Seventh Circuit Establishes FSMA Whistleblower Retaliation Framework: SOX-Style Elements, Actual-Decisionmaker Knowledge, and “Contributing Factor” Causation

I. Introduction

Case: Aisha Putnam v. CaramelCrisp, LLC d/b/a Garrett Popcorn Shops (7th Cir. Aug. 13, 2026).
Parties: Aisha Putnam (Plaintiff-Appellant), former Director of Research & Development with quality assurance responsibilities; CaramelCrisp, LLC (Defendant-Appellee), a popcorn and chocolate manufacturer and retailer.
Background: Putnam alleged that she repeatedly reported escalating food safety and quality-control violations to management and, in early 2019, sent anonymous emails to the FDA describing alleged violations. Two days after receiving an FDA response, she was terminated. CaramelCrisp later sued Putnam for alleged trade secret misappropriation (CaramelCrisp, LLC v. Putnam, 19-cv-2699 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2019)).

Key Issues on Appeal: (1) What legal framework governs retaliation claims under the Food Safety Modernization Act (“FSMA”), 21 U.S.C. § 399d? In particular, what level of employer knowledge is required when the protected activity is an FDA complaint? (2) Whether Putnam could pursue an Illinois common-law retaliatory discharge claim alongside FSMA. (3) Whether a new factual retaliation theory (that CaramelCrisp’s trade-secrets suit was retaliatory) could be added late in the case. (4) Whether Putnam’s trial-related challenges could be reviewed without a complete trial transcript record.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit dismissed Putnam’s trial-related appellate challenges because she did not provide complete trial transcripts, making meaningful prejudice review impossible (Tapley v. Chambers). The court affirmed summary judgment against the FSMA theory premised on Putnam’s FDA emails because she produced no evidence that the relevant decisionmakers had actual knowledge of those emails. The court also affirmed the refusal to allow Putnam to inject a new factual theory (retaliation via the trade-secrets lawsuit) on the eve of trial as an improper de facto amendment. Finally, although the court did not decide whether Illinois would recognize a common-law retaliatory discharge claim when FSMA provides a remedy, it held that any reversal would be futile because the jury’s FSMA verdict—rejecting causation under the lower “contributing factor” standard—precluded success under Illinois’s higher causation standard.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate record and dismissal of trial-related claims

  • Tapley v. Chambers, 840 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2016): Central authority for dismissing issues when a deficient record prevents meaningful review; the court declined to order supplementation because Putnam had ample opportunity to fix the record.
  • LaFollette v. Savage, 68 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1995): Reinforced the practice of dismissing appellate challenges where appellants fail to supplement the record even after being alerted.
  • Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648 (7th Cir. 2023); Artis v. Santos, 95 F.4th 518 (7th Cir. 2024); Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2010); Burton v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 994 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2021): Used to frame why transcripts are essential—each issue turns on whether the appellant was prejudiced at trial, a question requiring the full evidentiary context.

2. FSMA retaliation framework and causation standards

  • Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, 601 U.S. 23 (2024): The Supreme Court’s discussion of modern whistleblower statutes and “contributing factor” causation provided the conceptual anchor for treating FSMA as part of a whistleblower-statute family rather than importing Title VII’s retaliation framework.
  • Harp v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 558 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2009): Adopted as the template framework (originally for Sarbanes-Oxley) that the court extended to FSMA: protected activity; employer knowledge; unfavorable action; and “contributing factor” causation.
  • Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2018): Confirmed the continuing use of the Harp framework in whistleblower contexts, supporting its portability to FSMA.
  • Addis v. Dep't of Labor, 575 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2009): Defined “contributing factor” as something less than “substantial” or “motivating,” aligning with Murray.

3. Employer knowledge and causation in retaliation claims

  • Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2021); Miller v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2000); Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ., 667 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2011): Stand for the “threshold” proposition that retaliation requires the decisionmaker’s awareness of the protected activity; absent knowledge, the causal link fails.
  • Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 897 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2018): Rejects speculation about decisionmaker knowledge as insufficient to survive summary judgment.
  • Eaton v. J. H. Findorff & Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508 (7th Cir. 2021); Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2004): Distinguish “constructive” or “should have known” awareness from the required “actual knowledge” for retaliatory intent.
  • Dey v. Colt Constr., 28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994); Maarouf v. Walker Mfg. Co., 210 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2000): Recognize that circumstantial evidence can establish knowledge, but there must be evidence supporting a reasonable inference of awareness.
  • Whitaker v. Dempsey, 144 F.4th 908 (7th Cir. 2025): Provided the de novo standard of review for summary judgment.

4. Late-stage “new facts” as de facto amendment

  • Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2017): The governing doctrine—new legal theories are generally permissible, but new factual bases raised late can be treated as an attempted amendment that the district court may reject in its discretion.
  • Conner v. Ill. Dep't of Nat. Res., 413 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2005); Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 1996): Support the proposition that district courts may refuse late factual expansions that effectively amend the complaint.

5. Illinois retaliatory discharge and causation

  • Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2019): De novo review standard for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
  • Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2002): Summarized Illinois retaliatory discharge doctrine and noted dicta suggesting the claim may be unavailable where an adequate statutory remedy exists.
  • Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 909 (Ill. 1988): Cited via Brandon to situate the public-policy basis for the tort.
  • Matros v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 136 N.E.3d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); Michael v. Precision All. Grp., LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183 (Ill. 2014); Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. 1998): Establish that Illinois requires a stricter causation showing—termination “because of” protected activity; it is insufficient that retaliation was merely one of multiple motives.

6. Preclusion / futility / judicial economy

  • Teague v. Mayo, 553 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983), decision supplemented, 466 U.S. 144 (1984)): Used for the foundational proposition that issues once determined are conclusive; the jury’s determination on causation foreclosed re-litigation under a higher standard.
  • Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2010): Reinforced the “law of the case” effect of prior determinations within the litigation sequence.
  • Est. of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2011): Supported declining remand where reversal would be futile because another claim’s resolution already defeats the necessary factual predicate.
  • Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 880 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2018): Confirmed the appellate court may address preclusion sua sponte in the interest of judicial economy.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Seventh Circuit’s key doctrinal move: FSMA uses a whistleblower-statute framework

The court explicitly stated it had not previously considered what a plaintiff must prove under FSMA retaliation. Rather than following the district court’s Title VII/ADA/ADEA approach, the panel reasoned that FSMA belongs to a family of public-welfare whistleblower statutes and shares similar statutory language. Relying on Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC and its discussion of “similar whistleblower statutes,” the court held that an FSMA plaintiff must prove:

  1. protected activity;
  2. employer knowledge of the protected activity;
  3. unfavorable personnel action; and
  4. protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action.

The court imported this structure from Harp v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc. (SOX) and reaffirmed by Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc.. This is the opinion’s central precedential contribution: FSMA retaliation claims in the Seventh Circuit are governed by the SOX-style whistleblower framework, including “contributing factor” causation.

2. Knowledge is a threshold requirement—and it is actual decisionmaker knowledge

Having chosen the whistleblower framework, the court “zero[ed] in” on knowledge. Drawing on Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, Miller v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., and Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ., it reiterated that an employer cannot retaliate for conduct it does not know about, and the necessary causal link fails absent decisionmaker awareness.

Crucially, the court rejected the notion that it is enough that the employer could have known. Under Eaton v. J. H. Findorff & Son, Inc. and Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., the decisionmaker must have actual knowledge. The court acknowledged that knowledge can be proven circumstantially (Dey v. Colt Constr.; Maarouf v. Walker Mfg. Co.), but speculation does not suffice (Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi.).

Applied to Putnam’s FDA emails, the record lacked evidence that any decisionmaker knew about the anonymous complaint. Putnam pointed to testimony that the plant superintendent “probably talked” about “rumblings,” but the panel held this was too vague to support a reasonable inference of knowledge of FDA emails. Summary judgment therefore stood.

3. The trade-secrets-lawsuit theory: distinguishing new legal theory from new factual theory

Putnam attempted to argue that CaramelCrisp’s trade secrets suit itself was retaliatory. The district court refused to allow it late, and the Seventh Circuit treated her effort as a de facto attempt to amend the complaint. Under Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., plaintiffs may shift legal theories, but cannot inject new factual predicates late if it would cause unfairness or requires effective amendment. The panel emphasized that Putnam’s complaint did not mention the trade-secrets suit and she previously resisted consolidation by characterizing the cases as “fundamentally distinct.” Against that procedural history, the district court acted within its discretion to refuse the late factual expansion.

4. Common-law retaliatory discharge: futility due to causation standards and preclusion

The district court dismissed the Illinois retaliatory discharge claim on the theory that FSMA provided an adequate statutory remedy. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit sidestepped whether FSMA is “adequate” under Illinois law, because the jury’s FSMA verdict made any remand futile.

The panel carefully compared causation standards: FSMA requires only that protected activity be a “contributing factor” (a low threshold under Murray and Addis v. Dep't of Labor). Illinois retaliatory discharge, by contrast, requires the plaintiff to prove she was terminated “because of” her protected conduct and cannot win by showing retaliation was merely one of several motives (Matros v. Commonwealth Edison Co., citing Michael v. Precision All. Grp., LLC and Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co.).

Since a jury already found Putnam’s complaints were not even a “contributing factor,” she necessarily could not meet Illinois’s higher causation standard. Invoking Teague v. Mayo and Arizona v. California (issue conclusiveness), and characterizing the verdict as “law of the case” (Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill.), the court held that she could not relitigate causation. Even if the dismissal had been error, reversal would be futile (Est. of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank). The panel also noted it could raise preclusion sua sponte for judicial economy (Sanchez v. City of Chicago).

5. Trial-related claims: the appellate consequence of an incomplete transcript record

Putnam’s challenges to evidence exclusions, FDA subpoenas, jury instructions, verdict form, and denial of bifurcation were dismissed because the appellate court could not determine prejudice without a complete record of what the jury actually heard. The opinion underscores a practical rule of appellate litigation: where “prejudice” is the standard, the appellant must supply the materials that permit prejudice analysis (Tapley v. Chambers).

C. Impact

  1. Clear Seventh Circuit standard for FSMA retaliation claims. The decision provides the circuit’s first explicit articulation of an FSMA retaliation test and aligns FSMA with SOX-style whistleblower statutes rather than defaulting to Title VII retaliation doctrine. Future FSMA cases in the circuit can now brief and litigate with a settled elements framework.
  2. “Actual knowledge” remains a gatekeeper in whistleblower retaliation. Even with the plaintiff-friendly “contributing factor” causation standard, the decision highlights that anonymous external complaints (e.g., to the FDA) can fail if plaintiffs cannot link knowledge to decisionmakers. This will affect case strategy: discovery must target who made the decision and how information traveled.
  3. Procedural discipline: new factual theories must be pled timely. The de facto amendment analysis reinforces that plaintiffs cannot pivot to new factual retaliation acts late (e.g., later lawsuits as retaliation) without properly amending pleadings. Defendants, correspondingly, gain a structured argument to cabin late-stage expansions.
  4. Verdicts under lower standards can foreclose claims requiring higher standards. The futility/preclusion holding has broader civil-litigation implications: where a jury rejects causation under a low threshold, claims with stricter causation requirements may become nonviable, limiting the practical value of reviving dismissed counts on appeal.
  5. Appellate record preparation is outcome-determinative. The dismissal of trial issues serves as a warning that transcript decisions can decide the appeal; even potentially substantial trial errors may be unreviewable without a complete record.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Contributing factor” causation (FSMA): The protected activity need only play some role—however small—in the adverse action. It need not be the main reason.
  • Actual vs. constructive knowledge: “Actual knowledge” means the decisionmaker truly knew about the protected activity; “constructive” knowledge means they should have known. This opinion requires actual knowledge for retaliation causation.
  • De facto amendment: If a party introduces a new factual basis late (not just a new legal label), courts can treat it as an attempted complaint amendment—and deny it for unfairness, delay, or prejudice.
  • Bifurcation: Splitting a trial into phases (e.g., liability first, damages later) to reduce prejudice or improve manageability.
  • After-acquired evidence: Evidence the employer discovers after termination that might have justified firing anyway; it can reduce or limit damages even if liability is proven.
  • Issue preclusion / “law of the case” (as used here): Once a jury decides a factual issue essential to a claim (like causation), a party generally cannot relitigate that same issue in a different claim in the same litigation sequence—especially where the second claim demands an even higher showing.

V. Conclusion

Putnam v. CaramelCrisp, LLC is most significant for establishing, in the Seventh Circuit, a concrete FSMA retaliation framework modeled on SOX-style whistleblower statutes: protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse action, and “contributing factor” causation. The court simultaneously reinforced that “contributing factor” does not relax the foundational requirement that the relevant decisionmakers must actually know of the protected activity. Procedurally, the decision underscores two practical constraints: plaintiffs must timely plead new factual retaliation theories, and appellants must provide complete trial transcripts when prejudice is the appellate yardstick. Finally, the opinion illustrates how a jury’s rejection of causation under a low federal standard can foreclose parallel state-law theories requiring a stricter causation showing.