Shots Fired at a Residence Do Not Establish Virginia-Predicate VICAR Attempted Murder Without Proof of Specific Intent to Kill

Case: United States v. Ronald Jenkins, Jr. (consolidated with appeals of Japree Lortez Brooks and Malik Trevonte Newsome)
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date: March 10, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed in part; reversed/vacated/remanded in part (Brooks only)

1. Introduction

This consolidated Fourth Circuit decision arises from violent retaliatory acts following the killing of Brandon Leonard, a figure around whom a loose network—termed at trial “Brandon’s crew”—coalesced in Franklin, Virginia. The Government prosecuted the defendants under the federal Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (“VICAR”) statute, asserting that “Brandon’s crew” was a racketeering enterprise whose members trafficked drugs, shared firearms, and engaged in retaliatory violence to maintain dominance.

The appeals presented three principal clusters of issues:

  • Enterprise proof under VICAR/RICO principles: whether “Brandon’s crew” qualified as an “association-in-fact” enterprise for Count I (VICAR conspiracy to murder) and for Jenkins’ later Count IV (VICAR attempted murder).
  • Attempted murder intent under Virginia law: whether Brooks’ act of firing three shots into a residence supported VICAR attempted murder (Count II) predicated on Virginia attempted murder, and the related § 924(c) firearm conviction (Count III).
  • Witness tampering and sentencing: whether Newsome’s jail calls seeking alibi testimony constituted witness tampering (Count IX), and whether his sentence was reasonable.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court largely upheld the Government’s VICAR theory and the jury’s findings:

  • Affirmed all defendants’ Count I convictions (VICAR conspiracy to commit murder), concluding the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find an enterprise (“Brandon’s crew”).
  • Affirmed Jenkins’ Count IV conviction (VICAR attempted murder), rejecting the argument that the enterprise ended before the 2019 retaliatory shooting.
  • Reversed Brooks’ Count II conviction (VICAR attempted murder) and reversed the related Count III § 924(c) firearm conviction, holding the evidence did not establish Virginia’s specific intent to kill requirement for attempted murder merely from firing into a residence without evidence Brooks knew or had reason to know an intended victim (or any person) was in the line of fire.
  • Affirmed Newsome’s Count IX witness tampering conviction and affirmed his sentence, finding no procedural or substantive unreasonableness.
  • Remanded for entry of judgment of acquittal on Brooks’ Counts II and III and for resentencing of Brooks.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review (the appellate lens)

  • United States v. Darosa (standard: view evidence in light most favorable to Government) framed the court’s approach to all sufficiency challenges.
  • United States v. Fuertes and United States v. Robinson emphasized the “heavy burden” on defendants and that reversal occurs only when the prosecution’s failure is clear.
  • Bufkin v. Collins (quoting Jackson v. Virginia) anchored the constitutional sufficiency test: whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. What counts as a VICAR/RICO “enterprise”

  • United States v. Keene supplied the five-element VICAR framework (enterprise; racketeering; defendant’s position; qualifying violent crime; purpose to maintain/increase position).
  • United States v. Fiel supported interpreting “enterprise” consistently across VICAR and RICO.
  • United States v. Turkette provided classic enterprise proof requirements: organization (formal/informal) and functioning as a continuing unit.
  • Boyle v. United States was central: an association-in-fact enterprise needs purpose, relationships, and longevity, but no hierarchy, dues, initiation rites, or fixed roles; and “spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence” do not negate enterprise existence.
  • United States v. Palacios reinforced that “enterprise” should not be read too narrowly.
  • United States v. Savage reiterated deference to the Government-favorable view of evidence.
  • United States v. Pinson (via footnote) cautioned that independent, uncoordinated crimes do not automatically establish an enterprise’s common purpose.
  • United States v. Griffin was used to validate a “requisite commonality of purpose” showing.
  • Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King supported the distinction between participating in the enterprise’s affairs versus merely one’s own affairs.
  • United States v. Tillett and United States v. Harris (10th Cir.) supported that repeated association/social interaction can evidence “relationships” among associates.
  • Amazon.com, Inc. v. WDC Hldgs. LLC, United States v. Garcia (10th Cir.), and United States v. Fattah were used comparatively to show longevity can be satisfied over multi-year spans (and need not be continuous daily activity).
  • United States v. Zelaya minimized the burden for VICAR’s “purpose” element: the purpose to maintain/increase position need not be exclusive or primary.
  • United States v. Murphy reminded that credibility determinations belong to the jury.

C. Attempted murder intent (Virginia law governs the predicate)

  • United States v. Simmons established the analytic move: for a VICAR charge referencing a state predicate, courts look to state law to define the predicate offense.
  • United States v. Lassiter (quoting Virginia cases) and Commonwealth v. Herring set Virginia attempted murder’s elements: (1) specific intent to kill and (2) an overt act toward that end.
  • Winston v. Commonwealth defined “specific intent” as intent to accomplish the precise charged criminal act.
  • Hargrave and Thacker v. Commonwealth
  • Hancock v. Commonwealth
  • Coles v. CommonwealthBell v. CommonwealthHancock v. Commonwealth
  • Haywood v. Commonwealth
  • Secret v. Commonwealth
  • Bryant v. CommonwealthEllis v. Commonwealth

D. Witness tampering proof and jury instructions

  • United States v. Arrington
  • United States v. Sanders
  • United States v. Vann
  • United States v. Edlind
  • Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States

E. Sentencing review

  • United States v. Elboghdady
  • United States v. Friend
  • United States v. Fernandez-SanchezUnited States v. Knight

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Enterprise: “Brandon’s crew” satisfied Boyle’s minimal structural features

The Fourth Circuit accepted a pragmatic, evidence-aggregation approach consistent with Boyle v. United States:

  • Purpose: the jury could find the crew’s purpose was controlling drug trafficking in Franklin and enforcing that control through shared firearms and retaliatory violence (including charging “tithes” to rivals).
  • Relationships: overlapping membership, repeated interaction at the “Railroad” house, shared access to weapons, and coordinated responses to threats were enough—without proof of formal hierarchy, dues, or rituals.
  • Longevity: activity spanning from Brandon’s release (circa 2012) through at least 2019 supported longevity. Importantly, the court emphasized Boyle’s teaching that “quiescence” between violent “spurts” does not dissolve the enterprise.

The opinion also included a cautionary note: the holding should not be read to mean mere friendship plus individual illicit acts automatically establish an enterprise (echoing Boyle’s footnote and United States v. Pinson).

B. Jenkins’ “enterprise ended” argument failed under Boyle’s quiescence principle

Jenkins argued that by February 2019—fourteen months after Brandon’s death—the enterprise no longer existed. The court treated the gap as factually relevant but not legally dispositive. Under Boyle v. United States, enterprises may act intermittently. Here, the jury could find continuity of purpose (dominance/retaliation), an ongoing relationship (EJ and Jenkins), and reactivation in response to provocations (social media taunts), supporting enterprise persistence through the later shooting.

C. Brooks: Virginia attempted murder requires specific intent to kill; shooting at a house was not enough on this record

The court’s most consequential doctrinal move was its strict application of Virginia’s specific-intent requirement to the VICAR attempted murder predicate.

While acknowledging that intent may be inferred circumstantially (Hancock v. Commonwealth), the court emphasized the limiting principle from Thacker v. Commonwealth and Hargrave: deadly force alone does not prove specific intent to kill for attempted murder.

On the facts, Brooks fired three rounds toward a single-story residence in the early morning; bullets entered above the front door, above a bedroom window, and into the attic. The panel concluded that:

  • There was no evidence Brooks knew anyone was inside the residence or within the trajectory of the shots (distinguishing cases like Secret v. Commonwealth where occupancy knowledge was proven).
  • Evidence that Brooks knew whose house it was explained motive for targeting property associated with a rival, but did not establish intent to murder an occupant.
  • The inference that a home “might” be occupied at that hour was too speculative to satisfy “unequivocal purpose” to kill (Haywood v. Commonwealth).

The court underscored the statutory-architecture concern: Virginia separately criminalizes shooting at an occupied dwelling without an intent element (Va. Code § 18.2-279). Treating gunfire into a home as attempted murder without specific-intent proof would collapse that distinction.

Because Count III (§ 924(c)) was predicated solely on the vacated Count II “crime of violence,” it necessarily fell as well.

D. Newsome: “corrupt persuasion” sufficed for witness tampering; no threat required

Newsome tried to frame his calls as non-coercive and argued the instruction’s conjunctive phrasing required proof of intimidation/threats. The court rejected both points:

  • Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), corrupt persuasion is an independent pathway to liability; threats are unnecessary.
  • United States v. Edlind and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States
  • On jury instructions, United States v. Sanders and United States v. Vann

E. Newsome’s sentence: affirmed as procedurally and substantively reasonable

Applying United States v. Friend, the court held the district judge adequately addressed the § 3553(a) arguments, including comparative culpability and the seriousness of witness tampering, and imposed a below-Guidelines sentence. The panel found no abuse of discretion.

3.3. Impact

A. A sharpened evidentiary boundary for VICAR attempted murder predicates under Virginia law

The decision signals that, at least where the predicate attempted murder is governed by Virginia’s specific-intent doctrine, prosecutors must present evidence supporting an inference that the defendant intended to kill a person at the time of the act—not merely that the act was dangerous, retaliatory, or reckless. For cases involving gunfire into property:

  • Proof tending to show knowledge of occupancy, targeting of a person, or statements/behavior evidencing intent to kill becomes critical.
  • Absent such proof, the conduct may fit other offenses (state or federal), but it will not sustain a Virginia-predicate attempted murder theory.

B. Reinforcement of broad “enterprise” doctrine for loosely structured criminal groups

The court’s enterprise analysis—heavily grounded in Boyle v. United States—supports VICAR/RICO prosecutions of informal groups lacking classic gang indicia. At the same time, the opinion’s cautionary footnote (echoing Boyle and United States v. Pinson) may be cited by defense counsel to argue that “social hubs” and parallel criminality are not enough without evidence of common purpose and coordinated functioning.

C. “Quiescence” does not break enterprise continuity

The application of Boyle to a fourteen-month lull is likely to be invoked in future cases where an alleged enterprise’s violent acts are episodic. The decision suggests that courts will focus on whether purpose/relationships persist and can be reactivated, rather than demanding constant activity.

D. Witness tampering: asking for a false alibi is paradigmatic corrupt persuasion

The opinion strengthens the Government’s reliance on “corrupt persuasion” under § 1512(b)(1): recorded jail calls requesting fabricated alibi testimony will typically suffice even without threats or intimidation, consistent with United States v. Edlind.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • VICAR (18 U.S.C. § 1959): a federal statute punishing violent crimes (or conspiracies/attempts) committed to maintain or increase one’s position in a racketeering enterprise.
  • Association-in-fact enterprise: an informal group that functions as a unit. Under Boyle v. United States, it needs (1) a purpose, (2) relationships, and (3) longevity—no formal hierarchy required.
  • Rule 29 judgment of acquittal: a motion claiming the evidence is legally insufficient for a conviction; if granted, the court enters an acquittal.
  • Specific intent (attempted murder): intent to accomplish the precise act—here, to kill. Under Virginia law (as discussed through Thacker v. Commonwealth and related cases), dangerous conduct alone does not prove this intent for an attempt charge.
  • § 924(c) predicate dependency: if the underlying “crime of violence” is vacated, a § 924(c) conviction predicated solely on it typically cannot stand.
  • Corrupt persuasion (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1)): persuading someone to provide false or misleading testimony with consciousness of wrongdoing; threats are not required.

5. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision is most significant for drawing a firm line between dangerous retaliatory gunfire and attempted murder when the predicate offense is Virginia attempted murder: without evidence supporting a finding of specific intent to kill, a VICAR attempted murder conviction cannot stand, and any dependent § 924(c) conviction falls with it. At the same time, the court reaffirmed an expansive, functional understanding of “enterprise” under Boyle v. United States, including that enterprises may act intermittently without losing continuity. Finally, the court treated recorded requests for fabricated alibi testimony as classic “corrupt persuasion,” confirming the breadth of § 1512(b)(1) in the jail-call context.