Sheppard v. Progressive: “Furnished for the Regular Use” Means a Right of Use that is Steady/Uniform and Arises with Some Degree of Frequency—Typically a Fact Question

1. Introduction

Case: Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 375 Or 262 (2026).
Court: Supreme Court of Oregon (En Banc).
Parties: Kristina Sheppard (insured/petitioner) vs. Progressive Classic Insurance Company (UIM insurer/respondent).

The case concerns Oregon’s statutorily required uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) scheme and, specifically, the statutory (and policy) exclusion for injuries sustained while occupying a vehicle “furnished for the regular use” of the insured. Sheppard, a state employee, was injured by an underinsured driver while operating a state-owned work truck (a shared “floating” vehicle) she could use for work “as needed.” After the tortfeasor’s and the State’s coverages were exhausted, Sheppard sought UIM benefits under her personal Progressive policy. Progressive denied coverage under the “regular use” exclusion. The trial court granted summary judgment to Progressive; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court’s central task was to interpret “furnished for the regular use” as used in ORS 742.504(4)(b) (incorporated into UIM by ORS 742.502(4)) and to determine whether the record permitted summary judgment for either party.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment for Progressive, holding that the record contained genuine issues of material fact on whether the work truck was “furnished for [Sheppard’s] regular use.” The court also affirmed the denial of Sheppard’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that Progressive likewise had evidence from which a factfinder could find “regular use.” The case was remanded for further proceedings.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Wallace Co. v. State F. M. Auto. Ins. Co., 220 Or 520, 349 P2d 789 (1960)
    Role: The opinion’s cornerstone for interpreting “furnished for regular use.” Although Wallace construed a liability “regular use” exclusion in a policy context, the court treated it as key contextual evidence of what the legislature likely understood when it later enacted ORS 742.504(4)(b).
    Influence: (1) It frames the exclusion’s purpose: preventing an insured from paying premiums for one vehicle while effectively obtaining coverage for other vehicles the insured can use “at will and might use often,” thereby increasing risk and undermining premium allocation. (2) It centers the inquiry on the right to use—not merely how the vehicle was actually used. (3) It distinguishes “regular” use from “temporary,” “single occasion,” or “single purpose” uses. Importantly, the court in Sheppard rejects reading Wallace as requiring “de facto ownership” or an “unrestricted” right of use.
  • North Pacific Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 110 Or App 269, 821 P2d 444 (1991)
    Role: The Court of Appeals relied on it for a right-to-use-centered approach and for discounting “manner of use” restrictions.
    Influence: The Supreme Court did not embrace the Court of Appeals’ application (treating “as needed” work use as dispositive), emphasizing instead that “regular use” also requires a right of use that arises with some degree of frequency—a point not resolved as a matter of law on this record.
  • Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 323 Or 291, 918 P2d 95 (1996) and Erickson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 331 Or 681, 21 P3d 90 (2001)
    Role: Establish that ORS 742.504 provides a “comprehensive model” UM policy setting minimum coverage; policy terms less favorable than the model are unenforceable.
    Influence: They justify focusing on statutory meaning rather than contract intent, because the parties agreed the Progressive wording tracked the statute and did not provide broader coverage.
  • Perez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 289 Or 295, 613 P2d 32 (1980)
    Role: Where a policy is intended to implement a statutory minimum, coverage scope is determined by statutory construction, not policy wording; typical contra-insurer ambiguity rules do not control.
    Influence: Supports treating this case as statutory interpretation of ORS 742.504(4)(b).
  • State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) and PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
    Role: Provide Oregon’s interpretive methodology (text, context, and, as helpful, legislative history).
    Influence: The court uses ordinary-meaning dictionaries and contextual cues (including pre-enactment case law) and finds legislative history unilluminating on the precise phrase.
  • OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc., 356 Or 577, 341 P3d 701 (2014) and State v. Eastep, 361 Or 746, 399 P3d 979 (2017)
    Role: (1) Prior judicial decisions existing at enactment are contextual evidence of legislative intent; (2) dictionary editions near enactment matter for ordinary meaning.
    Influence: Bolster reliance on Wallace and on contemporaneously relevant dictionary meaning for “furnish,” “regular,” and “use.”
  • Moore-Reed v. Griffin, 374 Or 596, 581 P3d 949 (2025) and Twigg v. Admiral Ins. Co., 373 Or 445, 568 P3d 156 (2025)
    Role: Summary judgment principles (Moore-Reed), and general insurance policy interpretation principles (Twigg).
    Influence: Twigg is acknowledged but cabined: the case is statutory. Moore-Reed supports the lens for viewing the record on summary judgment.
  • Batten v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 368 Or 538, 495 P3d 1222 (2021)
    Role: Provides general UM/UIM framework background.
    Influence: Sets the statutory context but does not drive the “regular use” standard.
  • Shadbolt v. Farmers Insur. Exch., 275 Or 407, 551 P2d 478 (1976)
    Role: Distinguished; it interprets “regularly or frequently used,” not “furnished for regular use.”
    Influence: Reinforces that the phrase at issue has a specific lineage and purpose and should not be conflated with other policy formulations.

The court also surveyed numerous out-of-state cases and secondary sources (e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer; Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Hiland; Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marr; Pac. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lewis) mainly to show the phrase’s long use and interpretive variability nationwide, not to adopt a multi-factor test as a matter of Oregon law.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The case is statutory, not purely contractual

Because ORS 742.504 supplies a model UM policy and ORS 742.502(4) subjects UIM coverage to ORS 742.504, and because the parties agreed Progressive’s language matched the statutory minimum, the meaning of the exclusion turns on legislative intent, not individualized contract intent. That move matters: it positions “regular use” as a statewide rule governed by statutory construction, not a policy-by-policy ambiguity exercise.

B. Text: ordinary meaning plus frequency

Using ordinary meaning, the court reads “furnished for the regular use” as requiring that the insured be provided the privilege/benefit of using the vehicle on a steady or uniform basis or at fixed or uniform intervals. Crucially, and informed by Wallace, the right of use must arise with some degree of frequency; a merely incidental, ad hoc, or truly “temporary” availability is outside the exclusion.

C. Context: Wallace and the exclusion’s purpose

The court adopts Wallace’s purpose-based understanding: the exclusion prevents premium/risk mismatch when an insured can use other vehicles “at will and might use often.” The Supreme Court also clarifies what Wallace does not require: it does not demand “de facto ownership,” nor an “unrestricted” right, nor a showing that the insured could personally insure/add the vehicle to their policy.

D. Proof: direct and circumstantial evidence; no exclusive test

The court identifies (without making them exclusive requirements) two particularly relevant types of indirect evidence:

  • How frequently and why the insured actually used the vehicle (circumstantial evidence of what use was permitted, even if actual use is not dispositive).
  • Employer ownership / “company car” context (sometimes strongly suggestive of regular use, depending on the breadth and expected frequency of access).

E. Application: why summary judgment failed for both sides

  • Why Progressive was not entitled to summary judgment:
    Even if Sheppard could take the truck for work “as needed” without asking permission each time, her “need” was tightly tethered to contingent, ad hoc fire assignments and supervisory authorization to accept them. She was not assigned a vehicle; the agency apparently viewed her travel as too infrequent for assignment; records showed use in only 6 of 61 months; and the opportunity depended on multiple contingencies (wildfires, staffing needs, and her willingness/ability). A reasonable factfinder could view that as not “regular” in the required sense.
  • Why Sheppard was not entitled to partial summary judgment:
    The court rejects Sheppard’s categorical rule that a vehicle restricted to work purposes can never be “furnished for regular use.” Progressive had evidence that her use recurred across successive fire seasons, involved extended periods and substantial miles, and arguably reflected a steady/seasonal pattern tied to an aspect of her employment. A reasonable factfinder could therefore find “regular use.”

3.3. Impact

  • Fact-intensity and reduced dispositive motions: The decision makes clear that “regular use” commonly turns on the scope and practical frequency of the right of access, meaning summary judgment will often be inappropriate where access is contingent, seasonal, or governed by informal workplace norms.
  • “As needed for work” is not automatically “regular use”: Insurers cannot treat general workplace permission as dispositive when the permission is functionally constrained by episodic assignments and contingent need.
  • No categorical safe harbor for employees: Conversely, insureds cannot avoid the exclusion merely by pointing to work-only limitations; work vehicles can be “regular use” vehicles depending on the breadth and expected frequency of access.
  • Guidance for trial proof: Parties should develop records on assignment practices, frequency of availability, key control, written policies, actual historical use, and the predictability of occasions when the vehicle may be taken (including seasonal patterns).
  • Doctrinal clarification for ORS 742.504(4)(b): Oregon now has an explicit synthesis: “regular use” means a right of use that is steady/uniform and arises with some degree of frequency, evaluated via direct and circumstantial evidence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • UM vs. UIM: UM applies when the at-fault driver has no liability coverage; UIM applies when the at-fault driver’s coverage is insufficient to cover the insured’s damages. Oregon mandates both through ORS 742.504 (UM) and ORS 742.502 (UIM).
  • Model policy statute (ORS 742.504): Oregon sets minimum UM terms by statute. Insurers may offer better coverage, but not worse. So when a policy tracks the statute, courts interpret the statute’s meaning rather than treating it as a bespoke contract term.
  • “Regular use” exclusion (the idea): The exclusion aims to prevent someone from insuring one car but effectively getting UM/UIM coverage while frequently using another car they have ongoing access to—without paying for that added risk.
  • Summary judgment: A court can decide a case without trial only if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmoving party. Here, both sides had evidence supporting competing inferences about whether the access was “regular.”
  • Right to use vs. manner of use: The key question is the breadth of the insured’s right (authorization/privilege) to use the vehicle, not whether the insured used it like their personal car. But actual usage can still be circumstantial evidence of the right’s breadth.

5. Conclusion

Sheppard v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co. clarifies that, under ORS 742.504(4)(b), a vehicle is “furnished for the regular use” of an insured when the insured has been provided a right to use it on a steady/uniform basis that arises with some degree of frequency—an inquiry focused on the breadth of the right of access and commonly resolved by factfinders rather than on summary judgment. The court rejects both extremes advanced below: “as-needed work permission” is not automatically regular use as a matter of law, and work-only limitations do not categorically preclude regular use. The result is a more evidence-driven, context-sensitive doctrine that will shape UM/UIM litigation involving employer fleets, shared vehicles, and episodic work assignments.