Section 851(b) Is Satisfied by an On-the-Record Admission at the Plea Hearing; No Separate Sentencing Hearing Is Required Absent a Request (in an Anders Appeal)

Case: United States v. Naajeh Torres (Nos. 25-2842 & 25-2865)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date: July 1, 2026
Disposition: Not precedential; Anders motion granted; judgments affirmed.

1. Introduction

Naajeh Sayyid Torres, while on federal supervised release for a prior drug conviction, sold cocaine and methamphetamine to undercover agents and was charged with three counts of distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The Government filed an enhancement information under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) based on Torres’s prior federal drug conviction. Torres pleaded guilty, admitted the prior conviction, and was also charged with (and admitted) a Grade A violation of supervised release for committing new crimes.

On appeal, appointed counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there were no nonfrivolous issues. Torres did not file a pro se merits brief but did file a pro se notice of appeal asserting his career-offender sentence was “excessive.”

The case presented three core appellate questions: (1) whether counsel’s Anders submission was adequate; (2) whether Torres’s guilty pleas and sentences were legally sound; and (3) whether any arguable issue existed concerning the enhancement procedure under 21 U.S.C. § 851(b) and Torres’s career-offender designation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed. Applying Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) and the framework of United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001), the court held:

• Counsel’s Anders brief was adequate because it identified potential issues and explained why each was frivolous.
• The district court had jurisdiction over both the new federal drug prosecution and the supervised-release revocation.
• Torres’s guilty plea complied with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
• The drug sentence (a downward variance to 180 months from a career-offender guideline range of 262–327 months) was procedurally and substantively reasonable under United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), with additional reliance on Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
• Any challenge to the career-offender predicate based on overbreadth of state drug law was foreclosed by United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023).
• Torres’s unpreserved § 851(b) argument failed on plain-error review under United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526 (3d Cir. 2024) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) because the district court advised him of the information at the plea hearing and he admitted the prior conviction; the statute did not require a separate, unrequested hearing.
• The supervised-release revocation and consecutive 18-month sentence were procedurally and substantively reasonable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
  Established the procedure permitting appointed counsel to withdraw when an appeal is wholly frivolous, while ensuring the court independently reviews the record to protect the defendant’s right to counsel.
• United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001)
  Supplied the Third Circuit’s two-step review: (1) adequacy of the Anders brief; (2) independent review for nonfrivolous issues. The panel also invoked Youla’s limitation that, if the Anders brief is adequate, the court may “confine” review to the record portions identified by counsel.
• McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988)
  Provided the definition of “frivolous” as lacking any basis in law or fact.
• Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988)
  Cited for the appellate court’s obligation to conduct plenary review to determine whether any nonfrivolous issues exist.
• United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022) and United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2000)
  Used to articulate what an adequate Anders brief must do: identify potentially appealable issues and explain why they are frivolous.
• Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
  Anchored the constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea (knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of trial rights).
• United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)
  Provided the Third Circuit’s framework for procedural and substantive reasonableness review of sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
• Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) and United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2008)
  Cited to support the panel’s conclusion that Torres’s below-guidelines sentence could be treated as presumptively reasonable against his claim that it was too high (Liddell supplying the quoted extension of Rita’s logic).
• United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023)
  Foreclosed Torres’s argument that a state drug conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) merely because the state drug schedule may be broader than federal law.
• United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526 (3d Cir. 2024) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)
  Provided the plain-error framework for Torres’s unpreserved § 851(b) claim.
• United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 900 (2025)
  Used as a contrast case: Guyton involved a district court “disregard[ing]” § 851(b) by not giving the defendant the chance to affirm or deny the alleged prior conviction. Here, by contrast, Torres was advised at the plea hearing and admitted the conviction.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The Anders inquiry: adequacy plus independent review

The panel applied L.A.R. 109.2(a) through Youla’s two-part test. It found counsel’s submission adequate because it: (i) canvassed the record for potentially appealable issues (jurisdiction, plea validity, sentencing reasonableness), and (ii) explained why each lacked arguable merit under governing law. With that threshold met, the court limited its detailed review to the topics counsel flagged, consistent with Youla.

B. Plea validity and jurisdiction

The court quickly disposed of jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3237(a) for the drug case, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e)(3) for revocation. It then reviewed the change-of-plea colloquy for compliance with Boykin and Rule 11: competence, understanding of charges and maximum penalties, advisement of trial rights, confirmation of voluntariness, and factual basis.

C. Sentencing: procedural and substantive reasonableness

For the new drug sentence, the district court calculated the career-offender guideline range (262–327 months) under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(1), then varied downward to 180 months based on individualized mitigating factors (remorse; prior offenses non-violent; youthful timing). The panel held this satisfied Tomko (correct calculation + meaningful § 3553(a) consideration) and was substantively reasonable under Tomko’s “no reasonable sentencing court” formulation.

For the supervised-release violation, the panel emphasized: correct advisory range for a Grade A violation (18–24 months) under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), consideration of the revocation factors via 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), and the permissibility (and guideline-consistency) of a consecutive sentence to address breach of trust.

D. Career-offender predicate overbreadth argument foreclosed by Lewis

Torres asserted his prior state drug conviction should not count as a “controlled substance offense” because the state statute covered more substances or conduct than federal law. The panel deemed the argument frivolous because United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2023) held that this mismatch is irrelevant for U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) in the Third Circuit.

E. The § 851(b) issue: no separate, unrequested hearing required when the defendant admits the conviction on the record

The opinion’s most case-specific contribution is its handling of Torres’s newly raised 21 U.S.C. § 851(b) complaint. On plain-error review (Dorsey applying Olano), the court concluded there was no error because:

• § 851(b) requires that the court, after conviction but before sentencing, inquire whether the defendant affirms or denies the prior conviction and inform him that unraised challenges may be waived.
• The district court advised Torres of the § 851 information at the change-of-plea hearing, and Torres admitted the prior conviction there.
• The panel read § 851 as not mandating “a separate, unrequested hearing,” distinguishing United States v. Guyton, where the defendant was not given the chance to affirm or deny.
• Even assuming some procedural imperfection, Torres could not satisfy Olano step three (prejudice): he did not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome, particularly given the prior conviction’s apparent fit within “serious drug felony” and “felony drug offense” definitions under 21 U.S.C. § 802(58) and § 802(44), which drive enhancements under § 841(b)(1)(B) and (C).

3.3 Impact

Although labeled “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is practically important in three recurring appellate contexts:

• Anders practice: It reinforces the Third Circuit’s expectation that an Anders brief must be issue-spotting plus explanation (Langley/Marvin), after which the court may focus its review (Youla).
• § 851(b) administration: The opinion signals that, at least on plain-error review, an on-the-record advisement and admission during the plea colloquy can satisfy § 851(b) without a separate sentencing-stage hearing—so long as the defendant is actually given the opportunity to affirm/deny (distinguishing Guyton).
• Career-offender litigation: It illustrates that state-law “overbreadth” challenges to controlled-substance predicates remain nonstarters in the Third Circuit after Lewis, narrowing the field of potentially viable guideline challenges in Anders cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anders brief: A filing by appointed defense counsel stating the appeal has no nonfrivolous issues, paired with a brief identifying possible issues and explaining why they fail; the appellate court must independently check the record (Anders; Youla).
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court calculated the Guidelines correctly and considered the statutory factors; substantive reasonableness asks whether the final sentence is within the range of rational outcomes (Tomko).
• Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A guideline status that sharply increases the advisory range when a defendant has qualifying prior felony convictions (often drug or violent felonies) and commits a new qualifying offense.
• § 851 enhancement: A statutory mechanism requiring the Government to file an information to seek higher statutory penalties based on prior convictions (§ 851(a)), and requiring the court to ask the defendant to affirm or deny those convictions (§ 851(b)).
• Plain error (Olano): If an issue wasn’t preserved below, the defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that is clear, (3) that affected substantial rights (usually prejudice), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.
• Supervised release “breach of trust”: Revocation punishments focus less on the new crime itself and more on violating the court’s trust by breaking supervision conditions; guidelines often recommend consecutive terms for that reason (U.S.S.G. § 7B, introductory comment).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Naajeh Torres is a straightforward Anders affirmance that nonetheless highlights a useful procedural point: where a defendant is advised of a § 851 information and affirmatively admits the prior conviction on the record at the plea hearing, § 851(b) does not require a separate, unrequested hearing before sentencing—particularly under plain-error review. The decision also reiterates that (1) Lewis forecloses certain state-drug overbreadth attacks on career-offender predicates in the Third Circuit, and (2) downward-variant sentences supported by individualized § 3553(a) reasoning will be difficult to disturb on appeal under Tomko’s deferential standards.