Date: May 22, 2026

Seventh Circuit: Generalized Country-Deterioration Evidence Is Not “Material” to Reopen; Pereira Does Not Equitably Toll Untimely Reopening; Sua Sponte Reopening Denials Remain Unreviewable Absent Legal Error

1. Introduction

In Edison Mancellari v. Todd W. Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States (7th Cir. May 21, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Seventh Circuit reviewed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the “Board”) denial of Edison Mancellari’s motion to reopen his long-final removal proceedings. Mancellari, an Albanian citizen who entered without inspection in 2004, had previously been denied asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). His original claim centered on threats from a local mafia figure, Feridon Babaj, arising from a family dispute involving Mancellari’s sister and alleged trafficking concerns.

After the Board affirmed denial in 2012 and the Seventh Circuit denied review in 2013, Mancellari filed (in 2020) a motion to reopen—well beyond the ordinary 90-day deadline. He advanced three theories for excusing untimeliness: (1) changed country conditions in Albania; (2) equitable tolling premised largely on post-Pereira stop-time rule arguments supporting newly claimed eligibility for cancellation of removal; and (3) sua sponte reopening based on asserted “extraordinary” circumstances including marriage to a lawful permanent resident.

The Seventh Circuit denied the petition insofar as it challenged the Board’s refusal to reopen based on changed conditions and equitable tolling, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the challenge to the Board’s refusal to reopen sua sponte.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Changed country conditions: The court held the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that evidence of increased Albanian organized crime was not “material” to Mancellari’s individualized risk from Babaj or to whether Albania would be unwilling or unable to protect him. The evidence showed, at most, a cumulative worsening or persistence of previously known conditions.
Equitable tolling: The court held the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to toll the deadline. Even if Mancellari became eligible for cancellation of removal by 2014, Seventh Circuit law treats arguments later validated by Pereira as having been available earlier as a matter of statutory text; waiting years after eligibility accrued was not reasonable diligence.
Sua sponte reopening: The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because denial of sua sponte reopening is ordinarily unreviewable and, although the Board made some factual misstatements, there was no “legal error” that would open a narrow path to judicial review.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The disposition is heavily anchored in established Seventh Circuit standards for reopening, timeliness exceptions, and limits on judicial review. The principal precedents function as follows:

A. Standard of review for motions to reopen

Lopez-Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2020): Confirmed the court’s jurisdiction to review the Board’s grant or denial of a motion to reopen, establishing the gateway for review.
Salim v. Holder, 728 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2013): Supplied the “significant deference” framework for reviewing reopening denials and provided the key articulation of abuse-of-discretion review. The court also drew from Salim substantively: generalized country evidence must bear on whether the government is unwilling or unable to protect the applicant.
Awad v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2003): Provided the abuse-of-discretion test: a decision stands unless it lacks rational explanation, departs from policy, or rests on an impermissible basis.

B. “Changed country conditions” must be material and non-cumulative

Ingmantoro v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chakir v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2006)): Reinforced the core asylum principle that harm by private actors is not “persecution” unless the government is complicit or unable/unwilling to prevent it. This directly informed the court’s critique of Dr. Fischer’s report: it did not connect organized crime trends to Albania’s capacity or willingness to control Babaj.
Marquez v. I.N.S., 105 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 1997): Supported the Board’s and court’s recurring characterization that a “personal dispute” cannot ordinarily support asylum—important because Mancellari’s fear was tied to a private feud.
Meriyu v. Barr, 950 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Boika v. Holder, 727 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2013)): Supplied the “cumulative worsening” doctrine: incremental deterioration is not necessarily “changed country conditions” for reopening.
Zhao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 2005): Emphasized that evidence merely showing persistence of old conditions is not “changed circumstances.”
Kucana v. Holder, 603 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2010): Provided the crisp formulation that “proof that an old condition has continued does not suffice,” framing the evidentiary comparison required on reopening.
Menghistab v. Garland, 37 F.4th 1240 (7th Cir. 2022): Used for the “materiality” concept in the CAT context—i.e., the alleged changes must be material to risk of torture or entitlement to deferral of removal.
Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 845 (2026): Cited for the proposition that administrative determinations about fear of future persecution require judicial deference, reinforcing the appellate posture: the panel would not reweigh predictive findings so long as the Board’s reasoning remained rational.

C. Equitable tolling and the stop-time/cancellation theory after Pereira

Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. Sims, 390 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2004)): Supplied the equitable tolling test used here: the question is not delay length in isolation, but whether the claimant could reasonably have been expected to file earlier.
Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018): Provided Mancellari’s substantive premise: a deficient Notice to Appear lacking time/place does not trigger the stop-time rule. The court assumed arguendo that Mancellari might now be eligible for cancellation, but treated Pereira as not excusing delay.
Mejia-Padilla v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1026 (7th Cir. 2021): Was decisive on tolling: Seventh Circuit “post-Pereira” law forecloses the argument that the claim was unavailable before 2018. The statutory defect was “always evident” from the plain language; thus, diligence required filing when eligibility accrued (here, by 2014), not years later.
United States v. Manriquez-Alvarado, 953 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2020): Reinforced that Pereira interpreted an older statute and litigants were always “free to rely on that statute.” The panel used this to rebut any “pre-Pereira futility” narrative.

D. Sua sponte reopening: unreviewability and the “legal error” exception

Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder, 683 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. 2012): Stated both the “extraordinary situations” framing for sua sponte reopening and the baseline rule that the Board’s refusal is an unreviewable discretionary decision.
Cruz-Velasco v. Garland, 58 F.4th 900 (7th Cir. 2023): Identified the narrow crack in the door: judicial review may exist if the Board’s sua sponte decision is “tainted by a legal error.” The panel applied this standard and found only factual misstatements, not legal error.
Malukas v. Barr, 940 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2019): Supported the proposition that when discretion is “unbridled,” even an explanation (or lack of one) does not create judicially manageable standards for review. This insulated the Board’s sua sponte denial from appellate second-guessing.

E. Prior merits decision defining “persecution” severity (context)

Mancellari v. Holder, 526 F. App'x 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2011)): Provided the case’s earlier holding that threats without physical harm did not rise to “persecution” as defined in circuit law. While the 2026 decision focused on reopening standards, this background mattered because it underscored the need for any new evidence to be “material” to a previously rejected theory of harm.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Changed country conditions: “Materiality” requires a case-specific nexus

The court accepted that Albania may face increasing organized crime, but it treated that as legally insufficient because reopening on this ground demands evidence that is material to the petitioner’s risk in the particular case and to the legal deficiencies identified earlier. The panel emphasized two missing links:

Individualized threat nexus: Dr. Fischer’s 2020 declaration spoke broadly about Albanian organized crime’s growing power, but did not address why Babaj, specifically, poses a greater risk now (or has renewed interest after years of apparent non-interference with Mancellari’s family).
State protection nexus: Even if criminal power increased, the report did not show that Albania is now unwilling or unable to protect Mancellari from Babaj, a prerequisite when harm is from a private actor (Ingmantoro / Chakir).

The court also treated the new evidence as essentially non-transformative compared to the 2008 declaration stating organized crime was already a pressing problem. Under Boika, the Board compares then-versus-now conditions; evidence that “an old condition has continued” (Kucana) or merely worsened cumulatively (Meriyu) does not meet the statutory exception. Thus, the Board’s refusal to reopen had a rational explanation and fit within established policy.

B. Equitable tolling: diligence is measured against when the argument could have been raised

Mancellari attempted to leverage cancellation-of-removal eligibility by arguing his 2004 Notice to Appear did not trigger stop-time because it lacked time/place, tracking Pereira. The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeded in two moves:

Assume eligibility without deciding it: The court effectively bracketed the eligibility question (“we may take it as a given”), focusing instead on timeliness and diligence.
Reject the “I couldn’t have known before Pereira” premise: Citing Mejia-Padilla and Manriquez-Alvarado, the panel held the statutory argument was available years earlier; Pereira did not create new law that excused delay for equitable tolling purposes in this circuit’s framework. Once Mancellari accrued 10 years (by 2014), diligence required filing then or “reasonably soon thereafter.” Waiting six more years (until 2020) failed the Pervaiz/Williams test.

C. Sua sponte reopening: factual mistakes do not create jurisdiction absent legal error

The panel acknowledged the Board’s decision contained factual errors (e.g., saying no marriage evidence existed; implying an adjustment request under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)). But under Anaya-Aguilar the refusal to reopen sua sponte is generally unreviewable, and under Cruz-Velasco only a legal error can unlock review. The court held that correcting factual misstatements would not change the fundamental jurisdictional barrier described in Malukas: unbridled discretion yields no judicially manageable standard for appellate review.

3.3. Impact

Although labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the order consolidates several practical lessons—especially for immigration litigants in the Seventh Circuit—about what will and will not work in late reopening motions:

Expert reports must be individualized: General country deterioration (even if real) will not satisfy the “material” requirement unless it connects to the petitioner’s specific persecutor, the persecutor’s present capability/intent, and the state-protection analysis for private-actor harm.
“Cumulative worsening” is a recurring trap: If the prior record already recognized the general condition (e.g., crime or corruption), later evidence describing “more of the same, but worse” is vulnerable under Meriyu/Boika/Kucana.
Post-Pereira reopening requires speed once eligibility accrues: The court’s reliance on Mejia-Padilla continues to blunt equitable-tolling arguments that treat 2018 as the first reasonable moment to raise stop-time defects. Practitioners must frame diligence around when statutory eligibility accrued, not when Supreme Court confirmation arrived.
Sua sponte reopening remains a dead end on petition for review: Even documented factual mistakes may not create jurisdiction. To obtain review, petitioners must identify a genuine legal error—misunderstanding of legal authority, incorrect legal standard, or similar defect—rather than disputing factfinding or discretion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Motion to reopen: A request to restart immigration proceedings after a final order, usually to present new evidence. It is discretionary and typically must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.
Changed country conditions (exception to the 90-day deadline): A statutory exception allowing late reopening if the petitioner presents new, previously unavailable evidence showing materially changed conditions in the destination country. “Material” means it must matter to the petitioner’s legal entitlement to relief, not just describe broad trends.
Private-actor persecution and “unable or unwilling” protection: Harm inflicted by criminals or private individuals counts as “persecution” for asylum/withholding only if the government is complicit or cannot/will not protect the victim. Without that showing, the claim looks like a private dispute rather than protected-status persecution.
Equitable tolling: A doctrine that can excuse a late filing when, despite reasonable diligence, the person could not have been expected to file earlier. The key question is not simply how long the delay was, but whether earlier filing was reasonably possible.
Stop-time rule and cancellation of removal: “Cancellation of removal” for certain nonpermanent residents requires (among other things) 10 years of continuous physical presence. The “stop-time rule” can cut off that accumulation when the government serves a compliant Notice to Appear. Under Pereira v. Sessions, an NTA missing time/place is not a valid trigger for stop-time.
Sua sponte reopening: The Board’s power to reopen a case on its own initiative at any time. Because it is highly discretionary and lacks clear standards, courts usually cannot review a refusal—unless the refusal rests on a legal error.
“Denied in part and dismissed in part”: The court rejected some arguments on the merits (“denied”) but refused to consider others because it lacked authority to review them (“dismissed” for lack of jurisdiction).

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision underscores three interlocking points about late motions to reopen: (1) evidence of worsening general conditions must be tied to the petitioner’s individualized risk and the government-protection element to be “material”; (2) equitable tolling in the wake of Pereira v. Sessions demands diligence measured from when the statutory argument and eligibility were reasonably available, not when Pereira was decided; and (3) refusals to reopen sua sponte remain largely insulated from judicial review absent a true legal error. In combination, these principles tighten the practical pathways for reopening long-final immigration cases in the Seventh Circuit, particularly where the underlying claim involves private criminal threats and generalized country evidence.