§ 9-19-27 Does Not Govern Medical Records Used Solely for Impeachment; Party Testimony Can Supply Rule 901 Authentication

Case: Yohaira Galindez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Date: July 30, 2026
Disposition: Judgment for RIPTA affirmed

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a personal-injury action brought by plaintiff Yohaira Galindez against the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA). Galindez alleged she was injured on a RIPTA bus when the driver, Milton Luna, abruptly braked after a gray car cut in front of the bus. The case was tried to a jury in late 2023, and the jury returned a verdict for RIPTA.

On appeal, Galindez asserted eleven errors spanning: (i) multiple evidentiary rulings (including use of medical records and purported character/extrinsic-evidence violations), (ii) a spoliation issue relating to missing bus video, (iii) RIPTA’s eve-of-trial amendment to add “sudden emergency,” (iv) dismissal of a juror for childcare/family reasons, (v) the trial justice’s response to a deliberating jury’s spoliation question, (vi) an allegedly improper duty-of-care instruction (common-carrier “heightened duty”), and (vii) denial of a new-trial motion.

The Supreme Court affirmed across the board, holding that several arguments were waived for inadequate briefing or failure to preserve; and that, as to preserved issues, the trial justice acted within her discretion and correctly instructed the jury.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1. What the Court decided

• Medical records used for impeachment: § 9-19-27 did not apply; the records were admissible under Rule 803(4), and authentication was satisfied when Galindez confirmed the treatment/doctor/date. No evidentiary error.
• Spoliation: The trial justice actually gave a “comprehensive spoliation instruction,” consistent with Rhode Island law; no error.
• Multiple evidentiary complaints: Several were waived because Galindez did not identify the challenged evidence or develop the argument.
• Misattributed twin-sister medical record: Any prejudice was cured by a “swift and clear” curative instruction; no reversible error.
• Sudden emergency / amendment of pleadings: Allowing RIPTA to amend on the eve of trial was within the trial justice’s Rule 15 discretion; Galindez showed no “extreme prejudice,” especially given years of notice of RIPTA’s factual theory.
• Juror dismissal: Excusing Juror 170 for schedule/childcare-family needs was within the trial justice’s discretion; no showing of prejudice.
• Supplemental answer to jury question: The response accurately restated spoliation law and appropriately directed the jury back to the main instruction.
• Common-carrier heightened duty instruction: The issue was waived for failure to raise it in the Rule 59 new-trial motion, and also unpreserved because counsel provided no supporting law when requested.
• New trial motion: The trial justice reached the merits (after granting an enlargement of time) and did not deny on mere procedure; affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Waiver and appellate presentation

The Court foregrounded Rhode Island’s “raise-or-waive” and adequate-briefing requirements, relying on:

• Barnes v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority and Fisher v. Applebaum to enforce that merely listing issues “without a meaningful discussion” waives them.
• Broccoli v. Manning and A. Salvati Masonry Inc. v. Andreozzi to reiterate the same principle in the context of undeveloped arguments.
• Branson v. Louttit and Terzian v. Lombardi to stress the Court will not “scour the record” to rescue broad claims.
• Giddings v. Arpin to dispose of an unclear “aggravation” argument that lacked facts, law, and coherent development.

These authorities shaped the outcome materially: several of Galindez’s “evidentiary” issues never received merits review because the brief did not specify the witness, statement, exhibit, rule application, or prejudice theory.

B. Evidentiary rulings: deference, authentication, and medical hearsay

• State v. Rivera (quoting State v. Jones) supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings.
• Ims v. Town of Portsmouth reinforced that the Supreme Court is “disinclined” to find abuse if “some grounds” support the trial justice.
• O'Connor v. Newport Hospital (quoting McGovern v. Bank of America, N.A.) framed authentication as “not a high hurdle.”
• State v. Oliveira provided the “reasonably probable” threshold for authentication determinations.
• Perry v. Alessi (quoting McKenna v. St. Joseph Hospital) supplied the rationale for Rule 803(4): the patient’s strong motivation to be truthful for diagnosis/treatment.

Together these cases underwrote the Court’s twin holdings that (1) § 9-19-27 was the wrong analytical tool for impeachment use, and (2) the Rules of Evidence easily supported admission and authentication where Galindez acknowledged the encounter reflected in the record.

C. Spoliation and jury instructions

• Armour v. Bader supplied de novo review for jury instructions (including spoliation charges).
• State v. Threadgill and Ferris Avenue Realty, LLC v. Huhtamaki, Inc. were invoked to confirm the content and contours of Rhode Island spoliation doctrine, including that spoliation supports a permissive adverse inference.
• State v. Barnes (quoted through Threadgill) reinforced that spoliation “permits” but does not compel an adverse inference.

These precedents anchored the Court’s conclusion that the trial justice’s initial spoliation instruction was not merely adequate, but more than sufficient, and that the supplemental response during deliberations faithfully restated the permissive nature of the inference.

D. Curative instructions

• State v. Burkinshaw (quoting State v. LaPlante) supported the proposition that if prejudice is curable, the trial justice must deliver a timely and effective instruction—precisely what occurred when the twin-sister medical record surfaced.

E. Amendments of pleadings and “sudden emergency”

• Catucci v. Pacheco and Normandin v. Levine established the “liberal” posture toward amendments and the “great deference” owed to the trial justice’s Rule 15 decision.
• Harodite Industries, Inc. v. Warren Electric Corporation (quoting Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC v. Rossi) provided the controlling idea that Rule 15 permits amendment absent “extreme prejudice.”
• Lomastro v. Iacovelli (quoting Wachsberger v. Pepper) emphasized that delay alone is insufficient; the delay must cause “substantial prejudice.”
• Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit illustrated that even amendments “one day” before trial may be allowed where the opposing party cannot demonstrate extreme prejudice.

Notably, the Court did not definitively classify “sudden emergency” as an affirmative defense; it instead affirmed the trial justice’s pragmatic resolution: allow amendment and instruct the jury, because the factual theory (cut-off by a gray car prompting braking) was known for years and thus caused no cognizable prejudice.

F. Juror excusal mid-trial

• State v. Montero (quoting State v. Hazard) and State v. Berberian confirmed that juror-for-cause determinations are discretionary.
• Thornley v. Community College of Rhode Island underscored the reluctance to restrain a trial justice’s authority to excuse a juror mid-trial absent “clear abuse of discretion.”
• United States v. Johnson and United States v. Alexander were cited as persuasive federal analogs supporting excusal for practical reasons.
• Hazard also informed the prejudice analysis: removal is not reversible absent a showing of resulting prejudice.

The Court used these cases to reject the plaintiff’s theory that “cause” requires proof of bias. Scheduling and family obligations, the Court reasoned, may justify dismissal to avoid burdening the juror and to prevent deliberations from being rushed.

G. Supplemental jury instructions during deliberations

• Mangiarelli v. Town of Johnston (quoting Riley v. Stone) supplied the holistic standard: instructions are read as a whole and as an ordinary juror would understand them.
• State v. Martino (quoting State v. Collazo and State v. Gomes) established the duty to answer jurors’ “specific questions” and clarify central legal points concretely and unambiguously.

Applying these principles, the Court held the trial justice did exactly what due process requires: clarified that a finding of deficient retention may permit an inference the video would support the plaintiff, and that the inference is merely a factor for negligence—not “evidence of fault” by itself.

H. Preservation of legal error and Rule 59

• Amica Mutual Insurance Company v. Tashjian set the rule that legal errors in a jury-tried case must be presented to the trial justice in a motion for new trial; otherwise they cannot be raised on appeal.
• Mead v. Papa Razzi clarified that not every non-legal error must be itemized at the Rule 59 stage—highlighting that Galindez’s claim was different because it was an asserted error of law.
• State v. Mosley (quoting State v. Cahill), DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Company (quoting Boyers v. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc.), and State v. Wiggins (quoting State v. Hallenbeck) reinforced that issues must be properly articulated with supporting law in the trial court to be preserved.

These authorities drove the waiver ruling on the “common carrier heightened duty” instruction: Galindez neither preserved the claim in her new-trial motion nor supplied supporting case law when the trial justice directly requested it during the charge conference.

I. New-trial standard

• Armour v. Bader (quoting Baker v. Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island) provided the standard of review: affirm unless the trial justice overlooked/misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong, assuming the correct analysis was performed.

The Court relied on this framework to reject Galindez’s contention that the motion was denied on “procedural” grounds; the trial justice granted enlargement and then adjudicated the motion on the merits.

3.2. Legal Reasoning: How the Court Got There

A. Medical records: separating statutory “substitute testimony” from evidentiary impeachment

A central move in the Opinion is analytical categorization. Galindez treated § 9-19-27 as an all-purpose gateway for medical records. The Court instead treated § 9-19-27 as a targeted statute that makes certain medical bills/records admissible for enumerated purposes (fair/reasonable charges; necessity; diagnosis; prognosis; causation; disability/permanency). Because RIPTA used the record to impeach Galindez’s claim that she had no prior shoulder issues, the statutory pathway simply did not apply.

Having rejected the statutory framing, the Court applied the Rules of Evidence:

• Rule 803(4): the entries described symptoms and medical history pertinent to diagnosis/treatment, fitting the hearsay exception.
• Rule 901(a): authentication was satisfied when Galindez acknowledged she was treated by the referenced doctor on the referenced date—clearing the “low hurdle” described in O'Connor.

B. Spoliation: permissive inference instruction, with jury deciding intent and weight

The Court endorsed a spoliation instruction that (i) explains the inference is permitted but not required, (ii) situates spoliation “along a continuum of fault,” and (iii) assigns the jury the role of deciding whether destruction was intentional and what inference (if any) to draw. Importantly, the Court rebuffed the plaintiff’s characterization that the trial justice “failed” to give such an instruction—the record showed the opposite.

C. Amendment to add “sudden emergency”: prejudice, not timing alone, controls

Even though the amendment request arose “on the first day of trial,” the Court treated the dispositive inquiry as whether Galindez suffered “extreme prejudice.” Given years of discovery reflecting RIPTA’s consistent factual narrative (a gray car cut off the bus), the Court found notice and therefore no unfair surprise.

D. Juror excusal: practicality and deliberative integrity

The Court viewed the dismissal as a deliberation-management decision: allowing Juror 170 to remain risked either (i) burdening the juror, or (ii) pressuring the panel to rush deliberations to accommodate an artificial deadline. The plaintiff’s only articulated objection—that the juror seemed “sympathetic”—was deemed conjecture, not prejudice.

E. Supplemental instruction: answering the precise question without rewriting the law

The jury asked whether deficient video retention, by itself, was “evidence of fault” if the driver was not negligent. The trial justice’s supplemental instruction reframed spoliation properly: it may support an inference that the video would support plaintiff’s version, and the inference is only a factor the jury may consider in deciding negligence. The Supreme Court found this aligned with Martino and the non-conclusive inference principle reaffirmed in Threadgill.

F. Duty-of-care instruction: waiver and the discipline of issue preservation

The Opinion is also a procedural lesson: even potentially significant doctrinal points (e.g., whether a bus operator/common carrier owes a “heightened duty”) will not be reached where the litigant fails to preserve and support the claim at the correct procedural moments. The Court emphasized the trial justice specifically asked for supporting case law; counsel offered none, and then failed to raise the alleged legal error in the Rule 59 motion.

3.3. Impact: What This Opinion Likely Changes (and What It Reinforces)

A. Clarifies the boundary of § 9-19-27

The Opinion’s most concrete doctrinal clarification is negative: § 9-19-27 is not a universal authentication/foundation code for medical records. When records are offered for impeachment, parties should analyze admissibility under the Rules of Evidence rather than attempt to shoehorn the evidence into § 9-19-27 compliance.

B. Low-bar authentication is reaffirmed in a common trial context

The Court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s own testimony to authenticate the medical record underscores a practical trial point: authentication can be supplied by a witness’s acknowledgment that the document reflects their visit/treatment, leaving disputes about meaning or weight to the jury.

C. Spoliation: reinforces permissive inference and jury’s role

The case reinforces that spoliation is not a shortcut to liability. Even if a jury finds deficient retention, the inference is not mandatory and does not substitute for proof of negligence. This is particularly salient for routinely overwritten video systems: the instruction approved here invites jurors to weigh intent, explanations, timing, and the likely content of the missing evidence.

D. Rule 15 amendments: “eleventh hour” is not enough without prejudice

The Court’s application of Harodite Industries, Inc. v. Warren Electric Corporation and Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit signals that Rhode Island trial courts retain broad latitude to allow late amendments—especially when discovery has telegraphed the underlying facts for years. Litigants opposing late amendments should build a record of concrete, trial-specific prejudice (lost witnesses, foreclosed expert work, new factual investigation, etc.), not just timing objections.

E. Juror management: excusal need not be bias-based

By treating childcare/family scheduling as legitimate “cause,” the Opinion may be cited to support practical juror excusals aimed at protecting deliberation quality and juror welfare, without turning every excusal dispute into a bias inquiry.

F. Preservation doctrine: a strong reminder for civil trial practice

The Opinion is a template for how waiver arises in multiple ways: inadequate briefing, failure to cite the record, failure to supply legal authority when requested, and failure to raise legal error in a Rule 59 motion. Future appellants can expect strict enforcement of these preservation rules.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Authentication (Rule 901(a)): Proof that a document is what the proponent claims it is. The threshold is modest; a witness’s acknowledgment can be enough, with the jury deciding what the document ultimately proves.
• Hearsay exception for treatment (Rule 803(4)): Patient statements about symptoms/history made for diagnosis or treatment are often admissible because patients have strong incentives to be accurate.
• § 9-19-27: A statute that makes certain medical bills/records admissible for specific substantive purposes (charges, necessity, diagnosis, prognosis, causation, disability), typically as a substitute for live medical testimony—its scope is not unlimited.
• Spoliation: Destruction or failure to preserve evidence. The remedy often is a permissive inference that the missing evidence would be unfavorable to the destroyer; it is not automatic “fault.”
• Sudden emergency doctrine: If a person faces an unexpected situation requiring immediate action not caused by their own conduct, the reasonableness of their response is judged in light of that emergency.
• Rule 15 amendment: Courts liberally allow changes to pleadings, but may deny if the opponent shows substantial or extreme prejudice.
• Raise-or-waive / preservation: To appeal an issue, a party must clearly raise it, support it with law and record citations, and (for legal errors in a jury case) present it in a motion for new trial.

5. Conclusion

Galindez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority is an affirmance that functions as both doctrinal clarification and procedural warning. Substantively, it clarifies that § 9-19-27 does not control medical records used purely for impeachment and that Rule 803(4) plus modest Rule 901(a) authentication can suffice—sometimes through the witness’s own testimony. It also reinforces mainstream Rhode Island spoliation law: the adverse inference is permissive, fact-dependent, and ultimately for the jury.

Procedurally, the Opinion underscores that appellate outcomes often turn less on the perceived equities of a trial and more on disciplined preservation: developing arguments, citing the record, providing supporting authority when requested, and raising legal errors in a Rule 59 motion. The combined message is clear: Rhode Island appellate review is rigorous on both evidentiary doctrine and the mechanics of issue preservation.