Sentencing Upheld Where Court Disclaims Reliance on Acquitted Death-Resulting Conduct and Cooperator Co-Defendant Is Not a § 3553(a)(6) Comparator

Case: United States v. Corey Gaddy (11th Cir. June 10, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished)
Posture: Appeal from a 216-month sentence imposed after jury convictions for fentanyl-related distribution and conspiracy offenses.

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision addresses two recurring sentencing arguments in drug-distribution prosecutions involving overdose deaths: (1) whether the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by considering “acquitted conduct” (here, death-resulting elements the jury declined to find), and (2) whether the court created an unwarranted sentencing disparity by imposing a higher sentence than that received by a cooperating co-defendant who pleaded guilty.

The defendant, Corey Gaddy, was convicted at trial of conspiracy and distribution offenses involving fentanyl under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846 (and substantive distribution counts under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), with 18 U.S.C. § 2 aiding-and-abetting references). Although the operative indictment alleged that the conspiracy and distributions resulted in deaths (K.E. and J.P.) and serious bodily injury (J.C. and A.R.), the jury returned guilty verdicts without finding that deaths resulted from the offenses. At sentencing, the PSR recounted the overdoses but did not apply death-resulting guideline enhancements, and the district judge repeatedly stated he was not holding Gaddy responsible for any death.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying deferential substantive-reasonableness review, it held:

  • No acquitted-conduct reliance: The district court did not sentence Gaddy based on the death-resulting conduct the jury declined to find, notwithstanding PSR references to overdoses, because (a) the Guidelines calculation did not incorporate those deaths, and (b) the court expressly disclaimed holding Gaddy liable for any death multiple times, later clarifying the point in an amended Statement of Reasons.
  • No unwarranted disparity: Gaddy could not show an unwarranted disparity compared to co-defendant Shawn Rodriguez because Rodriguez pleaded guilty and cooperated; under Eleventh Circuit law, a cooperating pleader is not “similarly situated” to a defendant who goes to trial for § 3553(a)(6) comparison purposes.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review and substantive reasonableness

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): The court anchors its framework in Gall’s abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness, underscoring that appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for the sentencing court’s weighing of factors absent clear error.
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018): Cited for deference to a district court’s decision to vary from the Guidelines to serve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 34 F.4th 961 (11th Cir. 2022): Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part articulation of when a district court abuses its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors (failure to consider significant factors, giving weight to improper factors, or clear error of judgment).
  • United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020): Supplies the “definite and firm conviction” formulation for vacating a sentence based on erroneous weighing of § 3553(a) factors.

2. Sentencing disparity and “similarly situated” comparators

  • United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015): Establishes the threshold inquiry for § 3553(a)(6) claims—whether the defendant is similarly situated to the persons used as comparators.
  • United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008): Illustrates that cooperation/substantial assistance can justify different sentences; disparities are not “unwarranted” when defendants are materially different in sentencing-relevant ways.
  • United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2015): The key comparator rule applied here—“for purposes of § 3553(a)(6), a defendant who cooperates with the Government and pleads guilty is not similarly situated to his co-defendant who proceeds to trial.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The acquitted-conduct claim turns on “consideration,” not mere “presence in the record”

Gaddy’s argument relied heavily on the PSR’s narrative discussion of overdoses and deaths. The panel’s response is structural: it separates (i) PSR factual recitations from (ii) sentencing determinants (Guidelines computations and the court’s § 3553(a) analysis).

Two facts drive the holding:

  • No Guidelines incorporation: The PSR “correctly excluded enhancements for the deaths or bodily injuries” and thus the adopted Guidelines range did not embed the death-resulting allegations. The PSR’s note about potential departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 did not convert the narrative into an applied sentencing increase.
  • Express judicial disclaimers: The district court repeatedly stated it was “not holding” Gaddy liable for any death, reiterated this in post-sentencing reconsideration proceedings, and amended the Statement of Reasons to reflect that it did not sentence him “for causing deaths, in line with the verdict finding.”

The court therefore framed the appeal as failing at step one: because it found no reliance on acquitted conduct, it did not reach the step-two question (whether such reliance would be an abuse of discretion in this circuit).

2. The disparity claim fails because the comparator is legally inapt under § 3553(a)(6)

The panel treated § 3553(a)(6) as a “similarly situated” inquiry before any numerical comparison. Applying United States v. Duperval and United States v. Cavallo, it held Rodriguez is not a proper comparator because he pleaded guilty and cooperated, while Gaddy went to trial.

Importantly, the panel did not require a granular comparison of roles, culpability, or offense characteristics once it determined the procedural paths diverged in a way the circuit has deemed dispositive for comparator status. Under United States v. Williams, the difference in cooperation status alone can make a disparity “warranted.”

C. Impact

  • Practical boundary for acquitted-conduct challenges: The decision reinforces that an appellant must show actual sentencing reliance on acquitted conduct, not simply that the PSR discussed the conduct or that the judge made contextual remarks about it. Express disclaimers—especially repeated on the record and memorialized in the Statement of Reasons—can be outcome-determinative on appeal.
  • Comparator discipline under § 3553(a)(6): The case reiterates (consistent with United States v. Cavallo) that cooperating plea defendants are ordinarily off-limits as comparators for trial defendants, narrowing the class of disparity arguments likely to succeed.
  • Drafting and record-making lessons for district courts: This case demonstrates how clear oral findings and post-sentencing clarification orders can insulate a sentence from appellate attack when the PSR contains sensitive allegations (e.g., overdose deaths) not found by the jury.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Substantive reasonableness”: An appellate check on whether the sentence length is within a reasonable range given the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It is highly deferential; reversal requires more than disagreement.
  • “Acquitted conduct”: Conduct alleged by the government but not found by the jury (or conduct on which the defendant was acquitted). The key appellate question here was factual: did the judge actually use that conduct to set the sentence?
  • “Guidelines range” vs. “variance”: The Guidelines range is the advisory starting point. A “variance” is a sentence above or below that range based on § 3553(a) factors. Here, the court varied downward.
  • “Unwarranted disparity” under § 3553(a)(6): The law seeks to avoid unjustified differences among similarly situated defendants. If defendants are not similarly situated—especially where one cooperated and pleaded—the disparity is typically not “unwarranted.”

V. Conclusion

United States v. Corey Gaddy affirms a lengthy fentanyl-distribution sentence by emphasizing record clarity and comparator limits: (1) a sentencing court does not “consider” acquitted death-resulting conduct merely because a PSR recounts overdoses, particularly where the Guidelines calculation excludes it and the judge expressly disclaims reliance; and (2) a cooperating, pleading co-defendant is not a proper § 3553(a)(6) comparator to a defendant who proceeds to trial, so sentence differences between them are not, without more, “unwarranted.”