Self-Serving Sworn Testimony Can Defeat Summary Judgment in FLSA Off-the-Clock Overtime Claims (Even When Late-Disclosed Texts Are Excluded)

I. Introduction

In Patrick Byrne v. Goodwill South Florida TEP, LLC (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2026) (per curiam; not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit addressed a recurring Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) problem: an employer presents time and payroll records and written policies forbidding off-the-clock work, while the employee responds primarily with sworn testimony that the records understate hours actually worked because supervisors required or tolerated unpaid work before clock-in, after clock-out, and through lunch.

The parties were Patrick Wells Byrne (an hourly Assistant Operations Manager) and Goodwill South Florida TEP, LLC (operator of thrift stores). The key issues on appeal were:

  • Summary judgment: Whether Byrne’s deposition testimony and sworn declaration created genuine disputes of material fact that (1) he worked unpaid overtime and (2) Goodwill knew or should have known.
  • Evidence exclusion: Whether the district court properly excluded Byrne’s TOPS!-related text messages as late-disclosed discovery under Rules 26 and 37.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s evidentiary ruling excluding Byrne’s late-produced TOPS! text messages, holding the court acted within its discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). However, the Court vacated summary judgment for Goodwill and remanded, concluding that—even without the texts— Byrne’s sworn deposition testimony and declaration created triable disputes regarding uncompensated overtime and employer knowledge.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary judgment framework

  • Carroll v. Carnival Corp. and Mendez v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP: cited for de novo review of summary judgment and application of the same Rule 56 standard as the district court.
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.: supplies the governing definitions—“genuine” disputes and “material” facts—and the principle that courts do not weigh evidence or decide credibility at summary judgment.
  • Celotex Corp. v. Catrett: relied on for the requirement that the nonmovant must point to record evidence, not mere allegations.
  • Ellis v. England: invoked to reject conclusory allegations, unsupported speculation, or recordless assertions as insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
  • Scott v. Harris and Anderson v. City of Bessemer City: used for the narrow proposition that courts need not accept versions of events that are blatantly contradicted by the record, internally inconsistent, or implausible.
  • Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach: reinforces that the evidence and inferences must be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.
  • Schultz v. Am. Airlines, Inc.: cited (alongside the Supreme Court cases above) for the district court’s limited ability to disregard testimony that is implausible or could not have been observed.

2. FLSA overtime elements and burden-shifting

  • Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty.: anchors the two elements of an overtime claim—unpaid overtime work and employer knowledge (actual or constructive)—and explains the employee’s burden in the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Bailey v. TitleMax of Ga., Inc.: cited for the same two-element formulation and the private right of action for unpaid overtime.
  • Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.: provides the pivotal evidentiary rule where records are alleged to be inaccurate or inadequate: the employee need not prove precise uncompensated hours, but must produce evidence allowing a “just and reasonable inference,” after which the burden shifts to the employer to negate the inference or show precise work performed.

3. The “self-serving affidavit” rule at summary judgment

  • United States v. Stein (en banc): the Opinion’s central driver. The Court treated Stein as controlling on a practical question common in wage-and-hour cases: whether a plaintiff’s sworn, personal-knowledge account can create a genuine dispute even if uncorroborated and even if the employer’s records point the other way. The Opinion emphasized that Rule 56 allows self-serving statements based on personal knowledge and does not require independent corroboration.

4. Evidentiary discretion and discovery sanctions

  • Camps v. Bravo and Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach: set the abuse-of-discretion standard and the breadth of district-court choice on evidentiary rulings.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why summary judgment was improper

The Court framed the dispositive question as whether Byrne presented admissible, nonconclusory evidence, based on personal knowledge, from which a reasonable jury could find (1) unpaid overtime and (2) Goodwill’s knowledge. It held he did.

The Opinion treated the case as a straightforward application of United States v. Stein to the FLSA context: Goodwill offered payroll/time records and written policies; Byrne countered with sworn testimony that the records did not capture off-the-clock work. Under Stein, the district court could not discount that evidence merely because it was “self-serving” or uncorroborated.

2. Evidence supporting unpaid overtime and employer knowledge

Byrne’s sworn testimony described specific off-the-clock duties and times: arriving early (before 8:00 a.m.) to open gates and docks, prepare schedules, and power slow computers; staying after 4:30 p.m.; and working through lunch while being told to clock out regardless. He further attributed the practice to supervisor directives (Martin and, later, allegedly Fernandez) that he should avoid recorded overtime while still completing required work.

On knowledge, the Court credited that a jury could infer knowledge if supervisors instructed him to (a) avoid clocking overtime while (b) still completing tasks, and if Byrne complained to HR about after-hours obligations (e.g., waiting time tied to TOPS! and alarm issues). This was enough to get past summary judgment under Bailey v. TitleMax of Ga., Inc. and Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty..

3. Written policies and contrary declarations did not eliminate triable disputes

The Court stressed that Goodwill’s written “no off-the-clock work” policy and declarations from supervisors/coworkers may be persuasive at trial, but they do not authorize a court to weigh credibility at summary judgment under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. The Opinion also rejected the implicit notion that a policy alone conclusively establishes compliance in practice.

4. The “Fernandez in Georgia” evidence narrowed, but did not defeat, the case

Goodwill’s evidence that Fernandez was out of state during the alleged April 1, 2024 meeting undermined that specific factual assertion. But the Court found that the claim still survived because Byrne’s theory included earlier, supervisor-driven off-the-clock instructions (not dependent on that meeting). In other words, disproving one episode did not necessarily negate the broader alleged practice, particularly as to Martin.

5. Precision of overtime proof not required at summary judgment

Applying Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., the Court held Byrne was not required to prove the exact number of uncompensated hours at this stage if he contended the employer’s records were inaccurate; he needed only enough evidence to permit a “just and reasonable inference.” His description of routine pre-shift, post-shift, and meal-period work, along with an approximate weekly estimate, was sufficient to create a triable dispute.

6. Why excluding the TOPS! text messages was within discretion

The Court affirmed exclusion under a familiar Rule 26/37 pathway: TOPS!-related texts were responsive to discovery requests, but Byrne produced them only with his summary judgment response. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), late-disclosed evidence is barred unless the failure is “substantially justified or harmless,” and Byrne did not make that showing. Given the abuse-of-discretion review under Camps v. Bravo, the ruling stood.

C. Impact

Although designated “Not for Publication,” the decision is significant in three practical ways for Eleventh Circuit FLSA litigation:

  1. Reinforced viability of employee-only proof at summary judgment: The Opinion underscores that plaintiffs can survive summary judgment with detailed, personal-knowledge sworn testimony about off-the-clock work, even where payroll records appear facially complete, because United States v. Stein prevents courts from requiring corroboration as a condition of a “genuine dispute.”
  2. Separation of merits disputes from discovery compliance: The Court simultaneously signaled strictness on discovery obligations (late texts excluded) while rejecting the idea that evidentiary exclusion necessarily dooms the claim when other admissible evidence remains.
  3. Policies are not dispositive: Employers cannot rely solely on written prohibitions against off-the-clock work to win summary judgment if there is sworn evidence that supervisors’ instructions or operational realities effectively required uncompensated work.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Off-the-clock work”: Work the employee performs for the employer’s benefit that is not captured by the timekeeping system and therefore not paid.
  • FLSA overtime elements: The employee must show (1) overtime hours worked without proper pay and (2) the employer knew or should have known.
  • “Knew or should have known”: Actual knowledge (e.g., supervisor directives) or constructive knowledge (facts indicating the employer would discover the work through reasonable diligence).
  • Mt. Clemens burden shift / “just and reasonable inference”: If records are unreliable, the employee may estimate and prove hours indirectly; once that showing is made, the employer must rebut it with precise evidence or by negating the inference.
  • “Self-serving” testimony: Testimony that favors the speaker. Under United States v. Stein, that label is not a basis to disregard sworn, personal-knowledge testimony at summary judgment.
  • Rules 26 and 37(c)(1): If a party fails to timely disclose responsive information, the default consequence is exclusion of that information from use at summary judgment or trial, unless the late disclosure was substantially justified or harmless.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit drew a clear line: district courts may enforce discovery rules by excluding late-disclosed evidence, but they may not grant summary judgment by discounting an employee’s detailed sworn account simply because it is uncorroborated or conflicts with employer records. In FLSA off-the-clock cases, United States v. Stein and Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. together ensure that credible, personal-knowledge testimony can create a jury question about uncompensated overtime and employer knowledge—even when the employer offers facially compliant policies and time sheets.