Date: Jun 16, 2026

Seventh Circuit Requires Vacatur of Multi-Object Conspiracy and Pinkerton-Based FCPA Convictions When Snyder-Invalid § 666 Objects May Have Driven a General Verdict

I. Introduction

United States v. Anne Pramaggiore (7th Cir. June 15, 2026) addresses what happens when a jury returns a general verdict on a multi-object conspiracy and later Supreme Court precedent invalidates some of the conspiracy’s objects. The defendants, Anne Pramaggiore (then CEO of Commonwealth Edison Company, later CEO of Exelon) and Michael F. McClain (a ComEd lobbyist and political intermediary), were convicted after a 2023 jury trial of: (1) a four-object conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 & 2; (2) substantive 18 U.S.C. § 666 offenses; and (3) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) books-and-records offenses under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(5) & 78ff(a), plus aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2.

The government’s theory alleged a long-running scheme of payments—often through “subcontractor” or “no-show” consulting arrangements—benefiting Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan’s associates while ComEd sought favorable legislation. After trial, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024), narrowing § 666 to quid pro quo bribery (excluding illegal gratuities). That shift prompted vacatur of the substantive § 666 convictions, and then raised the central appellate questions: whether the conspiracy conviction could stand despite two now-invalid § 666 objects, and whether the FCPA convictions—submitted to the jury with a Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) instruction—could survive when the conspiracy foundation was uncertain.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. It held:

Conspiracy: Because the jury was instructed pre-Snyder and returned a general verdict on a conspiracy with four objects, two of which (the § 666 objects) became legally invalid after Snyder, the case presented a classic alternative-theory (Yates/Skilling) error. Under Seventh Circuit harmless-error precedent, the convictions could not stand because the court could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury convicted on a valid object (the FCPA objects).
FCPA substantive counts: The government obtained a Pinkerton instruction, allowing conviction if co-conspirators committed the books-and-records crimes in furtherance of the conspiracy and foreseeably. Because a valid conspiracy is a necessary predicate for Pinkerton liability, and the conspiracy verdict was tainted, the FCPA convictions also had to be vacated; the court could not know whether the jury relied on Pinkerton.
No acquittal under Thompson: The defendants’ reliance on Thompson v. United States, 604 U.S. 408 (2025) did not justify judgments of acquittal. Even assuming Thompson’s “false vs. misleading” distinction could matter to FCPA “falsify” language, the agreed jury instructions required falsity (not mere misleadingness), and there was sufficient evidence from which a properly instructed jury could find falsified records.
Retrial permitted: Because evidence could support conviction under proper instructions, the government may retry the conspiracy and FCPA counts without the invalid theories.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Substantive change in § 666: Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024)

Snyder v. United States is the doctrinal trigger. The panel emphasizes that, at the time of trial, Seventh Circuit law allowed § 666 to reach not only quid pro quo bribes but also illegal gratuities. Snyder resolved a circuit split and held § 666 “did not prohibit gratuities paid to state or local officials.” Because the jury instructions did not require a quid pro quo finding, the substantive § 666 convictions were vacated and dismissed. More importantly, Snyder retroactively rendered two objects of the charged § 371 conspiracy legally invalid as presented to the jury.

2. Alternative-theory/general verdict error: Stromberg, Yates, Skilling, Hedgpeth

The court situates the problem within the Supreme Court’s alternative-theory line:

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931): When a general verdict may rest on an invalid ground, the conviction cannot stand. Stromberg provides the structural concern: the reviewing court cannot know which ground the jury selected.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957): Extends Stromberg to legally flawed (not necessarily unconstitutional) theories—if “impossible to tell which ground the jury selected,” the conviction must be set aside.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010): Applies Yates to multi-object conspiracy where one object becomes legally invalid; frames the error as implicating constitutional guarantees tied to jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam): Confirms that Yates-type errors are subject to harmless-error review.

Together, these cases supply both the identification of error (the jury may have relied on an invalid object) and the remedial framework (harmless-error analysis applies, but with a stringent burden).

3. Harmless error framework and its constitutional anchor: Chapman, Sullivan, Carella, Satterwhite, Neder

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967): Constitutional errors can be harmless, but only if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993): The Sixth Amendment requires an actual jury finding of guilt; appellate speculation about what a hypothetical jury would have done is insufficient.
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam): Due process is violated if instructions relieve the government of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988): Articulates the Chapman lens: whether the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999): Provides the “did not contribute to the verdict obtained” formulation that the panel quotes as the operative test.

The panel’s emphasis is not on evidentiary strength in the abstract but on the jury’s role: harmlessness turns on whether the reviewing court can be sure what the jury necessarily decided under the instructions given.

4. Seventh Circuit’s “must-have-convicted” approach: Sorich, Borrero, Turner, Segal

The decision is especially significant because it reaffirms a demanding Seventh Circuit harmlessness standard in alternative-theory cases:

Sorich v. United States, 709 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2013): Harmlessness turns on whether the evidence was such that the jury “must have convicted” on both valid and invalid theories.
United States v. Borrero, 771 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2014): If instructions allow conviction on a legally insufficient theory, remand for a new trial is required because a jury following instructions might have convicted on the invalid ground “while disdaining the proper one.” Borrero also supports the remedial point that retrial remains available when a properly instructed jury could convict.
Turner v. United States, 693 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012): An example where error can be harmless when the evidence is “so thoroughly coextensive” that the guilty verdict necessarily implies guilt on the valid theory—an “all or nothing” scenario.
United States v. Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011): Harmlessness where the conviction must have been “premised on” a valid theory notwithstanding an invalid one.

Applying these precedents, the panel distinguishes Turner: a conspiracy to commit § 666 bribery/gratuities is not coextensive with a conspiracy to falsify records/circumvent internal controls under the FCPA. With non-overlapping objects and a general verdict, the court “just don’t know[s]” what the jury relied upon—precisely the scenario Borrero treats as requiring vacatur.

5. Circuit split acknowledged but not engaged: McKye, Wright, Bereano, Jefferson, Holly

The court notes other circuits’ more evidence-weighting approaches:

United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2012): Harmlessness may be found with “overwhelming” evidence on the valid theory.
United States v. McKye, 734 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2013) (Briscoe, J., concurring) and United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298 (10th Cir. 2007): The Tenth Circuit approach aligns more closely with requiring a determination that the verdict rested on a valid ground.
Bereano v. United States, 706 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012)): Affirms only if the evidence the jury necessarily credited to convict required guilt on a legally adequate ground.

The panel declines to revisit Seventh Circuit doctrine because the government did not ask it to do so, invoking Margolin v. Nat'l Ass'n of Immigr. Judges, 146 S. Ct. 1285 (2026) (per curiam) for the adversarial-system principle that unargued points are not considered.

6. Pinkerton dependency on a valid conspiracy: Pinkerton and United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2000)

On the FCPA counts, the court highlights the structural dependency of Pinkerton liability: Pinkerton v. United States allows substantive liability for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy. But United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2000) is quoted for the predicate requirement: “it is of course necessary to show that a conspiracy existed.” Because the conspiracy verdict may rest on invalid objects under Snyder, Pinkerton becomes an invalid alternative route to the FCPA convictions—creating another Yates-style uncertainty.

7. Post-Thompson “false vs. misleading” and sufficiency review: Thompson, Marchan, Corrigan

Thompson v. United States, 604 U.S. 408 (2025): In § 1014, “false” does not include “misleading,” so true-but-misleading statements are not criminal under that statute.
United States v. Marchan, 935 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2019): Juries are presumed to follow instructions.
United States v. Corrigan, 912 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 2019): Frames sufficiency review for whether the record lacks evidence to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court uses Marchan to reject the defendants’ attempt to recast the jury’s basis as “misleading but not false”: the instructions required falsity. It then relies on Corrigan to conclude that enough evidence supported a finding that the records were actually false (not merely incomplete or artfully vague), precluding acquittal.

8. Standards of review and retrial principles: Shango, Cavazos, Burks

Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1992): Questions of law reviewed de novo.
Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011): Facts summarized in the light most favorable to the government after conviction.
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978): Retrial is barred after reversal for insufficient evidence, but not after reversal for trial error; cited to underscore retrial availability here.

B. Legal Reasoning

Identify the legal error (Snyder + general verdict + multi-object conspiracy). After Snyder, two conspiracy objects (the § 666 objects) were legally invalid “given the way the jury was instructed.” Because the jury returned a general verdict, the court cannot tell whether the jury unanimously relied on invalid objects, valid objects, or some mix.
Apply Seventh Circuit harmlessness: the court asks what the jury necessarily did, not what it likely would have done. The panel repeatedly rejects outcome-predictive reasoning (“no jury on this record would have...”) as inconsistent with the jury-trial guarantee. Under Sorich/Borrero/Sullivan, harmlessness is established only when the verdict necessarily encompasses guilt on the valid theory (as in Turner’s “coextensive” evidence scenario). Here, the objects were not overlapping, so the verdict does not necessarily imply agreement to violate the FCPA.
Extend the same alternative-theory problem to the FCPA counts via Pinkerton. Because Pinkerton liability requires a valid conspiracy, and the conspiracy verdict is tainted, the Pinkerton path to FCPA conviction becomes legally unreliable. The jury was offered alternative routes to convict; one depended on a conspiracy that may not be legally valid as found. The court therefore vacates the FCPA convictions as well.
Reject acquittal: Thompson does not negate falsity under the instructions, and evidence of falsification was sufficient. The panel’s point is narrow but important: even if “falsify” in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) were argued to exclude mere misleadingness, the jury was not instructed on a “misleading” standard. Since the jury found falsity under the instructions, and the record contained sufficient evidence of actual false records (e.g., contract amendments stating work or roles that were not performed; invoices and single-source justifications omitting who was doing work while representing something else), the defendants are not entitled to judgments of acquittal.

C. Impact

Post-Snyder charging and instruction discipline in § 371 cases. In the Seventh Circuit, when prosecutors plead multi-object conspiracies that include any object vulnerable to later legal change (or object-specific instructional error), a general verdict creates substantial reversal risk unless (a) the objects are functionally coextensive in proof, or (b) the government secures object-specific findings (e.g., special verdict/interrogatories) or instructions that force the jury to make the legally required determinations (here, quid pro quo).
Seventh Circuit reaffirms a jury-centered harmlessness approach. The opinion reinforces that this circuit will not affirm simply because evidence of a valid theory is strong or even “overwhelming,” where the verdict does not necessarily rest on that theory. That stance affects appellate strategy (government must squarely ask for doctrinal change if it wants an “overwhelming evidence” standard) and trial strategy (structuring verdict forms and instructions to avoid Yates/Skilling vulnerability).
Pinkerton instructions become a liability when the conspiracy theory is unstable. By vacating substantive FCPA convictions due to the possibility that the jury used Pinkerton, the opinion signals that Pinkerton can amplify reversal risk: if the conspiracy count is later undermined, any Pinkerton-dependent substantive counts may fall as well unless it is clear the jury convicted on direct liability alone.
FCPA “books and records” prosecutions remain viable post-Thompson—but must track falsity, not just misleadingness. The court does not definitively decide Thompson’s application to § 78m(b)(5), but it underscores that, at least where juries are instructed on falsity, defendants cannot obtain acquittal by reframing false entries as mere omissions. Practically, prosecutors will likely emphasize affirmative false representations in compliance documents, contracts, and justifications rather than relying solely on incompleteness.
Broader compliance governance relevance. The narrative of internal controls, code-of-conduct requirements, and executive approvals illustrates how corporate compliance artifacts (single-source justifications, contract amendments, invoices, subcontractor disclosures) can become the factual core of FCPA books-and-records counts—and how those counts can be procedurally intertwined with public-corruption theories.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 666 (federal program bribery): A federal statute criminalizing certain corrupt payments involving state/local officials and entities receiving federal funds. After Snyder v. United States, § 666 in this context covers quid pro quo bribery (a corrupt exchange: payment in return for official action), not mere gratuities (payments given because of an official’s position or past/future goodwill without a proven exchange).
Multi-object conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371): A conspiracy charge can list multiple illegal “objects” (goals). A jury can convict if it unanimously finds an agreement to achieve at least one object. The problem arises when some objects are later deemed invalid and the jury’s general verdict does not reveal which object(s) the jury found.
General verdict vs. special verdict: A general verdict says “guilty” or “not guilty” without specifying the theory. A special verdict or interrogatories can require the jury to specify which object(s) it found, reducing uncertainty on appeal.
Yates/Skilling alternative-theory error: When the jury is allowed to convict on multiple theories and at least one is legally wrong, the conviction usually cannot stand unless the court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict rested on a valid theory.
Harmless error (Chapman standard): Even if there was legal error, a conviction can be affirmed if the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. In the Seventh Circuit’s framing here, this requires confidence about what the jury necessarily decided—not simply that evidence on a valid theory was strong.
Pinkerton liability: A doctrine allowing conviction for substantive crimes committed by a co-conspirator if they were reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy. It depends on the existence of a valid conspiracy; if the conspiracy finding is uncertain or legally flawed, Pinkerton-based convictions become vulnerable.
FCPA “books and records” / internal controls: Public companies must keep accurate books and maintain internal accounting controls. The government alleged the defendants caused false contracts/justifications/invoices to conceal payments and the true beneficiaries. The court held there was sufficient evidence of false records (not merely ambiguous ones), so acquittal was unwarranted.
Thompson’s “false” vs. “misleading” distinction: Thompson v. United States held that a different statute (§ 1014) punishes false statements, not true-but-misleading ones. Here, the panel’s key point was procedural and evidentiary: the jury was instructed it had to find falsification, and the record could support that finding.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Anne Pramaggiore crystallizes a Seventh Circuit rule with major practical consequences: when a jury returns a general verdict on a multi-object conspiracy and later authority (here, Snyder v. United States) renders some objects legally invalid as presented, the conviction must be vacated unless the court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury necessarily convicted on a valid object. The same uncertainty can undo substantive convictions submitted on a Pinkerton theory dependent on that conspiracy. At the same time, the opinion limits defendants’ ability to convert Thompson v. United States into automatic acquittals on FCPA books-and-records counts where the jury was instructed on falsity and the evidence could support actual false records. The case stands as a cautionary precedent on charging, jury instructions, and verdict form design in public-corruption-adjacent prosecutions that pair bribery theories with corporate recordkeeping offenses.