Seventh Circuit Recognizes “Dangerous-Felony” As-Applied Validity of § 922(g)(1) Under Bruen/Rahimi

1. Introduction

United States v. Edlando Watson (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) addresses two recurring post-Bruen questions: (1) whether the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is constitutional as applied to a defendant whose predicate felony is drug distribution; and (2) whether DNA evidence obtained under a later federal warrant is admissible when law enforcement previously obtained DNA under a potentially overbroad state warrant.

The defendant-appellant, Edlando M. Watson, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms, preserving appellate review of: (i) a Second Amendment as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1); and (ii) a Fourth Amendment suppression challenge to DNA evidence. The United States was the plaintiff-appellee.

Factually, the case arose from a Madison, Wisconsin shooting investigation that led police to firearms recovered from a storage unit linked to Watson through witness accounts, recorded jail calls, and DNA. Procedurally, Watson attacked the DNA collection sequence and the firearm prohibition’s constitutionality in the wake of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Fourth Amendment: The court held the DNA evidence was admissible under the independent-source doctrine because the federal DNA warrant rested on ample untainted probable cause and did not rely on the earlier (allegedly unlawful) state DNA match.
  • Second Amendment: Applying the Bruen/Rahimi history-and-tradition method, the court held § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to “dangerous” felons, and it specifically deemed Watson’s predicate felony—possession of cocaine with intent to distribute—inherently dangerous.
  • Limitation: The panel expressly did not decide whether a person convicted of a non-dangerous felony may be disarmed under § 922(g)(1).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Fourth Amendment / Suppression Framework

  • United States v. Correa, 908 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2018): cited for the standard of review—legal conclusions de novo, factual findings for clear error—framing the appellate posture for the suppression ruling.
  • Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961): provided the baseline that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
  • Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) and Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988): supplied the governing independent-source principle—evidence later obtained lawfully is admissible if the later seizure is “genuinely independent” of earlier taint.
  • United States v. Miller, 68 F.4th 1065 (7th Cir. 2023): was the opinion’s key analogy. As in Miller, the later warrant application omitted the potentially tainted fact (there: key fob use; here: DNA match), and the court reasoned the officers would have sought the warrant anyway based on untainted facts. Miller thus operationalized independence through two lenses: (1) what the issuing judge saw, and (2) whether officers’ decision to seek the warrant depended on tainted information.

B. Second Amendment Methodology After Bruen and Rahimi

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): the government urged Heller’s felon-dispossession “longstanding prohibitions” passage as controlling. The panel treated it as dicta insufficient to resolve modern as-applied litigation, especially after the Supreme Court’s later insistence on historical analysis.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): provided the two-step structure used here: (1) whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct; (2) whether the regulation is consistent with historical tradition. The court relied on Bruen for the “relevantly similar” standard and the admonition against demanding a “historical twin.”
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): supplied multiple doctrinal tools used to uphold § 922(g)(1) as applied: (i) the “why and how” framing for analogical history; (ii) the idea that multiple historical regimes can be considered “taken together”; (iii) the specific characterization of permissible disarmament targeting those who “threaten the physical safety of another”; and (iv) the “greater includes the lesser” move (if imprisonment is permissible to respond to threats, then temporary disarmament may be permissible).
  • Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023): controlled the court’s rejection of the government’s claim that Heller dicta forecloses the need for a Bruen historical inquiry in § 922(g)(1) cases.
  • United States v. Viveros-Chavez, 114 F.4th 618 (7th Cir. 2024): cited for the standard of review of the Second Amendment challenge.
  • United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843 (7th Cir. 2024): noted as a pre-Rahimi decision that relied on Heller dicta—implicitly distinguished by the court’s post-Rahimi insistence on full historical analysis.

C. Who Are “the people”?

  • United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990): used to interpret “the people” as a term of art referring to those in the national community or with sufficient connection to it.
  • United States v. Carbajal-Flores, 143 F.4th 877 (7th Cir. 2025): cited for the proposition that illegal aliens may be disarmed, but also used for its historical discussion (including English practices and the linkage of land ownership and arms).
  • Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc), United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc), Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025), United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024): marshaled to show an emerging cross-circuit consensus that felons are still among “the people” for textual purposes, shifting the decisive work to historical tradition at step two.
  • Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting): used twice: (i) for the individual/collective rights distinction (voting/jury service vs. individual rights), supporting the view that felons remain within “the people”; and (ii) for the proposition that legislatures historically could disarm “dangerous people,” which the panel treats as consistent with common sense and compatible with Rahimi.

D. Competing Circuit Approaches to § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (Pryor, C.J., concurring): relied upon for the synthesis that two historical traditions—categorical disarmament of dangerous groups and capital punishment for serious felonies—“taken together” support disarming those with dangerous felonies.
  • United States v. Mitchell, 160 F.4th 169 (5th Cir. 2025): cited as an example of a court finding § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied (there, to a § 922(g)(3) predicate offense), underscoring the unresolved national split.
  • United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) and Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025): noted as decisions continuing to reject as-applied challenges (and, as the panel suggests, sometimes relying on pre-Bruen/Rahimi frameworks).

E. Drug/Gun Dangerousness as “Common Sense” and Legal Backdrop

  • Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997): supplied Supreme Court recognition of the “dangerous combination” of drugs and guns and the link between drugs and violence.
  • Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280 (2025): cited to emphasize the real-world association of firearms with drug trafficking organizations and violent crime.

F. Relief Valve / Post-Conviction Restoration

  • United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002): cited to explain how Congress’s appropriations riders effectively disabled the statutory relief mechanism under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
  • Withdrawing the Attorney General's Delegation of Authority, 90 Fed. Reg. 13080 (Mar. 20, 2025): used to note a policy shift: the Attorney General has begun restarting the § 925(c) process, relevant to the “permanent” character of felon disarmament.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Fourth Amendment: Independence Turns on the Warrant’s Inputs and Investigative Causation

Watson’s core suppression theory was “you can’t unring the bell”: because federal investigators knew of the prior DNA match, any later DNA warrant was allegedly infected. The court rejected that framing by applying Murray v. United States’ “genuinely independent” requirement in a practical way:

  1. Judicial independence: The federal warrant affidavit did not mention that Watson’s DNA matched DNA on the guns, so the issuing judge’s probable-cause determination was not influenced by tainted information (as in United States v. Miller).
  2. Investigative independence: The court emphasized the “extensive evidence” tying Watson to the guns—eyewitness identification, witness statements about Watson moving guns, the tip about Yarrington’s unit, the presence of male DNA on the guns (without saying it matched Watson), and incriminating jail calls. That made it likely federal agents would have sought DNA anyway, even absent the earlier sample.

Doctrinally, the opinion reinforces that knowledge of tainted evidence does not necessarily taint later evidence if the later search is supported by independent probable cause and pursued for reasons not dependent on the earlier illegality.

B. Second Amendment Step One: Felons Are Still “the people”

The government argued felons fall outside “the people.” The panel sided with Heller’s broad reading of “the people” and found the historical record inconclusive enough to justify adherence to Supreme Court language until further guidance. This choice matters because it channels nearly all § 922(g)(1) litigation into step two—history and tradition—rather than allowing categorical textual exclusion.

C. Second Amendment Step Two: Two Traditions “Taken Together” Support Disarming Dangerous Felons

Lacking Founding-era felon-in-possession “twins,” the court constructed its justification through Bruen-style analogy, guided by Rahimi’s “why and how”:

  • Tradition 1 — categorical disarmament of “dangerous” groups: The court surveyed English and American historical practices where legislatures or sovereigns disarmed categories perceived as threatening public safety or stability (including Catholics, political dissidents, slaves, Native Americans, and later “tramps”). The panel acknowledged many such laws are morally repugnant and unconstitutional today under modern equal-protection norms, but treated them as evidence of an asserted historical power: categorical disarmament where the legislature deems a class “dangerous.”
  • Tradition 2 — “greater includes the lesser” from capital punishment for serious felonies: Because many serious felonies at the Founding were punishable by death, the court reasoned that if the political community historically possessed the greater power to execute those convicted of dangerous felonies, it possessed the lesser power to permanently disarm them. The opinion candidly recognizes debate about this logic (citing Kanter v. Barr (Barrett, J., dissenting) and Folajtar v. Att'y Gen. (Bibas, J., dissenting)) but reads Rahimi as endorsing the basic “greater/lesser” mode of reasoning at least in some contexts.

The key doctrinal move is the opinion’s narrowing: it does not uphold felon disarmament for every felony categorically; instead, it upholds § 922(g)(1) as applied to dangerous felonies and explicitly leaves non-dangerous felonies for future cases.

D. Application to Watson: Drug Distribution Is Treated as Inherently Dangerous

Watson’s predicate felony—possession of cocaine with intent to distribute—was labeled “inherently dangerous.” The court grounded that designation in “common sense” and in legal recognition that drug trafficking correlates with violence and firearms misuse (citing Muscarello v. United States, Richards v. Wisconsin, and Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos), as well as in Congress’s broader criminal framework that treats drugs-and-guns as aggravated conduct (e.g., § 924(c) and the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement).

Notably, the panel refused to decide whether Watson’s other felony—possession of a firearm by a drug user, § 922(g)(3)—would suffice as a predicate in a world where § 922(g)(3) may be vulnerable to as-applied challenges (citing United States v. Hemani (cert. granted)). That portion signals sensitivity to the interaction between evolving Second Amendment doctrine and the predicate-offense structure of § 922(g)(1).

3.3. Impact

A. Within the Seventh Circuit: A “Dangerous Felony” Lodestar, Not a Universal Rule

The opinion establishes (or, at minimum, crystallizes) a Seventh Circuit rule that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to defendants with “dangerous” predicate felonies, with drug distribution expressly included. The court simultaneously preserves space for litigation by refusing to decide whether non-dangerous felonies can justify lifetime disarmament. That reservation is significant because it invites the next wave of as-applied challenges focused on:

  • how “dangerousness” is defined (elements-based, conduct-based, or categorical);
  • whether “nonviolent” equals “non-dangerous” (the opinion suggests the two do not perfectly overlap); and
  • whether courts may consider “the entirety of [a defendant’s] criminal history” (the panel declined to decide that).

B. Nationally: The Decision Deepens the Post-Bruen Circuit Dialogue

The opinion explicitly situates itself in a fractured national landscape: some circuits reject felony-by-felony adjudication (e.g., language quoted from United States v. Jackson), while others permit successful as-applied challenges (e.g., Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S., United States v. Williams, and United States v. Mitchell). By adopting a “dangerous felony” approach, the Seventh Circuit charts a middle course likely to be tested in future Supreme Court review.

C. Practical Consequences: Relief and Restoration Re-enter the Conversation

The court’s discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)—and the Attorney General’s effort to restart the process—signals that future as-applied cases may increasingly grapple with: (i) whether “permanent” disarmament is truly permanent in practice, and (ii) how restoration mechanisms affect constitutional analysis or remedies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • As-applied vs. facial challenge: An as-applied challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in the challenger’s specific circumstances; a facial challenge argues the law is unconstitutional in all applications. Watson brought only an as-applied challenge.
  • Exclusionary rule: A doctrine that can bar evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches or seizures.
  • Independent-source doctrine: Even if police earlier obtained evidence illegally, the same or similar evidence can be admitted if later obtained through a genuinely independent, lawful path (e.g., a separate warrant supported by untainted probable cause).
  • Bruen “text and history” test: If the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct, the government must justify the firearm regulation by showing it aligns with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
  • “Relevantly similar” historical analogies: A modern gun law need not have an identical Founding-era predecessor; it must be similar in the reasons for the regulation (“why”) and the way it burdens the right (“how”).
  • “Greater includes the lesser”: If historical practice allowed a more severe restriction (e.g., imprisonment or even execution for certain crimes), that may support the constitutionality of a lesser restriction (e.g., disarmament), depending on context.
  • “Dangerousness”: The court uses this as the key constitutional hinge: legislatures historically disarmed persons or groups perceived as threats to physical safety or public stability; Congress may treat certain felonies—here, drug distribution—as falling in that category.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Edlando Watson delivers two principal holdings with forward-looking significance. First, it strengthens the Seventh Circuit’s application of the independent-source doctrine to salvage later warrants supported by untainted probable cause, even where investigators possess knowledge derived from earlier potentially unlawful investigative steps. Second, and more consequentially for Second Amendment litigation, it holds that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to “dangerous” felons and treats felony drug distribution as inherently dangerous under a Bruen/Rahimi history-and-tradition framework.

The opinion’s deliberate narrowing—reserving judgment on non-dangerous felonies—ensures continued as-applied litigation, but it provides a clear doctrinal anchor in the Seventh Circuit: where the predicate felony is deemed dangerous, § 922(g)(1) survives.