“Seeking Admission” Limits § 1225(b)(2)(A): Interior Noncitizens Detained After Long Residence Fall Under § 1226 and Must Receive Bond Hearings

1. Introduction

In Jose Daniel Contreras-Cervantes and related consolidated cases, the Sixth Circuit reviewed district-court grants of habeas relief to multiple noncitizens who had lived for years in the United States without lawful status. ICE (and related federal officials) detained them under the mandatory detention scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), relying on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Immigration judges largely declined to conduct bond hearings, concluding they lacked jurisdiction.

The central question was statutory but carried major liberty consequences: whether noncitizens arrested in the interior—who did not present themselves for inspection or otherwise affirmatively attempt lawful entry—may be treated as “alien[s] seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A), thereby triggering mandatory detention without bond, or instead fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which (at least under § 1226(a)) contemplates bond determinations. Petitioners also pressed a Fifth Amendment claim that detention without an individualized bond hearing violated due process.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the habeas grants. It held:

  • Statutory holding: § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like Petitioners because the statutory phrase “seeking admission” requires an affirmative pursuit of lawful entry. Petitioners—longtime interior residents who entered without inspection and were not attempting lawful entry—were therefore not within § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme and could be detained only under § 1226.
  • Constitutional holding: for those detained under § 1226(a), the failure to provide an individualized bond hearing violated Fifth Amendment due process (with the court leaving undisturbed that one district court had declined to reach the constitutional issue after granting statutory relief).

Although the government released Petitioners during the litigation (often without conducting any bond hearing), the court addressed the legality of the underlying detention regime because the dispute concerned the governing detention authority and process.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

(a) The Supreme Court’s detention framework: Jennings v. Rodriguez

The court treated Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) as the indispensable starting point for the INA’s detention architecture. Jennings distinguishes detention authorities for (i) certain “aliens seeking admission” under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) and (ii) “aliens already in the country” pending removal under §§ 1226(a) and (c). The Sixth Circuit used Jennings for two propositions:

  • Jennings confirms that detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is mandatory and continues “until removal proceedings have concluded.”
  • Jennings describes § 1226 as the “default rule” for detention pending removability decisions, reinforcing the court’s conclusion that § 1226 governs where § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not.

(b) Text-first statutory interpretation and canons

The opinion is as much an interpretive-method case as an immigration case. It relied on:

  • United States ex rel. Felten v. William Beaumont Hosp., 993 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)) to frame plain-meaning analysis through text, context, and statutory structure.
  • United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (via Robinson) for the rule that unambiguous statutory language controls.
  • Feliciano v. Dep't of Transp., 605 U.S. 38 (2025) and United States v. Green, 167 F.4th 832 (6th Cir. 2026) for ordinary-meaning defaults when Congress does not define a term.
  • Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 168 F.4th 367 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting Tomaszcuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 2018)) for the presumption that different words carry different meanings.
  • Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019) and Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013) for the canon against surplusage.
  • Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) for avoiding interpretations producing “absurd” results.

The court also engaged the dissent and government’s reliance on “otherwise” in § 1225(a)(3), rejecting the analogy to cases like Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015), Kleber v. CareFusion Corporation, 914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019), Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), and Attorney General of the United States v. Wynn, 104 F.4th 348 (D.C. Cir. 2024), emphasizing that those “otherwise” clauses followed enumerated lists—unlike § 1225(a)(3).

(c) The role of governmental practice after the end of Chevron

The opinion’s treatment of executive practice is shaped by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). Without relying on deference, the court used longstanding executive practice as “powerful evidence” of statutory meaning, citing NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014) (via Loper Bright). The court noted the government’s “previously unbroken 29-year streak” applying § 1226(a) (not § 1225(b)(2)(A)) to interior noncitizens who entered without inspection, including the 1997 interim rule (62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,323).

(d) Due process baseline for noncitizens inside the United States

For the constitutional question, the court relied on the deep line of Supreme Court authority recognizing due process protections for noncitizens who have entered the country:

  • Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) and Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) for the proposition that noncitizens who have “passed through our gates” may be expelled only through proceedings consistent with due process.
  • Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) for the centrality of freedom from physical restraint and the regulatory purposes of immigration detention (appearance and public safety).
  • Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) for the proposition that detention can be a permissible part of removal processes—but not a blank check.
  • Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (via Zadvydas) to reinforce the fundamental liberty interest in freedom from detention.

The government sought to limit due process using Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020) and Demore. The Sixth Circuit distinguished both: Thuraissigiam concerns noncitizens at or near the border “seeking initial entry,” and Demore addressed mandatory detention under § 1226(c) for criminal noncitizens, not the process due under § 1226(a).

(e) Sister-circuit decisions framing a live split

The Sixth Circuit located its holding within an emerging inter-circuit divide, expressly joining Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami and Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, and aligning with “Judge Lee’s individual opinion” in Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., while disagreeing with Avila v. Bondi and Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi. This framing signals that the court regarded the issue as nationally consequential and ripe for further review.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statutory pivot: “seeking admission” requires an affirmative pursuit of lawful entry

The court’s core move was to treat “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) as an operative limitation, not a synonym for “applicant for admission.” It proceeded in three steps:

  1. Defined terms do not end the inquiry: Congress defined “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1) and “admission” in § 1101(a)(13)(A), but did not define “seeking.” The court thus gave “seeking” its ordinary meaning, supported by contemporary dictionary definitions and Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142 (2023).
  2. Text and structure distinguish “applicant” from “seeking”: Using the presumption from Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP and the surplusage canon from Nielsen v. Preap, the court concluded Congress’s choice to include both phrases indicates “seeking admission” adds content beyond being an “applicant for admission.”
  3. Application to interior arrests: Petitioners, by entering without inspection and living for years in the interior, were not actively trying to obtain “lawful entry…after inspection and authorization” at the moment triggering § 1225(b)(2)(A). They were therefore not “seeking admission,” making § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable.

(b) Rejection of “seeking admission” as coextensive with “applicant for admission”

The government and dissent argued that every “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission,” pointing to § 1225(a)(3)’s “applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission….” The majority rejected this linguistic inference, reading “otherwise” as signaling distinct categories rather than collapsing them, relying on Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) and contrasting list-based “otherwise” usages.

The court also rejected a dissent-based attempt to preserve surplusage by tying “seeking admission” to the withdrawal provision (§ 1225(a)(4)). It reasoned that making bond eligibility depend on whether a person seeks immediate departure (or whether withdrawal is accepted) produces irrational outcomes, invoking Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League.

(c) Structural and pragmatic coherence: detention-capacity “escape hatches” and congressional design

Beyond textualism, the court argued Congress’s design choices strongly disfavor the government’s sweeping view. It contrasted IIRIRA’s inclusion of an “escape hatch” delaying implementation of § 1226(c) due to detention-space constraints with the absence of any similar provision for § 1225(b)(2)(A). Given Congress’s awareness of millions of interior noncitizens, the court found it implausible Congress silently mandated mandatory detention of that scale under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without capacity safeguards.

(d) The due process holding: § 1226(a) detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment here

Having concluded § 1226 governed, the court affirmed the district courts’ constitutional rulings that Petitioners were entitled to individualized bond hearings. Key elements of the reasoning:

  • Protected liberty interest: the relevant interest is not a right to remain in the United States; it is the fundamental interest in freedom from physical restraint, per Zadvydas v. Davis and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
  • Interior presence matters: Petitioners had “passed through our gates,” placing them within the due process-protected category described in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei and Yamataya v. Fisher.
  • Limits of the government’s Supreme Court reliance:
    • Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam was limited to near-border/initial-entry circumstances.
    • Demore v. Kim upheld categorical detention for § 1226(c) criminal detainees and did not authorize elimination of bond process under § 1226(a), which operates differently as the “default rule” in Jennings v. Rodriguez.
  • Alignment with other circuits’ due process case law: the court cited examples where prolonged or unjustified civil immigration detention demands a hearing to assess flight risk and dangerousness, including Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, Velasco Lopez v. Decker, and German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility.

3.3. Impact

(a) Immediate doctrinal effect in the Sixth Circuit

  • Statutory: DHS may not use § 1225(b)(2)(A) to impose mandatory, no-bond detention on interior noncitizens who are “applicants for admission” only by operation of § 1225(a)(1) but are not “seeking admission” in the ordinary sense.
  • Procedural: where such individuals are detained under § 1226(a), the Sixth Circuit’s decision supports a constitutional requirement of an individualized bond hearing (at least on the facts presented: long-term interior residence and detention without flight-risk/danger findings).

(b) National significance and likelihood of further review

The opinion intensifies a developing circuit split—expressly contrasting Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami and Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden with Avila v. Bondi and Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi. Because the question affects detention authority across large populations and interacts with recent statutory changes (including the Laken Riley Act’s amendments to § 1226(c)), the decision is a strong candidate for en banc review or Supreme Court resolution.

(c) Administrative-law consequences post-Loper Bright

The court’s reliance on executive “longstanding practice” as an interpretive aid—without deference—illustrates how agencies may lose Chevron-style control over statutory meaning yet still influence outcomes through durable, consistent implementation patterns (so long as courts find that practice coherent with text and structure).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Applicant for admission” vs. “seeking admission”: Under § 1225(a)(1), many people physically present without lawful admission are legally treated as “applicant[s] for admission.” This case holds that being labeled an “applicant” does not automatically mean the person is “seeking” admission for § 1225(b)(2)(A); “seeking” demands an affirmative attempt to obtain lawful entry.
  • § 1225 detention vs. § 1226 detention: § 1225(b)(2)(A) is generally mandatory detention for certain “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking admission.” § 1226 is the general detention authority pending removal decisions; under § 1226(a), release on bond is contemplated (unlike mandatory-detention categories such as § 1226(c)).
  • Habeas corpus in this setting: A habeas petition challenges the legality of custody. Here, the custody was attacked both because the government used the wrong statute (§ 1225 instead of § 1226) and because detention without a bond hearing was claimed to violate due process.
  • Procedural due process and “bond hearings”: Procedural due process requires meaningful procedures before depriving someone of liberty. A bond hearing is the mechanism to test whether detention is necessary (e.g., for flight risk or danger) rather than automatic.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision establishes a consequential rule for immigration detention in the circuit: § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory detention does not extend to interior noncitizens who are not affirmatively “seeking admission,” even if they are deemed “applicant[s] for admission” under § 1225(a)(1). Those individuals instead fall under § 1226, and—on the facts presented—due process requires an individualized bond hearing rather than detention without any flight-risk or dangerousness assessment. The opinion both deepens an acknowledged circuit split and provides a post-Loper Bright template for integrating text, canons, statutory design, and longstanding executive practice to resolve high-stakes questions of immigration custody.