Serialization-by-Tradition: 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) Survives Bruen Under Rahimi’s “Principles” Approach

Case: United States v. Jose Reyna (7th Cir.)
Date: January 28, 2026
Holding in brief: Even assuming the Second Amendment’s text reaches possession of a deserialized firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) is constitutional because it is consistent with the principles underpinning the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation—specifically, founding-era practices of marking, inventorying, and inspecting arms to enable tracking and compliance.

1. Introduction

Jose Reyna pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). Two days before sentencing, he moved to dismiss the indictment, raising a facial Second Amendment challenge under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The district court entertained the late motion for good cause and denied it on the merits—at Bruen step one—reasoning that possession of a deserialized firearm falls outside the Second Amendment’s plain text.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed but reframed the analysis: it expressed skepticism that this dispute can be resolved on text alone and instead upheld § 922(k) at Bruen step two, as refined by United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

Key issues:

• Whether possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number is categorically outside the Second Amendment’s textual scope (Bruen step one).
• If the conduct is covered, whether § 922(k) is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation (Bruen step two), applying Rahimi’s instruction to look to underlying historical principles rather than requiring a near-identical founding-era analogue.
• Because the challenge is facial, whether Reyna can show “no set of circumstances exists” under which § 922(k) is valid.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Reyna’s conviction. It declined to rest the decision solely on Bruen step one (plain text), explaining that Supreme Court language about “weapons in common use” by “law-abiding citizens” largely arose from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), in a discussion of precedent (especially United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)) and was accompanied by significant caveats. The panel therefore assumed—without deciding—that the Second Amendment’s plain text could cover possession of a deserialized firearm and proceeded to history and tradition.

Applying Rahimi’s refinement of Bruen, the court upheld § 922(k) because modern serialization (and the prohibition on knowingly possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number) is “relevantly similar” in principle to historical regimes that required firearms to be inventoried, inspected, and marked or stamped for tracking and compliance, often in connection with militia readiness or military logistics. While early America did not have today’s comprehensive serial-number system, the court found the underlying regulatory principle—traceability/accountability through governmental marking and inspection—firmly within the historical tradition.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
  Role: Establishes the governing framework: if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, the government must justify the regulation as consistent with historical tradition. The district court ended the case at step one; the Seventh Circuit treated step one as uncertain here and resolved the case at step two.

• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
  Role: The decisive interpretive pivot. The panel relied on Rahimi’s admonition that Bruen does not require a “law trapped in amber,” and that the “appropriate analysis” asks whether a modern law is consistent with the principles underlying historical regulation. That move allowed the court to treat inventory/inspection/marking practices as sufficiently analogous—“relevantly similar”—to modern serialization and, by extension, to § 922(k)’s prohibition on possession of a deserialized firearm.

• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
  Role: Provides the baseline: the Second Amendment protects an individual right, but “not unlimited.” The government argued (and other circuits accepted) that Heller’s “common use” and “law-abiding citizens” language can exclude deserialized firearms at step one. The Seventh Circuit carefully contextualized that language, emphasizing Heller’s own caveats (no exhaustive historical analysis; limits left for future cases) and Heller’s statement that the Amendment extends “prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms.”

• United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
  Role: The panel used Miller mainly to explain why the “common use” concept cannot be overread as a categorical step-one rule for all weapon-related regulations. It framed Miller as a limited decision and highlighted Heller’s warning against reading it broadly (including the absence of adversarial presentation in Miller).

• United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)
  Role: Supplies the stringent standard for facial challenges (“no set of circumstances exists” under which the law is valid), which makes Reyna’s claim especially difficult. The panel quoted Rahimi quoting Salerno, underscoring that Reyna needed to eliminate all constitutional applications of § 922(k).

• United States v. Johnson, 42 F.4th 743 (7th Cir. 2022)
  Role: Standard of review: the court reviewed § 922(k)’s constitutionality de novo.

• United States v. Gomez, 159 F.4th 172 (2d Cir. 2025) and United States v. Price, 111 F.4th 392 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc)
  Role: Sister-circuit confirmation of the bottom-line constitutionality of § 922(k), but by a different route: both circuits rejected challenges at Bruen step one (text), concluding deserialized firearms fall outside the Second Amendment’s coverage. The Seventh Circuit aligned with their result while explicitly diverging in reasoning.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in two key moves.

Move 1: Step one is not cleanly decisive on text alone

The opinion flags a methodological concern: Bruen describes step one as a “plain text” inquiry, but the Second Amendment’s broad phrasing (“keep and bear Arms”) does not obviously answer whether “Arms” excludes firearms with obliterated serial numbers. The court treats the government’s step-one argument as depending on an expansive reading of Heller—namely, that “common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” is a definitional boundary that can exclude entire categories of possession without proceeding to tradition.

The panel resists that move, emphasizing:

• Heller discussed “common use” largely while interpreting Miller and addressing stare decisis, not while announcing a comprehensive threshold test.
• Heller expressly did not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis of the right’s limits and anticipated future elaboration.
• Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi all recognize that the Amendment covers “bearable arms,” including modern instruments.

In effect, the court cautions against collapsing Bruen into a purely textual/common-use gatekeeping step that short-circuits the historical inquiry whenever a weapon or weapon-condition seems associated with criminal misuse.

Move 2: Step two validates § 922(k) under historical “principles” of marking, inspection, and accountability

Having assumed arguendo that the Second Amendment covers the conduct, the court uses Rahimi to address the obvious objection: serial numbers are a relatively modern phenomenon. Rahimi supplies the answer: a modern regulation may stand if it is consistent with the principles underpinning historical firearm regulation, even absent a precise founding-era twin.

The court then identifies a historical pattern: early American governments used mechanisms to track, inspect, and account for firearms—especially through militia musters, door-to-door inspections, inventories and reports, and wartime stamping/marking of arms to prevent theft and maintain readiness. It also cites early 19th-century “proving” regimes that required barrels to be inspected and marked, including laws penalizing the alteration/forgery of marks and requiring markings be difficult to erase.

On that foundation, the court characterizes modern serialization as a technologically advanced continuation of a familiar regulatory goal: ensuring traceability and public accountability for firearms within governmental authority. Section 922(k) fits this model by punishing knowing possession of a firearm whose serial number has been removed/altered/obliterated—conduct that defeats that traceability mechanism.

3.3. Impact

• Blueprint for defending “traceability” regulations post-Bruen: The decision strengthens the argument that regulations aimed at identification, inspection, and tracking (not merely bans on possession) can be justified by analogies to founding-era militia and military accountability practices, especially after Rahimi loosened the demand for close analogues.
• Limits the reach of step-one exclusions: By declining to hold that deserialized firearms are outside the Second Amendment’s text, the Seventh Circuit signals skepticism toward categorical, text-only carveouts based on “law-abiding/common use” shorthand. That may steer litigants and courts toward fuller historical records rather than threshold exclusions.
• Facial challenges to § 922(k) become harder in the Seventh Circuit: Given the court’s step-two holding and its reminder that facial claims are governed by the Salerno standard (as reiterated in Rahimi), litigants will likely pivot to as-applied challenges (e.g., unusual factual settings) rather than asserting that § 922(k) is unconstitutional in all circumstances.
• Deepening circuit alignment on the outcome, not necessarily the method: The Seventh Circuit joins the Second and Fourth Circuits in upholding § 922(k), but on a more historically synthetic rationale. This may reduce the likelihood of Supreme Court review based on outcome conflict, while leaving room for future disputes about how robust step one should be.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Facial challenge”: A claim that a law is unconstitutional in every application. Under United States v. Salerno (as quoted in Rahimi), the challenger must show “no set of circumstances exists” where the law is valid.
• Bruen’s two steps: (1) If the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct, it is presumptively protected. (2) The government can still win by showing the regulation fits the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
• “Law trapped in amber” (Rahimi): Courts do not require a modern gun regulation to have a near-identical founding-era replica. The question is whether it reflects the same underlying regulatory principle.
• “Relevantly similar” analogue: A historical regulation doesn’t have to match in technology or details; it must be similar in the way it addresses comparable public-safety or governance concerns, using comparable kinds of regulatory mechanisms.
• Serialization / deserialization: A serial number is an identifying mark enabling tracking of a firearm (for commerce, tracing, and law-enforcement investigations). “Deserialized” means the serial number has been removed or made unreadable—defeating that identification function.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jose Reyna reinforces that post-Bruen Second Amendment adjudication is not a search for exact founding-era matches. Guided by Rahimi, the Seventh Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) by locating a durable historical principle: governments have long required arms to be inspected, inventoried, and marked to promote accountability and traceability—especially in contexts tied to militia readiness and public authority over arms within the community. Even if the Second Amendment’s text reaches possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, § 922(k) fits within that historical regulatory tradition and therefore survives constitutional review.