Settlement Agreements with Tribes Are “Intergovernmental Cooperative Agreements” Requiring Approval Under 74 O.S. § 1221(D)(1)

1. Introduction

This original action arose from a jurisdictional dispute triggered by federal litigation in the Northern District of Oklahoma (Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. City of Tulsa, et. al., Case No. 23-cv-00490-JDR-CDL), where the Muscogee (Creek) Nation sought to enjoin Tulsa’s municipal prosecution of Indians for conduct occurring within the Nation’s reservation. While that federal case was pending, the City of Tulsa—through its Mayor and other officials—negotiated a “Joint Settlement Agreement” with the Nation.

The settlement contained a sweeping commitment: Tulsa agreed it “will not exercise Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Defendants on the Nation’s Reservation,” and it agreed to dismiss with prejudice pending municipal prosecutions and to refrain from initiating future ones against “Indian Defendants” on the reservation. Governor Stitt, on behalf of the State, challenged the settlement’s validity under Oklahoma’s statutory framework for state-tribal relations, arguing Tulsa lacked authority to bind itself this way without required approvals.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s central issue was narrow but consequential: whether Tulsa’s settlement was a valid “intergovernmental cooperative agreement” under 74 O.S.2021, § 1221(D)(1), and thus ineffective absent approval by both the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor (or the Governor’s designee).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court assumed original jurisdiction under Okla. Const. art. VII, § 4 and granted extraordinary relief. It held that Tulsa’s settlement with the Nation is an “intergovernmental cooperative agreement” addressing issues of mutual interest, and therefore it could become effective only upon approval by the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor as required by 74 O.S.2021, § 1221(D)(1). Because neither approval occurred, the Settlement Agreement was “invalid as a matter of law” and “unenforceable.”

The Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling Tulsa to secure the appropriate statutory approvals if it wishes to proceed with the agreement, and it granted declaratory relief declaring the settlement unenforceable until the statutory prerequisites are met.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Fent v. Contingency Rev. Bd., 2007 OK 27
  The Court relied on Fent for the publici juris doctrine—its authority to assume original jurisdiction when an urgent question of public interest requires immediate judicial resolution. Here, the issue implicated statewide governance: whether a municipality may effectively disclaim a category of criminal jurisdiction through a cooperative arrangement with a tribe without the State’s statutorily required checks.
• Treat v. Stitt, 2021 OK 3 and Treat v. Stitt, 2020 OK 64
  These cases were invoked as analogues for exercising original jurisdiction to declare agreements involving tribes invalid under Oklahoma law. The Court used Treat to reinforce two themes: (1) tribal-related agreements remain subject to Oklahoma’s legislatively imposed approval processes when state law so requires, and (2) extraordinary relief is appropriate to promptly resolve disputes over the validity of such agreements.
• Ethics Comm'n of State of Okla. v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37
  Cited to support the propriety of the Court granting the requested extraordinary relief (including declaratory relief) in an original proceeding. The citation functions as doctrinal support for the Court’s remedial posture rather than the substantive state-tribal statutory interpretation.
• Griffith v. Choctaw Casino of Pocola, 2009 OK 51
  The Court cited Griffith to emphasize the Legislature’s design of the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations as a structural “checks and balances” mechanism over agreements between tribes and governmental entities. This reinforced the Court’s conclusion that the statutory approval requirement is not a formality, but a core feature of the State’s governance framework for state-tribal arrangements.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

1. Characterization of the Settlement Agreement under § 1221(D)(1).
   Section 1221(D)(1) applies to “intergovernmental cooperative agreements” between a political subdivision and a federally recognized tribe on issues of “mutual interest.” The Court treated the settlement’s own language as dispositive: it repeatedly framed itself as a “cooperative, intergovernmental approach” advancing shared “law enforcement and public safety priorities and policies.” On that basis, the Court held it falls “squarely” within § 1221(D)(1).
2. Rejection of Tulsa’s “mere extension” theory.
   Tulsa argued the settlement merely extended (or reaffirmed) the 2006 Intergovernmental Cross-Deputization Agreement. The Court disagreed, focusing on the settlement’s “distinct terms and novel responsibilities,” especially its broad definition of “criminal jurisdiction” and its requirement that Tulsa dismiss pending cases and forego future prosecutions of Indian defendants on the reservation. Those obligations were not presented as a minor adjustment to cross-deputization operations but as a new legal framework governing prosecutorial restraint.
3. Even if viewed as an amendment, execution defects remained.
   The Court added an alternative holding: even if the settlement were an extension/amendment of the cross-deputization agreement, amendments required written execution “by each party,” and Tulsa’s execution differed from the set of officials who executed the cross-deputization agreement (the opinion notes the earlier execution included the City Council Chairman, City Attorney, and Chief of Police, while the settlement was executed by the Mayor, City Attorney, and City Clerk). Thus, the settlement failed as a proper amendment as well.

Having determined the settlement is an independent cooperative agreement (or, alternatively, an ineffective amendment), the Court applied § 1221(D)(1)’s approval condition: such agreements “shall be effective upon approval by the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor.” Because neither approval occurred, the agreement was invalid and unenforceable “as a matter of law” unless and until approvals are secured.

3.3 Impact

• Municipal-tribal settlements are not “just litigation management” when they restructure governance.
  The ruling signals that settlements resolving disputes about policing/prosecution on tribal reservation land—when framed as cooperative governance—can be treated as intergovernmental cooperative agreements subject to § 1221(D)(1). Cities cannot avoid statutory oversight by labeling a cooperative arrangement a “settlement.”
• State-level checks on political subdivisions are reinforced.
  The decision strengthens the Legislature’s chosen structure: political subdivisions may negotiate with tribes, but effectiveness depends on the Governor’s and Joint Committee’s approval. This constrains unilateral municipal commitments that have statewide jurisdictional or sovereignty implications.
• Practical litigation consequences.
  Future municipal defendants and prosecutors may litigate whether particular agreements are “cooperative agreements” under § 1221(D)(1), and challengers may seek expedited extraordinary relief where an unapproved agreement purports to alter criminal enforcement practices.
• Drafting and execution formalities matter.
  Governments must carefully document whether a new agreement is being formed or an existing one amended, ensure proper signatories under the governing instrument, and obtain statutory approvals before implementation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Original jurisdiction: The Supreme Court can take a case directly (without it first being decided in lower courts) when authorized and appropriate, especially for urgent public issues.
• Publici juris: A doctrine allowing immediate high-court review for matters affecting the public at large (not just private interests).
• Writ of mandamus: A court order compelling a government official/entity to perform a legal duty (here, to seek required approvals if it wishes to proceed).
• Declaratory relief: A judicial declaration of the parties’ legal rights/status (here, that the unapproved agreement is unenforceable).
• Intergovernmental cooperative agreement (74 O.S. § 1221(D)(1)): A formal agreement between a political subdivision and a federally recognized tribe on issues of mutual interest, which becomes effective only after approval by the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor (or designee).
• Cross-deputization: An arrangement allowing officers from one jurisdiction to exercise certain law enforcement powers in another jurisdiction, typically to improve public safety coordination across boundaries.
• “Criminal jurisdiction” as defined in the Settlement Agreement: Broadly includes enforcement authority through investigation, prosecution, sentencing, or incarceration— not merely police presence. The Court treated Tulsa’s commitment to cease prosecutions as a major jurisdictional reallocation.

5. Conclusion

2026 OK 39 establishes a clear rule of Oklahoma law: when a city enters a cooperative, governance-oriented arrangement with a tribe—especially one addressing law enforcement and prosecution— that agreement is an “intergovernmental cooperative agreement” under 74 O.S.2021, § 1221(D)(1) and is ineffective unless approved by both the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor (or designee). The Court’s enforcement of this approval requirement underscores the Legislature’s intended checks and balances over state-tribal and subdivision-tribal agreements, and it cautions political subdivisions that even settlements can be legally unenforceable if they function as unapproved intergovernmental compacts.