and the necessity of remand from the appellate record.

5. Pre-Williams record/remand line: United States v. Henson, United States v. Fordham, and United States v. Robinson

These cases supplied the procedural rule that became the functional “new” application in Wilkinson:

  • United States v. Henson, No. 24-3494, 2025 WL 1009666 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025): In pre-Williams cases, remand is unnecessary if the record evidence would have “indisputably” led the district court to find dangerousness sufficient to disarm.
  • United States v. Fordham, No. 24-1491, 2025 WL 318229 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025): Reinforced the same no-remand principle when the record already compels the conclusion.
  • United States v. Robinson, No. 24-1469, 2025 WL 2105111 (6th Cir. July 28, 2025): When dangerousness is “self-evident,” remand would only “confirm what the record already reveals.”

Wilkinson is a straightforward application of this trilogy: because the panel deemed dangerousness clear from the record, the defendant was not entitled to a do-over evidentiary hearing.

6. Crime-type guidance and supporting citations: Harmelin v. Michigan and Taylor v. United States

In assessing which convictions are probative of dangerousness, the panel invoked Williams’s categorization (without adopting a rigid categorical approach). The opinion quoted:

  • Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), for the proposition (as used in Williams) that drug trafficking is associated with violence.
  • Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990), for the idea that burglary creates the possibility of violent confrontation.

Those citations mattered here because Wilkinson’s record included both drug trafficking and burglary—two offense types the Sixth Circuit views as strongly correlated with danger even when not “crimes against the person.”

7. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013)

Descamps was cited not for its holding per se, but as a foil: Williams (and Wilkinson) reject importing ACCA’s categorical methodology into Second Amendment dangerousness analysis. This reinforces that courts may consider the broader record rather than only statutory elements of prior offenses—though Wilkinson also acknowledges practical limits when underlying facts are missing.

8. Quarles v. United States, 587 U.S. 645 (2019)

Quarles was used to explain the common-law understanding of burglary (dwelling at night with intent to commit a felony) and to highlight variation among state burglary statutes. This mattered because Wilkinson’s Kentucky third-degree burglary statute is broader than common-law burglary, and the record lacked details—reducing the conviction’s weight in isolation. Even so, the panel found dangerousness established by the total record.

9. United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2024)

Goins was central to how the panel treated Wilkinson’s repeated DUIs. The court analogized Wilkinson’s record to the defendant in Goins, quoting the “dangerous pattern of misuse of alcohol and motor vehicles” language. Wilkinson’s case was deemed at least as serious, because—unlike Goins—his record also contained burglary and drug trafficking felonies. The panel also noted a factual distinction (Wilkinson was not on probation when he possessed the firearm), but treated it as insufficient to overcome the broader dangerousness signal.

10. United States v. Poe, No. 24-6014, 2025 WL 1342340 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025)

Poe supported the court’s skepticism toward remand requests that are not accompanied by a concrete proffer. The panel emphasized that Wilkinson did not identify what evidence he would have presented to prove non-dangerousness—making remand especially unwarranted under the Sixth Circuit’s post-Williams approach.

11. Concurrence’s additional authorities: United States v. VanOchten, 150 F.4th 552 (6th Cir. 2025)

Judge Bush’s concurrence drew on § 922(g)(3) (illegal drug user in possession) as-applied precedent. In United States v. VanOchten, the Sixth Circuit upheld disarmament where the defendant’s intoxication and gun use posed acute danger. The concurrence treated VanOchten as “instructive” because Wilkinson possessed a loaded gun while under the influence of methamphetamine and manipulated it as officers approached—creating a substantial risk of death or injury even without firing the weapon.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The governing constitutional test: history-and-tradition, operationalized through dangerousness

The panel’s reasoning tracks the Sixth Circuit’s synthesis of Bruen and Rahimi as implemented in Williams: the Second Amendment allows disarmament of those who are dangerous, and § 922(g)(1) is valid as applied to such individuals. The key constitutional question thus becomes a dangerousness determination rather than a categorical inquiry into whether “felons” as a class may be disarmed in all circumstances.

2. The “entire criminal record” approach, with offense-type signals but no rigid categories

The court acknowledged Williams’s guidance that some crimes are more probative of dangerousness (e.g., crimes against the person; and certain non-person crimes like burglary and drug trafficking that “often lead[] to violence”), but it emphasized the required holistic inquiry.

Applying that method, the panel:

  • Identified Wilkinson’s three felonies (burglary; two drug trafficking convictions involving oxycodone sales).
  • Noted the recency of the most recent trafficking felony (2016), occurring less than five years before the 2021 firearm offense.
  • Recognized evidentiary limits on the burglary conviction (unknown details; broader state statute than common-law burglary), which reduced the ability to evaluate that conviction’s particular dangerousness.
  • Then placed decisive weight on the accumulated record of misdemeanors, especially repeated DUIs and fleeing-and-evading convictions, describing an annual cadence of criminal convictions since age eighteen.

3. The pre-Williams procedural question: remand vs. affirmance

The opinion’s practical holding lies in its remand analysis. Because Wilkinson’s case was litigated after Bruen but before Williams, the district court did not structure proceedings around the “individualized showing” concept. But under Henson, Fordham, and Robinson, remand is not required if the existing record would compel a dangerousness finding anyway.

The panel concluded dangerousness was effectively indisputable given (i) felony drug trafficking, (ii) a burglary conviction (even with limited details), (iii) extensive alcohol/drug and driving-related misconduct including multiple DUIs, and (iv) fleeing-and-evading convictions—especially because those incidents involved intoxication and such conduct can escalate into violence.

Finally, invoking Poe, the panel viewed Wilkinson’s failure to articulate what evidence he would add on remand as undercutting the claimed need for further proceedings.

C. Impact

  • Strengthening the “no-remand” pathway in pre-Williams cases: Wilkinson continues the Sixth Circuit trend of affirming § 922(g)(1) convictions without remand when dangerousness is apparent from the record, limiting post-Williams remands to cases where dangerousness is genuinely contestable on the existing record.
  • Expanded practical relevance of misdemeanor histories: The decision underscores that repeated misdemeanors—especially DUIs and flight from police—can materially contribute to a constitutional dangerousness finding, even where one predicate felony (like burglary) is factually underdeveloped.
  • Convergence of “public-safety” narratives across § 922(g) provisions: The concurrence’s reliance on intoxication-plus-firearm-risk reasoning (and analogies to § 922(g)(3) cases like VanOchten) may encourage litigants and courts to emphasize real-world risk factors—intoxication, firearm handling during police encounters, and vehicular danger—when assessing dangerousness under § 922(g)(1).
  • Litigation strategy signal: Defendants seeking remand must likely proffer concrete, individualized evidence of non-dangerousness; otherwise, courts may treat remand as futile where the record already suggests ongoing, escalatory risk.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all (or nearly all) applications. An as-applied challenge argues the law is unconstitutional as applied to a particular person’s circumstances. Wilkinson pursued both in the district court but pressed the as-applied theory on appeal.
  • Bruen “history and tradition” test: Rather than balancing governmental interests (like public safety) against individual rights, courts ask whether the modern gun regulation is consistent with historical regulatory traditions.
  • No “historical twin” requirement (Rahimi): The government need not find a near-identical historical law; it can rely on relevant historical analogues supporting similar regulatory purposes and burdens.
  • “Dangerousness” in the Sixth Circuit after Williams: § 922(g)(1) is constitutional at least as applied to people who are dangerous. A defendant may attempt to show he is not dangerous, but he bears the burden and the inquiry is individualized and holistic.
  • Why the “categorical approach” is rejected here: The ACCA often requires looking only at the statutory elements of prior convictions. The Sixth Circuit’s dangerousness analysis (per Williams) is broader and more contextual—though it still depends on what facts are actually in the record.
  • What “remand” means in this context: Sending the case back to the district court for further proceedings (e.g., allowing the defendant to present evidence of non-dangerousness). Wilkinson holds remand is unnecessary when the appellate record already makes dangerousness clear.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Tony Wilkinson applies the Sixth Circuit’s post-Williams framework to a pre-Williams record and reinforces a practical rule: when the defendant’s criminal history makes dangerousness effectively indisputable, the court will affirm a § 922(g)(1) conviction without remanding for an individualized non-dangerousness hearing.

The decision is significant for two reasons. First, it operationalizes the Sixth Circuit’s “dangerousness” standard as a record-driven inquiry where extensive misdemeanor conduct (not only predicate felonies) can carry substantial constitutional weight. Second, it signals that defendants seeking post-Williams remands must identify concrete, case-specific evidence of non-dangerousness—otherwise, the court will treat remand as unnecessary when the record already shows a pattern of conduct posing serious risk to the community.