Section 922(g)(3) Survives Facial Challenge, but Hemani Requires Reconsideration of Guilty-Plea Withdrawal

1. Introduction

This appeal concerns the constitutional limits of the federal prohibition on firearm possession by an unlawful user of, or person addicted to, a controlled substance, and the consequences of those limits for a guilty plea. David Gibson pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement and after jury selection, to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The district court subsequently denied his motion to withdraw that plea and sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment.

Gibson challenged both the statute and the validity of his plea. He argued that § 922(g)(3) was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, that the government’s factual presentation was insufficient, and that he had not adequately understood either the meaning of “unlawful user” or the offense’s knowledge requirement.

While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772 (2026), limiting the application of § 922(g)(3) to a non-dangerous person who used marijuana a few times weekly. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Gibson’s facial constitutional challenge and his evidentiary-sufficiency argument, but directed the district court to reconsider plea withdrawal in light of that intervening decision. It did not decide whether Gibson’s own conduct could constitutionally support a conviction.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

At the plea hearing, the prosecutor explained that the government would need to establish that Gibson was an unlawful user of controlled substances near the time he possessed a firearm and knew that he occupied that status. The prosecutor then offered the following factual account:

• Federal and local officers searched Gibson’s residence on November 17, 2022, and found 26 firearms.
• Gibson admitted regular marijuana use and having “dabbled in methamphetamine.”
• He admitted smoking methamphetamine the night before and the morning of the search.
• He had overdosed on narcotics in September 2021.
• He had pleaded guilty to a state methamphetamine-possession charge in February 2021.

Gibson accepted most of the proffer but disputed the characterization of his drug use as regular. He linked some use to his father’s death, acknowledged using drugs at some point while the firearms were in his home, and described taking two or three inhalations from a marijuana joint.

These qualifications matter because the constitutional question after Hemani cannot necessarily be answered merely by identifying some overlap between drug use and firearm possession. At the same time, the government’s account included methamphetamine use close to the search and an earlier overdose, making the record potentially different from the limited marijuana use addressed in Hemani. The appellate court did not determine the constitutional significance of those differences.

3. Summary of the Opinion

1. The guilty plea did not foreclose the facial constitutional challenge. Gibson could contest the government’s constitutional authority to prosecute conduct under the statute despite having pleaded guilty.
2. Section 922(g)(3) was not facially unconstitutional. Historical support for disarming presently intoxicated persons supplied a constitutionally permissible application, defeating an argument that the statute was invalid in every circumstance.
3. The evidentiary-sufficiency objection was waived. The court treated that objection as a non-jurisdictional challenge relinquished by the guilty plea.
4. The plea-validity questions required further consideration. After Hemani, uncertainty about which drug users may constitutionally be prosecuted affected Gibson’s arguments that he had not understood the charge or its knowledge requirement.
5. The district court received a limited opportunity to reconsider plea withdrawal. It must obtain supplemental briefing, rule again, and notify the appellate court so the remaining appeal can proceed.

The court neither vacated Gibson’s conviction nor ordered that his plea be withdrawn. Nor did it affirmatively determine that the government’s proffer established a constitutionally valid prosecution.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1. Constitutional challenges following a guilty plea

Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 178 (2018), supplied the threshold rule allowing consideration of Gibson’s facial challenge despite his guilty plea. Its role was procedural: the plea did not, by itself, eliminate his claim that the statute of conviction violated the Constitution.

The court did not treat Class v. United States as preserving every possible objection after a plea. Its later treatment of evidentiary sufficiency demonstrates the distinction between challenging the government’s legal authority to prosecute and challenging whether its evidence proves an offense.

4.2. Facial challenges and historical firearm regulation

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024), provided the demanding standard for a facial constitutional challenge outside the First Amendment context: the challenger must establish that no circumstances exist in which the statute would be valid. Consequently, identifying some unconstitutional applications of § 922(g)(3) would not establish facial invalidity.

The court also invoked United States v. Rahimi for the historical permissibility of disarming individuals who present a credible threat to others’ physical safety. That proposition supported the rejection of categorical invalidation; it did not establish that Gibson himself presented such a threat.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), supplied the historical-tradition framework underlying the Second Amendment dispute. Gibson argued that this decision displaced earlier circuit authority sustaining federal firearm restrictions. The panel rejected that broader abrogation argument and relied on historical support for restrictions involving present intoxication.

4.3. Other circuits’ rejection of facial invalidity

The court cited four decisions as reflecting a consistent rejection of facial challenges to § 922(g)(3):

• United States v. Seiwert, 152 F.4th 854, 872 (7th Cir. 2025).
• United States v. Stennerson, 150 F.4th 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 2025).
• United States v. Daniels, 124 F.4th 967, 974 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 2792 (2026).
• United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010).

The panel used these authorities collectively for the proposition that historical tradition supports disarming presently intoxicated individuals, leaving at least some constitutional applications of the statute. The decisions span periods before and after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, reinforcing the panel’s conclusion that the newer Second Amendment framework did not require facial invalidation.

The opinion did not examine those cases’ individual factual records or adopt a comprehensive test from any one of them. Their principal function was to establish agreement on the narrower facial-validity question.

4.4. Earlier Eleventh Circuit authority after Bruen

United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010), appeared as an example of earlier circuit authority upholding a § 922(g) restriction against a Second Amendment challenge. Gibson contended that such authority had been abrogated.

United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 888–89 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6281, 2026 WL 135685 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026), answered that argument. As the panel explained, that decision had recently rejected the same abrogation contention in the context of § 922(g)(1). Its importance here was the continued force of earlier circuit authority, not the proposition that every prohibited-person category must receive identical constitutional treatment.

4.5. Knowledge of prohibited status

Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 237 (2019), requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons prohibited from possessing one. Gibson invoked that rule to challenge whether he had adequately understood the knowledge element when pleading guilty.

The prosecutor had told Gibson that the government must prove he knew he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Nevertheless, the panel concluded that evaluating this explanation required a clearer account of which users could constitutionally fall within § 922(g)(3) after Hemani. The opinion did not establish a new requirement that defendants know the firearm prohibition itself or understand constitutional doctrine.

4.6. The intervening constitutional limitation

United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772 (2026), was decisive to the limited remand. There, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of an indictment because the government could not automatically deprive a non-dangerous defendant of firearm rights merely because he used marijuana a few times weekly. It also rejected the government’s proposed reliance on regular use of any amount of any controlled substance.

Crucially, United States v. Hemani reserved questions involving addicted persons, presently intoxicated persons, and prosecutions supported by individualized evidence that drug use renders a defendant dangerous to himself or others. Those reservations prevented a simple inference that Gibson’s prosecution was either necessarily valid or necessarily unconstitutional.

The panel also cited United States v. Nyandoro, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 2619961, at *7 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2026), for its observation that Hemani did not make the constitutional sufficiency of particular evidence obvious. This supported further consideration below rather than an immediate appellate resolution.

4.7. Waiver of evidentiary objections

United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998), supplied the basis for rejecting Gibson’s evidentiary-sufficiency contention. That decision treated a challenge to proof of an interstate-commerce element as non-jurisdictional and therefore waived by a guilty plea.

Applying the same distinction, the panel rejected Gibson’s contention that the proffer failed to establish a statutory violation. This was a procedural ruling, not a substantive endorsement of every factual assertion or a determination that the evidence met the constitutional limits recognized in Hemani.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1. Facial validity and unconstitutional applications can coexist

The opinion’s central analytical distinction is between invalidating a statute altogether and limiting its application to particular defendants. Gibson’s facial claim required him to eliminate every constitutionally permissible application. The panel concluded that historical support for disarming presently intoxicated persons defeated that claim.

That conclusion is compatible with Hemani. A statute may remain valid in some circumstances while being unconstitutional when applied to a non-dangerous person whose conduct consists of limited marijuana use. Thus, the court’s rejection of facial invalidity does not authorize prosecution of every person who uses a controlled substance.

There is also an important difference between the cited decisions’ roles: Hemani expressly reserved the present-intoxication question, while this panel relied on other circuit decisions and historical tradition to identify intoxication-related applications as a basis for rejecting facial invalidity.

5.2. Temporal proximity does not resolve every constitutional question

The prosecutor’s description emphasized drug use “in close proximity” to firearm possession. The record also contained Gibson’s broader admission that he used drugs at some point while the firearms remained in his home.

After Hemani, however, temporal overlap alone cannot automatically settle whether a prosecution is constitutional. Relevant distinctions may include the nature of the drug use, present intoxication, addiction, or individualized dangerousness. The panel did not adopt an exhaustive list or determine what evidence would establish any of these conditions.

Accordingly, neither the methamphetamine allegations nor the earlier overdose was treated as conclusively establishing a constitutionally sufficient prosecution. Their significance remained for further consideration.

5.3. The validity of the plea remains distinct from evidentiary sufficiency

The court separated Gibson’s objections into two categories. His attack on the sufficiency of the government’s evidence was waived under the guilty-plea rule. His contention that he had not understood the offense, however, called the plea’s validity into question and required additional analysis.

This distinction avoids circular reasoning. A guilty plea may foreclose an ordinary evidence challenge, but that procedural effect does not itself resolve whether the defendant adequately understood the charge when entering the plea.

Although Gibson initially described one objection as an insufficient factual basis, the panel disposed of his evidentiary contention through waiver. The opinion should not be read as announcing that every possible defect in a plea’s factual foundation is automatically beyond review.

5.4. Constitutional scope affects the assessment of the knowledge explanation

The panel identified an unresolved relationship between the constitutionally permissible reach of § 922(g)(3) and the explanation of its mental element. If some drug use cannot constitutionally support prosecution, merely informing a defendant that he must know he is an “unlawful user” may not resolve whether he understood the relevant status.

Nevertheless, the court did not specify a revised knowledge instruction or decide that the government must prove a defendant knew he was dangerous. It remanded because the constitutional baseline needed clarification before Gibson’s particular challenge could be properly evaluated.

5.5. The limited remand preserves the unresolved appeal

The court chose reconsideration rather than either ordering withdrawal or affirming the plea ruling outright. The district court must receive supplemental briefing, reassess the withdrawal motion, and report its ruling to the appellate court.

This is not an unrestricted remand for a new trial or resentencing. It creates a defined opportunity to address the intervening Supreme Court decision while leaving the remainder of the appeal for subsequent appellate action.

6. Potential Impact

Future constitutional litigation: The opinion directs attention away from categorical invalidation and toward fact-sensitive, as-applied challenges. Defendants must distinguish between arguing that § 922(g)(3) is invalid everywhere and arguing that their particular circumstances fall outside its constitutional reach.

Plea proceedings: Prosecutors and trial courts may need to examine whether generalized descriptions of unlawful drug use adequately explain a charge after Hemani. The decision does not prescribe a mandatory colloquy, but it illustrates the risks of treating any recurring drug use as automatically sufficient.

Pending appeals: An intervening constitutional decision may justify reconsideration of an existing plea-withdrawal ruling, even where a separate evidentiary objection has been waived. That is not an automatic entitlement to withdrawal; the district court must still decide the motion.

Limits of the ruling: The opinion establishes no universal dangerousness requirement, no minimum frequency of drug use, and no general exemption for marijuana users. Its unpublished status also limits its precedential force. Its principal value is the careful separation of constitutional validity, evidentiary waiver, and informed plea entry.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial challenge

An argument that a law is unconstitutional in all its applications. Under the standard applied here, one valid application defeats that argument.

As-applied challenge

An argument that a law cannot constitutionally be enforced against a particular person in particular circumstances, even though it remains valid elsewhere.

Historical tradition

The examination of historical firearm regulation used to determine whether a modern restriction is consistent with the Second Amendment.

Mens rea

The mental state required for an offense. Here, the relevant issue includes knowledge of the status that makes firearm possession prohibited.

Factual proffer

The prosecutor’s account of the evidence the government would present. A proffer is not the same as a jury finding after trial.

Non-jurisdictional waiver

The loss, through a guilty plea, of certain objections that do not concern the court’s authority to hear the prosecution. The court placed Gibson’s evidentiary-sufficiency objection in this category.

Knowing and voluntary plea

A guilty plea entered with adequate understanding of the charge and without improper coercion. Gibson’s unresolved arguments concerned whether he sufficiently understood the offense.

Limited relinquishment of jurisdiction

Permission for the district court to decide a specified issue while the appellate proceedings remain unfinished.

8. Conclusion

United States v. David Gibson preserves § 922(g)(3) against facial invalidation while recognizing that Hemani creates substantial questions about particular prosecutions and the adequacy of guilty-plea explanations. The court rejected Gibson’s evidentiary objection as waived but required renewed consideration of whether his plea should be withdrawn.

The essential lesson is that a statute’s general validity, the constitutional validity of a particular prosecution, and a defendant’s informed admission of guilt are separate questions. This opinion resolves the first, procedurally disposes of the evidentiary objection, and leaves the plea-validity issues for further proceedings.