Seventh Circuit: Pro Se Trustees Cannot Litigate for Trusts; “Original Signature” and § 1666 Notice Requirements Bar “Bill of Exchange” Theories

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Jordan Smith’s attempt to satisfy a credit-account balance using a document he styled as a “bill of exchange,” coupled with repeated “notices” demanding that Mission Lane, LLC treat the document as payment and refund a remaining balance. Mission Lane did not accept the document as payment and continued to report the account as delinquent. Smith sued, and after removal to federal court the litigation became entangled with procedural defects (signature and party-identification problems) and the substantive viability of Smith’s “bill of exchange” theory under federal consumer-credit statutes—most notably the Truth in Lending Act’s Fair Credit Billing Act procedures (15 U.S.C. § 1666).

The Seventh Circuit addressed three core issues reflected in the district court’s dismissal:

• Real party / representation: whether Smith could litigate pro se as “trustee” or “authorized agent” for a purported trust.
• Rule 11(a) signature compliance: whether the district court properly struck filings that lacked an “original signature” required by local rule.
• Merits under § 1666: whether Smith’s communications qualified as statutory “notice of billing error” sufficient to trigger a creditor’s duties to acknowledge and investigate.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court already gave Smith the benefit he requested by construing Smith (not the trust) as the plaintiff. It rejected Smith’s reliance on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1)(E), explaining that while trustees may sue in their own names, that rule does not authorize a non-lawyer to represent a trust pro se.

The court also upheld the striking of filings under Rule 11(a) because Smith failed to provide the required handwritten/original signature, and the Northern District of Indiana’s local rules for manual filings required an original signature (not a typed, stamped, or faxed signature).

On the substance of Smith’s Truth in Lending Act/Fair Credit Billing Act theory, the court held that Smith failed to identify any document satisfying § 1666(a)’s basic requirements for a “notice of billing error.” His communications demanded acceptance of his “bill of exchange” and asserted entitlement to payment/refund, but did not identify a billing error in a statement and explain why he believed it was erroneous. Because the entire case depended on the “bill of exchange” theory deemed frivolous, the court found dismissal with prejudice appropriate after multiple amendment opportunities.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013)
  Cited for the baseline rule that a pro se litigant may represent only himself. The panel used Georgakis to dispose of Smith’s attempt to appear as “trustee” or “agent” for a separate entity (a trust).
• C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1987)
  Invoked as persuasive authority reinforcing that a non-attorney trustee may not represent a trust pro se. The Seventh Circuit paired it with Georgakis to emphasize that Rule 17’s party-designation provisions do not override the prohibition on non-lawyer representation of others.
• Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 2021)
  Provided the standard of review: legal determinations are reviewed de novo, while a district court’s application of Rule 11(a) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The panel relied on Marcure to frame why the signature ruling would be upheld absent a clear misapplication.
• Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763–64 (2001)
  Supplied the principle that an unrepresented party must handwrite a signature unless a local rule permits typed signatures. This case anchored the conclusion that Smith’s typed signature was insufficient, particularly given the Northern District of Indiana’s stricter local rule for manual filings.
• Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015)
  Cited for the general rule favoring leave to amend unless futility is certain from the complaint’s face. The panel used Runnion to validate dismissal with prejudice after multiple amendments where the same “frivolous” premise persisted.
• Minocqua Brewing Co. LLC v. Hess, 160 F.4th 849, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2025)
  Cited for forfeiture/waiver principles: arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief come too late. This foreclosed Smith’s late attempt to pivot to other Truth in Lending Act theories.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Rule 17(a)(1)(E) does not authorize pro se representation of a trust

Smith argued that because Rule 17(a)(1)(E) permits “a trustee of an express trust” to sue in his own name, he could prosecute the case pro se while labeling himself trustee/agent for a “foreign trust.” The panel distinguished who may be the named plaintiff (a real-party-in-interest question) from who may conduct litigation on behalf of an entity (an unauthorized-practice/representation question). Rule 17 addresses the former; it does not confer a right for non-lawyers to represent other persons or entities. Applying Georgakis (and citing C.E. Pope Equity Tr.), the court reaffirmed that pro se status is personal and non-transferable.

Notably, the district court avoided a threshold trap by construing Smith (the individual) as the plaintiff “in the interests of justice,” eliminating any claim that the case was dismissed merely because the wrong party was named.

B. Rule 11(a) and local rules: manual filings required an “original signature”

The court treated the signature defect as a straightforward compliance problem. Rule 11(a) requires every filing to be signed by the party personally if unrepresented. Under Becker v. Montgomery, a handwritten signature is required unless local rules permit typed signatures. Here, the Northern District of Indiana’s manual-filing rule required the filer’s “original signature” and excluded stamped/faxed equivalents. Smith repeatedly used typed signature blocks and did not cure the defect after being warned and given additional time. Under the abuse-of-discretion standard from Marcure v. Lynn, striking the filings fell within the district court’s discretion.

C. § 1666: a creditor’s duties are triggered only by a qualifying “notice of billing error”

Smith’s principal merits argument on appeal was that his “notice” compelled Mission Lane to respond under 15 U.S.C. § 1666 regardless of whether a real error existed. The panel agreed in part with the statutory structure: the Fair Credit Billing Act creates procedural obligations once a qualifying notice is received. But it emphasized that not every communication is a qualifying notice.

The court summarized § 1666(a)’s requirements: the consumer’s written notice must (1) identify name and account number, (2) indicate belief that a statement contains a billing error and state the amount, and (3) explain the reasons for that belief. Evaluating Smith’s five communications as described in the order, the court found none satisfied the statutory criteria. They demanded acceptance of the “bill of exchange,” sought refund/redress, and referenced external legal assertions (including the Federal Reserve Act), but did not identify an error in a billing statement and explain why the statement itself was wrong.

That analysis dovetailed with the district court’s broader determination that Smith’s case rested on a “frivolous” proposition—that a self-created “bill of exchange” obligated the creditor to deem the debt paid. Without a qualifying § 1666 notice and without a non-frivolous predicate, Smith could not state a plausible claim under the Fair Credit Billing Act procedures.

D. Dismissal with prejudice after repeated amendment

The Seventh Circuit applied Runnion’s futility standard and concluded the district court acted within its discretion. Smith had already amended twice, and the second amended complaint remained anchored to the same “bill of exchange” payment theory. The panel accepted the district court’s conclusion that further amendment could not cure the fundamental defect—hence futility.

Smith’s attempt to propose additional Truth in Lending Act theories only in his reply brief was rejected as forfeited under Minocqua Brewing Co. LLC v. Hess.

3.3 Impact

Although labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the order consolidates several practical points that frequently recur in federal courts:

• Entity-representation boundary: litigants cannot use Rule 17 “trustee” language to circumvent the rule that only licensed attorneys may represent trusts and other entities.
• Signature compliance matters: Rule 11(a) requirements are enforced in tandem with local rules; a typed signature on paper filings can be fatal when local rules demand an original signature.
• FCBA notices must actually allege billing error: communications asserting idiosyncratic “discharge” theories or demanding acceptance of unconventional instruments do not necessarily trigger § 1666 duties unless they meet the statute’s content requirements.
• Futility supports prejudice: where repeated amendments recycle the same legally defective premise, dismissal with prejudice is sustainable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Bill of exchange” (as used here): Traditionally, a negotiable instrument ordering payment (e.g., a draft). The court treated Smith’s document as not constituting valid payment of the debt; the underlying “bill of exchange satisfies the debt” theory was deemed frivolous in this litigation posture.
• Rule 17 (Real Party in Interest): Determines who may sue in whose name. It does not authorize non-lawyers to conduct litigation for another person or entity.
• Pro se representation: “Pro se” means representing yourself only. You generally cannot represent a trust, corporation, or another person without being a lawyer.
• Rule 11(a) signature: Requires a personal signature on filings. If you file on paper and local rules require an “original signature,” typing your name is not enough.
• Fair Credit Billing Act notice (15 U.S.C. § 1666): A creditor must acknowledge/investigate only after receiving a written notice that identifies the account, claims a billing error, states the amount, and explains why it is an error.
• Dismissal “with prejudice”: The case is over in that court and cannot be refiled based on the same claim; appropriate when further amendment would be futile.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s order affirms a dismissal with prejudice where the plaintiff’s claims were built around a legally untenable “bill of exchange” payment theory and where his communications failed to qualify as § 1666 notices of billing error. Procedurally, it reinforces two recurring federal-court guardrails: (1) Rule 17 does not permit a pro se trustee to represent a trust, and (2) Rule 11(a) signature requirements—especially when strengthened by local rules mandating “original signatures”—are enforceable through striking noncompliant filings. Even in a nonprecedential disposition, the decision provides a clear roadmap for courts and litigants confronting similar attempts to repackage debt-dispute theories as federal consumer-credit claims.