Date: Mar 28, 2026

Sentencing Reversal Required When a Court Relies on a Defendant’s “Lack of Remorse” After Maintaining Innocence (Fifth Amendment)

1. Introduction

In BROWN (MONICA) v. STATE (CRIMINAL) (Nev. Mar. 26, 2026), the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed Monica Shawn Brown’s convictions for exploitation of an older or vulnerable person and theft, arising from her dealings with Melvina Watts-Young, a 63-year-old widowed cancer survivor who was relocating from California to Nevada.

The case centered on three appellate issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion at sentencing by relying on Brown’s perceived lack of remorse/accountability; (2) whether the State’s last-minute amendment to the information—adding direct, aiding-and-abetting, and conspiracy theories—prejudiced Brown’s substantial rights; and (3) whether the evidence supported the exploitation conviction.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge, holding that the sentencing court’s reliance on “lack of remorse” violated Brown’s Fifth Amendment rights.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Sentencing: Reversed. The district court abused its discretion by treating Brown’s “lack of remorse and accountability” as a dispositive sentencing factor while she maintained innocence and retained Fifth Amendment protections.
Amendment of information: Affirmed. The amendment added prosecutorial theories without charging a different offense, and Brown failed to show prejudice to substantial rights under NRS 173.095(1).
Sufficiency of evidence (exploitation): Affirmed. Evidence supported that Watts-Young was an “older or vulnerable person” and that Brown willfully exploited her through deception/undue influence and conversion under NRS 200.5092(3).
Disposition: Judgment affirmed as to guilt; reversed as to sentencing; remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Sentencing discretion and abuse-of-discretion framework

Randell v. State, 109 Nev. 5, 8, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (1993): Reaffirmed broad sentencing discretion on appeal, subject to reversal for abuse of discretion.
In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36-37 (2007): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion definition (arbitrary/capricious or beyond the bounds of law or reason).
Brake v. State, 113 Nev. 579, 584, 939 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1997): Established that reliance on prejudicial matters at sentencing requires resentencing, and specifically held it is an abuse of discretion to consider lack of remorse where the defendant maintains innocence; also required resentencing before a different judge.

2) Fifth Amendment protections at sentencing

Bushnell v. State, 97 Nev. 591, 593, 637 P.2d 529, 531 (1981): Confirmed that a defendant retains Fifth Amendment rights after a jury verdict because appellate remedies remain available.
Brown v. State, 113 Nev. 275, 291, 934 P.2d 235, 245-46 (1997): Held that considering a defendant’s lack of remorse while the defendant maintains innocence violates the Fifth Amendment.
Brake v. State (again): Applied the same principle and mandated resentencing before a different judge when the original court relied on lack of remorse.

The 2026 BROWN (MONICA) opinion is best read as a forceful reaffirmation and application of Brown v. State and Brake v. State: when “lack of remorse/accountability” functions as a sentencing driver while the defendant maintains innocence, the error is constitutional (Fifth Amendment) and structural enough—at least under Nevada practice—to require resentencing before a new judge.

3) Amendment of charging documents (notice and prejudice)

Viray v. State, 121 Nev. 159, 162, 111 P.38d 1079, 1081-82 (2005): Confirmed amendments are discretionary and permissible where no different offense is charged and substantial rights are not prejudiced; emphasized the defense’s ability to prepare.
State v. Kighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 374, 377, 997 P.2d 126, 129 (2000): Required that the State give adequate notice of theories of prosecution.
Hollander v. State, 82 Nev. 345, 353, 418 P.2d 802, 806 (1966): Demonstrated the breadth of permissible timing for amendments when not prejudicial (even after completion of trial on the substantive offense).
Shannon v. State, 105 Nev. 782, 785, 783 P.2d 942, 944 (1989) and DePasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 848, 803 P.2d 218, 221 (1991): Approved amendments that clarify “how” a crime was committed rather than charge a new crime.
Nall v. State, 85 Nev. 1, 3, 448 P.2d 826, 827 (1969): Allowed amendments consistent with preliminary hearing evidence where the defense’s ability to prepare was not affected.

Against those authorities, the court rejected Brown’s attempt to create a new doctrine: a rebuttable presumption of prejudice from an “unnecessary five-year delay” in adding theories. The opinion emphasizes that NRS 173.095(1) itself permits amendment “at any time before verdict or finding” if no additional/different offense is charged and substantial rights are not prejudiced, and Nevada caselaw has tolerated very late amendments where prejudice is absent.

4) Sufficiency of evidence and definitional authorities

Nolan v. State, 122 Nev. 363, 377, 132 P.3d 564, 573 (2006) (quoting McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992)): Set the “any rational trier of fact” standard, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 191, 196, 462 P.3d 671, 675 (2020): Defined “willful” as intentional/deliberate/with design.
Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 116 Nev. 598, 606, 5 P.3d 1043, 1048 (2000) (quoting Wantz v. Redfield, 74 Nev. 196, 198, 326 P.2d 4138, 414 (1958)): Provided the definition of conversion used to support the exploitation theory under NRS 200.5092(3)(b).
Carroll v. State, 132 Nev. 269, 287, 371 P.3d 1028, 1035 (2016): Limited cumulative error to circumstances involving more than one error.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The sentencing holding: “lack of remorse” as a Fifth Amendment problem

The court examined the sentencing transcript and concluded that, after weighing competing considerations, the district court treated Brown’s absence of “remorse” and “accountability” as the pivotal factor in denying her “a shot” (probation) and imposing imprisonment. Under Bushnell v. State, Brown still had Fifth Amendment protection post-verdict due to the availability of appeal. Under Brown v. State and Brake v. State, the sentencing court cannot use “lack of remorse” as an adverse inference where the defendant continues to maintain innocence.

The remedy followed Brake v. State: resentencing before a different judge, reflecting the concern that once a judge has relied on an impermissible consideration—especially one bound up with credibility and moral blameworthiness—the risk of continued influence is substantial.

2) The amendment holding: clarifying theories vs. changing charges

Applying NRS 173.095(1) and the notice cases, the court treated the State’s amendment as a permissible clarification of “the manner” of commission (direct liability, aiding/abetting, conspiracy), not an addition of a different offense. Critically, the original information already alleged Brown acted in a course of conduct “with Lawrence Brown,” and the preliminary hearing repeatedly framed Lawrence as involved. Those facts supported the conclusion that Brown had adequate notice and could prepare a defense against the State’s theory that she acted in concert with Lawrence.

The court also required a concrete showing of prejudice: Brown argued “ambush,” but did not explain how trial preparation or strategy would have materially changed had the amendment been earlier, nor how substantial rights were impaired.

3) The sufficiency holding: exploitation of an older or vulnerable person

The court walked through NRS 200.5092. A rational juror could find Watts-Young qualified as “older” (over 60) and/or “vulnerable.” On exploitation, the court emphasized evidence that Brown cultivated trust as a realtor/advocate, pressured Watts-Young into signing a confusing document later understood as a power of attorney, secured authorization to transfer $63,000 for “the house and everything,” deposited the money into accounts controlled by Brown and her husband, and did not use most funds for Watts-Young’s benefit or return the remainder.

The court further highlighted “permanent deprivation” evidence: the home was rented (not purchased for Watts-Young), the Jeep was financed in Lawrence’s name (not transferred to Watts-Young), and unspent funds were never repaid.

C. Impact

Sentencing practice: The opinion reinforces a bright constitutional boundary in Nevada sentencing: a court may not penalize a defendant for maintaining innocence by treating “lack of remorse/accountability” as an aggravating sentencing factor. It also reiterates that the appropriate remedy is resentencing before a different judge, increasing the practical stakes of sentencing remarks.
Charging amendments: The decision discourages attempts to create delay-based presumptions of prejudice and instead keeps the focus on NRS 173.095(1)’s two inquiries: (i) whether the amendment charges an additional/different offense; and (ii) whether substantial rights were prejudiced, with special attention to whether the defense can articulate concrete surprise or altered preparation.
Elder/vulnerable-person exploitation prosecutions: The court’s application of NRS 200.5092 illustrates how power-of-attorney procurement, bank transfers, and title/benefit mismatches (rental vs. purchase; financing in another’s name) can support exploitation by deception/undue influence and conversion, even when some goods/services were partially provided.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Lack of remorse” at sentencing: A judge often wants to know whether a defendant accepts responsibility. But when a defendant continues to assert innocence after conviction, using “no remorse” as a reason to punish more harshly can operate as a penalty for not admitting guilt—implicating the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Amending an “information” (NRS 173.095(1)): An “information” is the prosecutor’s formal charging document. Nevada allows amendments up to verdict if the amendment does not charge a new/different crime and does not prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights (especially the right to adequate notice to prepare a defense).
Aiding or abetting: Liability for helping someone else commit a crime—by counseling, encouraging, inducing, or otherwise facilitating it—combined with intent that the crime be committed.
Conspiracy: Liability based on an agreement to commit a crime and acting in concert to accomplish it. The amendment here added conspiracy as an additional theory of liability, not a separate substantive offense.
Exploitation of an older or vulnerable person (NRS 200.5092): A crime that can be proved by showing a person used trust/power of attorney plus deception, intimidation, or undue influence to obtain/control or convert the victim’s property, intending permanent deprivation.
Undue influence: Improper use of power or trust that overbears another’s free will and substitutes the influencer’s objectives.
Conversion: Wrongfully exercising control over someone else’s property in a way inconsistent with the owner’s rights—e.g., taking money for a stated purpose and diverting it to oneself.

5. Conclusion

BROWN (MONICA) v. STATE (CRIMINAL) affirms Nevada’s continuing rule that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection persists through the post-verdict, pre-appeal period and bars sentencing courts from relying on “lack of remorse” when the defendant maintains innocence. Where such reliance occurs—especially when it is outcome-determinative—resentencing must occur before a different judge. At the same time, the decision preserves prosecutorial flexibility to amend an information to clarify theories of liability under NRS 173.095(1), so long as the amendment does not charge a different offense and the defendant cannot show actual prejudice to substantial rights.