Sentence-Four SSA Remands Require a Merits Judgment Explicitly Affirming, Modifying, or Reversing the ALJ Decision

Introduction

In Pamela J. Follen v. Commr of Soc. Sec. (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2026), the Sixth Circuit addressed a recurring procedural problem in Social Security disability litigation: whether a federal district court may remand under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) without expressly entering a merits judgment that affirms, modifies, or reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of benefits.

The claimant, Pamela J. Follen, sought judicial review after the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied benefits. After answering the complaint, the Commissioner moved to remand for further articulation and consideration of medical opinion evidence—without conceding reversible error and without seeking affirmance, modification, or reversal. Follen agreed remand was appropriate but sought an award of benefits rather than further proceedings. The district court remanded under Sentence Four for further agency consideration and a new decision, but it did not identify any merits defect in the ALJ decision and did not explicitly affirm, modify, or reverse.

The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding the district court could not issue the remand as written under Sentence Four (or Sentence Six), and must clarify which statutory remand it is ordering and why.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that a district court cannot remand under Sentence Four of § 405(g) without entering a merits judgment—i.e., a judgment that affirmatively “affirm[s], modify[ies], or revers[es]” the Commissioner’s decision (or otherwise clearly identifies a merits error such as by vacating based on legal error).

Because the district court’s order neither made the findings required for a Sentence Six remand nor entered the merits judgment required for a Sentence Four remand, the order did not fit within the exclusive remand mechanisms authorized by § 405(g). The Sixth Circuit therefore VACATED the remand order and REMANDED for the district court to clarify its statutory basis and reasoning.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Disability adjudication framework (background law)

  • Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2003)
    Cited for the ALJ’s “five-step inquiry” and burden allocation (claimant bears steps 1–4; government bears step 5). This case supplies doctrinal context but does not drive the remand-hybrid issue; it frames what “the merits” generally entail in disability cases.
  • Napier v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2025)
    Quoted for a concise step-by-step description of the sequential evaluation. As with Jones, it is background supporting the court’s explanation of what an ALJ decides—and thus what a merits review would address.

2) The Sentence Four / Sentence Six divide and finality

  • Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991)
    The opinion’s central authority. The Sixth Circuit relies on Melkonyan for three key propositions: (i) district courts may remand only under Sentence Four or Sentence Six (no “inherent authority” to craft other remand types); (ii) Sentence Four remands require a merits determination and a final judgment; and (iii) where the record does not reveal what the district court intended, the appellate court may vacate and remand for clarification. The Sixth Circuit adopts Melkonyan’s “clarify its order” remedy as the appropriate fix here.
  • Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993)
    Used to underscore the “principal feature” of a Sentence Four remand: immediate entry of judgment, rather than retaining jurisdiction for post-remand proceedings. This supports the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that a Sentence Four remand must be tethered to a merits judgment (affirm/modify/reverse).
  • Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990)
    Cited for the proposition that Sentence Four remands are “final and appealable” judgments. This matters because the Sixth Circuit’s ability to review the district court’s order depends on whether it is the kind of order Congress made immediately appealable.
  • Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 17 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1994)
    Cited to explain that a Sentence Six remand does not reach the merits (thus does not affirm/modify/reverse). This sharpens the statutory boundary: if the district court avoided the merits, it must satisfy Sentence Six prerequisites; if it used Sentence Four, it must enter a merits judgment.
  • Marshall v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 444 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 2006)
    Supports the jurisdictional consequence of Sentence Six: the district court retains jurisdiction during agency proceedings. This contrasts with Sentence Four, where judgment enters immediately and jurisdiction typically ends.
  • Raitport v. Callahan, 183 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
    Cited for two ideas: Sentence Six remands are not final and appealable; and where remand characterization is unclear, vacatur for clarification is appropriate. The Sixth Circuit uses Raitport as persuasive support for the same remedy it adopts under Melkonyan.

3) Appealability of agency remands outside § 405(g)

  • Schuck v. Frank, 27 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1994)
    Cited to reinforce the general (non-SSA) rule that remands to agencies typically are not appealable. This highlights why Congress’s Sentence Four carve-out must be applied carefully and only when the statutory conditions for finality are met.
  • S.S. ex rel. A.S. v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 43 F.4th 1165 (11th Cir. 2022)
    Used as additional support for the broader administrative-law principle regarding remand non-appealability, emphasizing that social security remands are exceptional only to the extent § 405(g) makes them so.

4) Appellate jurisdiction to decide “what kind of remand is this?”

  • Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002))
    Cited for the axiom that courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, and may decide an issue that is both “merits” and “jurisdictional.” The Sixth Circuit uses this to justify reviewing whether the district court complied with Sentence Four or Sentence Six, because that compliance determines appealability.
  • Clinkscale v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-2191, 2025 WL 2528907 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2025) (per curiam)
    A recent, factually similar Third Circuit decision invoked to show that appellate review of the “nature of the remand order” is part of the jurisdictional inquiry in SSA cases. It supports the Sixth Circuit’s approach of vacating and remanding for the district court to clarify.

5) Vacatur/remand as a functional “Sentence Four” merits disposition (when based on error)

  • Bordelon v. Barnhart, 161 F. App'x 348 (5th Cir. 2005); Nelson v. Apfel, No. 98 C 2223, 1999 WL 261740 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 1999), aff'd, 210 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2000); Lassen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-CV-1037, 2010 WL 914668 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2010)
    These examples illustrate that courts sometimes “vacate and remand” with instructions to correct specified legal deficiencies. The Sixth Circuit uses them to signal that even if a judgment does not use the words “affirm/modify/reverse,” a vacatur tied to identified error still reflects a merits determination consistent with Sentence Four.
  • Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996)
    Cited for the proposition that a vacatur-and-remand is based on a determination that the Commissioner erred in reaching the denial. This supports the Sixth Circuit’s insistence that Sentence Four requires identification of a merits defect—something missing from the district court’s order here.

6) Mandamus as an improper substitute for appeal

  • Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967)
    Addressed in a footnote: although mandamus was floated at argument, the Sixth Circuit declined to treat the appeal as mandamus because mandamus is extraordinary and should not circumvent the final-judgment rule—especially where the court can proceed on jurisdictional grounds tied to § 405(g).

Legal Reasoning

  1. § 405(g) provides the exclusive remand mechanisms.
    Following Melkonyan, the court reiterates that district courts lack “inherent authority” to craft remands outside Sentence Four and Sentence Six.
  2. Sentence Six remand was unavailable on this record.
    Sentence Six requires predicate findings (e.g., new and material evidence with good cause, or a pre-answer Commissioner request). The district court made no such findings and the posture did not match the statutory prerequisites as the court described them.
  3. Sentence Four remand requires a merits judgment and immediate final judgment.
    Under the text of Sentence Four and the Supreme Court’s interpretations (Melkonyan, Schaefer), a remand under Sentence Four must be accompanied by a final judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the agency decision. The Sixth Circuit stressed that the district court’s order did none of these and expressly avoided identifying reversible error.
  4. Ambiguity about remand type creates a jurisdictional problem that an appellate court may address.
    Because appealability hinges on whether the order is a proper Sentence Four judgment, the Sixth Circuit treated “what kind of remand is this?” as a jurisdiction-linked inquiry (supported by Brownback and Clinkscale).
  5. Remedy: vacate and remand for clarification.
    Mirroring Melkonyan (and consistent with Raitport), the Sixth Circuit vacated the remand order and sent the case back so the district court can clearly state: (i) whether it is ordering a Sentence Four or Sentence Six remand; (ii) the statutory basis; and (iii) the specific defects in the ALJ decision or evidentiary record that justify that remand type.

Impact

  • For district courts: The decision pressures courts to be explicit and disciplined in § 405(g) remand orders. A “consent remand” or “Commissioner-requested remand” cannot be labeled Sentence Four unless the court also enters a merits judgment (or otherwise clearly identifies error consistent with affirm/modify/reverse).
  • For litigants and the Commissioner: Parties cannot assume that agreement on remand resolves the statutory classification. Motions and proposed orders will likely become more formal: identifying the precise statutory sentence, addressing Sentence Six prerequisites when applicable, or articulating the legal error that supports a Sentence Four merits disposition.
  • For appellate practice: The opinion reinforces that appellate courts may police the boundary between Sentence Four and Sentence Six to protect Congress’s finality scheme. This may increase vacatur-for-clarification outcomes where district courts issue ambiguous remand orders.
  • For the Social Security docket: While the ruling is procedural, it can affect timing and fee litigation (often tied to “final judgment” concepts) and reduce uncertainty about when a case is appealable and when the district court retains jurisdiction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sentence Four remand (42 U.S.C. § 405(g))
A remand that follows a court’s merits judgment that the agency decision should be affirmed, changed, or overturned (often because the ALJ made a legal error or lacked substantial evidence). It is typically accompanied by an immediate final judgment and is immediately appealable.
Sentence Six remand (42 U.S.C. § 405(g))
A remand for limited statutory reasons (commonly, new and material evidence with good cause, or certain Commissioner requests) where the court does not decide whether the ALJ was right or wrong. The district court generally retains jurisdiction; the remand is generally not immediately appealable.
Final and appealable order
A decision that ends the case in the district court (as a practical matter) and can be reviewed by the court of appeals. In SSA cases, Congress allows immediate appeal from Sentence Four judgments because they are final civil judgments.
Vacate
To nullify the lower court’s order. Here, the Sixth Circuit vacated because the remand order did not fit the statute’s authorized remand types as written.

Conclusion

Follen establishes (and forcefully enforces) a procedural rule with practical bite: a district court cannot send an SSA case back under Sentence Four unless it also issues a clear merits judgment that affirms, modifies, or reverses the ALJ’s decision (or otherwise identifies an error consistent with that merits disposition). If the court instead intends a Sentence Six remand, it must say so and make the required statutory predicate findings.

The broader significance is institutional: the Sixth Circuit’s approach protects the statutory architecture of § 405(g), preserves Congress’s intended limits on immediate appeals, and demands clarity in remand orders so that parties, agencies, and reviewing courts know whether a case is being resolved on the merits or merely returned for further development.