Sixth Circuit: Handcuffed Hallway Terry Stops May Be Reasonable; Suppression Theories Raised Only After Hearings Need Not Be Decided

1) Introduction

United States v. Gregory Kilgore, III (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2026) is an unpublished decision affirming the denial (in relevant part) of two suppression motions arising from a narcotics investigation at a Louisville apartment complex. After a controlled buy and a later search of a target’s ninth-floor unit, officers detained Gregory Kilgore III in the fourth-floor hallway as he exited an elevator, handcuffed him, and questioned him. Kilgore made one inculpatory statement before Miranda warnings (suppressed) and another after receiving Miranda warnings (admitted). Officers then obtained a warrant for Kilgore’s unit and discovered drugs and weapons.

The appeal presented three core issues: (1) whether the hallway detention was a lawful Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion and conducted with a reasonable level of force; (2) whether the district court erred by not deciding a belatedly raised argument that officers lacked lawful authority to be on the fourth floor; and (3) whether Kilgore’s post-Miranda statement was involuntary.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Kilgore and that the use of handcuffs and an armed posture did not necessarily convert the stop into an arrest given the circumstances (drug investigation, prior violent charge, prior flight, and officer experience regarding firearms). It further held the district court did not err by declining to rule on a new suppression theory first raised in post-hearing briefing, particularly where the defendant conceded it was outside the scope of the filed motion and no timely new motion was filed. Finally, it held Kilgore’s post-Miranda waiver and statement were voluntary absent threats, injury, fear, or other coercive tactics, and the surrounding show of force alone was insufficient to invalidate the waiver.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2007)
    The court relied on Campbell for the standard of review: legal conclusions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling. This framing mattered because the record contained competing narratives about the degree of force and the conversational tone; the panel deferred where “two permissible views of the evidence” existed.
  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
    Terry supplied the baseline: the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, but permits brief investigatory detentions based on reasonable suspicion. The panel applied Terry both to justify the initial stop and to assess whether the scope and intrusiveness were proportionate.
  • United States v. Young, 707 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2012)
    Cited for the principle that officers may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes so long as the stop is “reasonable,” tying the general Terry doctrine to Sixth Circuit phrasing.
  • United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005)
    The panel used Davis for the two-part Terry inquiry: (1) whether “specific and articulable facts” created reasonable suspicion; and (2) whether the degree of intrusion was “reasonably related in scope” to the circumstances.
  • Hoover v. Walsh, 682 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2012)
    Hoover supported the instruction to evaluate the “circumstances as a unified whole rather than as a series of disconnected facts,” undercutting Kilgore’s attempt to isolate and discount individual indicia (e.g., the “brother” reference).
  • United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)
    The panel invoked Sokolow to distinguish reasonable suspicion from a mere “hunch,” concluding the combined facts surpassed the hunch threshold.
  • Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2015)
    Brown was central on the force question: displays of force (including handcuffs) do not automatically convert a stop into an arrest but must be warranted by facts suggesting risk of violence or flight.
  • United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2001)
    Heath reinforced that officers may rely on training and experience that weapons often accompany drug trafficking; it helped justify handcuffing and heightened caution while investigating a suspected drug supplier.
  • United States v. Miller, 588 F. App'x 445 (6th Cir. 2014)
    The panel used Miller to approve a district court’s decision not to entertain a suppression argument raised for the first time in post-hearing briefing. That precedent directly supported the court’s “no error” conclusion on the fourth-floor-presence argument.
  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
    Miranda governed the admissibility of custodial statements. The district court suppressed Kilgore’s first statement because it occurred in custody before warnings; the appeal focused on the second, post-warning statement.
  • Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)
    The panel used Berghuis for the waiver framework: waiver must be knowing and voluntary, meaning a free and deliberate choice without intimidation, coercion, or deception, and with awareness of the right and consequences. It also cited Berghuis for the proposition that conduct inconsistent with exercising rights can evidence a deliberate choice to waive.
  • North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)
    Quoted via Berghuis on the prosecution’s obligation to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver.
  • Moore v. Berghuis, 700 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2012)
    Cited for the government’s burden to prove waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008)
    Cited for the appellate posture: when suppression is denied, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government.
  • Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)
    The panel referenced Seibert as a contrast: Kilgore did not argue (and the record did not show) a deliberate “two-step” tactic designed to elicit a pre-Miranda confession and then replicate it post-Miranda to undermine warnings.
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3)
    The panel pointed to Rule 12(c)(3) to emphasize timeliness: suppression arguments are subject to deadlines, and Kilgore’s belated theory came “well after the court’s deadline” without a motion seeking leave to raise it.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Reasonable suspicion and the “unified whole”

The panel treated the relevant facts as mutually reinforcing: (i) the target’s earlier statement that he was waiting for his “brother” to deliver drugs; (ii) Detective Spencer’s observation of Kilgore’s timed departure and return with a bag shortly before the controlled purchase completed; (iii) apartment staff later identifying Kilgore as the target’s “brother”; and (iv) the target’s cooperation identifying Kilgore in Unit 402 as his supplier. Using Hoover v. Walsh and United States v. Davis, the court concluded these were “specific and articulable facts” supporting reasonable suspicion.

2. Handcuffs and guns as a reasonable Terry intrusion

The key move was separating “high intrusion” from “automatic arrest.” Relying on Brown v. Lewis, the panel held that handcuffs and firearms can be consistent with a Terry stop when justified by objective safety/flight concerns. The justification here was twofold: officers had learned of Kilgore’s prior violent-felony charge and past attempt to elude law enforcement, and they credited the common association between drug trafficking and firearms, consistent with United States v. Heath.

Once Kilgore admitted to possessing drugs after Miranda warnings, that admission “verified the officers’ suspicions” and supplied probable cause, making the continued seizure and subsequent warrant process lawful on the record as the panel viewed it.

3. No obligation to decide a suppression theory raised only after hearings

Kilgore’s post-hearing argument was that the warrant authorizing entry into the building to search the ninth-floor target unit did not authorize officer presence on the fourth floor, rendering the hallway encounter unlawful. The panel did not reach the merits of that theory. Instead, it framed the issue as one of preservation and procedural regularity: the argument was not included in either suppression motion, was not raised at either hearing, and was advanced for the first time in post-hearing briefing. Citing United States v. Miller and referencing Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3), the court held the district court acted reasonably in declining to rule on it.

4. Voluntariness of the post-Miranda waiver

The voluntariness analysis followed Berghuis v. Thompkins. Even though Kilgore was handcuffed, surrounded by armed officers, and separated from his keys and phone, the panel emphasized the absence of classic coercion indicators: no threats, no injury, no claim of fear, and no deception undermining the warning itself. The court also noted Kilgore’s “very calm and polite” demeanor and his acknowledgment that he understood his rights.

The court explicitly distinguished situations like Missouri v. Seibert, where officers intentionally employ a two-step interrogation strategy to nullify Miranda’s effect; Kilgore did not argue that such a tactic occurred.

C. Impact

Although “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision consolidates several practical points likely to influence litigation positions in the Sixth Circuit:

  • Handcuffed hallway stops: The case reinforces that, in drug investigations, handcuffing and an armed posture may be upheld under Terry when the government can articulate concrete flight/violence risk factors (criminal history signals, prior flight, and drug-gun nexus testimony).
  • Fact aggregation: It underscores the “unified whole” method, making it harder for defendants to dismantle reasonable suspicion by atomizing each fact (e.g., contesting the meaning of “brother”) when the combined narrative supports suspicion.
  • Procedural discipline in suppression litigation: The holding on the belated fourth-floor argument incentivizes defendants to raise all suppression grounds in the motion and at the hearing, or seek leave to add grounds timely—otherwise, courts may treat them as forfeited or outside the motion’s scope.
  • Post-Miranda voluntariness threshold: The opinion signals that “show of force” facts, without more (threats, deception, exploitation, or a Seibert-type strategy), will often be insufficient to invalidate a post-warning waiver.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Terry stop”: A brief, investigative detention officers can conduct without probable cause if they have reasonable suspicion supported by specific facts.
  • “Reasonable suspicion”: Less than probable cause; more than a hunch. Courts look at the whole picture to see if the facts reasonably suggest crime-related activity.
  • “Scope/intrusion” of a stop: Even if a stop is justified, the methods used (handcuffs, guns, duration) must be reasonably tied to safety and investigative needs.
  • Miranda “custody” and “waiver”: If a person is in custody, police must give Miranda warnings before interrogation. A waiver is valid if the person understands the rights and voluntarily chooses to speak without coercion.
  • “Two-step” interrogation (Seibert): A tactic where police intentionally question without Miranda to obtain a confession, then Mirandize and seek the same confession—courts may suppress the post-warning statement if the tactic undermines Miranda.
  • Preservation/timeliness (Rule 12): Suppression arguments must be raised by motion within deadlines. Courts can refuse to consider theories raised late (e.g., after hearings) unless properly presented.

5) Conclusion

United States v. Gregory Kilgore, III affirms (1) a fact-aggregated finding of reasonable suspicion for a hallway Terry stop tied to a drug supplier theory, (2) the permissibility of handcuffing and an armed show of force during that stop when supported by flight/violence risk indicators, (3) a district court’s discretion to decline ruling on suppression theories introduced only in post-hearing briefing outside the motion’s scope and deadlines, and (4) the sufficiency of a post-Miranda waiver absent concrete coercion or a Seibert-type strategy. In combination, the decision highlights both substantive Fourth/Fifth Amendment doctrines and the procedural rigor required to litigate suppression effectively.