Seventh Circuit Maintains “Informal, Non-Adversarial” Due Process as Sufficient for Disciplinary Segregation Transfers (Post-Torres)

Case: Norberto Torres v. Kent Brookman (with Jason Hart)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date: March 18, 2026
Posture: Order denying rehearing en banc; dissent from denial by Judge Maldonado, joined by Judges Rovner and Jackson-Akiwumi.

1. Introduction

This Seventh Circuit order denies Norberto Torres’s petition for rehearing en banc after a panel decision in Torres v. Brookman, 155 F.4th 952 (7th Cir. 2025), which—according to the dissent—extended Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880 (7th Cir. 2024), to adopt a categorical procedural rule: prisoners facing transfer to disciplinary segregation are entitled only to “informal, non-adversarial due process.”

The underlying dispute concerns Torres’s claimed inability to call a witness and to see evidence used to justify a disciplinary segregation placement allegedly tied to accusations such as gang affiliation, followed by three months in harsh and unsanitary conditions. The petition asked the full court to revisit whether such disciplinary punishment must include the more robust procedures identified in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), rather than the more limited process associated with administrative placements discussed in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005).

2. Summary of the Opinion (Order and Dissent)

2.1 The Court’s Disposition

The court, per curiam, denied rehearing en banc by majority vote. Judges Jackson-Akiwumi and Maldonado voted to grant rehearing. The order itself contains no merits analysis; its practical effect is to leave the panel precedent undisturbed.

2.2 The Dissent’s Core Claim

Judge Maldonado’s dissent argues that the panel’s approach (as described) conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, entrenches a circuit split, and departs from Seventh Circuit case law that had treated Wolff as the baseline for disciplinary segregation proceedings. The dissent frames Torres as collapsing the doctrinal distinction between:

  • Disciplinary segregation (punitive; stigma of wrongdoing; fact-finding about specific misconduct), and
  • Administrative transfers/segregation (managerial; predictive and discretionary judgments; institutional security goals).

On the dissent’s telling, Torres extends the lower-procedure administrative model to punitive segregation, leaving prisoners without meaningful ability to present a defense (e.g., by calling witnesses or presenting documentary evidence), even when facing months of solitary-like confinement.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shape the Dispute)

A. Supreme Court anchor points: Wolff versus Wilkinson

  • Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974): The dissent treats Wolff as the Supreme Court’s disciplinary-hearing template, emphasizing that, “to the extent feasible,” inmates may call witnesses and present documentary evidence. The dissent also relies on Wolff’s statement (footnote 19) that it would be “difficult” to distinguish, for due process purposes, between procedures required for forfeiture of good-time credits and those required when “solitary confinement is at issue.”
  • Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005): The dissent characterizes Wilkinson as approving “informal, non-adversarial” procedures for administrative placement decisions (there, supermax), grounded in administrative prediction, institutional security expertise, and broad discretion—rather than adjudication of guilt for discrete misconduct.

B. The administrative-segregation line and its limits

  • Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995): Cited for the idea that informal procedures suffice for administrative segregation. The dissent uses it to show that the Supreme Court has associated informal process with nonpunitive, administrative decisions.
  • Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976): Used to underscore that many administrative decisions are subjective, predictive, and discretionary—features that, in the dissent’s view, justify more relaxed procedures.
  • Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): Quoted for the foundational principle that due process is “flexible” and context-dependent—supporting the dissent’s insistence on different procedural baselines for punitive versus administrative placements.

C. Liberty-interest gating: Sandin and “atypical and significant hardship”

  • Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995): The dissent accepts Sandin’s threshold rule: disciplinary segregation triggers due process only if it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” relative to ordinary prison life. But once that threshold is met, the dissent argues, Wolff supplies the minimum procedural safeguards.
  • Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990): Cited to support the broader proposition that certain severe deprivations within custody cannot be imposed without “minimum requirements of due process.”

D. Seventh Circuit internal conflict: older disciplinary-hearing statements versus Adams/Torres

  • Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019); Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009); Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2003): Presented as Seventh Circuit decisions consistent with applying Wolff-type protections in disciplinary contexts.
  • Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648 (7th Cir. 2023): Quoted by the dissent for a clear statement that due process in prison disciplinary hearings includes (among other things) the right to call witnesses and present evidence when consistent with safety.
  • Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012): The dissent says Adams relied on Westefer for the “informal, non-adversarial” standard, but criticizes this reliance because Westefer concerned administrative transfer (supermax), not punitive disciplinary segregation.
  • Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880 (7th Cir. 2024) and Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958 (7th Cir. 2024): The dissent describes these cases as “crystalliz[ing]” (and then extending) a reduced-process approach even for disciplinary segregation—an approach the dissent believes is in tension with Wolff.
  • Jackson v. Anastasio, 150 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2025) (Hamilton, J., concurring): Cited to show intra-circuit concern that Adams did not grapple with Wolff and Sandin and that more formal Wolff procedures should apply to prolonged solitary-like punishment.

E. Circuit-split authorities marshaled by the dissent

The dissent cites multiple circuits as applying Wolff-type protections (including witness and evidence presentation) in disciplinary segregation contexts:

  • Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1999)
  • Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2007)
  • Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789 (6th Cir. 2024)
  • Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994)
  • Ramer v. Kerby, 936 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1991)
  • Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2016)

The dissent connects the practical stakes of a circuit split to interstate prisoner movement, citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983), and the reality of interstate prison outsourcing.

F. Conditions-of-confinement and harms cited in the dissent (contextual, not dispositive)

  • Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) and Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015): Used to highlight documented psychological harms of solitary-like segregation and to rebut any assumption that months in segregation are trivial.
  • Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010): Cited to clarify that international norms (here, the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners) are not a source of justiciable rights, even if they illuminate humane-treatment benchmarks.
  • United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973): Quoted for the proposition that incarceration leaves a “residuum” of constitutional rights.
  • Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987): Cited for principles of vertical stare decisis (Supreme Court control) and respectful consideration of other circuits to avoid unnecessary splits.

3.2 Legal Reasoning (What the Dissent Says the Panel Rule Does—and Why That Matters)

Although the en banc denial itself is summary, the dissent supplies the operative legal critique:

  • Category error: The dissent argues Torres treats punitive disciplinary segregation like administrative placement, importing the “informal, non-adversarial” model reserved for managerial decisions and institutional predictions (Wilkinson, Hewitt, Greenholtz, Meachum).
  • Misreading of Wolff: The dissent disputes the notion (attributed to the panel) that Wolff procedures are required only when good-time credits are at stake. It points to Wolff’s explicit linkage between good-time forfeiture and solitary/disciplinary cell confinement, emphasizing that both sanctions can require “minimum procedural safeguards.”
  • Two-step structure: The dissent implicitly endorses a two-step approach: (1) determine whether segregation creates a liberty interest under Sandin (“atypical and significant hardship”); (2) if so, apply Wolff-type protections appropriate to disciplinary adjudication (subject to feasibility and institutional safety).
  • Fairness mechanics: Without witness/evidence access, the dissent warns disciplinary hearings devolve into a “swearing contest,” especially when the accused must rebut a guard’s account—raising the risk of arbitrary or erroneous punishment.

3.3 Impact (Doctrinal and Practical)

  • Within the Seventh Circuit: By declining rehearing, the court leaves in place (as characterized by the dissent) a rule that disciplinary segregation transfers may proceed under an “informal, non-adversarial” due process framework, rather than Wolff-style procedures, unless another trigger (such as loss of good-time credits) applies.
  • Entrenched circuit split: The dissent contends the Seventh Circuit now diverges from at least six circuits that apply Wolff to disciplinary segregation—creating inconsistent procedural rights depending on geography, notwithstanding interstate prisoner transfers (Olim v. Wakinekona).
  • Litigation reshaping: If procedural due process is narrowed, future plaintiffs may reframe claims toward: (a) proving a Sandin liberty interest via unusually harsh duration/conditions; and/or (b) challenging conditions under other constitutional theories (the dissent highlights health and psychological harms as salient).
  • Institutional incentives: A reduced-process model may lower administrative burden but increases the risk that major punishments are imposed on contested facts without robust testing—raising concerns about accuracy, legitimacy, and downstream impacts (e.g., stigma, parole prospects).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Due process” in prison discipline: The Constitution can require procedures before the state imposes certain serious deprivations. In disciplinary cases, Wolff is commonly associated with protections like notice, an impartial decisionmaker, the ability (when feasible) to call witnesses/present evidence, and a written explanation.
  • Disciplinary vs. administrative segregation:
    • Disciplinary: punishment for alleged misconduct; focuses on adjudicating disputed facts; carries stigma.
    • Administrative: management/security classification; often predictive and discretionary; not necessarily a condemnation of wrongdoing.
  • “Informal, non-adversarial” process: A lighter procedural model typically meaning notice of reasons and an opportunity to respond, without the fuller evidentiary features of adversarial adjudication.
  • Liberty interest and Sandin: Not every unpleasant condition triggers due process. Under Sandin, due process is implicated only when segregation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” compared to ordinary prison life.
  • Circuit split: When federal appellate courts disagree on the governing rule, similarly situated people may have different rights depending on where they are incarcerated—often prompting pressure for Supreme Court resolution.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc leaves standing the panel-era trajectory described by the dissent: beginning with Adams v. Reagle and extended in Torres v. Brookman, disciplinary segregation transfers may be governed by “informal, non-adversarial” procedures rather than the more protective framework associated with Wolff v. McDonnell.

Judge Maldonado’s dissent frames the stakes as both doctrinal (a claimed misalignment with Supreme Court distinctions between punitive and administrative placements) and practical (the accuracy and legitimacy of disciplinary adjudications that can lead to months of severe segregation). The decision’s broader significance lies in its entrenchment of a circuit divide over what process is constitutionally “due” before imposing punitive segregation.