Date: May 19, 2026

Sixth Circuit: § 924(c) Terms Must Run Consecutively to All Other Sentences (Including State), and Written Judgments May Clarify Oral Ambiguity

I. Introduction

In United States v. Estifanos Kumssa (6th Cir. May 13, 2026), the Sixth Circuit reviewed a federal sentencing dispute arising from two armed carjackings. The defendant, Estifanos Kumssa, was convicted of two counts of carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119(1)) and two counts of possessing and brandishing a firearm during those crimes (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). The key sentencing question was whether the district court could run the two mandatory § 924(c) terms concurrently with Kumssa’s existing and anticipated state sentences.

The appeal also raised a procedural issue: whether the district court impermissibly changed the sentence “outside the defendant’s presence” by issuing a written judgment that made the § 924(c) terms consecutive to state sentences after an arguably unclear oral pronouncement. Finally, Kumssa argued the government had forfeited (or invited error on) its position by not objecting at the sentencing hearing.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held:

Mandatory consecutiveness: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) bars a district court from running a § 924(c) sentence concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, including state sentences.
Ambiguity clarification: The oral sentencing record was ambiguous on whether “concurrency” extended to the § 924(c) terms; the written judgment did not conflict with the oral sentence but properly clarified it.
No bar from government conduct: The government’s conduct at sentencing did not prevent the district court from clarifying the judgment, and the district court permissibly requested briefing before entering the final written judgment.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Statutory interpretation and standard of review

United States v. Jackson and United States v. Langan were cited for the proposition that interpretation of § 924(c) is reviewed de novo. This framed the appellate court’s role as independently determining the statute’s meaning rather than deferring to the district court.
United States v. Eason (and its partial abrogation “on other grounds” by Shular v. United States) supported the broader methodological point: statutory interpretation of federal sentencing statutes is typically a legal question reviewed de novo.

2. § 924(c) consecutiveness—including to state sentences

United States v. Gonzales was the linchpin: the Supreme Court “expressly held” the § 924(c) consecutiveness mandate applies to state-imposed sentences. The Sixth Circuit treated Gonzales as directly controlling on the state/federal concurrency question.
Lora v. United States, Barrett v. United States, and Dean v. United States reinforced that § 924(c) removes judicial discretion to impose concurrent sentences vis-à-vis other imprisonment terms. Barrett, in particular, was quoted to emphasize that Congress extended the mandate so it applies between a subsection (c) sentence and “any other term of imprisonment.”
Duncan v Walker was invoked by Kumssa (not the court) to argue every word must be given effect—specifically “imposed on the person.” The Sixth Circuit rejected Kumssa’s attempt to use that canon to limit § 924(c) to sentences imposed at the same hearing.
Gilbert v. United States provided a powerful analog: the Sixth Circuit had recently interpreted materially similar language in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(2) to require consecutiveness to all other sentences “including undischarged state sentences,” relying on Gonzales and the natural meaning of “any other term of imprisonment.” That reasoning was imported to § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
United States v. Williams (with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)-(f)) was used to underscore that absent specific statutory authorization (e.g., substantial assistance), courts cannot deviate from mandatory minimum structures—supporting the “no discretion” theme.

3. Oral vs. written sentence; ambiguity vs. conflict; defendant’s presence

United States v. Hayden and United States v. Gagnon, together with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3), anchored the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing and the general rule that oral pronouncement controls if there is a conflict.
United States v. Shaw and United States v. Blake supplied the governing distinction: (a) a written judgment that conflicts with the oral sentence is invalid to the extent of the conflict; but (b) a written judgment may clarify an ambiguity without violating Rule 43 or due process.
United States v. Black (unpublished) was cited as additional Sixth Circuit support that clarification of ambiguity in writing is permissible.
United States v. Penson was cited as part of the circuit’s established line of authority on this oral/written sentencing relationship.
United States v. Thompson was used by analogy to suggest that whether language is ambiguous is typically a legal question, supporting the panel’s inclination toward de novo review even though prior sentencing cases had not articulated a standard.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC and CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese supplied a general ambiguity principle: language is ambiguous when it remains reasonably susceptible to two reasonable conflicting meanings. The court used this to justify its ambiguity finding for the oral record.

4. Forfeiture, invited error, waiver—and when they matter

United States v. Akridge, United States v. Carter, and United States v. Woods
United States v. Dale (citing United States v. Clariot and Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of Dirs.) supported the conclusion that, where the district court addressed the merits and the issue is fully briefed, the appellate court can review without treating the matter as improperly unpreserved in a way that blocks consideration.
Walker v. United States was distinguished because it involved the district court’s improper consideration of a waived statute of limitations defense; here, Kumssa did not establish waiver, and the ambiguity arguably only became clear after the court flagged it.
United States v. Smith supported the practical point that the lack of a contemporaneous objection does not necessarily bar correction where statutory minima were already made clear to the court.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Textual reading of § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii): “any other term of imprisonment”

The court treated the statutory command as straightforward: “no term of imprisonment” under § 924(c) “shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” The decisive interpretive move was rejecting Kumssa’s attempt to limit “imposed on the person” to sentences imposed in the same proceeding. The panel found that phrase does not carry a temporal or locational limitation; it simply identifies whose sentences are at issue.

2. Supreme Court reinforcement: Gonzales plus modern reiterations

Even if Kumssa’s amendment-based argument had traction, the Sixth Circuit found it decisively undercut by (a) Gonzales’s holding that the consecutiveness requirement applies to state sentences and (b) recent Supreme Court decisions—Lora, Barrett, and Dean—reaffirming that § 924(c) eliminates judicial discretion to order concurrency with other sentences.

3. The “similar language” argument: Gilbert as a bridge

The panel’s use of Gilbert is notable. Rather than treating § 924(c) as sui generis, it reasoned from a parallel statute (18 U.S.C. § 1028A) containing the same “imposed on the person” phrasing. Gilbert read “any other term of imprisonment” to include state sentences; the Kumssa panel saw “little daylight” and declined to create a divergence across statutes with comparable language and function.

4. Oral ambiguity and permissible written clarification

The oral sentencing record contained two competing signals: the district judge repeatedly described Counts Two and Four as “mandatory minimum consecutive,” but later stated “I will run those concurrent with the cases you asked me to run them concurrent with,” without specifying whether “those” included the § 924(c) counts. Because both readings were plausible, the panel found ambiguity—not a clear oral command of full concurrency.

With ambiguity established, Shaw/Blake controlled: the written judgment could clarify. The written judgment did so by stating that the 84-month terms on Counts Two and Four run consecutively “as well as any State sentence imposed on defendant,” while the 92-month terms on Counts One and Three could run concurrently with specified state matters.

5. Post-hearing briefing and the Rule 35(a) sidelight

The district court invited briefing after noticing the issue while preparing the written judgment. Although the government also filed a Rule 35(a) motion, the district court denied it and proceeded on the theory of clarifying ambiguity rather than “correcting” the sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the ambiguity/clarification route and expressly declined to reach Rule 35(a) disputes.

C. Impact

Concurrency requests will be structurally limited in § 924(c) cases: Defendants can still seek concurrency for non-§ 924(c) counts where permitted, but courts cannot extend concurrency to § 924(c) terms against any other imprisonment, including state sentences—whether already imposed or anticipated.
Sentencing clarity is essential: The case illustrates how an imprecise referent (“those”) can generate litigation. Practically, courts and counsel in the Sixth Circuit should explicitly separate: (a) the portion of the federal sentence that may be concurrent with state terms, from (b) § 924(c) terms that must be consecutive to everything.
Written judgments have a defined corrective role: Kumssa reinforces that a written judgment may add specificity—without violating Rule 43—when the oral record is genuinely ambiguous, especially where the clarification aligns the judgment with statutory mandates.
Government silence at the hearing is not a safe harbor: Where the statutory structure is mandatory and the district court ultimately addresses the issue on the merits before final judgment, defendants should not assume the government’s earlier non-objection will lock in an unlawful or unclear concurrency arrangement.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 924(c) “mandatory consecutive” sentence: A punishment that must be added on top of other sentences. The judge cannot make it overlap with (run at the same time as) other prison terms—even state sentences.
Concurrent vs. consecutive sentences: Concurrent sentences run at the same time; consecutive sentences run one after another.
Oral pronouncement vs. written judgment: The sentence said in open court generally controls. But if what was said is unclear (ambiguous), the written judgment may supply clarification that does not contradict what was orally imposed.
Ambiguity: Language is ambiguous when it can reasonably mean two different things. Here, the judge’s statement about running “those” concurrently could reasonably refer to all federal time or only the portion the judge had authority to make concurrent.
Forfeiture vs. waiver vs. invited error: Forfeiture is failing to raise an argument (silence). Waiver is intentionally giving it up. Invited error is when a party induces the court into a mistake. The court treated Walker (waiver) as inapposite and did not view the government’s conduct as barring clarification.
De novo review: The appellate court decides the issue fresh, without deference to the district court’s legal interpretation.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Estifanos Kumssa consolidates two practical rules for Sixth Circuit sentencing practice: (1) § 924(c) sentences must run consecutively to all other imprisonment, including state sentences, and statutory amendments do not create a “same-hearing only” limitation; and (2) when an oral sentence is ambiguous about concurrency, a written judgment may clarify—without violating the defendant’s right to be present—so long as it does not contradict the oral pronouncement and brings the judgment into compliance with mandatory law. In effect, Kumssa places a premium on precision at sentencing and confirms that statutory consecutiveness requirements will prevail over ambiguous oral phrasing.