Self-Defense Does Not Bar § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) Enhancement Where Deadly Force Was Unreasonable and Retreat Was Available—Especially for a Felon in Illegal Possession

1. Introduction

United States v. Dajour Naylor (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) addresses when a defendant’s self-defense claim can defeat a federal firearm sentencing enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (renumbered in a later Guidelines version as § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B)). Naylor, a convicted felon, pleaded guilty to possessing ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the District Court applied a four-level enhancement after finding he possessed a firearm/ammunition “in connection with another felony offense,” namely recklessly endangering another person under Pennsylvania law, based on footage showing him firing multiple shots in a parking lot with bystanders.

The key issue on appeal was narrow: even if the underlying conduct fit “another felony offense,” should the enhancement be denied because Naylor’s gunfire was justified self-defense under Pennsylvania law? The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding the District Court did not err in finding Naylor’s use of deadly force unreasonable and that he had—and violated—a duty to retreat.

Note: The panel labeled the decision “NOT PRECEDENTIAL” under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, meaning it does not bind future panels, but it is still instructive on how the court evaluates self-defense arguments in Guidelines litigation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The court affirmed the application of USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because the record supported the finding that Naylor committed the felony of recklessly endangering another person.
  • The court rejected Naylor’s contention that self-defense precluded the enhancement, holding the District Court did not misapply Pennsylvania self-defense law in finding:
    • Naylor’s belief in the need for deadly force was not objectively reasonable under the totality of circumstances (including video evidence).
    • Naylor violated a duty to retreat, since he had a plausible opportunity to avoid using deadly force with complete safety.
  • The panel also noted Naylor’s constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) were foreclosed by circuit precedent and conceded as such.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion’s reasoning is built from three bodies of authority: (1) Third Circuit standards of sentencing review, (2) Pennsylvania self-defense doctrine, and (3) cross-circuit cases on reviewing self-defense findings tied to Guidelines enhancements.

A. Federal sentencing review and issue preservation

  • United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009): supplied the framework for reviewing Guidelines decisions (legal conclusions de novo; factual findings for clear error; application to facts for abuse of discretion). The panel used this scaffolding to explain why Naylor’s challenge largely rose or fell on whether the District Court clearly erred in rejecting self-defense.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 40 F.4th 117, 121 (3d Cir. 2022): reinforced that, for sentencing enhancements, application of the Guidelines to facts is reviewed for clear error. The panel relied on this to set a deferential posture toward the District Court’s fact-heavy determinations about danger, reasonableness, and retreat.
  • United States v. Caraballo, 88 F.4th 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2023): defined clear error (“definite and firm conviction” of mistake) and emphasized that plausible findings supported by the whole record are not reversible. This was crucial because the Third Circuit framed the retreat finding as “at least plausible” based on the video and sequence of events.
  • United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70, 81 (3d Cir. 2022): cited for forfeiture when an argument is “tuck[ed] ... into a single footnote” without analysis. The panel referenced this in noting a potential forfeiture issue as to any undeveloped challenge to the “recklessly endangering” predicate, underscoring that sentencing appeals require properly developed briefing.

B. Pennsylvania self-defense doctrine

  • Commonwealth v. Harris, 665 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. 1995): provided the three-part Pennsylvania test for justified deadly force: (a) free from fault; (b) reasonable belief of imminent danger and necessity; (c) no violation of the duty to retreat/avoid danger. The panel treated these elements as the governing yardstick for whether self-defense could negate the “another felony offense” predicate.
  • Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (Pa. 2012): emphasized that the belief in the need for deadly force must be objectively reasonable “in light of the facts as they appeared to the defendant.” This case anchored the appellate court’s conclusion that, even if Naylor subjectively feared harm, the District Court permissibly found his resort to gunfire in a populated parking lot was not objectively necessary.

C. Cross-circuit support for “clear error” review of self-defense tied to enhancements

The panel cited persuasive authority from other circuits to justify reviewing self-defense findings for clear error in the enhancement context:

  • United States v. Mattox, 27 F.4th 668, 676-77 (8th Cir. 2022)
  • United States v. Clinton, 591 F.3d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 2010)
  • United States v. White, No. 23-10194, 2024 WL 4987350, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2024)
  • United States v. McGhee, No. 22-3471, 2023 WL 3815181, at *2-3 (6th Cir. June 5, 2023)

These citations served an important function: they insulated the panel’s approach from criticism that self-defense should be treated as a purely legal question. Instead, the court characterized self-defense (as deployed here) as an evidentiary, fact-bound justification whose success depends on the district judge’s assessment of reasonableness and alternatives—classic clear-error terrain.

D. Foreclosed constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2025): foreclosed Naylor’s Second Amendment challenge, at least as applied to individuals on parole or probation; Naylor conceded this bar.
  • United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 2001): foreclosed the Commerce Clause challenge, reaffirming § 922(g)(1) as a valid exercise of Congress’s regulatory power.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The enhancement and the “another felony offense” predicate

The enhancement applies when a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” The “other felony” identified was recklessly endangering another person, based on Naylor firing multiple shots in a parking lot where bystanders were present. The panel accepted the sufficiency of evidence for that felony predicate, referencing the District Court’s earlier analysis in United States v. Naylor, No. 21-398, 2024 WL 617659 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2024).

B. Why self-defense did not defeat the enhancement

The Third Circuit treated self-defense as a potential justification that, if established, could negate criminality of the “other felony offense.” It then affirmed the District Court’s rejection of that justification on two independent Pennsylvania-law grounds:

  1. Objective unreasonableness of deadly force under the totality of the circumstances. Applying Commonwealth v. Mouzon, the court agreed that even if Naylor believed he faced imminent danger, the belief that deadly force was necessary was not reasonable. The court emphasized that the District Court’s conclusion was strongly supported by video exhibits, which depicted Naylor retrieving a gun and firing multiple rounds in a public parking lot.
  2. Violation of the duty to retreat. Under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 505(b)(2)(ii), deadly force is unjustified if the actor knows he can avoid the necessity of deadly force with complete safety by retreating. The panel recited the sequence: Naylor dove to the ground after the first shot from a nearby hill, moved between cars, retrieved a gun, and—while others retreated—stood, fired toward the hill while running across the lot, then returned behind cars and fired again. On that record, it was “at least plausible” that he had an opportunity to retreat; therefore, the appellate court could not find clear error.

C. The court’s specific treatment of “deadly force” and statutory exceptions

The panel also rejected two doctrinal moves that would have eliminated the retreat inquiry:

  • “This wasn’t deadly force.” The court held that firing a gun multiple times is “readily capable of causing death or serious bodily injury,” fitting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 501’s definition of deadly force—especially in a crowded parking lot.
  • “No retreat because the attacker used a firearm.” Pennsylvania’s no-retreat provision for firearm attacks under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 505(b)(2.3) is unavailable to a person “engaged in criminal activity” or “in illegal possession of a firearm.” The court reasoned that because Naylor was a convicted felon barred from possessing a firearm, he could not invoke that exception once he picked up the gun.

3.3. Impact

Although “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is practically significant in at least four ways:

  • Self-defense as a fact question at sentencing. By aligning with United States v. Mattox, United States v. Clinton, United States v. White, and United States v. McGhee, the decision reinforces that self-defense arguments used to block Guidelines enhancements will typically be reviewed deferentially, making district-court fact development (especially video) pivotal.
  • Retreat analysis can be decisive even when the defendant is initially “free from fault.” The panel accepted it was undisputed Naylor did not provoke the encounter, but still affirmed denial of justification based on reasonableness and retreat—highlighting how Pennsylvania self-defense can fail on later elements.
  • Illegal possession can strip away “stand-your-ground”-type protections. The court’s reliance on § 505(b)(2.3)’s limitation underscores a recurring theme: defendants unlawfully possessing firearms may be unable to claim statutory no-retreat privileges, a point likely to recur in firearm sentencing cases tied to state-law justifications.
  • Guidelines renumbering is non-substantive but can cause confusion. The opinion’s note that the enhancement appears in the “current” Guidelines as § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) is a practice cue for litigants to track which manual applies and to brief both numbering schemes when relevant.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (“in connection with another felony offense”)
A federal sentencing rule that increases the offense level if the firearm/ammunition possession is tied to another felony (for example, using the gun in a separate felony). The “other felony” need not be a federal offense; it can be a state felony.
“Recklessly endangering another person” (Pennsylvania)
A crime generally involving conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious injury to others. Firing multiple shots in a public area with bystanders is classic evidence.
Self-defense: subjective fear vs. objective reasonableness
A person may truly fear harm (subjective belief), but the law requires that belief—and the choice to use deadly force—to be reasonable from an objective standpoint, considering what a reasonable person would do in the same circumstances (Commonwealth v. Mouzon).
Duty to retreat
Even when threatened, deadly force is not justified if the person can safely avoid it by retreating (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 505(b)(2)(ii)). “Stand your ground” style exceptions exist, but Pennsylvania limits some exceptions where the actor is engaged in criminal activity or illegally possesses a firearm.
Clear error review
A highly deferential appellate standard. The appellate court does not ask whether it would decide differently, but whether the district court’s finding was implausible or a definite mistake (United States v. Caraballo). If the district court’s account fits the record, it stands.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Dajour Naylor affirms that a defendant’s self-defense narrative will not automatically block the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement when the district court plausibly finds (1) the defendant’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and/or (2) the defendant could have retreated with complete safety. The decision also highlights a critical Pennsylvania limitation: a felon who illegally possesses a firearm may be unable to invoke statutory no-retreat protections. In practice, the opinion underscores the importance of record evidence (especially video) and the uphill battle defendants face under clear-error review when challenging self-defense-related sentencing findings.