Shaw v. Smith: Standing to Enjoin Systemic Highway-Patrol Stops, but Injunctions Must Be Minimally Intrusive and Cannot Redefine the “Kansas Two-Step”

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: January 29, 2026
Case: Shaw v. Smith, Nos. 23-3264 & 23-3267

I. Introduction

Shaw v. Smith arises from a series of Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) stops of interstate motorists traveling to or from Colorado—an interstate corridor made contentious by diverging state marijuana laws. Plaintiffs (Blaine Franklin Shaw, Samuel James Shaw, Joshua Bosire, Mark Erich, and Shawna Maloney) alleged that KHP troopers used two recurring techniques to prolong and intensify traffic encounters in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the right to interstate travel: (1) treating out-of-state travel and “drug source/destination” geography as indicia of criminality, contrary to Vasquez v. Lewis; and (2) using the “Kansas Two-Step” to transform completed stops into continued questioning and searches without valid reasonable suspicion or truly voluntary consent.

Following jury findings of Fourth Amendment violations in individual damages trials, the district court held a bench trial on systemic practices and entered a four-year injunction imposing extensive documentation, consent, recording, supervision, and training mandates—limited to out-of-state plated motorists who appear to be traveling to/from Colorado on specified highways (I-70, I-35, U.S. 54, U.S. 36).

On appeal, Superintendent Erik Smith challenged (a) Article III standing for prospective relief and (b) the scope of the injunction as an abuse of discretion and an undue intrusion into state governance.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiffs do have standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief because the record established (1) a substantial risk of future encounters with KHP and (2) a pattern and practice of unconstitutional conduct that was effectively authorized through training and institutional practice. The panel thus rejected KHP’s reliance on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons as a categorical bar to standing.

On remedy, however, the court affirmed only in part and reversed in part:

  • State-of-origin / “drug source” geography: The district court abused its discretion by ordering relief beyond mandatory corrective training. The appellate court limited the initial remedy to training, emphasizing narrow tailoring and federalism concerns.
  • “Kansas Two-Step”: The court set aside the Two-Step portion of the injunction as an abuse of discretion because Tenth Circuit precedent has repeatedly upheld post-stop reengagement as potentially consensual without the specific disclaimers and distancing requirements the injunction imposed, and because injunctions cannot effectively rewrite circuit law or devolve into impermissible “obey the law” commands under Rule 65(d).

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these limitations.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standing for Prospective Relief and the Lyons Framework

The court’s standing analysis is built on modern Article III doctrine—TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, and Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med.—requiring a concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury that is fairly traceable and redressable. For future injury, the court used Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus and Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA to apply the “certainly impending” / “substantial risk” framework.

KHP’s core standing argument relied on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, where a past chokehold victim lacked standing to enjoin future chokeholds absent a sufficient likelihood of repeated injury and a policy authorizing the unconstitutional conduct. The Tenth Circuit treated Lyons as a demanding but satisfiable standard, then found both prongs met on this record:

  • Likelihood of future encounter: The court emphasized the routine nature of traffic stops, citing O'Shea v. Littleton (assuming plaintiffs will attempt to obey the law) yet recognizing that even careful drivers can be stopped (with a nod to the frequency of minor infractions discussed in Navarette v. California (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The “STOP A LOT OF CARS!” policy evidence further supported recurrence.
  • Official authorization / pattern and practice: Unlike Lyons, where the record did not show an officially sanctioned pattern, the district court found KHP training and culture authorized reliance on state-of-origin and drug-corridor logic, and deployed the Two-Step in a coercive manner. The panel reinforced this with comparative authority recognizing standing when plaintiffs are targeted by officially sanctioned unconstitutional patterns: Melendres v. Arpaio and Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir.

The court also leaned on Allee v. Medrano for the proposition that persistent patterns of police misconduct can justify injunctive relief—casting Lyons as a case about insufficient likelihood and insufficient policy proof, not a broad immunity from structural injunctions in policing cases.

2. Fourth Amendment Baselines and the “State of Origin” Rule

The substantive constitutional anchor is Vasquez v. Lewis, which held that state residency and “drug corridor/source/destination” labels are “so broad as to be indicative of almost nothing” and are impermissible as justification for detention or continuation of a stop. The opinion treats the record as demonstrating institutional resistance to Vasquez—including testimony that troopers were trained to use state-of-origin and a delay in incorporating Vasquez into training materials.

The stop-extension framework is taken from United States v. Wallace: once the traffic mission is complete, officers must let the motorist go unless there is reasonable suspicion of another crime or the driver voluntarily consents to further questioning.

3. Consent, Seizure, and the “Kansas Two-Step” in Circuit Precedent

The district court’s Two-Step remedy rested on voluntariness principles from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte and the consensual encounter test as described in United States v. Manjarrez. But the appellate court held that, as a matter of circuit law, the district court’s operational requirements conflicted with repeated Tenth Circuit decisions upholding post-stop reengagement without:

  • an express “free to go” advisement (United States v. Bradford),
  • significant physical separation or time delay (United States v. West; United States v. Hunter), or
  • anything more than farewell language like “have a safe one” as a sufficient signal the stop ended (United States v. Ledesma), with additional citations to United States v. Guerrero and United States v. Mercado-Gracia.

The panel’s methodological point is as significant as the substantive one: relying on United States v. Little, United States v. Abdenbi, and United States v. Spence, and supported by Ornelas v. United States (and the Seventh Circuit’s United States v. Wade), the court stressed that “ultimate” Fourth Amendment determinations are reviewed de novo to maintain uniformity and provide administrable guidance. That orientation made it difficult for a district court injunction to impose a quasi-categorical set of distancing-and-disclaimer rules when the circuit’s own case law had not required them.

4. Equitable Power, Federalism, and Injunction Specificity

For the propriety of suing a state official for prospective relief, the court invoked Ex parte Young and the Tenth Circuit’s formulation in Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty. The traditional permanent injunction elements were drawn from Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., with the public-interest/balance-of-harms merger noted via Nken v. Holder.

KHP’s federalism-based objections leaned on O'Shea v. Littleton and Rizzo v. Goode. The panel distinguished O’Shea as centered on interference with future state criminal proceedings (and thus related to abstention principles exemplified by Younger v. Harris). It found Rizzo less controlling because the district court here found a pervasive practice effectively authorized by training, not merely a failure to discipline a small set of rogue officers acting contrary to policy.

Still, the panel imposed a strong narrow-tailoring principle on remedies against state agencies, quoting Eaglemed LLC v. Cox and echoing the Supreme Court’s comity language from Rizzo v. Goode. It also cited Steffel v. Thompson to suggest declaratory relief (and modest injunctions) as alternatives to “strong medicine,” and illustrated the point with Knox v. Salinas, Ruiz v. Estelle, Toussaint v. McCarthy, and Marie v. Mosier.

The opinion also addressed the then-recent Supreme Court decision Trump v. CASA, Inc. on “universal injunctions,” concluding it did not bar this relief (not nationwide; “complete relief” and incidental third-party benefits; plus KHP’s class-related stipulation and waiver analysis under Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc.).

Finally, the court used Rule 65(d) specificity doctrine to reject injunctions that amount to “obey the law” commands, citing Schmidt v. Lessard and the Tenth Circuit’s own Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo..

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Standing Holding: A Policing “Pattern and Practice” Route Around Lyons

The key doctrinal move is that Lyons is treated not as a near-per-se bar to forward-looking policing injunctions, but as a template: plaintiffs must show (i) a substantial risk of future contact and (ii) official authorization or widespread practice. The court found both satisfied by a combination of:

  • traffic-stop inevitability and plaintiffs’ future travel plans,
  • statistical evidence of disproportionate out-of-state targeting and canine sniffs,
  • testimony that troopers were trained to use state-of-origin in suspicion analysis, and
  • evidence of institutional non-adjustment after Vasquez v. Lewis.

Importantly, the court’s standing analysis is intertwined with a structural claim: if training and institutional practices predictably generate unconstitutional stops, the future injury is not speculative in the Collins v. Daniels / Lippoldt v. Cole sense; it is a measurable and recurrent risk.

2. Remedy Retrenchment: “Least Intrusive” Initial Relief Against State Agencies

Having opened the courthouse door with standing, the panel then narrowed what federal equity may do once inside. The remedy section effectively establishes a sequencing principle for systemic policing relief against state agencies:

  • Where the constitutional violation is traceable to training/understanding of governing law (here, disregard of Vasquez v. Lewis), the “no broader than necessary” principle favors mandatory corrective training as the initial remedy, absent evidence that training will fail.
  • Broader managerial remedies (documentation mandates, supervisory preclearance, reporting to the court, and the like) require a stronger showing of necessity, particularly given federalism and comity concerns emphasized by Eaglemed LLC v. Cox and Rizzo v. Goode.

The opinion leaves open escalation: if training fails and unconstitutional practices persist, more intrusive relief could become justified on a fuller necessity record.

3. The Two-Step Reversal: Injunctions Cannot Recast Circuit Fourth Amendment Doctrine

The court did not hold the “Kansas Two-Step” always constitutional; it held that the district court’s injunction—requiring particular advisements and physical disengagement protocols—was inconsistent with a line of Tenth Circuit cases that had repeatedly deemed similar post-stop encounters consensual without those requirements (United States v. West; United States v. Bradford; United States v. Ledesma; United States v. Hunter; United States v. Guerrero).

Two additional constraints reinforced the reversal:

  • Uniformity through de novo review: The panel emphasized that the “ultimate” seizure/consent determination is a legal conclusion subject to de novo review, and thus district courts cannot effectively adopt contrary general rules via injunction when circuit precedent has articulated a different legal understanding of what signals the end of a stop.
  • Rule 65(d) specificity limits: If the injunction were reframed as merely requiring lawful Two-Step use, it risks becoming an impermissible “obey the law” order under Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.; if it is operationalized with precise behavioral commands, it risks conflicting with circuit doctrine.

C. Impact

1. Standing: Lowering the Practical Barrier for Systemic Traffic-Stop Injunctions

Shaw v. Smith is a significant standing decision for Fourth Amendment institutional-reform litigation within the Tenth Circuit. It signals that plaintiffs can obtain prospective standing where:

  • future contact with law enforcement is realistically recurrent (traffic stops), and
  • the unconstitutional practice is shown to be systematic and “authorized” through training and culture.

This matters beyond Kansas: the decision provides a blueprint for combining individualized stop evidence with agency-wide statistical and training proof to satisfy City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.

2. Remedies: A Training-First, Escalation-Later Model

The remedial holding simultaneously constrains structural reform. Even with proven constitutional violations, federal courts are directed to craft the least intrusive effective remedy against state agencies—starting with training unless plaintiffs show training will not work. This increases the evidentiary importance of:

  • proof of continued violations after corrective measures,
  • evidence that training has been tried and failed, and
  • findings of deliberate noncompliance that necessitate monitoring and reporting.

3. Two-Step Litigation: Criminal Suppression Precedent Constrains Civil Injunction Design

The decision warns that extensive, prophylactic Two-Step injunction provisions may be vulnerable if they impose requirements inconsistent with Tenth Circuit criminal cases upholding similar encounters as consensual. Plaintiffs seeking systemic relief will likely need either:

  • to focus on antecedent illegality (e.g., unlawful stop basis under Vasquez v. Lewis), or
  • to develop a record distinguishing their fact pattern from the circuit’s “consensual post-stop” cases in a way that supports a circuit-level doctrinal shift rather than an injunction-level workaround.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Standing (Article III): The requirement that the plaintiffs face a real, personal risk of being harmed again—not just that the government acted unlawfully once. Here, the court found a “substantial risk” of future stops plus proof that the challenged conduct is systematic.
  • Reasonable suspicion: A specific, articulable basis to suspect crime that justifies extending a stop. Vasquez v. Lewis says “out-of-state plates,” “drug corridor,” and “drug source/destination state” logic are too broad and innocuous to carry weight.
  • Consensual encounter vs. seizure: After a traffic stop ends (documents returned), officers may ask more questions only if a reasonable person would feel free to leave. The “Kansas Two-Step” is the practice of ending the stop and immediately reengaging to seek consent or build suspicion.
  • Permanent injunction & narrow tailoring: Even when a court finds constitutional violations, the remedy must be no broader than necessary—especially against state agencies, where federalism/comity concerns require restraint.
  • Rule 65(d) specificity: Injunctions must clearly describe what is prohibited or required. Orders that simply say “follow the law” are generally invalid because they do not give concrete, enforceable guidance.

V. Conclusion

Shaw v. Smith establishes an important two-part lesson for institutional Fourth Amendment litigation in the Tenth Circuit. First, motorists can have standing to seek forward-looking relief against a highway patrol when the record shows a substantial risk of future stops and an officially sanctioned pattern of unconstitutional practices. Second, even where systemic violations are proven, federal courts must begin with minimally intrusive relief against state agencies—here, corrective training on the irrelevance of state-of-origin factors under Vasquez v. Lewis—and cannot sustain an injunction that operationally redefines the “Kansas Two-Step” contrary to circuit precedent or that collapses into an impermissible “obey the law” decree.

The partial dissent underscores the unresolved tension the case leaves for future litigation: when a state agency is found to have intentionally disregarded controlling precedent, what evidentiary showing is sufficient to justify moving beyond training to monitoring and structural compliance mechanisms.