Shifting Termination Explanations and Disputed “Belligerence” Create a Jury Issue of Pretext in § 1981 Retaliation

Case: Eddie Stewart v. GES Recycling South Carolina LLC
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date: August 13, 2026
Disposition: Vacated and remanded (published)

Introduction

Eddie Stewart, an African American driver at a South Carolina metal-scrap recycling plant operated by GES Recycling South Carolina LLC (“GES”), alleged a racially hostile work environment, race discrimination in training and promotion opportunities, and retaliatory discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to GES on all claims. On appeal, Stewart challenged only the dismissal of his § 1981 retaliatory discharge claim.

The central appellate issue was whether a reasonable jury could find that Stewart’s termination—occurring shortly after he complained to his manager about discrimination and racial slurs—was retaliatory, notwithstanding GES’s asserted non-retaliatory justification that Stewart was terminated for “belligerent and insubordinate conduct.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit vacated summary judgment on Stewart’s § 1981 retaliatory discharge claim and remanded. The majority held that, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Stewart, genuine disputes of material fact existed on pretext under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green framework—specifically whether GES’s proffered reason was false or had changed over time. The panel emphasized that Stewart’s evidence could support a finding that GES told him he was terminated for “the way you talked” to a manager (reasonably understood as profanity), while later litigation positions reframed the basis as more serious “belligerent and insubordinate conduct” (including allegedly intimidating or threatening behavior that Stewart denied).

A dissent would have affirmed, reasoning that the relevant question was whether GES honestly believed Stewart acted belligerently and insubordinately, and that the difference between “the way you talked” and “belligerent and insubordinate conduct” was not substantial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union: Cited for de novo review and the summary-judgment obligation to view facts and inferences in the nonmovant’s favor—an obligation the majority found the district court did not honor when it treated GES’s characterization of Stewart’s conduct as effectively undisputed.
  • Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC: Provided the Fourth Circuit’s articulation of § 1981 retaliation proof routes (direct/circumstantial evidence or McDonnell Douglas) and the governing “but-for” causation standard. Although Guessous also appears in the hostile-environment limitations discussion, its key role in the appealed claim was its retaliation framework.
  • Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar: Anchored “but-for” causation—retaliation must be shown as the decisive cause of termination, not merely a motivating factor.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: Supplied the burden-shifting structure used by the district court and majority: prima facie case, employer’s legitimate reason, and plaintiff’s proof of pretext (which merges with ultimate proof of intentional retaliation).
  • Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc.: Cited for the proposition that close temporal proximity “weighs heavily” on causation at the prima facie stage—supporting why Stewart could clear the initial causation threshold given the short gap between his complaint and termination.
  • Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc.: The centerpiece for the majority’s pretext analysis: pretext may be shown if the employer’s proffered reason “is false” or has “changed over time,” and differing justifications are probative of pretext in and of themselves.
  • Staub v. Proctor Hosp. and Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs.: Staub was cited for “cat’s paw” liability; Karpel for the rule that issues raised for the first time on appeal generally are not considered. The majority used Karpel to decline Stewart’s newly raised cat’s paw theory, underscoring the importance of preserving theories in the district court.
  • Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc.: Invoked by the district court (and noted by the majority) for analogies to termination following allegedly “intimidating” and “threatening behavior,” highlighting how characterization of an employee’s conduct can drive outcomes at summary judgment—precisely what the Fourth Circuit found disputed here.
  • Dissent-only authorities—including CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist Coll., Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., and Hux v. City of Newport News, VA— framed the dissent’s “honest belief” and “substantial change” concepts. While not adopted by the majority, they mark the doctrinal fault line: whether the disputed issue is “what happened,” “what was said contemporaneously,” or “what the employer honestly believed,” and how much semantic drift matters.

Legal Reasoning

The majority accepted that § 1981 retaliation requires “but-for” causation, and proceeded under McDonnell Douglas. The determinative step was pretext: whether a jury could reasonably infer retaliation because the employer’s stated reason was untrue or inconsistent.

Two evidentiary disputes drove vacatur:

  • Disputed conduct (fact vs. characterization): The district court treated it as a “given” that Stewart’s conduct was “belligerent and insubordinate” in an intimidating/threatening sense. The majority held that Stewart’s version—profanity and anger in a workplace where profanity was commonplace, without the alleged physical intimidation—did not compel that conclusion at summary judgment. Importantly, the majority treated the inference from third-party intervention (a coworker telling Stewart to be quiet; a manager calming him down) as ambiguous and not dispositive of “threatening” behavior.
  • Shifting or expanded termination rationale: The majority found a triable issue in the gap between what Stewart says he was told at termination (“the way you talked to [Gordon]”) and what GES later emphasized in litigation (“belligerent and insubordinate conduct”). That divergence mattered because, under Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., changes in justification are independently probative of pretext, and falsity is a classic route to showing the proffered reason is a cover for retaliation.

The court was careful to situate these disputes in the summary-judgment posture: it was not deciding which account was true, only that a reasonable jury could credit Stewart’s account and infer that retaliation could have been the but-for cause of termination.

The majority also rejected GES’s alternative argument that Stewart failed to establish a prima facie case because an “intervening event” broke causation, reasoning that its pretext holding sufficed to defeat summary judgment.

Impact

This published decision strengthens two practical pathways for § 1981 retaliation plaintiffs to reach a jury in the Fourth Circuit:

  • Contemporaneous explanation vs. litigation justification: Where an employer’s communicated reason for termination differs in substance from later descriptions (especially when later versions imply heightened misconduct), the discrepancy can itself generate a genuine issue of pretext.
  • “Belligerence” as a contested fact question: Employers frequently justify termination after discrimination complaints by invoking “insubordination,” “disrespect,” or “threatening behavior.” The opinion cautions district courts not to convert those labels into undisputed facts, particularly where the employee disputes the alleged severity and the record supports multiple reasonable inferences.

The opinion also carries litigation-management implications: it underscores waiver risks (the cat’s paw discussion) and signals that courts may scrutinize record misstatements and inconsistent employer narratives, not only as credibility issues for trial but as potential pretext evidence at summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation: A worker may sue when punished (including fired) for opposing race discrimination tied to the making or enforcement of contracts (including employment).
  • But-for causation: The plaintiff must show the firing would not have happened absent retaliation—retaliation must be decisive, not merely one factor.
  • McDonnell Douglas framework: If there is no direct “smoking gun,” the plaintiff can proceed by (1) showing a basic inference of retaliation, (2) the employer stating a lawful reason, and (3) the plaintiff showing that reason is pretext (a cover).
  • Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason is untrue, inconsistent, or changing may allow a jury to infer the real reason was unlawful retaliation.
  • Summary judgment: A judge may end a case before trial only when no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on a material fact.
  • Cat’s paw theory: Even if the formal decisionmaker lacked bias, an employer can be liable when a biased supervisor’s actions are intended to—and proximately cause—the adverse action. This case highlights that the theory must be preserved in the district court.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Eddie Stewart v. GES Recycling South Carolina LLC establishes a clear, trial-forcing principle in § 1981 retaliation cases: when the employee produces evidence that the employer’s termination rationale is disputed in fact and/or has shifted between what the employee was told and what the employer later asserts, a jury question on pretext—and therefore but-for causation—may exist. The opinion reinforces the summary-judgment mandate to draw inferences for the nonmovant, and it cautions that post hoc embellishment of “insubordination” narratives can backfire as evidence of retaliatory pretext.