“Seeking Admission” Limits § 1225(b)(2)(A): Interior Noncitizens Must Be Detained Under § 1226 With Bond-Hearing Protections

I. Introduction

In Juan Lopez-Campos v. Kevin Raycraft (consolidated with related appeals), the Sixth Circuit addressed a consequential detention question after the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Petitioners—long-term, unlawfully present noncitizens arrested in the interior of the United States—were detained without bond under the government’s view that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandated their detention as “applicant[s] for admission.” They sought habeas relief, arguing that (1) their detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (which allows bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A); and (2) detention without an individualized bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment.

The district courts granted habeas relief, ordering bond hearings (and, in most cases, also finding a due process violation). The government appealed. Although the government released the Petitioners without bond hearings after losing below, the Sixth Circuit reached the merits and affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Statutory holding: Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to interior noncitizens who never took an affirmative step to obtain lawful entry; the phrase “seeking admission” requires an active attempt to obtain “admission” (lawful entry after inspection and authorization). Petitioners were therefore subject to detention, if at all, under § 1226.
  • Constitutional holding: For Petitioners detained under § 1226(a), the failure to provide an individualized bond hearing violated procedural due process given their prolonged detention and deep ties to the interior of the United States. The court rejected the government’s reliance on border-entry and criminal-detention precedents.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The detention framework and the § 1225 / § 1226 divide: Jennings v. Rodriguez

The court anchored its statutory analysis in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), which described immigration detention as split between: (i) §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) for certain noncitizens “seeking admission,” and (ii) §§ 1226(a) and (c) for noncitizens “already in the country” pending removal proceedings. The Sixth Circuit treated this description as confirming a structural distinction: § 1225 is not a universal detention mandate for everyone “deemed” an applicant for admission; it is targeted to those actually seeking admission in the ordinary sense, while § 1226 operates as the default for interior arrests.

2. Statutory interpretation methodology: Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., and Sixth Circuit textualism

The opinion applied the familiar textual framework from Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) and United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (as quoted through United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp., 993 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2021)): read words in context; if unambiguous and coherent, stop. It also relied on the ordinary-meaning approach expressed in United States v. Green, 167 F.4th 832 (6th Cir. 2026) and related circuit authority, while recognizing Congress’s ability to define terms specially per Feliciano v. Dep't of Transp., 605 U.S. 38 (2025).

3. Ordinary meaning of “seeking”: dictionary usage and Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs.

To fix the meaning of “seeking admission,” the court emphasized dictionaries contemporaneous with IIRIRA and reinforced the “request/ask for” sense of “seek” noted in Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142 (2023). The key move: “seeking” requires an affirmative effort toward lawful entry. The Petitioners—who entered without inspection and lived for years avoiding inspection—were not “seeking” lawful entry at the time of interior arrest.

4. Canons of construction: surplusage, distinct-words presumption, absurdity avoidance

The court drew on the distinct-words presumption (different words mean different things) as articulated in Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 168 F.4th 367 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting Tomaszcuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 2018)), and the canon against surplusage using Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019) and Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013).

These canons mattered because § 1225(b)(2)(A) uses both “applicant for admission” (a defined statutory category) and “alien seeking admission” (an undefined phrase). If “seeking admission” merely meant “being an applicant for admission,” Congress would have written only one of them.

The court also invoked the absurdity principle from Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) to reject the dissent’s attempt to give “seeking admission” independent work by tying it to withdrawal of an application under § 1225(a)(4). The majority reasoned that such a rule would irrationally make bond eligibility turn on whether a person tries to leave immediately or whether withdrawal is accepted—an outcome the court deemed too incoherent to attribute to Congress.

5. “Otherwise” and rejecting the government’s grammatical argument: Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons and related cases

The government argued that § 1225(a)(3) (“applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission”) implies every “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission.” The majority declined to treat “otherwise” as importing a catchall of the preceding phrase because § 1225(a)(3) lacks the sort of enumerated list structure that triggers that reading, citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) and discussing the limits of ejusdem generis via Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024) and other examples.

6. Agency practice after the end of Chevron: Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo

The court treated the government’s long-standing practice (1997–2025) as interpretive evidence, citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). Post-Loper Bright, the Sixth Circuit framed agency practice not as controlling deference but as historically informative evidence about what reading is “natural and reasonable,” particularly where the government itself conceded its interpretation was novel.

7. Due process: interior noncitizens’ protections and limits—Mezei, Yamataya, Zadvydas, Demore, Thuraissigiam

The due process analysis turned on a line of Supreme Court decisions:

  • Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) and Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) supplied the “passed through our gates” principle: noncitizens physically inside the United States (even unlawfully) are protected by due process in expulsion procedures.
  • Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) supplied the liberty baseline (“freedom from imprisonment” at the heart of due process) and the idea that civil immigration detention must remain tethered to regulatory purposes and temporal reasonableness.
  • Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) upheld categorical mandatory detention for certain criminal noncitizens under § 1226(c), but the Sixth Circuit refused to extend that holding to § 1226(a) detainees (and emphasized Demore’s reliance on Congress’s flight-risk findings for criminal categories).
  • Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020) was confined to expedited removal and noncitizens at or near the border seeking initial entry; the Sixth Circuit held it did not control long-term interior residents.

For procedural-due-process doctrine, the court also cited Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (via Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000)) and Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (via an unpublished Sixth Circuit disposition), using these cases to frame the central requirement: a meaningful opportunity to be heard when the government deprives physical liberty.

8. Sister-circuit decisions and the emerging split

The Sixth Circuit expressly joined the approach of Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1243395 (11th Cir. 2026) and Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. 2026), and aligned with “Judge Lee’s individual opinion” referenced in Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1223250 (7th Cir. 2026). It thus rejected the opposing interpretations in Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) and Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core textual distinction: “applicant for admission” vs. “seeking admission”

The opinion’s central doctrinal contribution is its insistence that Congress’s definition of “applicant for admission” in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) does not erase the ordinary meaning of the separate phrase “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A). Even if unlawfully present noncitizens are “deemed” applicants for admission for statutory purposes, they are not necessarily “seeking admission” unless they take an affirmative step toward lawful entry (inspection/authorization) as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

2. Context and structure: why Congress likely did not mean “mandatory detention for millions”

Beyond semantics, the court added a structural and pragmatic inference: Congress built transitional capacity safeguards into IIRIRA’s mandatory detention for certain criminal noncitizens (the § 1226(c) rollout), but included no analogous “escape hatch” for § 1225(b)(2)(A). The court treated that contrast as evidence that Congress did not intend § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate detention for the enormous interior population of unlawfully present noncitizens.

3. Government’s counter-theories rejected

  • “All applicants are seeking” theory: rejected as inconsistent with the statutory choice to include both phrases and with ordinary meaning.
  • “Otherwise” argument from § 1225(a)(3): rejected as a misfit use of canons and as better read to cover distinct categories (e.g., LPRs and stowaways) that may seek admission without being “applicants for admission.”
  • Defining “seek” via “apply/applicant”: rejected because “applicant for admission” is a statutorily defined term of art; courts should not disassemble and re-derive it from the ordinary meanings of “applicant” and “apply.”
  • “Seeking admission by resisting removal” theory: rejected because many forms of relief (e.g., certain cancellation or TPS/asylum-related statuses discussed via Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409 (2021) and BIA decisions like Matter of Y-N-P-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 10 (BIA 2012)) do not equate to “seeking admission,” and because § 1225(b)(2)(A) is triggered by an “examining immigration officer,” not an immigration judge.

4. Due process: § 1226(a) detainees and the requirement of an individualized bond hearing

Having held § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable, the court treated Petitioners as § 1226(a) detainees. It then upheld the district courts’ conclusion that prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violated due process for long-term interior residents. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning tracked established themes in Zadvydas v. Davis (liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint; civil detention must serve regulatory ends) while distinguishing:

  • Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam as a border-entry/expedited-removal case, not an interior-detention case; and
  • Demore v. Kim as addressing § 1226(c) criminal mandatory detention supported by congressional findings, not § 1226(a)’s default discretionary scheme.

The court also cited how other circuits have required bond hearings or heightened burdens once detention becomes unreasonable, including Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 2020), and German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020).

C. Impact

1. Practical consequences for detention policy in the Sixth Circuit

The decision substantially limits the government’s post-Matter of Yajure Hurtado attempt to route interior, long-term unlawfully present noncitizens into § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s no-bond regime. Within the Sixth Circuit, such individuals are generally governed by § 1226, restoring access to individualized bond adjudication (unless a separate mandatory-detention provision applies).

2. Doctrinal consequences: a sharpened circuit split and increased Supreme Court gravity

By explicitly aligning with Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden and Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami and rejecting Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi and Avila v. Bondi, the Sixth Circuit deepened a live circuit conflict on the meaning of “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A). The issue affects large numbers of interior detainees and detention capacity nationwide, making Supreme Court review more likely.

3. Interaction with the Laken Riley Act amendments

The majority did not treat the Laken Riley Act as displacing § 1226(a) for all interior unlawfully present noncitizens; instead, it maintained § 1226’s centrality as the default detention framework for interior cases not properly governed by § 1225. Future litigation will likely explore how the Laken Riley Act’s expanded § 1226(c) categories interact with bond procedures and constitutional limits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Admission” vs. “presence”: “Admission” is a technical term meaning lawful entry after inspection and authorization. Being physically present in the United States—lawfully or unlawfully—is a different concept.
  • “Applicant for admission”: By statute, some people already inside the United States (including those never lawfully admitted) can be “deemed” applicants for admission for immigration-law purposes.
  • “Seeking admission”: The Sixth Circuit treated this as ordinary language requiring an affirmative attempt to obtain lawful admission—not merely being classified as an applicant for admission.
  • Mandatory detention vs. bond hearing: Mandatory detention statutes require custody without individualized release determinations. A bond hearing is an individualized proceeding assessing flight risk and danger.
  • Habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2241): A mechanism for a detainee to challenge unlawful custody, including detention under the wrong statute or detention that violates the Constitution.
  • Key interpretive canons used: the presumption that different words have different meanings; the canon against surplusage (avoid making words meaningless); and the canon against absurd results.

V. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s principal contribution is a clarified rule of statutory scope: § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory detention applies only when the government can show the person is “seeking admission” in the ordinary, affirmative sense, not merely “deemed” an applicant for admission by presence without lawful admission. As a result, long-term interior noncitizens like the Petitioners fall under § 1226, where individualized bond procedures—and, in prolonged detention circumstances, the Fifth Amendment’s demand for meaningful process—constrain executive detention authority. The opinion squarely rejects extending border-entry and criminal-mandatory-detention precedents to this interior, § 1226(a) context and intensifies a circuit split poised to shape national detention practices.