Sentencing Due Process in the Eleventh Circuit: Using Co-Conspirators’ Trial Evidence with a Rebuttal Opportunity; Unnoticed Unrelated Comparator Sentences as Non-Prejudicial Error

Introduction

United States v. Jose Ivan Carbajal (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) arises from a multi-year drug-trafficking organization (DTO) operating from Florida with supply lines extending to California and beyond. Jose Ivan Carbajal (“Carbajal”), described as a California supplier, pleaded guilty (without a plea agreement) to: (1) conspiracy to traffic drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; and (2) conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) produced a Guidelines range of life (total offense level capped at 43; criminal history category IV). The district court imposed 480 months (40 years) on the drug count and 240 months concurrent on the money-laundering count.

On appeal, Carbajal framed the dispute as a due process/notice challenge to sentencing: (i) the district court’s use of testimony and exhibits from co-conspirators’ trial, and (ii) the government’s mention (and the court’s consideration) of sentences imposed on unrelated defendants.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held:

  • No due process violation occurred from the use of trial testimony from co-conspirators’ trial because Carbajal had an adequate opportunity at sentencing to rebut or otherwise challenge its reliability consistent with U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3.
  • The use of trial exhibits was reviewed for plain error (no objection below) and likewise involved no error because Carbajal had an opportunity to contest them at sentencing.
  • The panel accepted that it was error for the district court to consider sentences of specific unrelated defendants without prior notice to Carbajal, but it was not plain error warranting relief because the references were “fleeting and tangential” and did not affect substantial rights under United States v. Vandergrift.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Notice and procedural fairness at sentencing

The opinion’s due process analysis centers on United States v. Plasencia, 886 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2018), which states that “due process requires that a criminal defendant have adequate notice of, and an opportunity to contest, the facts used to support his criminal penalty,” while reiterating that sentencing is not as “exacting” as trial. The Carbajal panel uses Plasencia in two ways:

  • Notice can be practical, not formal. Because the government’s sentencing memorandum referenced the trial proof, Carbajal was on notice that it would be raised and potentially relied upon.
  • The core due process concern is reliability, not confrontation. The defendant’s “primary due process interest” is to avoid being sentenced on “invalid premises or inaccurate information.”

In addressing preservation, the court invoked United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019), for the requirement that objections be stated with enough clarity that the court cannot misunderstand them—supporting the panel’s refusal to treat Carbajal’s objection to “testimony” as also preserving an objection to “exhibits.”

The court also enforced appellate waiver/abandonment principles via United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2003), noting Carbajal did not develop any argument that he lacked access to the referenced evidence.

2) Using evidence from another proceeding

The crucial limitation comes from United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1990): “evidence presented at the trial of another may not—without more—be used to fashion a defendant’s sentence if the defendant objects,” but it is permissible if the defendant “had the opportunity to rebut the evidence or generally to cast doubt upon its reliability.” The Carbajal panel treats Castellanos as the controlling rule and ties the “without more” requirement to: U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), which requires an “adequate opportunity” to present information on disputed sentencing factors.

The opinion further reinforces the breadth of sentencing information by citing United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025 (11th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that reliable hearsay may be considered at sentencing. This matters because trial testimony from another case and its derivative summaries often function like hearsay from the sentencing defendant’s perspective; the touchstone is reliability plus a fair chance to contest.

3) Standards of review driving outcomes

The panel’s disposition is strongly shaped by standard-of-review precedent:

  • United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412 (11th Cir. 2016): constitutional sentencing challenges are reviewed de novo.
  • United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2005): unpreserved constitutional errors are reviewed for plain error.
  • United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249 (11th Cir. 2021): the four-part plain error test.
  • United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019): an error is “obvious” when the explicit language of a statute/rule or binding precedent directly resolves it.

On the unrelated-sentences issue, the court found “error” (lack of notice of the specific comparators) but denied relief on the third prong, relying on United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014), which treats substantial rights as unaffected where an impermissible consideration is “only a minor fragment” of the court’s reasoning.

4) Guidelines enhancements referenced (contextual, but influential)

Although the appeal was framed as a due process/notice challenge, the sentencing context includes enhancements that were litigated and discussed with reference to controlling law:

  • Firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), discussed with reference to United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2008) (four-part test for co-conspirator firearm possession and foreseeability), and United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2006) (“guns are a tool of the drug trade,” making firearm possession reasonably foreseeable in lucrative drug conspiracies).
  • Leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (organizer/leader of extensive activity), which the district court applied by finding Poole and Carbajal were the “two primary people” who “put all this in motion.”

These enhancement disputes mattered indirectly: they explain why the government’s sentencing memorandum relied on co-conspirators’ trial proof and why the district court referenced its own experience “having sat through a lengthy trial involving two other defendants.”

Legal Reasoning

A. Trial testimony and exhibits from co-conspirators’ trial

The panel separated two questions: (1) notice and (2) permissible use despite lack of cross-examination.

  • Notice: Even absent an explicit judicial warning, the government’s sentencing memorandum referencing the trial proof “alerted” Carbajal such evidence would arise and could be relied upon. The panel analogized to Plasencia, where notice was adequate when the government referenced trial testimony and the defendant was present for it; here, the non-identity of the proceeding did not matter because Carbajal was familiar with the record and did not claim lack of access.
  • Opportunity to contest (reliability safeguard): Relying on Castellanos and U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), the panel reasoned that sentencing may rely on evidence from another trial if the defendant can rebut it or cast doubt on reliability. The court emphasized Carbajal actually did so: he disputed characterizations (e.g., Navarro-Martinez as “muscle”) and challenged testimony (e.g., alleged murder plot) as uncorroborated. The absence of cross-examination at the other trial did not, by itself, establish a due process violation at sentencing.

B. Sentences of unrelated defendants (specific comparator problem)

The government referenced two unrelated sentences (35 and 38 years) as comparators. The panel acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) requires courts to consider avoiding unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants. But it rejected the proposition that this statutory duty automatically supplies advance notice of the specific unrelated comparators to be invoked at sentencing.

Critically, the panel drew a distinction—grounded in Plasencia and supported by United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1992)—between: (i) notice that a category of information may be considered, and (ii) notice that particular facts (here, the identity and sentences of specific unrelated defendants) will be used. The panel held Carbajal had no such specific notice; thus, “the Court therefore erred in considering the sentences.”

Nonetheless, relief failed under plain error because the panel found no effect on “substantial rights”: the district court asked a single follow-up question about criminal history categories and otherwise grounded its sentence on the offense’s scale, Carbajal’s criminal history, and other sentencing facts. Under Vandergrift, the unrelated comparators were, at most, “a minor fragment” of the sentencing reasoning.

Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” (and thus not binding precedent), the decision has practical significance in three ways:

  • Reaffirmation of the “rebuttal opportunity” model for sentencing evidence. The opinion applies United States v. Castellanos and U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 to approve reliance on proof from a co-conspirator trial where the defendant can meaningfully contest reliability at sentencing—even without cross-examination in the prior proceeding.
  • Clarification that specific unrelated comparator sentences can create a notice problem. The panel’s recognition of “error” signals that parties who plan to argue § 3553(a)(6) using particular third-party sentences should disclose them in advance (e.g., in a sentencing memorandum) to avoid due process challenges.
  • Reinforcement of preservation and plain-error realities. The case illustrates how failing to object distinctly (testimony vs. exhibits; notice vs. admissibility; comparators) can shift review to plain error, where even identified “error” will not yield relief absent a concrete showing of prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Due process” at sentencing: The defendant must have a fair chance to know and contest the key facts influencing the sentence; sentencing is less formal than trial, and courts may consider a wide range of reliable information.
  • U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a): A Guidelines procedure requiring the court to give the parties an adequate opportunity to present information on disputed sentencing issues—this is the “safety valve” that permits use of broader information (including hearsay or other-trial evidence) if reliability can be tested through rebuttal.
  • “Plain error” review: If an issue was not properly raised below, the defendant must show not only error, but that it was obvious, harmed substantial rights, and seriously affected the integrity of proceedings. This is often outcome-determinative.
  • § 3553(a)(6) disparity: Courts should avoid unwarranted sentencing differences among similarly situated defendants, but invoking specific unrelated comparator sentences without notice can raise fairness concerns.
  • Leadership and firearm enhancements: These are Guidelines increases based on role in the offense (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1) and possession/foreseeability of firearms in drug conspiracies (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)), often litigated through testimony, investigative records, and co-conspirator evidence.

Conclusion

United States v. Jose Ivan Carbajal reinforces a pragmatic due process framework for federal sentencing in the Eleventh Circuit: evidence from a co-conspirator’s trial may be used when the defendant has a meaningful opportunity at sentencing to rebut it under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, even absent cross-examination in the other proceeding. At the same time, the panel recognized that relying on specific unrelated comparator sentences without prior notice is error—yet, without a showing of prejudice, that error will not satisfy plain-error relief. The decision thus underscores both the breadth of information a sentencing court may consider and the procedural discipline required to preserve sentencing challenges.