Shipping-Loss Civil Liability Statutes Do Not Excuse Fraud: Carmack Amendment Irrelevance and § 1344(2) Bank-Fraud Intent in United States v. Kariem Dubose

Introduction

In United States v. Kariem Dubose (Nos. 23-3162, 23-3065, 24-1328), the Third Circuit considered consolidated appeals by three brothers—Zumar, Abdush, and Kariem Dubose—convicted for a coordinated fraud scheme targeting USPS, UPS, and Citizens Bank. The Government’s proof centered on more than 1,200 allegedly fraudulent “lost or damaged package” claims filed under fake names, with claim proceeds deposited into Citizens Bank accounts opened for shell businesses.

The appeals raised recurring criminal-procedure and fraud issues: (1) sufficiency of the evidence (Rule 29); (2) whether defendants could present a purported defense grounded in 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (the “Carmack Amendment”); (3) whether the Government’s closing argument impermissibly shifted the burden of proof; and (4) for Zumar, whether the District Court properly terminated self-representation and rejected additional indictment-based challenges.

The opinion is designated NONPRECEDENTIAL, but it is a useful synthesis of established standards and a clear application of Supreme Court and Third Circuit doctrine to “package-claim” fraud and related banking conduct.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed all convictions (and Zumar’s sentence), holding:

  • Sufficiency: The evidence supported each defendant’s convictions; direct proof of every fictitious payee and every fabricated shipment was not required given the broader evidentiary record (reused receipts, facially fabricated names, text messages, bank activity, and coordinated conduct).
  • Bank fraud: Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), the Government need not prove intent to defraud the bank; it suffices that the defendant intended to obtain bank-controlled property “by means of” false statements (applying Loughrin v. United States).
  • Carmack Amendment: The Carmack Amendment was irrelevant to the charged crimes and could not support a trial defense because it does not authorize submitting fabricated claims (and, even if applicable, would not excuse fraud).
  • Closing argument: No plain error; the prosecutor permissibly highlighted the absence of evidence supporting a legitimate explanation without shifting the burden of proof.
  • Self-representation: Termination of Zumar’s pro se status was proper due to obstructionist misconduct; counsel-of-choice arguments failed.
  • Indictment and variance/amendment: The indictment was sufficient; no constructive amendment or prejudicial variance occurred; other undeveloped arguments were forfeited.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning is anchored in well-settled standards. Each cited precedent played a specific role:

1) Sufficiency of the evidence / Rule 29 framework

  • United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2014) and United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005): The court invoked plenary review and the familiar sufficiency lens—viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asking whether “any rational trier of fact” could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2002): Supplied the elements of mail and wire fraud: (1) scheme to defraud, (2) use of mails/wires, and (3) specific intent to defraud.
  • Rivera, 74 F.4th at 137 (as cited in the opinion): Reinforced the rational-jury standard for sustaining verdicts on appeal.

2) Bank fraud—intent to defraud the bank is not required under § 1344(2)

  • Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014): This was dispositive of Kariem’s “Citizens Bank wasn’t the intended victim” argument. The court applied Loughrin to hold § 1344(2) does not require intent to defraud a bank, only intent to obtain bank-controlled property “by means of” a false statement—i.e., the lie is the natural mechanism inducing the bank to part with funds in its custody.

3) Right to present a complete defense; relevance as a threshold gate

  • Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984): Provided the constitutional baseline: defendants must have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. The Third Circuit emphasized that this right operates through ordinary evidentiary rules—particularly relevance—so evidence that is irrelevant may be excluded without violating the Constitution.
  • Fed. R. Evid. 401: Used to frame the threshold requirement: the Carmack-based theory failed first and foremost because it was not relevant to whether defendants knowingly executed a fraud scheme.

4) Prosecutorial argument and burden shifting; plain error review

  • United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1996): The court relied on Balter to distinguish improper burden shifting from permissible argument highlighting the lack of record support for a defense theory.
  • United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449 (3d Cir. 2025) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): Supplied the four-part plain-error test because the burden-shifting claim was not preserved below.

5) Self-representation; termination for obstructionist conduct

  • United States v. Noble, 42 F.4th 346 (3d Cir. 2022): Established plenary review of claims that a defendant was improperly deprived of self-representation.
  • Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) and McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984): The court used Faretta both for the right itself and for the critical limitation—courts may terminate self-representation when a defendant engages in “serious and obstructionist misconduct.” McKaskle reinforced the non-absolute nature of the right.
  • United States v. Taylor, 21 F.4th 94 (3d Cir. 2021): Cited for the expectation that district courts exercise patience before terminating pro se status—supporting that the trial court acted cautiously and only after escalating disruption.

6) Counsel of choice; substitution of counsel

  • United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982): The opinion cited Welty for the requirement of “good cause” to substitute counsel during trial.
  • United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969) and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006): Used to frame that there is no absolute right to a particular counsel; the record showed no new retained counsel and no adequate basis for substitution.

7) Indictment sufficiency and pretrial challenges

  • United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2002): Provided the standard of plenary review for indictment sufficiency.
  • United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2012) (rev'd on other grounds by United States v. Hill, 98 F.4th 473 (3d Cir. 2024)): The court drew from Huet to summarize what generally suffices: identify the statute, list elements, and specify the time period, along with sufficient factual allegations.
  • United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2013): Clarified that Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v) allows pretrial challenges where an indictment fails to charge an essential element.

8) Constructive amendment and prejudicial variance

  • United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2006): Supplied the definitions and standards, including the presumption that juries follow clear instructions—key to rejecting the theory that references to 18 U.S.C. § 288 effectively changed the charged offenses.
  • United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118 (3d Cir. 1985): Provided the standard for prejudicial variance: unchanged charging terms but proof at trial materially differs from the indictment’s allegations.

9) Pro se filings and forfeiture

  • Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007): The court noted it would liberally construe Zumar’s pro se submissions.
  • Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182 (3d Cir. 2021): Reinforced that pro se litigants must still comply with procedural rules and support arguments.
  • Garden, 495 F.3d at 296 n.7 (as cited in the opinion): Cited in support of treating undeveloped arguments as forfeited.

Legal Reasoning

1) “Overwhelming evidence” can satisfy each count without proving every micro-fact directly

The defendants’ sufficiency attacks sought to atomize the proof: Abdush argued the Government did not directly prove each check payee was fictitious or each claimed package loss was false; Kariem argued lack of mens rea and lack of evidence tying him to mailings.

The court’s response reflects a core feature of fraud prosecutions: the Government may prove a scheme and intent through patterns, coordination, and circumstantial evidence. Here, reused receipts, facially fabricated claim names, coordinated bank deposits into shell accounts, and inculpatory text communications supported the inference that the claims were fraudulent and that each participating defendant knew the essential nature of the scheme.

2) Bank fraud under § 1344(2): the bank need not be the “target,” but the lie must be the mechanism

Kariem’s “intended victim” argument was rejected as foreclosed by Loughrin v. United States. The court treated the bank’s role as a custodian of property: if defendants use false statements as the means naturally inducing the bank to release or transfer funds in its custody, § 1344(2) can be satisfied even if the bank is not the ultimate target of the broader scheme.

Factually, the “means” requirement was supported by evidence that Kariem and Zumar allegedly responded to a bank hold by making false representations about the payees and then pursued fraudulent litigation to force the bank to release funds.

3) Carmack Amendment “defense” fails at relevance: civil carrier-liability rules do not authorize fake claims

Abdush and Kariem attempted to reframe the conduct as claims activity governed by the Carmack Amendment. The court treated this as an evidentiary relevance question embedded within a “complete defense” constitutional claim: even assuming arguendo some relationship to shipping-loss rules, no legal regime permits fabricated evidence and false claimants. Because the proposed Carmack evidence would not make any material fact—such as intent to defraud—more or less probable in a lawful way, it was irrelevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and properly excluded.

The court’s reasoning draws a bright line: statutory frameworks that create or channel legitimate claim processes do not negate criminal intent where the defendant’s conduct consists of fabrication, impersonation, and deception.

4) Closing argument: pointing out absence of supporting evidence is not burden shifting

Under plain-error review, the court found no improper burden shifting. Consistent with United States v. Balter, it is permissible for the Government to argue that the record lacks evidence supporting a defense narrative (here, that there was no legitimate reason for purchasing such a volume of insured postage). The opinion also notes what the prosecutor did not do: claim defendants had to prove innocence or comment on failure to testify.

5) Terminating self-representation: obstruction can forfeit Faretta rights

The court upheld the revocation of Zumar’s pro se status because his conduct—particularly refusing to answer clear questions on the eve of trial and disrupting proceedings—made continuing impossible. This is a textbook application of Faretta’s limitation (footnote 46) allowing termination for serious obstruction, reinforced by McKaskle and tempered by the “patience” expectation in United States v. Taylor.

6) Indictment sufficiency and “other-crime” references at trial

Zumar argued that testimony touching on 18 U.S.C. § 288 (false postal-loss claims) effectively changed the case. The court rejected constructive amendment because the jury instructions stayed tethered to the indicted offenses and their elements; at most, the trial evidence could have supported additional liability, but that is not the same as altering what the jury was asked to decide. The variance claim failed for similar reasons: the proof matched the charged scheme.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the decision carries practical guidance in several common litigation zones:

  • Fraud schemes built on “legitimate process” veneers: The Carmack discussion underscores that defendants cannot launder fraud into legality by pointing to a legitimate claims regime. In future cases involving insurance claims, disaster-relief claims, benefit applications, chargebacks, or carrier-loss claims, courts are likely to treat “the program allows claims” as irrelevant where the alleged conduct is fabrication.
  • § 1344(2) prosecutions involving deposit accounts: The reaffirmation of Loughrin supports bank-fraud liability where false representations are used to unlock or move funds held by a bank—even if the bank is not the ultimate target and even if the funds are in an account associated with the defendants.
  • Proof structure in high-volume fraud: The sufficiency analysis reflects prosecutorial and judicial acceptance of pattern-based proof in “many-transaction” schemes. Defendants should expect that the Government is not required to provide direct testimony on every single transaction where the scheme is proven through representative evidence, records, and communications.
  • Trial management and Faretta limits: The self-representation holding illustrates how courts may build a record of obstruction and then terminate pro se status without constitutional error—particularly on the eve of trial when delays are most disruptive.
  • Closing arguments: The opinion illustrates how prosecutors can safely argue “there is no evidence of X” so long as they do not suggest the defendant must produce evidence or testify.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 29 / “sufficiency of the evidence”: A defendant can ask the judge to throw out the case for lack of evidence. On appeal, the court asks only whether a reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in the Government’s favor.
  • Mail and wire fraud: Not every mailing/wire must itself be a lie; it must be used to further a fraudulent scheme, and the defendant must intend to defraud.
  • Bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2): Under Loughrin, the Government does not have to prove “the defendant meant to cheat the bank.” It must prove the defendant tried to obtain money/property under the bank’s control, and did so “by means of” a false statement that naturally would cause the bank to release the funds.
  • Carmack Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 14706): A civil statute about carrier liability for lost/damaged shipments. Even where it applies, it is not permission to submit false or fabricated claims; civil claim rules do not negate criminal fraud.
  • Plain error: If you fail to object at trial, you usually must show an obvious error that affected the outcome and seriously harms the justice system’s fairness before you can win on appeal.
  • Constructive amendment vs. variance: A constructive amendment is when the trial effectively changes the crime charged (highly dangerous and often reversible). A variance is when proof differs from the details alleged but does not change the charged offense; it matters only if it prejudices the defendant.
  • Self-representation (Faretta right): Defendants may represent themselves, but courts may stop it if the defendant obstructs proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Kariem Dubose affirms a multi-defendant, high-volume fraud prosecution by applying settled doctrine: sufficiency review defers to rational inferences from a patterned record; § 1344(2) bank fraud does not require intent to defraud the bank under Loughrin; a “complete defense” does not entitle a defendant to present irrelevant statutory material like the Carmack Amendment to excuse fabricated claims; prosecutors may highlight evidentiary gaps without shifting the burden; and self-representation may be terminated when a defendant becomes obstructionist. The decision’s broader significance lies in its clear demarcation between lawful participation in claims systems and criminal liability for exploiting those systems through fabrication and deception.