Singh v. Bondi: Internal Relocation Rebuttal Defeats Asylum/Withholding and Forecloses CAT Where Torture Risk Rests on the Same Speculative Nationwide-Tracking Theory

I. Introduction

Case: Singh v. Bondi, No. 23-7361 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 2026) (Summary Order).
Petitioner: Sukhjinder Singh, a native and citizen of India.
Respondent: Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General.
Agency posture: Petition for review of a BIA decision affirming an IJ’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Singh alleged persecution in India by supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) because he supported the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party (Mann Party) and refused to sell drugs for them. The dispositive issues on review were narrow: the BIA affirmed denial because (1) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rebutted any presumption of future persecution by showing Singh could reasonably and safely relocate within India, and (2) Singh failed to show it was more likely than not that he would be tortured.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. Applying substantial-evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions, the Court held:

  • Even assuming past persecution, DHS met its burden to rebut future persecution by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Singh could avoid future harm through internal relocation and that relocation would be reasonable under the circumstances.
  • Singh’s theory that India’s identification infrastructure would enable police to alert his BJP-affiliated attackers to his location was speculative on this record, particularly given the absence of evidence that the attackers were government officials or had nationwide reach.
  • CAT relief failed because Singh’s torture claim relied on the same factual predicate as his asylum/withholding claims, and the ability to relocate undermined any “more likely than not” showing of torture.
  • The Court declined to entertain arguments about issues the BIA did not reach and refused to consider evidence outside the administrative record (including a State Department report postdating the IJ’s decision).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Although the disposition is a nonprecedential “SUMMARY ORDER,” the Court’s reasoning is built from established Second Circuit and Supreme Court authorities that structure immigration review, define burdens, and clarify the internal-relocation inquiry.

1. Scope of review and “as modified” agency decision

  • Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005) and Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005): The Court reviewed the IJ decision “as modified and supplemented by the BIA,” limiting appellate review to the grounds the BIA actually relied upon. This framing mattered because Singh raised arguments on issues the BIA did not reach.
  • INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976): Cited for the principle that courts and agencies need not make findings on issues unnecessary to the result. The Court used this to reject Singh’s attempts to litigate matters not addressed by the BIA.

2. Standards of review

  • Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013): Reiterated de novo review for legal conclusions and substantial-evidence review for factual findings.
  • The Court also cited 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) for the “compelled to conclude” limitation: factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.

3. Asylum vs. withholding standards

  • Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2021): Used to describe withholding’s “more likely than not” standard and, importantly, later to support the internal-relocation reasoning in an India/Mann Party context.
  • Vanegas-Ramirez v. Holder, 768 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2014) and Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam): Confirmed that withholding has a higher burden than asylum and that failure to establish asylum eligibility typically defeats withholding.

4. Time-of-decision regulatory citation practice

  • Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023): Cited to justify applying the regulations in effect at the time of the IJ’s decision.

5. CAT burden and the “relocation” factor

  • Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010): Used for the proposition that where the record does not demonstrate risk of harm sufficient for asylum, the applicant “necessarily” fails to satisfy CAT’s higher likelihood requirement—particularly when the CAT claim rests on the same evidence.
  • Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2021) (again): Cited for the specific linkage: the ability to relocate internally to avoid persecution means the applicant cannot establish a likelihood of torture.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Issue narrowing: only BIA grounds considered

The Court expressly confined review to the BIA’s stated reasons—internal relocation and failure to show likely torture—rejecting collateral challenges as “misplaced and not properly before us.” This approach operationalizes the “as modified and supplemented” review rule and avoids advisory determinations.

2. Internal relocation as the dispositive rebuttal to future persecution

Assuming (without deciding) past persecution, the Court applied the regulatory rebuttal framework: DHS may rebut a fear/presumption of future persecution by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the applicant can avoid future persecution by relocating and that relocation would be reasonable. The Court cited 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (asylum) and 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B) (withholding), and reasonableness factors in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3) and 1208.16(b)(3).

The Court rejected Singh’s burden-shifting argument (that the agency improperly placed the burden on him), emphasizing that the agency articulated the correct standard and that the record reflected DHS elicited relevant relocation testimony.

3. Why Singh’s “nationwide tracking” theory was insufficient on this record

Singh argued that identification requirements (including a biometric system) would enable police to locate him and tip off his attackers. The Court treated the chain of inferences as speculative:

  • No showing that the government was seeking him or that he had engaged in high-profile activities likely to attract nationwide attention.
  • No evidence that his BJP-affiliated abusers were government officials.
  • The only basis to fear police collaboration was that an officer once refused to accept a report—insufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of nationwide coordination.
  • Even if identification could reveal location, it did not follow that police would share it with private actors or that those actors would pursue him outside Haryana.

In reinforcing these points, the Court drew on Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, including its caution that an attack by members of a regional party in one state is not automatically attributable to the national government, and its prior approval of internal relocation for a Mann Party member facing regionally bounded political harm.

4. Reasonableness of relocation: individualized factor balancing

The Court upheld the agency’s evaluation of reasonableness factors—family ties, education, language, age, and ability to work—acknowledging some factors may cut against relocation but finding the overall assessment supported by substantial evidence. The opinion also addressed Singh’s Sikh minority/discrimination concern by noting the unchallenged IJ finding that Sikh communities exist in other parts of India.

5. Administrative-record constraint

The Court refused to consider a 2020 State Department report because it postdated the IJ decision and was not presented to the agency, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A), which confines judicial review to the administrative record underlying the removal order. This is an important procedural reminder: factual supplementation generally must occur through agency mechanisms (e.g., motions to reopen), not on petition for review.

6. CAT: same factual predicate plus relocation defeats “more likely than not” torture

CAT protection required Singh to prove it was “more likely than not” he would be tortured by or with government consent/acquiescence under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The Court emphasized that the CAT regulations also require considering evidence of safe relocation, citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii).

Because Singh’s CAT claim “rested on the same facts” as his asylum claim, and because the record supported internal relocation, the Court relied on Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111 and Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106 to affirm denial: relocation that defeats future-persecution risk also undermines a claim that torture is more likely than not.

C. Impact

While not precedential, the order illustrates several practical and doctrinal consequences for future litigation in the Second Circuit:

  • Internal relocation remains a powerful, case-dispositive rebuttal tool where harm is localized and the applicant lacks evidence of nationwide pursuit, government interest, or high-profile political activity.
  • “Speculative chain” arguments about surveillance/ID infrastructure may fail absent concrete evidence linking (i) data access, (ii) official misuse or collusion, and (iii) the persecutors’ capacity and intent to track and act beyond a home region.
  • CAT claims cannot simply repackage asylum facts without additional proof of likely torture and state involvement/acquiescence—especially where relocation evidence undercuts future risk.
  • Record discipline is decisive: petitioners must build relocation and country-conditions evidence before the IJ/BIA; later reports generally cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Substantial evidence review: The court does not decide the facts anew; it asks whether the agency’s view is reasonable. A petitioner must show the evidence compels the opposite conclusion.
  • Asylum vs. withholding of removal: Asylum requires a “well-founded fear” and is discretionary; withholding requires showing persecution is “more likely than not” and is mandatory if proven.
  • Burden shifting after past persecution: If past persecution is assumed or found, the government can still defeat future fear by proving safe and reasonable internal relocation.
  • Internal relocation (two-part test): (1) Can the applicant avoid harm elsewhere in the country? (2) Is it reasonable to expect the applicant to move there, considering practical constraints (ties, language, employment, discrimination, etc.)?
  • CAT protection: Requires showing torture (severe pain or suffering) is more likely than not, and that it involves government action, instigation, consent, or acquiescence—not merely private violence.
  • Administrative record rule: The court of appeals generally cannot consider new evidence not presented to the agency.

V. Conclusion

Singh v. Bondi reaffirms (in nonprecedential form) a familiar but consequential pattern in Second Circuit immigration adjudication: when alleged persecution is regionally bounded and the applicant cannot substantiate a non-speculative, nationwide risk—particularly of state-enabled tracking or collusion—DHS can rebut future-persecution fear through internal relocation, defeating both asylum and withholding. Where the CAT claim rests on the same record and relocation is viable, the applicant is unlikely to satisfy CAT’s “more likely than not” torture standard, especially without concrete evidence of government involvement or acquiescence.