Section 844(i) Qualifies as “Arson” (and Thus a Career-Offender Crime of Violence) Under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2)

1. Introduction

United States v. Quintin Ferguson (7th Cir. Mar. 17, 2025) addresses a recurring federal sentencing question: whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §844(i)—maliciously damaging or destroying (or attempting to do so) by fire or explosives property used in or affecting interstate commerce—counts as “arson” for purposes of the career-offender guideline, U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(a).

The issue mattered because U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2) lists “arson” as a “crime of violence.” If Ferguson’s §844(i) conviction qualified as “arson,” and he had the necessary predicate record, he could be sentenced as a career offender, substantially increasing his guideline range.

Ferguson’s core argument was definitional: even if §844(i) looks like arson, it allegedly is not generic arson because it does not require, when the defendant burns his own property, proof of an insurance-fraud purpose—a limitation associated with Model Penal Code §220.1 (1962).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §844(i) is a conviction for “arson” as that term appears in U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2).

Applying the (assumed) requirement to use a generic-offense definition and the categorical approach, the court reiterated its own definition of generic arson—“the intentional or malicious burning of any property”—and concluded that §844(i) fits comfortably within it. The court rejected importing an insurance-fraud qualifier and supported its generic definition with a historical survey of state arson laws at the times most relevant to the Sentencing Guidelines (1987 adoption; 1989 career-offender addition).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Seventh Circuit’s existing “generic arson” definition

  • United States v. Misleveck, 735 F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 2013): Adopted a broad generic arson definition encompassing “the intentional or malicious burning of any property.” This case supplied the controlling circuit definition that the panel reaffirmed.
  • United States v. Gamez, 89 F.4th 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2024): Reiterated the same generic definition. The Ferguson panel treated Gamez and Misleveck as settled circuit law, making Ferguson’s proposed insurance limitation an attempt to narrow an already-established baseline.
  • Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 589–91 (7th Cir. 2013): Described arson in terms of “willful or malicious burning.” The court cited Brown to show consistency across Seventh Circuit formulations and to emphasize mens rea (willful/malicious) rather than ownership or insurance motive.

2) Supreme Court’s “generic offense” methodology (borrowed from burglary cases)

  • Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990): The foundation for defining an enumerated offense (“burglary”) generically when a federal sentencing statute uses the label without defining it. Taylor also supplies the key methodological point that the inquiry is element-based (the “categorical approach”), not fact-based.
    Influence in Ferguson: The panel accepted the parties’ framing—define “generic arson” and compare it to §844(i)’s elements—while noting that Guidelines cross-references might make that step unnecessary in another case.
  • Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016): Reinforces that the categorical approach compares statutory elements, not underlying conduct, and polices when courts may look beyond the statute.
    Influence in Ferguson: The decision is cited as part of the Supreme Court’s burglary line illuminating how to identify “generic” content by reference to prevailing state-law definitions at the relevant time.
  • United States v. Stitt, 586 U.S. 27 (2018): Clarified “generic burglary” by canvassing state statutes and concluding that, at the relevant time, many states treated vehicles adapted for overnight accommodation as “burglary” locations.
    Influence in Ferguson: Ferguson borrows Stitt’s state-law survey technique. The Seventh Circuit explicitly modeled its Appendix on Stitt’s appendix-like state survey and used the same historical lens to determine what “arson” commonly meant when the Guidelines were adopted/expanded.

3) Begay and the Model Penal Code argument rejected

  • Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008): Mentioned the Model Penal Code in discussing what kinds of risky crimes the ACCA’s residual clause was “getting at,” in the course of holding DUI not covered.
    Influence in Ferguson: Ferguson relied on Begay’s reference to Model Penal Code §220.1 (1962) to argue for an insurance-fraud limiter when the defendant burns his own property. The Seventh Circuit rejected that move: Begay did not define “generic arson,” and the Court’s MPC reference was illustrative of risk, not a choice of MPC arson elements as the federal generic definition.

4) Non-case authorities and cross-references supporting “arson” treatment

  • Model Penal Code §220.1 (1962): Treated as one historical definition, but not controlling for “generic arson.”
  • John Poulos, The Metamorphosis of the Law of Arson, 51 Missouri L. Rev. 295, 446 (1986): Used to support the proposition that by the late 1980s states had widely moved beyond the common-law “property of another” limitation.
  • Guidelines and statutory cross-references:
    • U.S.S.G. Appendix A (referencing §844(i) to U.S.S.G. §2K1.4, captioned “Arson; Property Damage by Use of Explosives”)
    • 18 U.S.C. §3295 (treating §844(i) as an “arson offense”)
    The court suggested these might independently support labeling §844(i) as “arson,” but ultimately proceeded on the parties’ “generic arson” assumption.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Framing the inquiry (generic offense + categorical approach): The panel assumed (because the parties assumed) that “arson” in §4B1.2(a)(2) refers to generic arson in the Taylor sense. It then applied the categorical approach: compare the elements of §844(i) to the elements of generic arson.
  2. Existing circuit definition controls: The Seventh Circuit already defines generic arson as “the intentional or malicious burning of any property” (Misleveck; Gamez; Brown). On that definition, §844(i)—which requires malicious destruction/attempted destruction “by means of fire or an explosive” of covered property—fits.
  3. Rejecting Ferguson’s insurance-fraud limitation: Ferguson tried to narrow generic arson by importing Model Penal Code §220.1’s special rule for burning one’s own property (insurance fraud). The panel rejected this on two grounds:
    • Doctrinal: Begay’s MPC reference was not a holding on arson’s generic elements.
    • Historical/common-usage: Taylor’s method looks to the “generic sense” used in most states at the relevant time. The court conducted that inquiry for arson and found that, by 1987/1989, most states did not require either (a) burning “property of another” or (b) an insurance-fraud purpose when burning one’s own property.
  4. State-law survey as confirmatory evidence: Echoing Stitt, the court canvassed state statutes and found:
    • By 1987, no states limited arson to burning only the property of another (citing Poulos).
    • Only two states (North Dakota and Wisconsin) followed the Model Penal Code’s insurance-fraud limitation for burning one’s own property.
    • Many states criminalized burning one’s own property in broader circumstances (e.g., risk to occupants, risk to persons, risk to other property).
    The Appendix lists state arson statutes in force in 1987, reinforcing that the broad “malicious burning” conception was dominant when the Guidelines’ relevant language was adopted.

C. Impact

1) Career-offender consequences in the Seventh Circuit: The holding squarely supports treating §844(i) as “arson” under §4B1.2(a)(2), making it easier for the government to establish career-offender status where §844(i) is the instant offense (or potentially a predicate, depending on guideline application and timing). Defendants can no longer credibly argue (in this circuit) that generic arson excludes burning one’s own property absent an insurance-fraud motive.

2) Reinforcement of a methodology: Ferguson extends beyond arson: it confirms that when an enumerated offense in federal sentencing law is undefined, courts may resolve disputes by (a) using the categorical approach and (b) identifying “generic” meaning by surveying state statutes at the relevant historical moment—an approach explicitly patterned on United States v. Stitt.

3) Reduced force of Model Penal Code-based narrowing arguments: The opinion signals skepticism toward treating the Model Penal Code as the default “generic” definition when it is not the majority approach among states at the relevant time. Litigants relying on MPC idiosyncrasies (like the insurance proviso) face an uphill battle without strong evidence that the MPC reflected dominant state practice.

4) Potential inter-circuit and guideline-interpretation implications: Other circuits confronting “arson” in enumerated-offense clauses may find Ferguson’s state-law compilation persuasive, particularly because it tracks the Supreme Court’s Taylor/Stitt method. Additionally, the court’s aside about Appendix A, §2K1.4, and 18 U.S.C. §3295 hints at an alternative argument: that guideline and statutory cross-references can sometimes resolve the label question without a full generic-offense reconstruction—an issue future litigants may develop.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Career offender (U.S.S.G. §4B1.1)
A guideline status that increases the advisory sentencing range for defendants with certain current convictions and at least two prior felony convictions for qualifying drug offenses or “crimes of violence.”
Crime of violence (U.S.S.G. §4B1.2)
A guideline definition that includes certain “enumerated offenses” (like “arson”) and, in other contexts, offenses meeting force-based definitions. Here, “arson” matters because it is specifically listed.
Enumerated offense
A crime named in the guideline or statute (e.g., “arson,” “burglary”) rather than described by its elements. When undefined, courts often determine its “generic” meaning.
Generic definition
A court-crafted definition intended to capture the core version of an enumerated offense as commonly defined across jurisdictions at the relevant time. It prevents sentencing enhancements from turning on idiosyncratic labels in any one jurisdiction.
Categorical approach
The method of comparing the statutory elements of the conviction offense to the elements of the generic offense—without looking at what the defendant actually did in the particular case.
Mens rea: “maliciously”
A culpable mental state requiring wrongful intent or a conscious disregard of a known risk, depending on context. The panel treated §844(i)’s “malice” as comfortably within the “intentional or malicious” mens rea used in its generic arson definition.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Quintin Ferguson cements in the Seventh Circuit that 18 U.S.C. §844(i) is “arson” for purposes of the career-offender guideline’s enumerated offense clause, U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(2). The court reaffirmed its broad generic arson definition—the intentional or malicious burning of any property—and refused to graft onto it a Model Penal Code insurance-fraud limitation for burning one’s own property. Grounding the definition in a Taylor/Stitt-style historical survey, the opinion strengthens the role of majority state practice (not the MPC) in fixing generic meaning and expands the practical reach of career-offender treatment for federal arson cases within the circuit.