Self-Serving Testimony Without Objective Corroboration May Not Defeat Summary Judgment in Fourth Circuit Title VII Harassment Claims (and FLSA Tipped “Dual Jobs” Claims Remain Subject to a Strict Two-Year Limitations Period Absent Proof of Willfulness)

I. Introduction

In Juanita Crouch v. SunCakes NC, LLC (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer accused of (1) Title VII sexual harassment/hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and retaliation, and (2) Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) minimum-wage and retaliation violations. The plaintiff, Juanita Crouch, worked for roughly four months as a server at an IHOP operated by SunCakes NC, LLC (“SunCakes”).

The appeal centered on whether Crouch’s evidence could (a) create a triable issue of hostile work environment and retaliatory motive under Title VII given her largely uncorroborated account, (b) show pretext under the burden-shifting framework when the employer asserted chronic absenteeism and tardiness, and (c) overcome the FLSA’s limitations period and tipped-employee rules where the record reflected minimum wage was met through base pay plus tips.

Although the opinion is unpublished and therefore “not binding precedent in this circuit,” it illustrates how the Fourth Circuit may evaluate evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment, particularly where a plaintiff claims corroboration existed (friends/coworkers/manager) but does not produce it.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Hostile work environment (Title VII): The court acknowledged the alleged propositions for sex and the lewd phone call were “totally unacceptable,” but held summary judgment was proper because Crouch offered no objective corroboration despite claiming she contemporaneously told others and was asked to provide a written statement she never produced.
  • Sex discrimination (Title VII): SunCakes offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason—persistent absenteeism/tardiness supported by the record—and Crouch produced no evidence of pretext.
  • Retaliation (Title VII): Even assuming protected activity, the record lacked evidence of a causal link between the complaint and termination, and again lacked evidence of pretext.
  • FLSA claims: The minimum-wage and retaliation claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations, and the plaintiff failed to show “willful” violations that would trigger a three-year period. The court also emphasized tipped-employee “dual jobs” principles and that base pay plus tips satisfied minimum wage on this record.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Evans v. Tech. App. & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996)

The panel relied on Evans for the proposition that “self-serving opinions without objective corroboration” are “not significantly probative” at summary judgment. In Crouch, that principle did not operate as a categorical bar against harassment claims lacking witnesses; rather, the court stressed the plaintiff herself asserted she had contemporaneously told multiple people (a friend, coworkers, and the general manager) and yet provided no supporting declarations, testimony, or written complaint. The absence of corroboration—where corroboration was seemingly available—was treated as evidentiary weakness sufficient to sustain summary judgment.

2. Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2004)

Williams reinforced the same evidentiary theme: “merely a self-serving opinion . . . cannot, absent objective corroboration, defeat summary judgment.” The court used Williams to underscore that the plaintiff must produce evidence of “sufficient probative force” to permit a jury to find in her favor, and that conclusory or uncorroborated assertions—especially where corroboration was allegedly at hand—may be inadequate.

3. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)

The court applied the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to the discrimination claim (and functionally to the retaliation/pretext analysis as well): once SunCakes articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination (attendance violations), the burden shifted to Crouch to show that reason was pretext for unlawful bias. The Fourth Circuit found “not one scintilla of evidence” indicating sex was the true reason for termination given the attendance record.

4. Boyer-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015)

Citing Boyer-Liberto, the panel emphasized the plaintiff’s burden to prove a “causal link” between protected activity (complaining of sexual advances) and the adverse action (termination). On this record, the causal link failed not because a complaint can never support causation, but because the evidence did not tie the complaint to the termination decision and did not rebut the employer’s documented attendance rationale.

5. Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2011)

On limitations, the court invoked Desmond for the rule that the employee bears the burden of proving “willfulness” to obtain the FLSA’s three-year limitations period. Without evidence of willfulness, the default two-year period governed and barred claims filed more than two years after accrual.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Hostile work environment: unacceptable conduct vs. triable evidence

The opinion draws a sharp line between (a) acknowledging alleged sexual propositions and lewd conduct as “totally unacceptable,” and (b) determining whether the plaintiff produced enough admissible, probative evidence to survive summary judgment. The court’s reasoning turned less on a detailed “severe or pervasive” discussion and more on evidentiary sufficiency: Crouch claimed she told multiple people and the general manager, but offered no statements from those individuals and no contemporaneous written complaint—despite agreeing to provide one. Under the court’s reading of Evans and Williams, this left the claim resting on uncorroborated assertions that were “not significantly probative” in these circumstances.

2. Discrimination: attendance as a legitimate reason and failure of pretext

For the discrimination claim, SunCakes’ documented absenteeism and tardiness functioned as a straightforward legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. The court highlighted concrete metrics (missed shifts, tardiness, leaving early, and missing all scheduled shifts in January before termination). Applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the court held Crouch did not meet her burden to show the stated rationale was false or that discrimination was the real motive.

3. Retaliation: causation and pretext failures

Even accepting that complaining to the general manager could be protected activity, the court found no evidence that the complaint caused the termination. The panel relied on Boyer-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp. to emphasize causation as an element and reiterated that the attendance rationale was not shown to be pretextual. In effect, the same evidentiary gap that undermined the discrimination claim (no proof the attendance reason was a cover) also defeated retaliation.

4. FLSA: limitations, willfulness, and tipped “dual jobs”

The court treated January 12, 2022 (termination) as the relevant date for the limitations analysis and held that filing the FLSA claim on February 24, 2024 exceeded the two-year period in 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The court also rejected extension to three years because there was “no evidence” of willfulness, citing Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C. for the plaintiff’s burden.

Substantively, the court also explained why the wage theory appeared weak on this record: under 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(A), a tipped employee meets minimum wage if base wage plus tips reach the minimum wage, and 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e) recognizes “dual jobs”/related duties in tipped occupations that do not require a separate, higher rate for incidental non-tipped tasks. The court concluded the record showed SunCakes paid Crouch at least minimum wage (base plus tips) throughout employment and that she did not controvert that.

C. Impact

  • Practical evidentiary pressure at summary judgment: The opinion signals that when a plaintiff claims contemporaneous disclosures to identifiable witnesses (coworkers/manager/friends), the Fourth Circuit may expect at least some objective corroboration (e.g., declarations, testimony, texts, emails, written complaint) to avoid summary judgment—particularly where the plaintiff was invited to memorialize the complaint and did not.
  • Attendance records as powerful nondiscriminatory reasons: The decision underscores that well-documented attendance violations can be dispositive absent concrete evidence of pretext.
  • Retaliation claims still hinge on causation evidence: Merely engaging in protected activity is insufficient; plaintiffs must produce evidence connecting the complaint to the adverse action and negating the employer’s stated reasons.
  • FLSA timing discipline: The case reinforces the two-year default limitations period and the plaintiff’s burden to prove willfulness for the three-year period, while also emphasizing that tipped “dual job”/related-duty regulations can defeat claims that incidental non-tipped tasks necessarily require full minimum wage.
  • Doctrinal weight: Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not binding precedent; its principal impact is persuasive and practical—showing how panels may deploy existing precedent (Evans, Williams, McDonnell Douglas, Boyer-Liberto, Desmond) to resolve common proof problems.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment
A pretrial ruling that ends a case when the evidence, viewed in the nonmoving party’s favor, still would not allow a reasonable jury to rule for that party.
Hostile work environment (“severe or pervasive”)
A Title VII theory requiring proof that workplace harassment was sufficiently serious or frequent to alter the terms and conditions of employment. In this opinion, the court focused heavily on whether the plaintiff produced enough corroborated evidence to reach a jury.
“Self-serving” testimony and “objective corroboration”
A party’s own account is evidence, but the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that unsupported personal assertions—especially when other evidence should be readily available—may be insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Corroboration can include witness declarations, contemporaneous writings, recordings, or other documentation.
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting and “pretext”
If an employer offers a legitimate reason for an adverse action (here, absenteeism), the employee must show the reason is not true or not the real reason, and that unlawful discrimination/retaliation actually motivated the decision.
FLSA “willfulness” (29 U.S.C. § 255(a))
A heightened showing that the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct violated the FLSA. If proven, the limitations period extends from two to three years; the employee bears the burden of proof.
Tipped credit and “dual jobs”/related duties (29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e))
Tipped employees may be paid a lower cash wage if tips make up the difference to minimum wage. Related, non-tipped tasks performed as part of the tipped occupation (e.g., side work associated with serving) do not necessarily require a different wage rate under the regulation cited by the court.

V. Conclusion

Crouch v. SunCakes NC, LLC affirms summary judgment across Title VII and FLSA theories by applying established Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court frameworks to proof and timing problems: uncorroborated testimony—where corroboration was allegedly available—did not create a triable harassment dispute; documented attendance failures supplied a legitimate reason for termination that the plaintiff did not rebut as pretext; retaliation failed for lack of causation evidence; and FLSA claims were barred by the two-year limitations period absent proof of willfulness, with the record also reflecting compliance under tipped-employee rules and “dual jobs” guidance. Even as an unpublished decision, it provides a clear roadmap of what evidence plaintiffs must marshal to survive summary judgment in the Fourth Circuit.