Seventh Circuit: Sentencing Commission Cannot Use U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) to Treat First Step Act § 924(c) Anti-Stacking Change as an “Extraordinary and Compelling” Reason

Introduction

United States v. Eural Black (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025) addresses a clash between (i) Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting the compassionate-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and (ii) the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy-statement revision, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), which allows courts to consider certain nonretroactive changes in law when a defendant is serving an “unusually long sentence.”

The defendant, Eural Black, is serving a 40-year sentence driven largely by pre–First Step Act “stacked” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions (5 years for the first count and 25 years for the “second or subsequent” count, consecutive). He sought compassionate release, arguing that the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment—if applied today—would likely cut his sentence roughly in half.

The central issue was institutional as much as substantive: when a Commission policy statement conflicts with circuit precedent and implicates Congress’s explicit decision to make § 924(c)’s anti-stacking amendment nonretroactive, whose interpretation controls?

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Black’s motion. It held that United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021), remains binding: the First Step Act’s § 924(c) anti-stacking amendment “whether considered alone or in connection with other facts and circumstances” cannot be an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for compassionate release.

The court further held that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its delegated authority in promulgating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) insofar as it permits § 924(c) anti-stacking to serve as an eligibility-conferring “extraordinary and compelling” reason. Because Congress made the anti-stacking amendment explicitly nonretroactive, using compassionate release eligibility to achieve reductions based on that change would impermissibly create retroactive effect and thus conflict with federal statute.

The court added an important limitation: the anti-stacking change is not irrelevant to compassionate release. If a defendant is otherwise eligible on independent grounds, a district court may consider the anti-stacking change when deciding the extent of any reduction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The Commission’s role and limits

  • Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996): Cited for background on the Sentencing Reform Act and the Commission’s creation and function. The case supports the premise that the Commission’s outputs (guidelines/policy statements) operate within statutory confines.
  • Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989): Cited to confirm the Commission’s placement in the judicial branch and its authority to issue guidelines and policy statements under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).
  • United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997): A key constraint principle—Commission discretion “must bow to the specific directives of Congress.” The Seventh Circuit uses this to frame § 1B1.13(b)(6) as invalid if it conflicts with Congress’s nonretroactivity directive in the First Step Act.

2) The First Step Act, § 924(c) stacking, and nonretroactivity

  • United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019): Cited for the pre–First Step Act operation of stacked § 924(c) mandatory minimums (25 years for “second or subsequent” counts in the same case).
  • United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021): The controlling Seventh Circuit precedent. It held that treating § 924(c)’s anti-stacking amendment as “extraordinary and compelling” would effectively make that amendment retroactive, contradicting Congress’s explicit choice in First Step Act § 403(b) to deny retroactivity for sentences already imposed.
  • United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594 (7th Cir. 2022): Noted as part of the Seventh Circuit’s “Thacker progeny” and as a marker of the circuit split acknowledged by the Commission.

3) Compassionate release procedure and the “policy statement gap”

  • United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020): Recognized that, after the First Step Act enabled prisoner-filed motions, the Commission lacked a quorum and could not update policy statements; the existing policy statement regime applied only to BOP-initiated motions. Black relied on the Commission’s later action to argue Thacker was merely stopgap; the majority rejected that characterization.
  • United States v. Williams, 65 F.4th 343 (7th Cir. 2023): Provided the standard of review (abuse of discretion, with legal questions reviewed de novo).

4) Delegation, agency authority, and the court’s “within the statute” inquiry

  • Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Central to the court’s framing of how courts review whether an agency acted within delegated authority. The majority cites it for the proposition that courts must exercise independent judgment to ensure an agency remains within statutory bounds.
  • Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977): Cited via Loper Bright for the principle that an agency interpretation can supersede a court’s only where it remains within the scope of delegation.

5) The acknowledged circuit split (substantive backdrop)

The majority notes that Thacker’s position is not unanimous and lists decisions on both sides:

  • United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (generally aligned with the anti-retroactivity concern).
  • United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2021) (more receptive to considering the anti-stacking change in the “extraordinary and compelling” analysis).

The majority further relies on United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024), which held that § 1B1.13(b)(6), “as applied to the First Step Act’s modification of § 924(c), conflicts with the will of Congress.”

6) Dissent’s authorities

  • United States v. Jean, 108 F.4th 275 (5th Cir. 2024), overruled by United States v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688 (5th Cir. 2025): Used in dissent to show fluidity and disagreement, supporting the dissent’s view that the Commission reasonably resolved an unsettled question by compromise.

Legal Reasoning

1) The majority’s core syllogism: nonretroactivity + “consistency” constraint = invalid policy statement (as applied)

The court accepts that Congress “explicitly delegated” to the Commission the job of describing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). But the delegation is bounded by 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), which requires Commission policy statements to be “consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute.”

From there, the majority reasons:

  1. The First Step Act’s anti-stacking change to § 924(c) was explicitly made nonretroactive for already-imposed sentences (First Step Act § 403(b)).
  2. United States v. Thacker already held that treating that anti-stacking change as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason would produce the very retroactive effect Congress withheld.
  3. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), as applied to § 924(c) anti-stacking, contradicts Thacker by making that change a basis for eligibility (even if filtered through additional factors like “unusually long sentence,” “10 years served,” “gross disparity,” and individualized circumstances).
  4. Because that eligibility pathway conflicts with Congress’s nonretroactivity choice, the Commission exceeded its authority under § 994(a)’s “consistency” requirement.
  5. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in Thacker controls; Black is ineligible because he offered no other extraordinary-and-compelling basis.

2) Rejection of Black’s “multifactor, discretionary, not retroactive” argument

Black argued that § 1B1.13(b)(6) does not truly make § 924(c) anti-stacking retroactive because: (i) it requires multiple criteria, (ii) it only makes a defendant eligible (not entitled), and (iii) any reduction is discretionary and may be partial.

The court’s response is categorical: Thacker already decided that allowing the anti-stacking change to count—“whether as the sole reason or one of several, and whether as of right or at the court’s discretion”—impermissibly creates retroactive effect. The majority thus treats Thacker as foreclosing “cleverer” formulations of the same eligibility theory.

3) Rejection of the “Thacker was temporary gap-filling” framing

Black also argued Thacker was an interim decision because it arose when the Commission lacked a quorum. The majority responds that Thacker interpreted the statute § 3582(c)(1)(A) itself, not merely an outdated policy statement, and nothing in Thacker suggested a future Commission policy statement could override Congress’s nonretroactivity directive or the Seventh Circuit’s resulting interpretation.

4) Limiting principle: anti-stacking may still matter at the discretionary stage

The opinion tries to preserve room for individualized sentencing judgment. It distinguishes between: (a) using anti-stacking as an eligibility trigger for extraordinary-and-compelling status (not allowed in the Seventh Circuit), and (b) considering anti-stacking once some other extraordinary-and-compelling basis exists, as part of the court’s discretionary decision on whether and how much to reduce.

5) Separate writings

  • RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, concurring. He joins based on stare decisis: Thacker was circulated under Circuit Rule 40(e), and the court declined en banc review.
  • HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. He views the statute as intentionally “vague,” emphasizes Congress’s express delegation in § 994(t), and argues § 1B1.13(b)(6) is a reasonable, middle-ground policy that can coexist with Congress’s choice not to grant automatic retroactivity under § 403(b). In his view, the majority reads Thacker too broadly and fails to respect the Commission’s delegated interpretive role now that the quorum has been restored.

Impact

  • Seventh Circuit rule (practical): Defendants with pre–First Step Act stacked § 924(c) sentences cannot establish compassionate-release eligibility by pointing to the anti-stacking amendment—even under § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s “unusually long sentence / gross disparity” framework—unless and until Thacker is overruled (en banc) or displaced by Supreme Court review.
  • Commission policy statement narrowed by judicial review: The decision treats § 1B1.13(b)(6) as invalid “insofar as” it conflicts with the First Step Act’s nonretroactivity as understood in Thacker. That “as applied” invalidation may invite further litigation about which other “changes in law” can be considered without creating impermissible retroactive effect.
  • Deepened circuit split and path to Supreme Court review: The opinion expressly acknowledges the split and aligns with United States v. Rutherford. The conflict is now not only about compassionate-release discretion, but about the Commission’s authority to “resolve” splits through policy statements when Congress has made an underlying substantive change expressly nonretroactive.
  • Strategic consequences for compassionate-release motions: In the Seventh Circuit, movants with stacked § 924(c) sentences must identify independent extraordinary-and-compelling grounds (e.g., severe medical issues, family circumstances, etc.) and then use the anti-stacking change only as an argument affecting the extent of relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Stacking” under § 924(c): Pre–First Step Act, multiple § 924(c) counts in one case could trigger a 25-year mandatory minimum for each count after the first. The First Step Act restricted that 25-year enhancement to true recidivists—later prosecutions after a prior conviction became final.
  • Nonretroactivity: Congress sometimes changes sentencing rules but chooses not to reopen already-final sentences. Here, First Step Act § 403(b) limited the anti-stacking benefit largely to defendants not yet sentenced as of enactment.
  • Compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)): A narrow exception allowing sentence reductions for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” subject to Commission policy statements and judicial discretion.
  • Policy statements vs. statutes: Policy statements guide courts but must remain consistent with statutes. The majority treats § 1B1.13(b)(6) as exceeding authority where it would undermine Congress’s explicit statutory choice.
  • Eligibility vs. discretion: The court separates (1) what can make someone eligible to seek a reduction (“extraordinary and compelling”) from (2) how much reduction, if any, should be granted after considering all circumstances.
  • Stare decisis in a circuit: Panels are bound by prior panel decisions (like Thacker) unless overruled by the en banc court or the Supreme Court.

Conclusion

United States v. Eural Black entrenches a firm Seventh Circuit boundary on compassionate release: the First Step Act’s nonretroactive § 924(c) anti-stacking amendment cannot be repurposed—directly or through the Commission’s “unusually long sentence” policy statement—as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason establishing eligibility for sentence reduction. The decision is significant not only for defendants serving stacked § 924(c) sentences, but also for separation-of-powers and delegation questions about how far the Sentencing Commission may go in using policy statements to address circuit splits when Congress has spoken through an express nonretroactivity command.