Single-RTO DFAX Studies May Establish “Deliverable into this State” for Noncontiguous Renewable Facilities under R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b)

I. Introduction

Case: In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3103 (Ohio Aug. 18, 2026).
Tribunal under review: Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO” or “the commission”).
Appellant: Carbon Solutions Group, L.L.C. (“CSG”).
Appellee: PUCO.
Intervening appellees: Six Avangrid-owned wind projects (Moraine Wind, Rugby Wind, Elm Creek II Wind, Buffalo Ridge II Wind, Barton Windpower 1, and Barton Windpower, L.L.C.) plus market participants (Blue Delta Energy, L.L.C. and Northern Indiana Public Service Company, L.L.C.).

The dispute arose from PUCO’s certification of six out-of-state wind farms as “eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource-generating facilities,” enabling the projects to sell renewable energy (including through renewable-energy credits) into Ohio’s compliance market. The central statutory issue was whether electricity from facilities located in noncontiguous states “can be shown to be deliverable into this state” under R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b)—a requirement PUCO has historically assessed using DFAX/power-flow studies under the commission’s 2011 administrative framework commonly referred to as the “Koda test.”

CSG attacked the evidentiary sufficiency and procedural regularity of PUCO’s decision, contending (i) the PJM-generated DFAX studies were “hypothetical” because the facilities sit in MISO territory and (ii) PUCO failed to adequately explain its decision under R.C. 4903.09, among other alleged errors.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed PUCO’s order. It held that PUCO’s deliverability findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and not contrary to law, and that PUCO’s written order satisfied R.C. 4903.09. The court also rejected CSG’s procedural challenges: (1) CSG waived its subpoena argument by failing to timely object at hearing, and (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to consider CSG’s hearsay claim because it was not specifically raised in the rehearing application as required by R.C. 4903.10.

A notable limiting note in the majority opinion: while holding that a PJM DFAX study was sufficient on this record, the court stated it did “not wish to preclude” PUCO in future cases from requiring multiple-RTO studies or other forms of evidence when evaluating deliverability.

Dissent (Fischer, J., joined by Willamowski, J.): agreed on the procedural disposition of the second proposition of law, but would have reversed and remanded on the first proposition, concluding PUCO violated R.C. 4903.09 by failing to meaningfully address CSG’s “evidentiary gap” argument and criticizing the majority for effectively supplying its own fact-finding by relying on testimony not cited by PUCO.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • In re Application of Koda Energy, L.L.C., PUCO No. 09-555-EL-REN, 2011 WL 1144649 (Mar. 23, 2011)
    The cornerstone administrative precedent. PUCO adopted DFAX/power-flow studies to operationalize “deliverable into this state” for noncontiguous facilities, setting a “significant impact” threshold (DFAX > 5% and megawatt equivalence > 1 MW). The Supreme Court treated PUCO’s continued use of this test as reasonable and accepted its application here.
  • In re Adoption of Rules for Alternative and Renewable Energy Technology, Resources, & Climate Regulations, PUCO No. 08-888-EL-ORD, 2009 WL 1759671 (June 17, 2009)
    Cited to reinforce PUCO’s longstanding interpretive stance that the deliverability inquiry is about demonstrating capability of physical delivery, not tracing actual electrons.
  • In re Rev. of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co., 2018-Ohio-229
    Used for background on renewable-energy credits and the conceptual separation between physical power flows (indistinguishable on the grid) and compliance instruments that “track” renewable attributes.
  • Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2004-Ohio-6767 and AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 51 Ohio St.3d 150 (1990)
    These frame the standard of review: PUCO orders are reversed only if “unlawful or unreasonable,” and the appellant bears the burden.
  • In re Application of Firelands Wind, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-2555 and Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 1997-Ohio-196
    Establish de novo review on questions of law, while leaving fact determinations largely to PUCO unless clearly unsupported.
  • In re Complaints of Lycourt-Donovan v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 2017-Ohio-7566, Monongahela Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2004-Ohio-6896, and AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2000-Ohio-422
    Cited to emphasize judicial restraint: the court does not reweigh evidence and will uphold PUCO if there is sufficient probative evidence and no misapprehension or disregard of duty.
  • Allnet Communications Servs., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 1994-Ohio-460, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 32 Ohio St.3d 306 (1987), and Tongren v. Pub. Util. Comm., 1999-Ohio-206
    These articulate what R.C. 4903.09 requires: sufficient detail to allow a reviewing court to understand the evidentiary basis and reasoning, while noting strict compliance is not required.
  • In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a Competitive Retail Elec. Serv. Power Broker & Aggregator, 2021-Ohio-3630
    CSG relied on it for the proposition that PUCO cannot issue a “bare-bones” order; the majority distinguished it based on the depth of the record and the length/detail of PUCO’s order here.
  • In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 2018-Ohio-4698 and In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 2016-Ohio-1608
    Used to restate that PUCO must avoid unsupported conclusory orders and must provide enough reasoning to permit review.
  • In re Complaint of Smith v. Ohio Edison Co., 2013-Ohio-4070, In re Application of Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-5664, and Parma v. Pub. Util. Comm., 1999-Ohio-141
    Support the waiver holding: failure to timely object deprives PUCO of an opportunity to cure and waives the issue for appeal.
  • In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 2014-Ohio-4271 and In re Letter of Notification Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 2024-Ohio-4747
    Applied to hold the hearsay argument was jurisdictionally barred because it was not specifically raised in the rehearing application under R.C. 4903.10.
  • In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-3224 (“Moraine Wind I”)
    Incorporated via a substantial footnote: the court reiterated that PUCO cannot “grant” rehearing for the limited purpose of further consideration beyond statutory timing; such entries result in denial by operation of law, rendering PUCO’s later substantive rehearing entry a nullity.
  • Ridgeview Ctr., Inc. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 42 Ohio St.3d 30 (1989)
    Cited for the proposition that internal inconsistency can render an order unreasonable.
  • Ohio Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2006-Ohio-5853 and Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 2021-Ohio-4463
    Provide background on RTOs (PJM and MISO) and market structure relevant to the interregional deliverability dispute.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The “deliverable into this state” standard and PUCO’s operational test

The statute requires that out-of-state renewable generation “can be shown to be deliverable into this state” (R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b)). For noncontiguous states, PUCO’s rule defines deliverability to include electricity “originating from other locations” upon a demonstration of physical deliverability (Adm.Code 4901:1-40-01(F)).

PUCO and the court accepted that “deliverable” means “capable of delivery,” not proof of actual delivery to a particular Ohio load—an important conceptual move given the physical indistinguishability of electrons on the grid and the compliance role played by renewable-energy credits. Within that framework, the court upheld PUCO’s use of the Koda thresholds (DFAX > 5% and MW equivalence > 1 MW) as a reasonable proxy for whether a facility’s injection “significantly impacts” Ohio transmission flows.

2. Why a PJM-only DFAX record was sufficient on these facts

CSG’s central technical objection was interregional: the wind farms are in areas administered by MISO, while Ohio is in PJM; therefore, CSG argued, PJM’s DFAX studies were conditional (“if they were to deliver their energy into PJM”) and did not prove the ability to move energy from MISO into PJM and then into Ohio.

The majority’s resolution has three components:

  1. Koda does not, by its terms, mandate a particular RTO or multiple studies. PUCO could reasonably treat a power-flow study performed by an RTO as sufficient without requiring an additional MISO study in this docket.
  2. Record evidence supported the staff’s reliance on PJM DFAX outputs. The court pointed to staff testimony about review and methodology and accepted that the commission had sufficient probative evidence to conclude the thresholds were met.
  3. The court avoided freezing the evidentiary standard going forward. It explicitly declined to preclude PUCO from requiring multi-RTO DFAX studies, an “affected system study,” or other evidence in future cases if PUCO deems it necessary.

In effect, the court treated the deliverability showing as a flexible, commission-administered evidentiary judgment so long as the agency stays within the “zone of permissible statutory construction” and supports its conclusions with sufficient probative evidence.

3. R.C. 4903.09 (reasoned decision-making) and the court’s adequacy holding

CSG argued PUCO failed to address an “evidentiary gap” and thus violated R.C. 4903.09 (findings of fact and written opinions setting forth reasons). The majority held PUCO’s order—supported by staff reports, testimony, and admitted DFAX materials—was detailed enough to permit review and distinguishable from In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a Competitive Retail Elec. Serv. Power Broker & Aggregator.

The dissent sharply disagreed, viewing PUCO’s response as nonresponsive to the specific “MISO-to-PJM-to-Ohio” objection and criticizing the majority for relying on record testimony PUCO did not cite as part of its stated rationale.

4. Procedural holdings: waiver and rehearing specificity

  • Subpoena denial (waiver): CSG did not object when the attorney examiner denied its subpoena motion at the hearing. Under In re Complaint of Smith v. Ohio Edison Co., In re Application of Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., and Parma v. Pub. Util. Comm., the court treated the issue as waived.
  • Hearsay claim (jurisdictional bar): Because CSG did not specifically raise the hearsay argument in its rehearing application, R.C. 4903.10 barred appellate review, consistent with In re Application of Ohio Power Co. (2014) and In re Letter of Notification Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc..

C. Impact

1. Substantive energy-regulation impact: The decision strengthens PUCO’s discretion to accept a single-RTO DFAX/power-flow study (here, PJM) as sufficient to satisfy R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b) for noncontiguous out-of-state renewables, even when the generation sits in a different RTO footprint (MISO) than Ohio (PJM). This lowers litigation risk for applicants relying on the Koda framework and may reduce the need for duplicative multi-RTO studies in at least some dockets.

2. Administrative-law impact: The court’s acceptance of PUCO’s order under R.C. 4903.09 signals that detailed staff reports incorporated by reference and a non-“bare-bones” explanation can suffice, though the dissent provides a roadmap for future appellants to argue that PUCO must explicitly confront specific technical challenges (particularly where an RTO’s disclaimer language is central to the objection).

3. Litigation practice impact: The waiver and rehearing-specificity holdings reinforce strict preservation norms in PUCO appeals: failure to object contemporaneously can waive procedural error, and failure to specifically include an issue in rehearing can defeat jurisdiction on appeal.

4. Prospective flexibility: By expressly stating it does not preclude PUCO from requiring additional studies or alternative evidence in future cases, the court preserved PUCO’s ability to tighten evidentiary requirements if interregional conditions, market rules, or modeling assumptions warrant a more demanding showing.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Deliverable into this state”: Not proof that particular electrons end up in Ohio, but proof that the facility’s output is capable of physically flowing into Ohio over the interconnected grid.
  • RTOs (PJM and MISO): Regional entities that operate and plan the high-voltage grid and wholesale markets in their territories. Ohio is in PJM; the wind farms here are in the Upper Midwest where MISO administers transmission assets.
  • DFAX / power-flow study: A computer simulation that estimates how injecting power at a generator changes flows on transmission lines. PUCO uses DFAX to infer whether a generator meaningfully affects Ohio lines.
  • The “Koda test”: PUCO’s 2011 rule-of-thumb: deliverability is shown if a DFAX study indicates a “significant impact” on an Ohio line—DFAX value greater than 5% and megawatt equivalence greater than 1 MW.
  • R.C. 4903.09: Requires PUCO to explain its decisions with findings and reasoning sufficient for appellate review; it is about transparency and reviewability, not perfection or exhaustive discussion.
  • R.C. 4903.10 (rehearing preservation): Issues generally must be specifically raised in a rehearing application to be reviewable on appeal; otherwise the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them.

V. Conclusion

In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C. affirms PUCO’s certification of six noncontiguous, out-of-state wind farms as eligible Ohio renewable resources and, in doing so, effectively endorses PUCO’s continued reliance on the Koda DFAX deliverability framework. On this record, the court accepted that a PJM-generated DFAX study could adequately demonstrate “deliverable into this state” under R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b) without requiring additional MISO studies—while preserving PUCO’s discretion to demand more robust evidence in future cases. The opinion also underscores the procedural discipline demanded in PUCO litigation: timely objection is essential to avoid waiver, and rehearing applications must specifically preserve issues for appellate review.